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BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

PROFESSOR SIR ALFRED ZIMMERN is Montague Burton Professor of International Relations, since 1930; Director of the Geneva School of International Studies. Author of *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918–35* (1936); *The Third British Commonwealth* (1926), and other works.

THE HON. HAROLD NICOLSON, C.M.G., National Labour M.P. for West Leicester, formerly in the Diplomatic Service; was Counsellor of H.M. Embassy in Berlin 1927–29. Author of *Lord Carnock, Peacemaking 1919, Curzon: The Last Phase,* and other works.

MR. H. WICKHAM STEED is Lecturer on Central European History at King's College, University of London. Former Foreign Correspondent, Foreign Editor and Editor of *The Times.* His recent books include *A Way to Social Peace, Vital Peace: A Study of Risks* and *The Doom of the Hapsburgs.* He has recently returned from a visit to the United States.

MR. CLEMENT JONES, C.B., is a Director of the Booth Steamship Co. Ltd., and other companies. He was Secretary to Lord Curzon's Shipping Control Committee, Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet and a Secretary to the British Delegation at the Peace Conference.

THE DECLINE OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS[1]

PROFESSOR SIR ALFRED ZIMMERN

WHAT do we mean when we speak of standards in connection with public affairs? A standard is something that stands, or is fixed, as a rule or a measure or a model. But it is not simply a rule or a measure or a model set up in emptiness or in the clouds. It is a rule that is commonly observed, a measure that is a yardstick for ordinary use, a model that is imitated in daily life. Herein lies the difference between a standard and an ideal. When we speak of standards of conduct we are thinking of the men and women that we see around us, of the things which they habitually do or refrain from doing, of what, as the saying goes, "is done" and "not done." The same holds good when we speak of the standards of public life: we think, in this connection, not of the prophet or the saint or the crusader, but of the ordinary working member of the House of Commons or of a Town Council or of any of the infinite number of committees of which we have each one of us the good fortune to be members.

How do standards in public life come into existence, and how are they maintained? They come into existence through the growth of what we call, or rather what the French call and what we have adopted for want of a better name, esprit de corps: the sociologists, I suppose, would use some more formal expression, such as group-consciousness. And what is esprit de corps? It is an enlargement of the sense of loyalty and solidarity which has its historical origins and its psychological roots in the blood-relationship, in the family and the clan. An enlargement, I say, but also an adaptation to the circumstances of public life and also, at its highest, an intensification. The esprit de corps of the Athenians as described in Pericles' Funeral Speech was more intense and more powerful than the feeling entertained by the average Athenian for his family or his tribe or his parish. But, whether weakened or strengthened by its transference from the private to public plane, esprit de corps, as we in this country know it, always

[1] Address at a meeting at Chatham House on October 26th, 1937; Professor J. L. Brierly, O.B.E., B.C.L., in the Chair.

remains in touch with the sphere of personal relations. It does not involve the abandonment of private life and its habits and affections, a clean cut, so to speak, between the home and the committee room, but rather, as Burke put it in a phrase that cannot be bettered, the "bringing of the dispositions that are lovely in private life into the service and conduct of the Commonwealth." There have indeed been instances in history where the clean cut between the public and the private has been made. The corps of Janissaries, composed of boys taken early from their homes, is perhaps the most striking case on record. It was neither a repository of private virtue nor of esprit de corps as we have just defined: for a Janissary would unthinkingly obey orders which no Englishman, whether in uniform or not, would execute, in the very improbable event of any English commanding officer being so much out of touch with current English standards as to issue them.

This leads us on to the second part of our question. How is esprit de corps, when once it has been created, maintained? The answer, in a word, is—through institutions. Institutions are at once symbols of the continuity of the public life of the community and agencies for the effective use of its moral resources. We might compare the House of Commons or Chatham House to a bank. Every member deposits there his little capital of good citizenship, of willingness to render public service within the terms of the charter of membership. The institution lives and derives its credit from the combined contributions of its members, and thus it is enabled, on occasion, when any individual member is in difficulties, to allow him an overdraft—that is to say, to bring the combined moral resources of the community into play in order to bring a laggard or a weakling up to the common standard. Institutions thus do more than carry on public business. They train and develop the sense of social responsibility and they are powerful agencies of restraint. They exert a sanction which is all the more effective because it is not written down in black and white. We dare not behave worse than is expected of us. Expected of us by whom? By the other members of the gang to whom we are tied by the use of the first person plural, whether the gang be at Westminster, or in St. James's Square, or in those cosmopolitan districts of Chicago where investigators into the behaviour of gangs have found the flower of loyalty growing up in the most unpromising of soils. For wherever there is a gang there is some kind of a standard.

Is there any standard of behaviour in international relations?

The title chosen for this paper would seem to imply that there is : for if there is no standard, how can we say that it has declined? But if there is, and we shall examine into this a little later, it is certainly not a standard set up by an international or world society, and maintained, in the way just described, by international or world institutions. The first thing that any sociologist, landing on this globe from another planet, would note is that when men use the first person plural about political or social matters, whether in Europe, Asia, Africa or America, they are never speaking of mankind as a whole, unless, by some extraordinary chance, our visitor should run into Mr. H. G. Wells. There is, in fact, at present no world community in existence. There has as yet been no enlargement of esprit de corps from lesser groups to the world as a whole. And in the absence of a world society, and of the morale which such a society would carry with it, there cannot yet be world institutions. There are no doubt boards, and committees and conferences functioning in the field of international relations : apart from bodies set up by treaty, such as the League of Nations, the Universal Postal Union, and the Permanent Court of International Justice, there are several hundred non-official international bodies; they are periodically enumerated in a handbook published at Geneva. But with rare exceptions, of which the Boy Scouts Organisation is perhaps the most notable—because in that case an esprit de corps of a very special quality was ready in abundance for enlargement—these bodies are rightly so called, for they are bodies without a soul, without the binding power and the driving force of an overmastering common purpose. The League of Nations is, of course, a standing conference, with a number of other standing conferences subordinate to it, the so-called technical organisations. No experienced statesman has ever claimed for it that, at its present stage, it was anything more than an agency of co-operation between States, a means of drawing the last ounce of practical usefulness at any given moment out of the willingness of States, and particularly of the Great Powers, to act together for the time being. What it was hoped to do, in other words, was to use the self-interest of the individual States as a lever for common action, much in the same way as a certain latter-day follower of Bentham devised a system in his country cottage by which water was supplied to the whole household through an apparatus in the visitors' bathroom : in turning on what he thought was an exceedingly stiff tap for his own private use the guest was unconsciously ministering to a common purpose. An excellent working arrangement, whether

in Hampshire or at Geneva ! But a working arrangement between persons animated by a number of different purposes is not a basis for institutional life. There is all the difference in the world between juxtaposition and association, between a discordant choir of " I's " and a unison of " We's."

But if there is as yet no world esprit de corps, no sense of world citizenship, expressed and sustained by world institutions, why is it that we are disconcerted, to use no stronger expression, by such events as have taken place in Spain and China? Why is it that we are surprised that such things could possibly happen? Why in the world should they not happen? Did we think that human nature was incapable of such behaviour? If so, we have forgotten the lessons of history, not only ancient, but modern. There are plenty of precedents for the kind of events which have taken place both in Spain and China: what is new about them is not the aim and temper of their perpetrators, but the scale and method and system of their operations. The revolutionary violence of the Spanish Civil War is true to the type of such outbreaks and can be paralleled almost word for word in the classical account of the troubles in Corfu twenty-three hundred years ago, where the flames were fanned, as to-day, by the intervention of stronger Powers from outside. " The cause of all these evils," writes Thucydides, " was the love of power originating in avarice and ambition and the party-spirit engendered by them when men are fairly embarked on a contest. For the leaders on either side used specious names, the one party professing to uphold civic institutions and the equality of the many, the other the wisdom of the aristocracy, while they made public interest to which in name they were devoted really their prize. Striving in every way to overcome each other, they committed the most atrocious crimes. And yet even these were surpassed by the magnitude of their revenges which they pursued to the very utmost, neither party observing any definite limits either of justice or public expediency, but both alike making the caprice of the moment their law. . . . Neither faction cared for religion, but any fair pretence which succeeded in effecting some odious purpose, was greatly lauded, and citizens who were of neither party fell a prey to both. Either they were disliked because they were aloof, or men were jealous of their surviving." [1]

As for the Japanese operations in China, do they not simply illustrate what has always happened in history when new weapons have come into play? Have the Japanese behaved worse than

[1] Thucydides, iii. 82.

the generals in the Thirty Years War, which left Germany desolate for generations? Indeed, far less Chinese lives have been lost in the bombing raids which were deplored in the resolution passed at the recent Meeting at the Albert Hall [1] than were lost through the negligence of the Chinese authorities themselves in the Yangtze valley floods of a few years ago. And if it be said that we must not compare devastation caused by Nature with deliberate violence set in motion by human command, then let us turn from China to a country from which, owing to the prickings of our consciences, we have of late years studiously averted our eyes, Armenia. For sheer wholesale destruction of human life the palm still belongs to a certain Turkish Minister of the Interior, who on September 15th, 1915, issued the following order:

> "To the Police Office at Aleppo. It has already been reported that by order of the Committee the Government have determined completely to exterminate the Armenians living in Turkey. Those who refuse to obey this order cannot be regarded as friends of the Government. Regardless of women, children and invalids, and however deplorable the method of destruction may seem, an end is to be put to their existence without paying any heed to feeling or conscience. Minister for the Interior, Tala'at." [2]

According to the careful calculations of a German authority, who was in Asia Minor at the time, the total number of persons who lost their lives as a result of this order was about one million, a figure that would have staggered a Nebuchadnezzar or an Attila with their primitive methods for dealing with populations that they wished put out of the way.

Nevertheless, these recent happenings have both surprised and shocked us. And if we ask ourselves why, surely the answer is, not that we ever believed human nature to be incapable of such excesses, but that we had been confident that, in this twentieth century, there existed restraints powerful enough to prevent their taking place. It is not the revelation of human wickedness so much as the failure of the restraints in which we have placed reliance which has brought these events right home to us. We had thought that we were living in a civilised world in which sufficient precautions had been devised to keep in check, not only the criminal element in the make-up of each one of us, but also the criminal margin of mankind as a whole. Hence our consternation when we see the devil walking abroad, positively

[1] Organised on October 5th, 1937, by the *News Chronicle* to express united opinion against "Japan's War on Civilians."

[2] See Nansen, *Armenia and the Near East* (1928), p. 307.

parading his hoofs and horns, and even receiving the congratulations of one of the joint authors of the Lateran Treaty.

The real question before us, then, is why we imagined that such restraints existed: for if there is no world society, it is not reasonable to expect that there should be a system of social restraints in the international sphere. Restraints cannot operate in a vacuum. They are set in motion and maintained by human agencies. What are the agencies that we imagined would maintain a standard or standards effective enough to prevent the occurrence of such events as we have seen? There are, I think, three such agencies at the back of our minds, on each of which or on all of which combined we vaguely relied for preserving the fundamental decencies in the field of international relations. These three are Christianity, international law and our own English standard of behaviour. Each of these three agencies has its own standard, and he would be a bold man who would attempt to set down in black and white a sort of composite code which would be an amalgamation of them all. Nevertheless all three of them, whether separately or in combination, have exerted a powerful influence over the conduct of international affairs in the last few centuries. To-day we have been awakened with a start to discover that these agencies are no longer effective: that, so far as international relations are concerned, they belong to a by-gone age. The realisation of this fact is the chief lesson to be drawn from the present crisis. Standards which we have been accustomed to rely upon unthinkingly as exercising a restraining influence on the behaviour of governments and peoples have been suddenly revealed to us, if I may appropriate a famous phrase from the history of diplomacy, to be "laths painted to look like iron." Where, then, are we to look for such restraints in the future? Or must we face a perpetuation of the existing chaos? And, if so, how long can our boasted civilisation survive? That is the issue implicit in what has happened in Spain and China.

Let us examine more closely into these three agencies which have failed us. "In the revolution of thought through which we are living," remarked the Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford in his inaugural lecture a few months ago, "the profoundest and most disturbing element is the breakdown of that ethical system which, since the days of Constantine, has imposed upon European culture at least the semblance of moral unity." Until yesterday Europe was a Christian continent. To-day it is so no longer. Although the greater part of Europe is still divided into parishes, although in most countries there is still in every village a church

in which regular worship is held, Christianity has ceased to be the religion, even the professed religion, of the majority. It has become once more what it was before the days of Constantine, the religion of a minority, perhaps even of a small minority.

No doubt during the sixteen centuries that elapsed between the conversion of Constantine and the present-day decline, whether temporary or prolonged, of Christianity the world was at no time governed in the spirit of the Christian Gospel. The Kingdom of Heaven is not of this world, and the effort to bring the Christian ideal to bear upon the complex and refractory material of public affairs can never achieve more than a partial success. Between the things of Cæsar and the things of God there is a perpetual tension which it is beyond the power of statesmanship, even under the best conceivable conditions, to resolve. In the day when war and poverty have been eliminated from public affairs, and social conflicts have been assuaged within the bosom of a classless society, the tax collector will still remain as a symbol of the gulf that exists, in the nature of things, between the political and the spiritual order, between the best of Commonwealths and a congregation of Saints.

Let us also frankly admit that official Christianity, in its various guises, was far from representing the best possible working adjustment between the Gospel and the society of the time. Terrible crimes, as it seems to us to-day, have been committed in the name of Christianity, and committed by men who believed that they were acting conformably with the precepts of the faith. Nevertheless, when we have made allowances for all this, when we have placed the massacre of the Albigenses beside the massacre of the Armenians and the burning of the heretics beside the bombing of Nanking and Canton, the fact remains that Christianity, so long as it remained a living force in Europe, did set a standard of conduct both in domestic public affairs and in international relations. The two were indeed for this purpose indistinguishable, since what men called " our common Christendom "—the use of the first person plural came in those days naturally to the lips—was a realm transcending the territories of individual rulers. Christian peoples were thus bound together not simply in a common allegiance to an ideal, but in common acceptance of an authority to which kings, statesmen and political thinkers paid homage. There was indeed much dispute both before and after the Reformation as to the seat of that authority, and as to the earthly personage in whom it was or should be vested. But no one, Luther no more than Hildebrand, and Bodin

no more than Grotius, doubted that there was such an authority or questioned its binding character.

Thus it was that to this Christian standard there was applied the majestic name of law—a law that was recognised as transcending the regulations or enactments of local rulers, even after these had sought to increase their self-respect and to fortify their power by investing themselves in the mantle of sovereignty.

Let me illustrate this point by quoting two high authorities from our own country which we are accustomed to regard as having enjoyed an independent existence for very many centuries. "Of law," says Richard Hooker, the philosopher of Anglicanism, "there can be no less acknowledgment than that her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world." Two centuries later Blackstone, whom we do not associate in our minds with international relations, repeats the same doctrine in less sonorous tones.

"Man, considered as a creature [he says], must necessarily be subject to the laws of his Creator, for he is entirely a dependent being. . . . This will of his Maker is called the law of nature. . . . This law of nature being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries and at all times: no human laws are of any validity if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force and authority, mediately or immediately, from this original."

Behind this law there was, of course, a sanction. It was the sanction that we see so frequently depicted in the windows of cathedrals and parish churches, the sanction of eternal punishment. Indeed, Christian artists seem to have taken especial pleasure in depicting the great ones of the earth being subjected to pains and penalties far transcending anything contemplated by the authors of Article 16 of the Covenant.

The Christian standard in international relations has been steadily weakened during the last few generations. The so-called Family of Nations that is to-day so conspicuously divided consisted originally of the old Christian States of Europe for whose people the Christian law of nature and its traditions and sanctions were a living reality. It was only in 1856, when the Turkish Empire was received into the Family of Nations, that international law ceased to be a law between Christian States alone; and as late as 1880 Gladstone, in his address to the electors of Midlothian, accused his opponents of having dishonoured Great Britain in the eyes of Europe by filching the island of Cyprus in violation of the

Treaty of Paris which "formed part of the international law of Christendom." During the last half century, however, the expansion of the Family of Nations beyond the confines of Christendom has proceeded so rapidly and has been accepted as so natural that its ancient limits have passed out of men's minds. When Japan, after the Sino-Japanese war of 1875, was recognised as a Great Power and thus entered the Family of Nations, little or no thought was given to the fact that she stood quite outside the circle of the old Christendom. And, to come down to quite recent times, when Abyssinia was admitted to the League of Nations in 1923, it was for reasons wholly unconnected with the fact that she was a Christian State of very old standing.

It is only to-day that we are realising, in their full force, the effects of this progressive process of de-Christianisation. For a long time there was a vague belief that Christian standards, such as they were, would penetrate the newcomers, and that thus a new and larger unity would be brought about. This belief persisted even when Christian standards were clearly losing their authority within the older Christian States themselves. It was thought that these standards would retain sufficient vitality even when divorced from the religious system to which they owed their origin. We realise to-day that both these hopes have been disappointed. The non-Christian States have not been leavened by the Christian spirit and the momentum of the original Christian impulse is dying down in countries no longer Christian. Thus it has come about that when a ruler, whether in an old Christian country, such as Germany or Italy, or in a non-Christian country, such as Japan, is considering whether he should adopt a course of action plainly repugnant, not only to Christian teaching, but to the common usages of Christian governments, he does not at once put it aside as immoral or unthinkable. Rather he proceeds to ask himself a question which his predecessors would have shrunk even from conceiving, "Why not?" To this question, once it is put, neither his conscience nor his expert advisers give a convincing answer. The oracles of natural law are dumb. And so it comes about that what was yesterday unthinkable is to-day transported into the realm of political reality.

Let us now turn to the second of the traditional agencies of restraint, international law. As we have just seen, international law derived its title, as law, and its original authority from its connection with the Christian tradition of the law of nature. But this foundation has been increasingly undermined, and thus there has been a danger, of which students of the subject have been

aware at least since the eighteenth century, that the elaborate superstructure built upon it might be left dangerously in the air. Indeed, anyone coming fresh to the subject from other fields of study cannot help becoming aware of a permanent condition of *malaise* amongst international lawyers. It has been common form among them for a long time past for every successive treatise-writer to raise the question of the validity of the title of his subject and to answer it as best he can. The result of this prolonged rumination has been the increasing dominance of a more purely secular, not to say scientific, school of thought, the so-called positivists, the traditional view connecting international law with the law of nature being now generally discarded, except among Roman Catholic writers. " We know now-a-days," wrote the cautious Oppenheim in 1905, " that a law of nature does not exist. Just as the so-called natural philosophy had to give way to real natural science, so the law of nature had to give way to jurisprudence or the philosophy of the positive law. Only a positive law of nations can be a branch of the science of law." One cannot but sympathise with this movement for the modernisation of international law by bringing it into closer relations with the study of law in general. The ambiguity involved in the term " natural law " has caused endless confusion, and the world, whether learned or unlearned, would be well rid of it. But unfortunately when the international lawyers seek for a new basis for their study on the terra firma of positive fact, that is to say, in the actual conditions of international politics, they are laying themselves open to disappointment. For law, when it is distinguished from morality on the one hand and from the uniform workings of nature on the other, can only exist within a social framework. *Ubi ius ibi societas.* Where there is law there must be a society within which it is operative. " Law is not a commodity which can be produced by methods of mass-production," said our Chairman recently in rebuking the impatience of some of his less level-headed colleagues; " it is the conscience of a community expressing itself in rules of conduct appropriate to the conditions in which the members of the community have to live their common life." [1] But, as we saw a few moments ago, there is no such community in existence in the field of international relations.

The conclusion seems unescapable that positive international law, so-called, has no claim to the name of law. In breaking loose from its religious and ethical origins it has forfeited its ancient claim to the obedience of Christian governments and their peoples:

[1] *Acta Scandinavica Juris Gentium*, VII, i, p. 12.

its claim on the others has never been direct, but only derivative. Thus its hold over the Japanese depended, as Mr. Keynes would put it, on a double bluff. The Japanese were expected to respect international law because their Christian colleagues in the Family of Nations did so. And their Christian colleagues were expected to do so in virtue of a discarded theory based on a belief which had become extinct. Can we wonder that both in the East and in the West the bluff has been called? The marvel indeed is that this elaborate system, poised as it has been for generations past on no more than the slender foundations of custom and convenience, should have stood the strain so long. If we are inclined to be astonished that the Japanese should have taken it upon themselves in 1931 to violate three treaties and the Italians in 1935 to violate five, to be followed by a sixth in the spring of 1936, ought we not rather to look back with wonder on our own reaction to the German breach of only one treaty in 1914? It took time for the water to percolate through the dyke. But to-day it is clear to us all that the barriers are down.

No doubt the disaster has been both accelerated and magnified by the excessive demands that have been made since the War on a system inherently unstable and already dangerously weakened. It has been a great misfortune that, through the unwisdom of a relatively small group of politically-minded jurists—or should I rather say juridically trained politicians—the generous popular aspirations for a more just and stable world order should have become associated among the Continental democracies, and to a lesser degree in this country and the United States, with plans for the extension and systematisation of the body of rules known as international law.

Certainly the establishment of the rule of law in world affairs is a sound objective for present-day statesmanship: one might go further and say that it is the only sound objective. The same can be said of the familiar French slogan: *la Paix par le Droit*—Peace through Justice or Right. But those who have made themselves responsible for interpreting this objective in terms of the traditional international law have incurred a very heavy responsibility; for they have prevented the concentration of attention on the main issue, the creation of conditions which will make possible the growth of a true system of law, and the utilisation of such conditions as may at present exist as between particular peoples. And they have exposed the delicate system of inter-State etiquette or good manners, for that, in effect, is all that the traditional international law now is or can be, to a

strain that it was in no way fitted to bear. Thus they have brought discredit upon the Old Diplomacy and its processes whilst being powerless to provide it with a successor. They have enabled the venerable rule of the immunity of ambassadors—no doubt a rule smacking of privilege and of the *ancien régime*, but good enough in its way—to fall into desuetude without showing mankind the way to ensure the immunity of peoples.

The pre-War generation of international lawyers was careful to keep clear of such generous illusions. Intent on adjusting their technique to the actual condition in the chancelleries and in international politics, they left crusading to others. Louis Renault, the great French jurist who did so much to improve the processes of arbitration and conciliation, was never convinced of the advisability of making recourse to them compulsory. As early as 1877, four years after the formation of the International Institute of International Law, in which the confraternity has since foregathered, Albert Sorel took occasion, in a text-book written for students, to issue a warning against what he must already have recognised as an impending danger :

> " Do not [he said] proceed upon the assumption that there is now in existence a condition of law and order in the world on which you can proceed to erect a structure of institutions, world courts and the like. That way lies disaster. All that you will do, if you tread that path, is to destroy all that is best in the existing customs." [1]

Seldom has a prediction been more completely fulfilled !

Before leaving this subject I cannot avoid devoting a few words to the latest attempt on the part of certain international lawyers to extricate themselves from the dilemma in which they feel themselves to be placed. In the last few years there has emerged into prominence a school of writers, ingenious rather than profound, whom we may perhaps call pseudo-naturalists. They have laboured to erect a system of international law which has its roots neither in the old Christian tradition, which they do not share, nor in the social conditions of the present-day world, which, in so far as they pause from their labours to observe them, they recognise as not ripe for a true legal order on a world scale. Their system, which would not be worth mentioning here if it had not misled some enthusiasts into believing that it provided a new standard in world affairs, is simply an elaborate series of abstract propositions set up in the clouds. It is even further removed from concrete social reality than the abstractions

[1] *Précis du Droit des Gens* (1877), p. 449, by Albert Sorel and Funck-Brentano. The above is a rough paraphrase of the argument of this passage.

of their colleagues, the theoretical economists: for pure economic forces do exert a continuous force in society, however seldom their operation can be observed in an unobstructed form. But of the force exerted by the system of rules, to give them their correct title, norms, set forth in the writings of Professor Kelsen and his disciples there is no sign to be detected. Nor, to do them justice, do they make any such claim. All that they set out to do is to develop a technique. The world is free to use this technique as individuals are free to play chess. But these pseudo-naturalists do not attempt to explain, for they consider it none of their business, why the world of international politics has been becoming more and more disorderly just in the years when they have been elaborating their technique of order. Such studied indifference to reality seems, to say the least, a little out of place:

> "The East bowed low before the blast
> In patient deep disdain;
> She let the legions thunder past,
> And plunged in thought again."

But the Eastern Sages whom Matthew Arnold had in mind when he wrote these lines were not employing their meditations in drawing up rules for the behaviour of the legions and their governments.

I turn to the third agency which we vaguely think of as providing a standard in international relations. This is our own English code of behaviour. We tend to forget how great an influence our own standards have exerted in international politics in the past, particularly in the century between Waterloo and 1914. We also tend to forget, because it is rather painful to remember, how ready and able we were to translate those standards into active policies and even to impose those policies upon others who did not share them. As Professor Seton-Watson has lately reminded us, we have drifted since the War into an attitude of negation or neutrality about problems in which not only Palmerston, but "even the mildest of his contemporaries would almost infallibly have intervened with the whole force of Britain behind them:" [1] For those were days when we were predominant at sea and when we were still islanders. Those were also days in which we were sure of our own moral standards, such as they were, and had not yet, in the words of Sir Richard Livingstone, "exchanged the certainty of faith for a twilight of opinion." [2] Do not let us, in false modesty, underrate the disintegrating effect upon the world of the weakening

[1] *Britain in Europe* (1937), p. 270. [2] *Greek Ideals and Modern Life* (1935), p. 3.

both of our material power and of our hold upon the ultimate values and certainties of life. Rightly or wrongly, the world had become accustomed to look to us for guidance and initiative in any moral issue that arose in international affairs. "Two voices," wrote Wordsworth,

> "Two voices are there: one is of the sea.
> One of the mountains, each a mighty voice."

But it is the voice of the sea that the world has listened to for centuries, ever since Milton penned his sonnet on the slaughtered saints in the Waldensian valleys and Cromwell sent the fleet to Civita Vecchia to stop the massacre. And when the voice of the sea joined the chorus that was formed in the land of the mountains it was still to us, rather than to any other of our fellow-choristers, that the world went on listening. Little or nothing is ever done on a moral issue at Geneva without British leadership. Even Nansen could not carry his Armenian scheme when we failed to support it, and thereby broke his heart.

That is not to say that British standards are moral standards *par excellence*. Far from it. Not only are our moral judgments as seen from Geneva or any other foreign centre often open to the charge of one-sidedness, not to say eccentricity, but we also constantly expose ourselves to the still more damning accusation of capriciousness. We blow hot at one moment and cold the next. We strain at the Hoare–Laval agreement and swallow the conquest of Ethiopia. Or, to take an example from the past, we allow Mr. Gladstone to denounce the filching of Cyprus and to stir our feelings about the condition of the Christians in the Turkish Empire: and when he is in power, we allow him to drop the subject of Cyprus and to do nothing for the Christians in Asia Minor. We are equally incalculable in our choice of protégés. At one time it is the Greeks who are the pet nationality of the day; at another it is the Italians, at another the Bulgarians. Others, perhaps equally deserving, are left in the shade. We have never, for instance, taken much interest in the Albanians. Since the War we have waxed enthusiastic over the Assyrians: it was romantic to think that they were our fellow-Christians, like the Abyssinians. Later on they became a liability and a nuisance. So we dropped them, as we drop someone who has travelled a stage with us on the train, to recall a phrase that Lord Balfour used about the way in which some people viewed the dropping of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. A few weeks ago the Assyrians were handed over to the good graces of the Iraqi

government, which has promised to be on its best behaviour. Why should it keep its promise? Have we kept ours to the Assyrians?

Yet, when all is said and done, our British standard, defective though it is and capricious though we are in applying it, is better than no standard at all. And no one who has studied the pre-War documents can doubt that, without us, the level of international morality during that period would have been a good deal lower than it was. A few months before he sprung upon the world and upon us—and not least upon M. Sazonoff—his Bosnian coup, Baron d'Aehrenthal, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, was discussing with the British Ambassador the project of a certain Balkan railway. This problem had been broached by Austria just at the moment when a long-drawn-out scheme for reforms in Macedonia, of which we were the principal sponsors, seemed on the verge of realisation. This seemed to Sir Edward Grey, as we would say, to be not "playing the game" and the Ambassador was instructed to say so, in the language of diplomacy. "In reply," reads the Ambassador's account of the interview, "Baron d'Aehrenthal said that the policy of the two countries was different: ours was idealistic and humanitarian, his was frankly realistic." [1] On this we may observe that the frank realism of Austro-Hungarian statesmanship led to the elimination of that Power from the map of Europe within a little over ten years of that conversation, whilst we, with our idealistic and humanitarian whims and caprices, still survive. However that may be, no reader of the documents can doubt that Baron d'Aehrenthal's remark did us too much honour. But what can be said with truth is that for many generations past humanitarian considerations have never been entirely absent from British policy, that they have been one among the many strands interwoven in that many-coloured fabric. Of how many other European Powers, great and small, could that be said?

We have examined the ancient safeguards and seen how they have been shorn of their restraining influence. We can now see how it has become possible for such events as have happened in Spain and China and elsewhere to take place. Is this process of deterioration inevitable? Can no new influences be set in motion to arrest it? Is there nothing that we in this country can do to restore some measure of world-order, or, better still, to establish the rule of law in the world?

Before attempting to answer that question let us take a brief glance at some other features of the situation that confronts us.

[1] *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, V, p. 340.

What we have to face is not simply the breakdown of old safeguards, but the emergence into the field of international relations of new forces of a range and power which the old safeguards, even if they had retained their strength, would have found it difficult to resist. These forces, which there is no time here to analyse in detail, spring from two sources, democracy and science. Between them they have brought us to a condition in which what was for Talleyrand and Metternich, and even for Bismarck and Salisbury, a problem of relations between governments carried on through foreign ministers and diplomats has become a problem of relations between peoples carried on through a large variety of agencies, amongst whom the popular press, the wireless and the cinema play an important part, not to speak of those official Ministries of Propaganda whose relations with Foreign Offices must be a constant source of difficulty in the countries so fortunate, or unfortunate, as to be equipped with them. The public life of to-day is in all the leading countries very different in tone and temper, and above all in rhythm and volume, from what it was before the War. In a work devoted to this theme Mr. J. A. Spender has elaborated this contrast with all the detail and piquancy derived from close personal experience.[1]

Nowhere is this contrast more marked than in foreign affairs. In the days when international law was an authoritative etiquette it was a relatively small group of persons who bore the brunt of the impact between States, and what was called public opinion—a phrase that occurs constantly in the documents—was either an occasional growl from a rather sleepy British lion or the sharp shrill appeal of a special interest, with every now and then a voice breaking in from Exeter Hall, stern and insistent in its tones but not always equally definite in its demands. To-day it is whole peoples who are so to speak the opposite numbers. Populations numbering millions and tens of millions are listening and reading and arguing and questioning, bandying about high-sounding watchwords such as Peace and Justice and Equality and Honour, and demanding of their statesmen that they should transform them in double-quick time into substantial concrete realities.

The civilised peoples of the world, or, to be more precise, the literate and newspaper-reading peoples of the world, are indeed just now passing through what might be called a primary school stage in their education on international affairs. They are easily attracted by any large simple idea, all the more when it is presented to them through the megaphone or through some

[1] *The Public Life* (1925).

up-to-date advertising medium. What is even more serious, they are frequently attracted by two or more large simple ideas at once, without stopping to inquire whether or not they are mutually contradictory. So far as this country is concerned, recent reports from the quarters best likely to know indicate that at the present moment foreign affairs claim ninety-five per cent. of the public interest, leaving only five per cent. for the domestic issues which used to be the main staple of political controversy. This is a situation which involves its dangers even with an electorate so inherently sensible and so quick to learn from experience as our own. But who are we at Chatham House that we should deplore it? It presents us, indeed, with an opportunity that we should be wrong to refuse for playing our part in the work of carrying on this process of education, so largely at the present time a process of self-education, beyond the difficult and awkward stage that it has reached so far.

Let me pause to interpose a remark at this stage. It is, I think, a mistake to attribute this new popular interest in international affairs, and in particular the idealistic form that it has taken, wholly or even mainly to the preaching of President Wilson and of those in this country who have echoed his message. No doubt the demand for what is paradoxically called Open Diplomacy owes much to his impulse. But it is safe to say that if Mr. Hughes had become President of the United States in 1916 and if, in consequence, a more modest project of international co-operation had been worked out at the Peace Conference with the collaboration of Mr. Elihu Root, the statesmen of the post-War generation would nevertheless have found themselves confronted with popular demands of much the same type as those with which we are familiar. The only difference would have been that the world would have been spared the sharp ascent on to the heights of exaltation and the even sharper pain of that disillusionment which bulks so largely in our thought and discussion on these problems to-day.

In what direction can we look for any improvement? I answer boldly, through studying the problem of relations between peoples, and through making every possible use of the possibilities that already exist in this connection.

One of the mistakes that we have made is that of thinking that our problem is a problem of relations between governments. It is not a problem of relations between governments: still less is it a problem of machinery. At the present time we have, indeed, almost too much machinery. What with Geneva

and the Hague and Buenos Aires and Montevideo and Paris and Washington, foreign ministers to-day can hardly move without stubbing their toes against a pact. The palace of the diplomats has been over-furnished. What we have to deal with is, in the proper sense of the words, not a political problem at all, but a social problem. It is a problem of the relations between those vast collectivities in whom, as the world now is, there is vested the ultimate control over public affairs, foreign and domestic alike. It was a sound instinct on the part of our government that, when our Ambassador was recently wounded in China, the demand for redress was based not on the fact that he was an ambassador, but on the fact that he was a civilian. In the world into which Science and Democracy, twin genii or twin demons, have projected us it is the common man who counts in international relations. It is the common man who decides the issues of peace and war. It is the common man who carries on wars and decides wars, on a front as deep as the whole country. In that sense the problem of international relations has been, if I may coin so barbarous an expression, totalitarianised. War has been totalitarianised, as we realise when we see pictures of children in gas-masks. But so also has Peace, or, as I would prefer to say, World Order. It is to the common man that we must address ourselves if we would make progress towards the establishment of the Rule of Law in world-affairs.

When we approach our problem from this angle the clouds begin to lighten. For nothing is more certain than that the common man is not a savage. It is not normal for him to turn a machine-gun on to women and children, or to take pot shots at large centres of population from the air. Whatever Thomas Hobbes, who anticipated in the seventeenth century the conclusions of some of our modern exponents of the sub-conscious, may have believed about human nature, the great mass of mankind to-day consists of decent kindly folk who want nothing better than to earn their livelihood under conditions of peace, order and good government. This is certainly as true in China as it is in the British Empire and the United States : it is broadly true also, I make bold to say, of the populations whose rulers habitually go about in military uniform. President Roosevelt is, indeed, under-stating the case when he declares, as he has done on more than one occasion, that ninety per cent. of mankind are peacefully disposed. In other words, to recur to the term used in the earlier part of these remarks, the great mass of mankind habitually exercise social restraint in their dealings with

one another. Why do they exercise this restraint? Because of the policeman round the corner and of the magistrate on the bench? Certainly not, if we define law, as our Chairman has defined it, as being, not a command of the sovereign, but the formulation into common rules of the conscience of the community, that is to say, of attitudes and habits already existing among the mass of the people. The problem before us, then, is not one of finding new standards: it is the problem of enlarging the range and scope of existing standards. It is the problem of mobilising and making effective in the field of world affairs "dispositions"—to use Burke's phrase—that are already dominant in the public life of the leading countries of the world. It is the problem of making plain to ordinary men and women how, in the large-scale interdependent world of to-day, they can best do their duty to their neighbour.

But, someone will interpose, you are dropping into the language of the Christian Gospel after telling us that Christianity is an extinct force. I wish I had time to follow up this objection. Here I can only say that I do not regard Christianity as an extinct force. What is extinct, as a force in international affairs, is the sanction of eternal punishment. But the Christian ethic and, more than that, the spirit of the Christian Gospel still represent a very powerful force in public affairs. Indeed, it would be a bold thing to maintain that the passing of the Old Diplomacy denoted a diminution of the influence of Christianity in public affairs. However that may be, it is certain that, as religious affiliations are now distributed in the world, the mobilisation of energies that is called for requires the collaboration of the adherents of the other great religious systems whose ethical standards and outlook are so clearly related to those of Christianity. We shall never return to Christendom in the old sense of the term. And we in the West cannot afford, least of all at this moment, to turn our backs on Confucius.

Can we come to closer grips with this problem of enlarging the range and scope of existing standards? I think we can. For one thing, the process is already taking place before our eyes. What is the significance of the movement for a voluntary boycott of Japan that has broken out simultaneously in the United States, in Australia, in New Zealand, in this country and perhaps also elsewhere? Surely it is that great masses of common people have at last become aware, dimly and confusedly, perhaps, that what is happening in China concerns them, that they have a direct responsibility for it, irrespective of any official action taken by their government, and that, through the facts of inter-

national interdependence, they also have a large measure, perhaps even a determining measure, of power over Japan. They have indeed, if they can succeed in organising their movement, a greater power than the governments. No government can bring economic sanctions into play unless it is assured of the support of public opinion. On the other hand, no government can force its people to purchase goods which it would rather not touch, except in the case of bare necessities in the event of every alternative source of supply being banned. And it is a bold government that will thus, as it were, besiege its own people. This is a matter on which, as it would seem, some statesmen need to do a little clear thinking. If the cabled reports are correct, both the Australian and New Zealand governments have publicly deprecated voluntary action on these lines, the New Zealand Premier having gone so far as to declare that it is for the government to decide with whom the people of New Zealand are to trade. Shades of Cobden! One might go further and invoke the shades of Magna Carta and of British liberty in general. Who is the Prime Minister that he should decide for me where I am to buy my silk socks? How long is it, one feels inclined to ask, since New Zealand came under totalitarian rule? But even in Italy, when measures were taken to ensure that straw hats should be worn rather than felt hats, I do not remember hearing that people were sent to the islands for wearing no hat at all. I hasten to add, however, that I am making these remarks under correction, since the fuller reports of these incidents are not yet available.

But however much we may welcome these manifestations of a rudimentary esprit de corps, these faint beginnings of a system of Hue and Cry, let us not make the mistake of thinking that what is needed is simply the repression, or even the prevention of violence. It goes far deeper than that. It is a question of how the peoples can acquire the habit of living together: for only when they really live together, instead of being juxtaposed as they are at present, shall we arrive at anything deserving to be called by the name of a world society.

When we state the problem in this way, it is clear that anything resembling a universal world society is far beyond the confines of practical politics. All that we can hope to do is to promote a process of social integration on a more limited scale between countries or groups of countries where the conditions are already favourable. So far as the problem of world order is concerned, this more limited integration would be sufficient: for the countries concerned happen to be the more powerful

countries. If they can arrive at a common standard, as I believe they can, they can impose it, for the time being, on the rest of the world, as Great Britain largely did in the nineteenth century. I do not say that this is a satisfactory philosophical solution of our problem: perfect solutions are rare in politics, not least in international politics. But at least it is better than our present chaos. "The function of force," said a high American authority, "is to allow moral ideas time to take root." We may, I think, accept this as a working solution, with two provisos: first, that the force be exercised not by one people, but by a group of associated peoples; and second, that the moral ideas are not thought of as a mere replica of the moral system and attitudes of the dominant peoples.

But it is not easy for peoples to learn to live together. It took the English and the Scots several generations, even when aided by a common parliament. Men are quicker at making social adjustments to-day. But the task is not simple, and there has been singularly little skilled guidance. An opinion obtained currency after the War that all that was required was to bring people of different nationalities together, and that the dispositions that are lovely in national life might be trusted to blend by a sort of automatic chemical process and so produce a condition of international understanding and harmony. Thus we have lived through what posterity will call a Conference Age, an age of banquets and data papers and prepared agenda and skilled secretariats, and it has brought us where we are now. I do not think I can better illustrate the bankruptcy of this essentially lazy method of conducting international relations than by quoting from a document that reached me a few weeks ago:

"The Seventh Biennial meeting of the ——— ——— Federation was held in Tokyo, August 2nd–7th, 1937. The Federation is composed of the international organisations of ——— of seventeen or eighteen countries. There were represented at the Tokyo Conference thirty-seven different countries. The attendance was between 3000 and 3500, somewhat less than half of which came from foreign countries, the largest group being some 700 from the United States.

"The chief object of the organisation is the promotion of international understanding, and hence of international peace. Consequently it was quite unfortunate that a conference was held just at the time when a great international war was breaking out in the Orient. However, the hosts were so courteous that the conflict was never mentioned in committee meeting; nor, in fact, so far as the writer knows, was it mentioned in private conversation.

"The chief object of the organisation is obtained through the formation of personal acquaintance between the visiting ——— and the ——— of the land where the conference is held, and through the visitation of cultural institutions of that country. In this respect the recent conference was a great success, since the attendants spent some days or weeks in visiting various regions in Japan. In each locality they were greeted by the reception committee which took charge of the visiting ——— and entertained them with unstinted hospitality."

What is the value, whether for international relations or for the enrichment of the individual life, of this kind of "personal acquaintanceship"? It is clear that the hosts and the guests never really met in any true sense at all. They just touched one another, as it were, politely with the tips of their fingers. Indeed, a report like this helps one to understand why and how it is that there has in recent years been such a violent revulsion against what is called internationalism, a revulsion which has risen to a paroxysm in certain countries, but from which no country has been exempt, not even the Scandinavian States and the British Dominions.[1] A first contact with foreigners is like putting one's toe into cold water. One instinctively draws it back, or, if one has been so foolhardy as to join a ship bound for Tokyo, one metaphorically jumps overboard and makes at full speed for one's native shore. Or, if one has been stationed at Geneva, one plays golf on Saturdays and Sundays with the kind of people who know how to play golf. The instinctive pull away from association with strangers is immensely powerful. To ignore it, as the propagandists have done, is foolish. It can be overcome, as the example of our own island shows, but it requires a conscious effort. Moreover, this effort is all the more difficult and uncongenial at a time when the national life is itself deeply disturbed, for it is at that time that the dominant traits are most apt to assert themselves, and these dominant traits differ greatly from one another from nation to nation. Thus dominant traits which cause no trouble in international relations in quiet times become a positive danger at times of crisis. And very often, as we have seen, a time of crisis is also a time of conference, so that national attitudes stiffen just at the moment when they should relax.

We must understand the psychology of isolationism before

[1] It should be added, in fairness to the author of the report, that he goes on to say that "the members of the Federation were impressed with the inadequacy of their methods and the futility of their efforts" and to draw the same conclusion as the present writer, namely that "international understanding and peace are primarily a matter of determining attitudes."

we can hope to overcome it. And we might do worse than begin with the study of our own British brand of isolationism, which takes the characteristic form of refusing to analyse our own motives. Yet until we are clear as to our motives, we shall never be able to make them plain to others, to project British methods of dealing with men and events across the footlights, and thus to sweep away the common stupid prejudice against our so-called hypocrisy and double-dealing. While other nations suspect us of ulterior motives we maintain our reserve, and content ourselves with accusing foreigners of the unmannerly practice of imputing motives. Hence a perpetual deadlock.

Lord Grey, very unlike the present Foreign Secretary, was a typical example of this kind of reserve. At the close of one of his despatches written at a particularly troubled time, he adds this cry from the heart. "If the Germans would only deal with us as we deal with them there would be no difficulty."[1] Yet we know to-day that the Germans never understood his way of dealing with them, because he never succeeded in projecting his English make-up across the footlights. Let us enlarge the idea behind his words. "If only foreigners would deal with us as we deal with them there would be a world society." But for that to come to pass both the foreigners and we must make the effort of realising why the other side does not understand. This is not an effort that involves the beating of drums or the familiar methods of agitation. Nor does it involve turning us into a new kind of creature. What it does involve is meditation rather than agitation, meditation as to how we can broaden and deepen our human relationships without turning ourselves into actors. The so-called "star," whether on the screen or on the platform, is a constant cause of disintegration in international life.

This may seem a small conclusion for a bulky argument. Yet does it not contain the root of the whole matter? On the day when ordinary Englishmen and foreigners can converse without embarrassment on either side, when each has learnt how to bring the whole of his personality into play, as when he smokes his pipe at home, world order will be assured. Until that day has arrived the violent ones of the earth will continue to say "Why not?" and the meek will continue to wring their hands.

Summary of Discussion.

PROFESSOR J. L. BRIERLY (in the Chair) said that if he made one or two criticisms he hoped that these would not be misinterpreted as

[1] *British Documents*, VI, p. 237.

a criticism of the address as a whole, with most of which he agreed. It was quite true that it was impossible to have either national or international law unless there were a substratum or soil out of which it could grow, a community in the true sense of that word, but on the whole a large measure of obedience was still rendered to existing international law. The exceptions were notorious and caught the public eye, but observance was still the rule. Running through the speech, too, he thought he saw an implied contrast between international law and national law which perhaps did not sufficiently emphasise the melancholy fact that in the world to-day the observance of any kind of law was rather a rare thing, the exception and not the rule. Those who lived in a law-abiding State were apt to think that the rule of law was the prevailing condition in which men lived, which was not the case. International law was particularly weak only when compared with the law of a small minority of States.

Secondly, he wondered whether we really were witnessing a decline in international standards, and whether the old safeguards were ever as dependable as the lecturer implied. If the comparison were between present standards and the ideals which we had been attempting to set up during the last fifteen years, we might be inclined to believe in a decline, but if the comparison were between present and pre-War diplomatic morality, was this apparent decline a real one? Was there, for instance, any very great difference between the seizure in 1911 of Tripoli and the Abyssinian aggression of 1935? Both had been premeditated acts of international brigandage involving the disregard of treaties. The difference lay in the way in which we had regarded them. In 1911 Great Britain had given Italy her sympathetic support, her motive being the desire to detach Italy from her German associations; in 1935 she had opposed Italy and had risked the very danger that she feared in 1911, the association of Italy and Germany, which had actually come to pass. What had changed was not international conduct, but the standards by which such things were now judged. The real change was a rise in standard rather than a deterioration in conduct.

DR. G. P. GOOCH said that the lecturer wrote well and read well, and whether one agreed with him or not it was always possible to understand exactly what he meant. He had given an address from which a lawyer had something to learn, a historian, a philosopher, a moralist, and last but not least a citizen, the common man of whom he had spoken, in whom it was quite clear, though the fact had been indicated rather than stressed, he found the ultimate hope of salvation.

The address fell into two parts: firstly disappointments, then hopes. The world was to be seen, not entirely, but for the most part, given over to the cult of violence, and this violence was more accepted by or acceptable to the world than it had been before the War, during the nineteenth century, when, as the lecturer had justly remarked, the influence of Great Britain had been so immensely greater than it

was to-day. He had painted the canvas very darkly, probably because in the space of an hour it was necessary to go in for scene-painting rather than miniature. But, as Renan said, "la vérité est dans les nuances," which might be roughly translated: "do not over-simplify." The speaker agreed with the Chairman that the rape of Tripoli in 1911 had been every bit as bad as the rape of Abyssinia in 1935. There had not been such a great fall because, starting at the low level of 1911, no such thing as a fall was possible.

The barriers were down, declared Professor Zimmern. The devil, naked and unashamed, was stalking along the highway of the world. The decline of Christian standards had been mentioned. The decline of Christian belief? Yes. But the decline of the application of Christian standards and ethics in the relations of States! It was doubtful. Christianity had been a great ideal in the Middle Ages, as it was now at Geneva, but how much more had it been? It had never come down from heaven to earth. The more one knew about the Middle Ages the more one realised how little that ideal had been rooted in the life and conduct of mankind. After the collapse of the Middle Ages, when Europe had been nominally Christian *le Roi très Chrétien*, François I, was to be found making an alliance with the Turks, the first alliance between a Christian kingdom and the infidel. He did not care who the Turks were or what they were as long as they helped him in his struggle against Charles V. Then there was another very Christian sovereign, the monarch of Spain, under whose rule fire and sword had been carried over the mountains of Mexico and Peru. What of Louis XIV who went regularly to Mass, *le Roi très Chrétien* again, the guardian of the Christians in the East? He devastated the Palatinate. A knowledge of history had not enabled the speaker to find very many applications of the standard of Christianity.

With regard to the decline of international law, everyone knew that since the Japanese raid on Manchuria in 1931 the skies had been exceptionally dark and the devil exceptionally active; but it should be remembered that the greatest political performer of the nineteenth century, Bismarck, had said that in every treaty there was an unwritten provision that it remained valid so long as things remained as they were at the moment of signature. Not much standard about that. The greatest ideal of all was that of the reign of law, but it would take a very long time to get anywhere near it. It had been said that Cecil Rhodes thought in continents. Any worthwhile historian thought in centuries. Though he suffered like other men, he had the help of the conviction that in the end the human spirit would triumph over the obstacles that confronted it.

Concerning English standards, it had been pleasant to hear the lecturer's praise for British behaviour and influence during the nineteenth century. In the nineteenth century Great Britain had done some good things and some bad ones. A book had been written by a German scholar on this subject, *The Spirit of English Policy*, by Professor Kantorowicz, who had been driven out of Nazi Germany on

account of his Jewish blood, and he had taken exactly the same line as the lecturer.

Sir Alfred Zimmern had ended on a note of hope. It was very encouraging to find that this distinguished intellectual had lived through so many years at Geneva and yet retained his faith in the common man. He himself had felt so often, when governments did foolish and wicked things, if one could only get behind the governments at the common man! He wished that this point about there being too much machinery, too many conferences, and too little intercourse between the ordinary normal human beings who were fundamentally decent people, could have been developed further. But how could the common man in Germany or Russia or any of the totalitarian States "get together" with the common man in England or elsewhere? In the totalitarian countries, sprawling across the map of Europe and threatening at any moment to enlarge the field of their activities, the common man did not count, and we had to deal with the governments which represented or misrepresented him.

MISS FREDA WHITE said that she would like to question the definition of international relations as a manifestation of Christendom at any time. She had found it difficult, when attending for many years the places where many nations spoke together, to feel that there was any superiority in the Christian nations. She had often listened to Persians and Chinese, and felt that Europe was barbarous. The civilisation of Christendom had been an aggressive civilisation. To go back to a type-case, what had the Arab civilisation thought of the Crusaders who said "Deus le vult" and waded through rapine, massacre and treachery to the shrine of the gentlest of the Gods? The gift of Christendom to Japan was aggression; it was the one lesson that she had taken to heart. But of course all the higher religions contained the aspirations of the common man and his desire for a life where he could get food and shelter, a few people to serve and to be fond of, and quiet sleep at night—the essence of peace. That was common to Christianity and to Buddhism and to all religions, even to Islam, because it was the most tolerant.

It was true that the common people had tried to force their decent feelings and aspirations upon politics, but what were they even in the democracies? Only dust. The relations between nations were not expressed by their feelings, but by the policies of their governments. Conferences, treaties, etc., were the necessary machinery by which countries had to meet. Aggression and ultimatums were carried out by governments. The serious thing to-day was that those relations had deteriorated a great deal. The only sign of grace to be found in the totalitarian States was that when one of them committed an atrocity, like the bombing of Guernica by the Germans, they were sufficiently conscious of the common opinion of humanity to lie about it. It was their only gesture in the direction of morality. Even Great Britain had gone fairly low. There had been a curious and

remarkable instance of this at the Assembly this year at Geneva. China had appealed to the League under Articles 10, 11, and 17, asking for an inquiry into what had happened. Mr. Eden, M. Delbos and M. Litvinov had been quite vacant upon the subject; and then Mr. Bruce had advanced to the rostrum. He produced an extraordinary argument by which he had said that the aggression in China could not be considered under Article 17 because that would involve an inquiry and perhaps the application of sanctions in a part of the world where the universality of the League was not complete. (This seemed strange in view of the fact that the only non-member in this case would be the friendly and well-disposed United States.) Therefore he would like the case not to be considered under this article, but under Article 11, in which case it would be possible to hold a conference elsewhere, where (*sous-entendu*) it would not be necessary for anyone to keep their obligations. So the case of China was to be considered at Brussels with a view not of action, but, it seemed, of inaction. It was evidently felt that at Geneva there was some constraint put upon one to keep one's word, to keep the spirit and letter of one's commitments, but away from that place this obtained no longer. In point of fact the same thing had been done in 1931, but then no one had dared to say so publicly. There was definitely a deterioration.

LIEUT.-COLONEL H. ST. CLAIR SMALLWOOD said that he entirely agreed with the lecturer that the only way to better conditions was through the common man. By what method was it possible to arrive at this end? He had said that ninety-five per cent. of the people to-day were interested in foreign affairs, but if he were to take the daily papers of London, he would find only two or three of those papers had a really intelligent grasp of foreign affairs, and the people who read the other less well-informed papers were very inclined to take their opinions from such a source. A very few days ago there had been intense interest taken in the happenings in China and Spain; in one paper the speaker had seen a tiny paragraph, a few lines devoted to these events, while in the more serious papers there had been columns and columns about the situation in those two countries. When one compared the circulation of *The Times* with that of the less well-informed papers it was difficult to believe that 95 per cent. of the population were interested in foreign affairs.

LORD ADDINGTON said that in view of the fact that the weapons of destruction had increased in power, and war had become an even greater danger than before to the mass of people, it was essential to get back to even higher standards and to the fundamental Christian principles. It was on the basis of these principles that the best understanding had as yet been produced in the personal intercourse between different peoples including those of China and Japan.

MR. H. W. NEVINSON said that he quite agreed with the other speakers about the difficulties of the common man, and would like the

lecturer to explain why he thought that the common man had any influence upon politics even to the point of war. In Europe it was the common man who had been suppressed. The common man had no voice, no power. The power belonged to Mussolini, Hitler, Metaxas, Stalin. The speaker hated the Japanese Government as much as it was possible to hate anyone, but they had every excuse now in trying to kill and massacre as many people as they could. In war it was the latest and most destructive weapon that was always used. Now that England was no longer an island she would be bombed from the air quite certainly in any war which broke out between her and another Power. London was a target which could not be missed. With an aeroplane it was not possible to aim and kill the Prime Minister, nor even to aim at the War Office; everything would be smashed indifferently. The object of war was murder, to kill as many people as possible in order to break the morale of the population. Great Britain would send her aeroplanes to smash up Berlin and Rome in the event of war with either Germany or Italy. It was not possible to discriminate. War was wrong in itself, but all acted in the same way when involved. Therefore it was not right to blackguard one Power for doing what all would do in the same circumstances.

ADMIRAL DRURY-LOWE said that he thought a great deal of the trouble with regard to the deterioration of the standards of international political conduct was due to the fact that the politically virtuous were not as determined as the politically vicious. Those who believed in right were not prepared to run the risk for the right that the law-breaker was prepared to run in breaking the law.

The lecturer had referred to the fact that there was no world esprit de corps. It was rather too much to be hoped for all at once, but in Geneva there was a world international civil service, which gradually, during eighteen years, had been building up a common international spirit, where they were now taking the oath to a common international service. Those who went out there were encouraged to see how this form of world esprit de corps was growing.

PROFESSOR ZIMMERN said that he had very much appreciated the remarks of the Chairman. But he could not agree that the real change was a rise in standard rather than a deterioration of conduct.

He had not said that ninety-five per cent. of the people were interested in foreign affairs, but that of those interested in public affairs ninety-five per cent. were now interested in foreign affairs as opposed to domestic affairs. This was a big change from the time before the War. From his experience he thought that a larger proportion of people was now interested in foreign affairs and public affairs in general than ever before.

The common man controlled politics in the free democracies because he made the great public opinion without which the government could not act. If he had wanted action in 1931, there would have been

action. If the twelve million people who had signed the Peace Ballot had known what they were signing, if those votes had had weight instead of simply numbers, things would have been very different. That was why the lecturer welcomed such signs as a movement for a popular boycott. The British Government could not move very far in foreign affairs unless they had the country behind them. That was why it was so difficult for Great Britain to commit herself to any obligations for an indefinite period, or indeed to commit herself at all in regions of the world where she was not quite sure of the interest of her people. The common man had the absolute veto on government action in foreign affairs. If the government made a treaty which the common man did not understand, that treaty was potentially void. The best illustration of this was in the provisions of Locarno with regard to the demilitarisation of the Rhineland. These had never been explained to the British public. Just at the time when Germany had marched into the Rhineland the lecturer had been addressing working-class audiences in the North of England—good, virtuous people. How had their virtue expressed itself? Fair play for the Germans. Why should they not do what they liked in their own land? A very creditable ethical sentiment, yet nevertheless a condonation of a breach of treaty. This they had not been able to understand at short notice.

Mention had been made of the totalitarian States. Of course the people in Germany, Russia, Italy and Japan were not in a position to bring a decisive influence to bear on international relations. But there was no hope for a better world order including States so governed; they had to be ruled out for the present. It was a question, as regards immediate policy, of doing the best thing in a bad situation, of palliatives and expedients. What was the good of saying that international law should be observed by countries in which there was no law? The future of world-order lay with the constitutional and law-abiding countries. We could only hope that, sooner or later, the totalitarian States would revert to constitutionalism through their own efforts.

The third speaker had found that the lecturer had been too kind to Christianity. But his argument had been to deal with existing standards. For good or for evil international politics, power politics had their roots in Europe. International law and the relations between States had grown up in Europe out of the mediæval system. He had mentioned Confucius, but to compare Christianity with Buddhism or Confucianism would have carried him too far. The collaboration for which he had been looking was a collaboration between all the communities which had ethical standards.

The lecturer pleaded guilty to the charge of over-simplification. This was because of the time limit. He had been complimented on his faith in humanity after being at Geneva so much. There had been a verger in a University church in Cambridge who had remarked to a visitor: "Yes, sir, man and boy I have listened to sermons in this church for over fifty years and I thank God I am a Christian yet."

THE COLONIAL PROBLEM

THE HON. HAROLD NICOLSON, C.M.G., M.P.

I SHALL begin my address with two assumptions. First, that we are all agreed that a Second German War would be an irreparable disaster for all concerned. Secondly, that in order to prevent such a disaster we are willing, both as a nation and as individuals, to make considerable sacrifices. Such differences of view as may exist between us are thus concerned, not with the end to be aimed at, but with the means by which that end can be achieved. Opinions are divided as to whether the German danger can best be exorcised by gentleness, or power, or an admixture of both. The special facet of this problem which we are now to examine is the question, " It is *possible* to satisfy Germany by colonial concessions ? "

I have put the question in its simplest form, yet it is evident that it is not a simple question, but one of the most intricate and unanswerable that could well be raised. Every word that it contains requires scrutiny and qualification. The word " possible," for instance, has a dual application. We must first ask ourselves whether it is " possible " to make concessions, and secondly whether the concessions which we are able to make will, by any possibility, satisfy Germany. We must also ask ourselves what we mean by the words " satisfy," " Germany," " colonial " and " concessions."

It will be admitted that both in Germany and in Great Britain there exists a deep and widespread dread of any second world conflagration. It will be admitted, also, that this dread is more intense in Great Britain than it is in Germany. The latter has little, apparently, to lose and much, apparently, to gain. There is nothing that we ourselves wish to acquire, whereas a major war would endanger not only our power and possessions, not merely our whole social structure, not our authority only, but even our independence. Even if, as is probable, we were victorious in the end, we should be left enfeebled, exhausted and wracked by internal dissension. Thus I for one (although I shall always repudiate the peace-at-any-price doctrine), shall join with those

who feel that it is right and necessary to pay a considerable price for peace.

If, therefore, in what follows I may seem to throw some doubt upon the policy of colonial concessions, it is not in the least because I desire to slam the door. It is merely because I question whether the colonial door is wide enough, or high enough, to serve our purpose; it is because I regard it as a back door, as a side door, and not as the main entrance.

Nor is this all. I have the impression that the intense anxiety which has inevitably been aroused by Germany's armament and by her policy of triangular alliances, has led many people in Great Britain to abandon those principles of policy upon which our greatness has been constructed, and to seek to escape by a back-entrance without considering whether such evasion is either necessary or wise. Ever since the fifteenth century the principle of our policy has been the old Roman principle of *parcere subiectis et debellare superbos*; we have striven to protect the smaller countries of Europe against the supremacy of any single State or coalition. It may well be that the decrease in our insular security entails some modification of this principle; I do not believe that it should entail its complete reversal.

I have the impression also that many people seek to escape from their apprehensions by making what they believe to be a virtue out of what they believe to be a necessity. It is amazing how many men and women who, in 1923, assailed our Foreign Office for being "pro-German" are now assailing that admirable institution for being "pro-French." We shall not escape from our difficulties by representing Germany as the very lamb with which the lion has for so long been anxious to lie down. We must face the issue squarely and without any sentimental deflections. It is in such a spirit that I, who have never regarded myself as anything but pro-British, would wish to consider this colonial question.

Before we pass to the realities of the problem, let me first examine the case for the restitution of the former German colonies as it is put forward by the German propagandists and as it is accepted by many thousands of people in Great Britain.

The argument runs as follows. In the first place, our seizure of the colonies was a breach of contract. Germany laid down her arms on the understanding that the eventual terms of peace would be based upon the fourteen points of President Wilson. The fifth of these points provided for "a free, open-minded and

absolutely impartial adjustment of colonial claims." The adjustment imposed by the Treaty of Versailles and subsequent instruments was neither free, nor open-minded, nor impartial. The Allied Powers therefore were guilty of violating the terms under which Germany surrendered. Their occupation of the colonies is thus illegal, and the colonies should be restored to Germany as a matter of right.

I do not see that this argument has any validity either in law or in reason. Legally, President Wilson's fifth point is superseded by Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles under which Germany surrendered her overseas possessions unconditionally. In reason, transferences of territory have always followed upon a successful war, and to that extent Germany has no more " right " to her former colonies than Hanover has a " right " to her independence or Denmark a " right " to the duchies.

Yet, although we may be satisfied that the legal argument is not valid either in law or in fact, we must admit that the circumstances and the spirit in which the colonies were acquired are not morally defensible. Had we frankly annexed these territories by right of conquest, we should be in a far stronger position to-day. The fact that we desired to seize the colonies and at the same time to pay lip-service to the Fourteen Points led us into one of the most flagrant acts of hypocrisy that even the Peace Conference committed, and culminated in that appalling piece of jesuitical exegesis by which we explained that we could not give a mandate to Germany owing to her mal-administration of her colonies in the past. Instead of basing our rights upon military victory (which was a fact), we based them upon a moral comment which was both ungenerous and untrue. And when the Germans contend that this has placed us in a false position from the outset they are abundantly correct.

Let me now pass to the second German argument, namely that our seizure of their former colonies has robbed them of essential raw material, including food-stuffs. It is of course easy to disprove this argument by quoting the pre-War figures and by indulging in the familiar song and dance around that 1 per cent. import and that ½ of 1 per cent. export. Yet it would be fairer and more correct to recognise that these figures are not wholly conclusive, and that Nazi Germany would be certain to exploit the colonies to a far greater degree than was ever attempted under William II.

A similar consideration applies to the emigration argument. We can, if we like, point out that the total number of Germans

settled in the pre-War German Empire was less than the number of those Germans who were established in Paris. This rejoinder also is to my mind ill-considered and unfair. It is certain that were the former colonies to be restored to-day, the amount of Germans who would seek to settle in Africa and elsewhere would be enormously increased; and in any case the sense of claustrophobia which lives in the slogan *Volk ohne Raum* would be largely diminished.

The true answer to these two arguments is not, I should suggest, to dwell upon pre-War statistics, but to examine what the figures would be in ten years time from now. No sensible German would claim that, even given the most intensive exploitation and emigration, the return of the colonies would solve either their economic or their demographic problems.

Finally there is the argument of *Gleichberechtigung* or equality, the argument of " National Honour." To this argument I myself feel strongly sympathetic. As an Englishman I resent that our name should still be appended to that vicious colonial-guilt argument. In many ways the German administration of Tanganyika Territory, let us say, was less lenient and less progressive than our own. In other ways it was admirable. To say that Germany is morally unfitted to possess colonies is to say something which is demonstrably untrue.

Moreover, whatever we may feel about it ourselves, it is certain that the equality argument figures largely in the German consciousness. There are thousands of splendid young Germans to-day who pine with envy and even rancour at the thought that were they English they would be governing vast provinces with nothing but a fly-whisk in their hands. It is little use explaining to them that the opportunities and delights of colonial service are not quite so lavish as all that. They are convinced in their souls that the present situation implies for them an unjust denial of adventure. And I for one do not blame them for their resentment.

So much for what might be described as the German propaganda case. In terms of argument it can be disposed of very easily. But we are not indulging in dialectics; we are examining human grievances; we are seeking to discover how two great and essentially friendly nations can be prevented from drifting into war. When discussing a task of such delicacy and magnitude it is mere waste of time to consider who is right in logic and who is wrong. What we have to consider are the emotional realities of the case, and how far, by practical concessions or adjustments,

we can meet those realities. I therefore pass to the second part of my argument, which is concerned with the two questions "What can we give?" and "What does Germany really want?"

I begin with the question of what offer we could in practice make to Germany. It is unfortunate that not only the Germans, but also a large number of people in Great Britain, regard the colonies as a series of material objects which can, by a mere stroke of the pen, be transferred from the ownership of one person into the ownership of another. We know that this is untrue. Colonies are not static pieces of territory; they are living organisms in process of rapid development. To surrender them would not entail merely the signature of some deed of gift: it would entail a major surgical operation. By such transfer we should be breaking pledges and disappointing serious hopes. I am well aware that the argument of the "needs and interests of the natives themselves" has often been exploited insincerely. Yet it is an argument which in actual practice possesses serious validity.

Consider, for instance, our present system in Tanganyika Territory. It is actually based upon the theory of trusteeship, indirect rule, the dual mandate. The Tanganyikan African to-day is not flogged, he is not exposed to forced labour, he is not conscripted for military service. The native inhabitants of Tanganyika to-day are taught to believe in their own rights, are educated to aspire to their own future. They are in no sense treated as members of an inferior race; they are treated as members of a progressive community which in due time will achieve self-government. Within the last fifteen years these new conceptions have become habits of thought, not only among our own administrators, but among the Africans themselves. It would be a cause of grave disappointment to many Africans were they transferred from the rule of a country which is successfully carrying out the principle of trusteeship, to a country the main and avowed intention of which is exploitation.

I do not wish to be self-righteous on this point, or to suggest that German administration would be less efficient or less humane than our own. The efficiency would perhaps be greater and the humanity would only be of a slightly different kind. But I do contend that it would be difficult for any Nazi administration, with their conceptions of race superiority and the suppression of the individual, to continue the system or the state of mind which we have introduced. And I do contend that the change of system would cause much disappointment to the best elements among the Africans themselves.

Let us, however, ignore this human difficulty and regard the late German colonies as if they were in fact goods and chattels which can be bartered and exchanged. We are then faced with the problem of legal ownership. I am not a jurist myself, but I confess that I find it very difficult to answer the question "To whom do the ex-German colonies belong?" It might be said that in law the ownership of these colonies is vested, under Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles, in the Principal Allied and Associated Powers; or, in other words, that the United States and Japan share in that ownership. It might be said that the colonies "belong" to the Mandatory Power, to the League of Nations or to the inhabitants themselves. I do not presume even to suggest an answer to this intricate question of ownership. I wish only to suggest that the point is hotly disputed, and that were we by a stroke of the pen to transfer sovereignty from ourselves to Germany there might, and would, be other interested parties who would claim that such transference was not ours to make.

Thus the United States would probably contend that they only agreed to the mandatory system on condition that the "open door" was preserved. The League of Nations might contend that mandates could not be bartered as between one country and another without their previous consent. And France might contend that we were not legally entitled to hand over our own share of the mandates to Germany without consulting her in her position as co-trustee.

Let us suppose that even these difficulties were surmounted and that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom felt themselves in the position to "offer" to Germany the return of her former colonies. Obviously this could apply only to those territories over which we ourselves possessed a mandate. It would not apply to the territories held under mandate by the Union of South Africa, by Australia or by New Zealand.

Supposing, again, that we were able to induce the French Government to join with us in making to Germany a joint offer in regard to Togoland and the Cameroons, such an offer would be almost derisory unless we were able to add to it the cession of Tanganyika Territory. As you are aware, such a cession would entail a serious and most debatable sacrifice. Apart from the desires of the more educated section of the African population, the strategical objections are extremely weighty. The cession of Tanganyika Territory would interrupt the Imperial air-route to the Cape, would place Kenya Colony in a dangerous position

between a Fascist Abyssinia on the north and a Nazi Tanganyika on the south, and would provide Germany with a base upon the Indian Ocean.

To my mind even this most serious sacrifice would be worth making were we convinced that it would assure peace for the next thirty years. But could we be so certain? This question brings me to my second problem, namely, " What does Germany really want? "

Students of Anglo-German relations since 1871 will agree that the difficulty with which Great Britain has continually been faced is that of obtaining from the German Government any clear statement of their real requirements. Our repeated demands for some such statement have always been regarded by the Wilhelmstrasse as either insulting or fraudulent. And the reason for this reiterant misconception is, I firmly believe, due to the fact that the German conception of policy is fundamentally different from our own.

As I have had frequent occasion to suggest elsewhere, the British conception both of policy and of negotiation is essentially a shopkeeper's conception, a mercantile conception. We believe that when powerful interests come into conflict it should always be possible to reach some compromise under which each side sacrifices something to the other side, and by which both will remain content. And we assume that once some such contract has been concluded it will form the basis of stable collaboration in the future and offer reasonable hope of satisfaction and finality.

The German's conception, on the other hand, is the heroic or the warrior conception. He regards negotiation as a trial of strength, implying in its results that one side is victorious and the other defeated. Nor is this all. He is apt to envisage diplomacy as a form of warfare, and to employ such military methods and devices as the feint, the surprise attack, the out-flanking movement, camouflage, the *Kraftprobe* or trench-raid and the limited objective. His tendency is to regard any concession as a local retreat and to set himself immediately to consolidate the position thus evacuated with a view to some further advance. Thus whereas to us a negotiation is little more than a bargain between two men of business, the German is apt to regard any such settlement as unheroic or as a *Kuh-handel*, and to assume that any concessions which they may be asked to make are insulting humiliations and any concessions which we may be ready to make are proofs of weakness on our part. In other

words, the objective of German policy is something abstract, namely triumph or power; and the concrete concessions which may be made to them are viewed, not as objects desirable in themselves, but as symbols of this abstract conception. It is this fundamental difference of approach which has always rendered so difficult any permanent agreement between Germany and Great Britain.

I do not believe myself that present German policy differs in any important respect from pre-War policy. I believe that power is still the ultimate objective, and that the frame of mind is still a warrior frame of mind. Yet one difference is certainly noticeable. Before the War German diplomacy was conceived from the point of view of the *Offizierskasino*, the Officers' Mess. To-day it is conceived from the point of view of the *Unteroffizierskasino*, the Sergeants' Mess.

This frame of mind is certainly of importance in relation to the problem of colonial concessions. There are many people in Great Britain who (being obsessed by the shopkeeper point of view) sincerely imagine that Germany will be " grateful " for a " generous gesture " on our part. To the Germans, generosity means patronage; gratitude, humiliation. They do not want us to be kind: they want us to be frightened.

Yet even if, for the moment, we ignore these psychological considerations, are we correct in assuming that Germany would be " satisfied " were we able to return to her those colonies which she possessed in 1913? Even when she possessed those colonies in undisputed and unconditional ownership she was still clamouring for her place in the sun. To-day, in my opinion, she would demand something more. She would say to us, " You are quite correct in arguing that our former colonies were of little value to us either for settlement, for markets, or as sources of raw material. What we now require in the colonial field is *Gleichberechtigung*, that is equality of possession." It would be extremely difficult to define what she meant by such equality. Would it be quantitative or qualitative? Would she say, " The population of England is such and such to the square mile and England possesses so many square miles of colonial territory "? Or would she say, " We do not want our former colonies. They were practically useless. What we want is rubber, copper and tin. We want the Malay States, the Rhodesias and Swaziland "? We cannot foresee the nature of her demands. All I wish to suggest is that those who think the Colonial Deal can be made on the basis of a little slice of the Cameroons or Togoland are subject to

a most profound illusion. In other words, if we imagine we can pay the Danegeld in terms of the former German colonies we are imagining something which could only be temporarily and locally true. The price which we may have to pay for peace is infinitely heavier than that.

I return to my original question, "What does Germany want?" I answer with my previous answer, "What Germany wants is power." She knows very well that the return of her former colonies (even if that were feasible) would diminish rather than increase her power. I regard Herr Hitler as a most consistent man. I believe that what he himself desires is contained in the pages of *Mein Kampf*. What he desires is *Grund und Boden* or, in other words, territorial and economic acquisitions in Central and South-Eastern Europe. Such acquisitions might lead him into conflict with Russia. If he is to succeed in that conflict he must assure that he is protected in the rear, that he has the necessary *Rückentdeckung* as against France. In order to sterilise France he must sterilise England. Yet what does he possess wherewith to purchase our neutrality? He has no real assets at all. Therefore he creates an artificial asset, the Colonial Propaganda. He can now offer us the abandonment of his claim for the colonies in return for a free hand in the East. If we take his colonial demands at their face value, then he at least obtains some colonies, which will please his people. If we refuse his demands, then he can claim in compensation our neutrality in his European ambitions. It is for this reason so important that we should not surrender one inch of colonial territory without obtaining in return precise assurances in regard to Germany's European ambitions. To restore the colonies in return for German "friendship" would be to exchange a substance for a shadow. It is for this reason that I am opposed to any colonial concession except as part of a general settlement.

I do not wish to conclude these remarks on a note of pessimism. I am not a pessimist. I believe that peace can be secured. I believe that the German people are sincerely anxious to live in terms of amity with the British people; I do not believe that either of us desires to fight the other again. But I also believe that colonial concessions will prove far more difficult and far less efficacious than most people imagine. That we must for the moment abandon our happy shopkeeper conception of diplomacy and realise that what we are faced with is a warrior conception. That we must therefore not allow ourselves to be weakened by

side-shows (and the colonial question is essentially a side-show) but must concentrate upon the main front. And that this front is represented by some gigantic and determined revision of the Peace Treaties, conceived, not in terms of the old nationalities or frontiers, but in terms of economic planning and co-operation on a scale which until now has not been dreamt of in our philosophy.

It is little use, if I may summarise my views, trying to conciliate violence by small concessions in local areas. What we should do is in the first place to convince the violent that they are faced by the forceful. And in the second place to prove that the forceful are willing to be wise.

Summary of Discussion

MR. AMERY said that from the political and national point of view the outlook shown by Herr Hitler in *Mein Kampf* was the outlook of the ordinary German. They were primarily a continental nation. The Polish Corridor, Austria, the German districts of Czechoslovakia, expansion for German farmers eastwards, all these things bulked infinitely larger in their minds than distant colonies. This was equally true from the economic point of view. Nothing which Germany lost in her colonies was comparable to the loss in raw materials sustained in the Silesian coal-fields or in the iron-fields of Lorraine; and any trade agreement within Europe itself which gave her favourable terms would be worth infinitely more than all her previous colonies.

The speaker believed that a solution in Europe, on the economic side, could be arranged. This had been indicated by the lecturer when he had spoken of co-operation and not competition. The speaker believed that if Great Britain would be prepared to waive her treaty rights under the most-favoured-nation clause and so enable Germany and the Danubian countries and, indeed, all the countries of continental Europe and their colonies, to give each other favourable economic terms from which the British Empire and the United States of America would be to some extent excluded, then she would be providing Germany with the thing she really wanted, namely, a favoured and sheltered market. To offer her world free-trade in competition with the Japanese and others would be as useless to Germany as the return of the colonies under mandatory conditions.

On the political and territorial side it was difficult to see what could be given, at any rate without abandoning one's present friends in Europe. Great Britain could say that she would break with France and abandon Czechoslovakia, Austria and Russia, and hold on to her colonies. At the moment this would be a most unwise if not an impossible policy. At some later stage it might be possible, if Italy were brought back to the Stresa position, to induce France to let go of Russia.

The main reason why the colonies had been taken away from

Germany was because before the War they had been regarded by her as being comparatively worthless and had only formed the basis for an agitation for a bigger Empire and for a German naval policy directed against Great Britain. The German dream during those years was to follow up the series of victories which had first pushed Austria out of Germany and secondly made Germany the dominant Power of Europe by a naval victory which would make Germany the mistress of the outer world. Therefore it was perfectly natural that for reasons of security the Allied and Associated Powers should not return the German colonies after the War. But in so doing the makers of the treaty had considered that of all the injuries done to Germany the loss of colonies was the least vital, either from the economic point of view or from its effect on national psychology. Germany's colonial system had had no deep roots in the life of the nation. It was true that charges of misgovernment, some of them true, were brought against Germany. That was typical of the atmosphere of the time, but this had not been the real issue.

The speaker could not speak strongly enough about the responsibilities of all the Mandatory Powers towards the natives.

MISS MARGERY PERHAM said that the amount of attention given to native interests during the discussions of colonial claims showed that it might be in danger of being neglected in any final settlement; yet, however small it might be in the areas and people involved, it was of the utmost importance from the point of view of principle.

It was strange that in a country such as Great Britain this point should have been neglected. Those whose attitude was that it would be preferable to give away one, two, or even three colonies rather than have bombs dropping on London, did not stop to consider it at all. Those liberal and humanitarian circles which would usually be concerned with the interests of dependent peoples had been so busy applying their liberalism and humanity to Germany (the speaker admired them for this) that this other aspect of the question had of late escaped their notice. Those also who had inherited the ancient tradition of Little England, that mixture of principle and ignorance, reacted away from anything which they might be able to label imperialist cant. There was a tendency to sneer at the assumption of responsibility for the natives and the " White Man's Burden," and therefore those who did not wish to cede colonies tended to avoid this apparently vulnerable position and to base their opposition on solid grounds of imperial and strategical interests. Sympathy with the German claim for the colonies had so increased of late that we were busy clearing Germany's colonial character from the criticisms of Versailles, and deprecating our own capacities in this field. We were in danger of reacting from one hypocrisy to another. In the effort to abandon complacency we might abandon truth, and a truth vital to those people who were to be the instruments of our appeasement.

This truth was that the restitution of the former colonial possessions to Germany would not be in the interests of the subject races. It was impossible to compare the thirty years of German occupation with the twenty years of British rule which had followed. There was no possible basis of comparison. As late as 1906 there had been a great native rebellion raging over a large part of Tanganyika, and even just before the War large areas had been administered in a very rudimentary and skeleton fashion. It was since the War, with the immense increase of quality and quantity of the British administration, the growth of roads and communications, and the enlarged conception of the sphere of government, that a penetrating contact had been achieved which could not have been possible for either Great Britain or Germany before the War. These colonies could not be transferred, even from the mechanical point of view of the change in administration, without the most painfully dislocating effect. British administration in Tanganyika, as in Togoland and the Cameroons, was the result of centuries of experience in the government of native peoples. Tanganyika to-day, especially, was based upon the experience of the years culminating in the Lugard system in Nigeria which had been taken over by Sir Donald Cameron and patiently adapted to the special needs of East Africa. By careful study and an infinitely flexible system, a method of local government had been adapted to the varying shapes and sizes of the tribes in Tanganyika. Their confidence had at last been won, at least to some extent, and the system had been turned into a kind of political kindergarten, a shock absorber for the devastating impact between primitive Africa and twentieth-century Europe. Even under the most ideal conditions of transfer could any other Power be expected to carry on a system such as this?

Great Britain had learned by experience the temptations which could arise from the possession of colonial power. She had also learned the various checks which had to be developed against such abuse. Enlightened self-interest carried one a certain way, but history showed that it would not go far enough. Probably one of the greatest factors for softening the hard grip of Europe upon native and primitive peoples had been Christianity. Another most potent check was that of free institutions, the greatest amount of publicity, parliamentary discussion, Royal Commissions and all the rest of the British apparatus of public enquiry and reform. In both cases the speaker left the audience to draw the antithesis in the case of Germany. Thirdly, Great Britain had learned how easy it was to expect too much of Africa, to over-exploit, to over-produce. German scientists would be quite capable of dealing with technical matters such as soil erosion, but what about that more dangerous erosion, that of native society crumbling under the pressure of twentieth-century European industrial exploitation? Only a day or two ago Dr. Goebbels had said that if the British did not produce very much at present in those colonies Germany would show us how to produce more.

Great Britain was just beginning to realise that imperialism was ɔt a good thing. It contained the elements of demoralisation both r the ruler and the ruled, and our hope had been that in a not very r-distant period imperialism would be brought to an end. How uld this be done? The way was embodied in the Covenant of the ague of Nations, the Mandatory system of teaching backward oples to stand by themselves. Great Britain was committed to is not only by her promises under the Covenant but by her own stitutions. Could she hope that if she gave up the colonies there ɔuld be this shortening of the period of imperialism and not an definite prolongation with continued embarrassment and grave litical international dangers? Germany had rejected the Mandates stem in advance. Hitler had ridiculed our "weak conception" of ching subject peoples how to do without us. Let us for once face fact that we were going to do evil that good might come and at st reduce the evil to the smallest possible proportions.

SIR MALCOLM ROBERTSON said that perhaps the most interesting t of the lecturer's address was the question: Was it possible to isfy Germany by colonial concession? His answer was in the ative. Few people realised the fundamental importance of Hitler's k *Mein Kampf*. A peer with whom the speaker had had a slight in the Press had said that Hitler's book had been written in prison 1925, but as a matter of fact the second half had been written a ple of years later. The Führer of the German Reich says in his k:

'We must again devote ourselves to representing the highest points of view very foreign policy, that is to say bringing the land into its proper proportion he numbers of the population . . ." (p. 735).

'As our forefathers did not receive the land on which we live to-day as a from heaven but had to conquer it by staking their lives, so in the future act of grace by any people can assign to us the land, and so life for our ɔle, but only the force of a victorious sword. However much we may all gnise the necessity for a reckoning with France this would yet remain fective if it were to become the only goal of foreign policy. It can only sense if it acts as a cover for an enlargement of the living room of our ɔle *in Europe*. It is not to colonial acquisition that we must look for a tion of this question but exclusively to the acquisition of territory for lement which will increase the area of the Motherland . . ." (p. 740).

'We finally part with the colonial and trade policy of the period before the and pass over to the land policy of the future . . ." (p. 742).

'I freely acknowledge that even in the period before the War I should have it to have been better if Germany, renouncing her inane colonial policy, commercial fleet and Navy, had set herself against Russia in alliance with land and so gone over from a weak world policy to a determined European cy of acquiring continental territory . . ." (p. 753).

'Take every care that the strength of our people has its foundations not in nies but in the land of its home in Europe. Do not look upon the Reich as re if it cannot give for centuries to come its own piece of land and soil to y branch of our people. Never forget that the holiest right on this earth is right to land for one's own cultivation and that the holiest sacrifice is the d that one spills for this land" (p. 754).

There in the Führer's own words was the answer to the question put by the lecturer. If further evidence of this fundamental German policy of acquiring territory in Europe were needed it was but necessary to study with care the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, which were especially interesting treaties when compared with the Treaty of Versailles which was open to so much heart-burning and self-criticism on the part of people in Great Britain. Some people thought that the Mandated territories, which were not British colonies, should be returned to Germany. But Germans themselves said that this would not be enough. They would want more. And, secondly, they demanded the return of the colonies as a right and would not make it a bargaining-counter. This was what British people had to consider: Was it possible to keep the peace by handing Germany back her former colonies? The speaker doubted it.

Lord Arnold said that he was glad that the moral issue had been mentioned. A great many people seemed to think that there was no moral issue involved. To-night the lecturer had reminded his audience of Article 5 of President Wilson's Fourteen Points which had been the basis of the Armistice: that there should be a free, open and absolutely impartial adjustment of colonial claims. It was not only difficult but impossible to reconcile that with the fact that at Versailles every yard of territory which Germany possessed had been taken away from her. The speaker did not agree that Article 5 had been wiped out because Germany had signed the Treaty of Versailles. It had been a dictated treaty signed at the point of the bayonet. Mr. Lloyd George had admitted that there had been aeroplanes ready to attack if Germany did not sign. This was one of the last injustices of the Versailles Treaty which remained, the colonial question.

The speaker said that the second speaker in the discussion had indulged in such an assumption of moral rectitude and almost omnipotence on the part of the British that it had made him gasp. She did not seem to be aware of the fact that there were critics, even in Great Britain, of British government of native races. Sir Edward Grigg had said that the claim that Germany was not fit to govern colonial territory had never been justified and should be removed. A writer in the press, a Lecturer of Manchester University, had said that study of the history of Africa during the period from 1884 onward led him to believe that Teutonic rule in East Africa had been at least as enlightened as French rule in Equatorial Africa, as Belgian rule in the Congo area, as British government in the East African Protectorate now known as Kenya, and as the government in any of the Portuguese colonies ruled from Lisbon. Then there was for Great Britain the question of the colour bar in South Africa, the confiscation of the political rights of the Cape natives during the last two or three years, the forced labour which was still a part of British policy in certain African territories, and also the loss of the best territory in Kenya by the natives so that the white settlers should be supplied with the

best land. The British assumption of moral rectitude must be intolerable to Germany. The speaker was not suggesting that the only territory to be transferred to Germany should be British colonial territory; on the contrary, a letter had appeared in *The Times* of February 3rd, 1937, written by Sir Claud Russell, suggesting that part of Western Nigeria should be given and also part of the Cameroons, some of the Portuguese possessions and part of the Belgian Congo area. The speaker thought that many natives would prefer to be under German rule rather than under the rule of some of the before-mentioned Powers. It was also true that in certain stages of the last War the natives had fought better for the Germans than had some natives for the other Powers.

The lecturer had admitted the "colonial lie." It had been a mistake to take the colonies, and now there was a chance of undoing it. There was at present a most extraordinary disparity in the distribution of territory and mineral wealth. It had been estimated that there were twenty-five minerals and commodities essential for modern life. Of these the British Empire had adequate supplies in no less than eighteen, Germany in four, Italy in four, and Japan in three. From the point of view of territory Great Britian and the British Empire, France and her colonies, and Russia comprised about half the world; with the addition of the United States of America it came to two-thirds; when China and Brazil were added, those six Powers would be found to own three-quarters of the world's territory, while the remaining 68 nations, including Germany, Italy and Japan, had the rest.

Many persons did not consider the colonies of much economic use, but the Germans thought otherwise, and although most of the territory in question was not suitable for white populations the Germans were very energetic in intensive development; they were very good at that sort of thing and might develop these territories in a way which would lead to very much greater production than that yet achieved by other Powers. Great Britain had so many colonies that great production in any one of them did not matter, but the Germans had none. The major production of rubber and palm oil came from colonies. Those were important products.

Most important of all, some such settlement would do a great deal to satisfy German prestige. The psychological effect would be enormous. Although, as the lecturer had said, it might not be possible to satisfy all Germany's claims with colonies, a satisfactory colonial settlement would pave the way to peace. Mr. Amery, able though his arguments were, would not be able entirely to satisfy Germany with economic help in Eastern and Central Europe, important though that might be. If the colonial question were not settled it might be one of the events leading up to another war, if not the main cause of it. What would the verdict of posterity be if war were allowed to come about the transfer or non-transfer of a comparatively trifling amount of tropical territory which not one Englishman in a thousand

could accurately locate on the map? Mr. Lansbury had said in the House of Commons that the world was mad. It was to be hoped that it was not as mad as that.

Mr. Wickham Steed said that the last speaker had made a valuable contribution by pointing out that a suggestion had been made in *The Times* that not only Great Britain should make a contribution in Africa to Germany but that parts at least of the Belgian Congo and Angola should also be contributed. This was a very shrewd suggestion and perhaps, when the history of recent fox-hunting came to be revealed, it might be seen that the fox had run very much in this direction. The third speaker had quite rightly said that the second volume of *Mein Kampf* had not been written in prison but afterwards. It was written, in fact, with the help of members of the German General Staff, and the strategical conceptions in it were very important. It was doubtful if there were one single person in the group to which the fourth speaker belonged who could read German sufficiently well to read this book, and there was no adequate English edition. Hitler had taken great care of that. The English edition was only about one-fifth of the original work. It was very necessary not to establish the one rule against which the whole of the British Commonwealth, as well as all civilised countries, protested: that might was right.

Dr. T. Drummond Shiels said that the colonial question was not one problem but many problems; and the return of the German colonies was not, strictly speaking, a colonial problem at all.

As far as we knew, the German demand had never been precisely formulated. It was not known whether Britain only was supposed to contribute or whether other Powers or the Dominions were also involved. The proposed machinery of transfer was not disclosed; or whether Germany was willing to accept a Mandate. So it was only possible to arrive at a few general principles to be applied when information was forthcoming.

Undoubtedly, to prove her desire for friendship with the German people, Great Britain was willing to concede reasonable demands in any sphere. There would, however, be strong and widespread objection to buying German friendship at the cost of the desertion by Great Britain of other friendly countries; of a set-back to international action towards world disarmament and economic co-operation; or of a betrayal of our native peoples. If Germany insisted on colonies first, and conditions afterwards, Great Britain should recognise that acceptance would only be the beginning of further demands under the threat of force.

Perhaps the most important Colonial consideration—if the matter went so far—was that of the retention of the Mandates system in any new arrangement. The speaker thought that—whatever its origins—it would be generally agreed that the Mandates system marked a

great advance in international and national morality in the bestowal and acceptance of responsibility for the development and welfare of primitive peoples. International supervision, indeed, might well be further extended. It was desirable, even in the case of a democratic Power, where the exposure of maladministration or local injustices was comparatively easy. As Lord Lytton had pointed out (in an admirable series of speeches on this subject at the International Studies Conference on "Peaceful Change" in Paris a few months ago) in Germany there was no free parliament, no free press, and no complaints against authority could be made with safety. When, in addition, the racial theories of the present German Government were remembered, it would surely be a betrayal of the trust which Great Britain had undertaken even to contemplate handing back these native peoples without their consent and without very real safeguards. Although this case did not rest on the demerits of German colonial methods, it was, nevertheless, true that the task of the British administration in Tanganyika had been to gather together the threads of native society which had been broken under the former German régime. If insistence on mandatory conditions caused allegations of inferiority of status, an international Colonial pool might be considered. We should not, however, contemplate any territorial or other adjustments with Germany except as part of a comprehensive and satisfactory international settlement.

Our own Colonial problem was that of the well-being and happiness of the peoples of our colonies and protectorates. Unfortunately, the British public always forgot about their colonies until there was a riot, or some other trouble, or until, as now, they became factors or pawns in international negotiations. Notwithstanding good intentions, and considerable successful efforts, many British overseas peoples were under-nourished, unhealthy, and had low standards of life. That was, for us, the real colonial problem; and a greater attention to it would not only be humanly and economically profitable, but would also be a truly international contribution. Our coloured peoples were restless and critical. It would not be wise to alienate them either by diplomatic injustice or by neglect of their needs, as this would weaken the physical and mental resources and the unity and concord of the British Commonwealth of peoples. And, while British administration was by no means perfect, the British Empire, with all its imperfections, should continue to be the greatest international factor in the preservation of democracy and world peace.

LORD NOEL-BUXTON referred to the lecturer's view that German policy was of the heroic not the objective kind. In that case, did he think that Sir Edward Grey had been wrong (it had been said how alike the present German outlook was to that held before the War) when he had endeavoured to meet the craving of the German people for colonies? Perhaps he had thought that if Germany were granted an Empire this would be a sufficient reason for not risking those

colonies in war. This argument had been used the other day, in favour of returning the colonies, by Lord Samuel in the House of Lords.

Would the lecturer also give a little more of his opinion on the native question, because the experts did differ on this matter? What difference would the existing Nazi régime and racial theories make to the actual administration of the colonies? The German administration had had great admirers in the past. It had had terrible blots, as had all records in the early days of the exploitation of Africa by foreign Powers. But the record had changed in the years immediately previous to the Great War. Obviously, the change would be painful, and would mean a certain loss; but Great Britain had not hesitated to inflict a change after the War, and this alone should not be accounted as sufficient reason for withholding the colonies from Germany. The District Commissioners would, of course, be Nazis; but would this inflict great hardship on the natives? There would be keen exploitation, but already in theory keen exploitation was carried on by Great Britain. The racial theory would not involve a hatred of the natives like that of the Jews. They would not have seized professional positions or laid themselves open to animosity. No doubt there would be strong efforts to prevent a population of half-castes, but was that a terrible charge? It certainly was not so in British eyes.

MR. HAROLD NICOLSON said, in regard to *Mein Kampf*, that the only criticism that might be made was that perhaps its anti-French bias had been a little affected by the occupation of the Ruhr which was still fresh in Hitler's mind. *Mein Kampf* was still continuously and almost compulsorily circulated in Germany; it was what Herr Hitler and his people really did think; it was therefore a document of vital importance, and there should be a really good English translation of the first German edition. It was both very unfortunate and very wrong that English students who could not read, not German, but the strange sub-Austrian dialect used by the writer, should be deprived of that first German edition, now suppressed even in Germany, where Hitler had said that the Germans were the most gullible race on earth, and that if they were told a big enough lie sufficiently often they would believe it.

The last speaker had asked whether Sir Edward Grey had thought that he could satisfy the Germans by the grant of colonial territories belonging to the Portuguese. Probably the situation had been very much the same as at present. There had been a dual drive to satisfy Germany. On the one hand there had been the question of the reversion of the Portuguese colonies and on the other the idea of the Baghdad Railway. Then as now there had been a terrific desire for an understanding with Germany. We knew now how those efforts had been misunderstood in Germany; how they had been met with obstinacy and suspicion, distrust and rancour. Sir Edward Grey, if he had known of this reaction, would probably have said that it might

be impossible to satisfy the Germans, but it *was* possible to satisfy one's own conscience. In the same way now every effort should be made towards a more satisfactory state of public conscience.

Also, had Sir Edward Grey thought that colonies for Germany would be hostages to fortune? The lecturer did not think so. He thought that Sir Edward Grey had had such a simple mind that he would not have thought in this intricate way. But it was true that those who had tried at the Paris Conference to prevent all Germany's colonies being taken away from her had used that argument, and also the argument that it would be very dangerous to have a great European Power completely unaffected by the colour problem, with no responsibilities in regard to this problem when it arose, as it certainly would arise.

He thought that probably most people would be agreed upon the answer to the question: Was it possible to satisfy Germany by colonial concessions? Firstly, it would be very difficult to make those concessions, and secondly, they would be very unlikely to satisfy Germany. But considered as a small part of a very much wider and more important general settlement, they would assume their rightful place and proportion; they should never be treated as a side issue apart from the main front.

THE UNITED STATES AND BRITISH POLICY [1]

Mr. H. Wickham Steed

I went to the United States this autumn for a special reason and on a special errand. During the past eighteen months a few people in this country belonging to all British parties and some people belonging to no British party have been meeting at irregular intervals to consider the "Defence of Freedom and Peace." They are not an organisation. They have been called a focus. The late Sir Austen Chamberlain attended one or two of our meetings. Sir Archibald Sinclair and other Liberals, Mr. Winston Churchill and other Conservatives, Sir Walter Citrine and other members of the Trade Union movement and some of the Labour Party have taken part as individuals, entirely on a non-party basis, and we have worked out various statements of aims and principles which we have tried to make known. Our object has been to allow any British Government (the present National Government or any other) to know where it could get solid support in Great Britain if it followed a policy based on certain fundamental ideas, these ideas being essential, in our view, to the continued existence of the British Commonwealth itself.

Some Americans heard of these activities as long ago as last January, and they asked me if I would come over to the United States and suggest how something similar could be done over there. I said that on no conditions whatever would I go to the United States and suggest that Americans should do anything at all. Nothing could be more fatal. I was not then free; later in the year when they returned to the charge I was freer, and said I would go over in October, solely to tell them what was being done in this country, and leave them to draw their own conclusions if they wished to draw them.

One of the reasons why I was pressed to go in the last instance was that we worked out last July a draft statement of policy, which one American visitor saw and thought so nearly a statement of what ought to be American policy that he insisted it should be communicated confidentially to certain associations in the United

[1] Address at Chatham House on November 25th, 1937, by Mr. H. Wickham Steed; with Professor C. K. Webster, Litt.D., F.B.A., in the Chair.

States. This draft policy has not yet been made public in Great Britain; but it has been agreed to by some members of all parties, and so, since this statement of policy was the axis around which whatever I could say in the United States revolved, I will quote its main lines:

> The aim of British policy should be to uphold and defend the vital interests and free civilisation of Great Britain and the British Commonwealth and, in co-operation with other countries, to safeguard peace. The methods of attaining this aim are: (*a*) to ban aggressive violence from international relations, to restore respect for treaties and covenants, and *for this purpose* [these are very important words] to raise and to keep the armed strength of Great Britain and the Commonwealth up to whatever level may be needed; (*b*) to co-ordinate, through the League of Nations and otherwise, political, economic and military strength, so as to deter and, if need be, to resist armed aggression; (*c*) to discountenance and counteract aggression in the form of propaganda; (*d*) to promote impartial inquiry into international grievances and peaceful redress of proved wrongs.
>
> While recognising that all civilised peoples are entitled to choose their own political and social systems, British policy must nevertheless seek to support at all times the positive principles of responsible individual freedom, under representative democratic government, upon which the British Commonwealth is founded. Among these principles are respect for individual human rights, toleration of racial, religious and political differences and free association between the members and sections of the community, all of which are essential conditions of the establishment of peace. British policy, therefore, must oppose in the international sphere intolerance and recourse to arbitrary violence. It must favour methods of impartial inquiry and peaceful adjustment, and the willing acceptance of a common law of nations, and it must be ready to join others in withstanding breaches of this law as the only way to diminish armaments and to create peace.

I spoke in public in the United States only once or twice, but I spoke confidentially to the Council on Foreign Relations, to the Foreign Policy Association, to the New York Jewish Committee, to the Harvard Club, and various other gatherings. I met also some responsible executive officers of the United States. In all quarters I was assured that our draft policy is in accord with American ideas, and I was asked whether I could give them the assurance that it was, or would be, British policy. I said: "I cannot. I can only tell you what some of us are trying to do."

Now, the first thing that struck me, in Canada to begin with, and then later in the United States, was the prevalence of a mood

which Canadians and Americans alike call "defeatism." It was a thing I had not expected to find. To define it is not easy. It is a mood compounded of dejection and fright. It is the mood of people who feel that the world as they see it, with democracy and the things they believe in, is slipping away from them, and that there is nothing to be done about it. These people are good souls, honestly bewildered, not knowing which way to turn. Their present mood is "anti," not "pro." In American home affairs this mood is marked by sceptical and critical opposition to President Roosevelt's New Deal, and in foreign affairs by isolationism. But those who are in this mood recognise, with irritation, that isolationism may no longer be practicable. In part, but only in part, this mood is an outcome of the mainly negative foreign policy followed in the United States since 1920. It springs from reluctant recognition of the truth that, as a recent American writer put it, this negative policy has steadily helped to lose the peace after the United States had helped to win the War.

Up to 1929, abounding prosperity was taken as proof of America's wisdom in clearing out of Europe and leaving the Allies to fend for themselves. But the great crisis of November 1929 shook this belief severely. Any hope there may have been of prompt recovery when I was in the United States some seven years ago was completely swept away by the deeper wave of depression in 1931 and 1932. And from 1932, or the beginning of 1933, onwards, the semi-socialism of President Roosevelt added to the alarm which the depression itself had inspired. At intervals, it is true, the United States Government, with varying degrees of support from public opinion, had striven for some sort of international co-operation. The Washington treaties of 1921–22, the Kellogg Pact in 1928, the Hoover Moratorium, and the Stimson proposals for Anglo-American co-operation in the Far East in 1932 were all instances of an American desire to escape from isolation. Of these efforts, the Stimson proposals and their rejection by Great Britain are now chiefly remembered. Disappointment at the British refusal, to which the present position in the Far East is widely attributed, was (and is) deep and bitter. During my visit I found this disappointment still lurking everywhere. Again and again, in public and in private, I was questioned upon the British reasons for having refused Mr. Stimson's invitation; and it is an interesting fact that nowhere, either in public or in private, was I questioned upon the payment of War debts.

The reception given to President Roosevelt's Chicago speech, with its warning that neither isolation nor neutrality will keep the

United States from being drawn into a major war, needs to be judged in the light of these antecedents. Against the President's domestic record large numbers of influential Americans in both parties inveigh vehemently. They think his New Deal little better than spoliation; though as they admit he has the people with him they despair of checking what they regard as his headlong course. Their belief in the Supreme Court as the constitutional custodian of the sacred rights of property has been outraged by his attack upon the Supreme Court Judges, and particularly by his recent appointment of Senator Black, a New Dealer of somewhat mottled political reputation, to be one of its Judges. And when President Roosevelt tells the country that it must take part in the search for peace, and join in withstanding aggression since neither isolation nor neutrality will offer a way to safety, defeatist opponents gnash their teeth and aver that the United States intends to keep out of foreign entanglements and war though democratic civilisation itself go to the devil.

That, as nearly as I can judge, is the mood which Americans call "defeatism." I will give reasons in a moment for thinking that it is not quite so deep as it is widespread. President Roosevelt's Chicago speech, extracts from which I will quote, gave it a jolt. His speech was not improvised. I understand that it, or a draft of it, was written in the State Department of Washington a full month before the President started on his trip through the country, though the President is said to have completely rewritten it before he delivered it. He may not have made up his mind whether to deliver it, or anything like it; but when he had been through the West and the Middle West, those parts of the United States which most foreigners and several Americans wrongly think more backward in regard to international affairs than other parts, he delivered the speech in Chicago, deliberately taking that great Middle West city as his platform. Now, if you bear in mind the impact upon American opinion of things that have taken place in the world and in Europe recently, you will be able to judge the kind of atmosphere in which the President was speaking. The American public as a whole are far better informed about international affairs than the British public. The American papers carry, probably, two columns of information upon international affairs, European, British and so on, for every column or half-column carried by leading English newspapers. And as they look upon these things from a distance and see them in perspective they are very often able to form a pretty shrewd judgment upon the way things are going. To put it mildly, the

course of British policy since, say, 1932 has bewildered them. They could not see what we were driving at—and I do not blame them. As they credit us invariably with great subtlety of mind and with deep, long-thought-out designs, their bewilderment was the more extreme; and because they cannot understand us they become, in the words of a very important British statesman whom I have seen since my return, "suspicious of us." Though we do not realise it, our minds are subtle. It is only when we see a great example of British subtlety, like the late Lord Balfour, that we recognise there may be something in this American suspicion. We are constant applicants of the principle of relativity, and often seem to have no other principle whatever.

Into American bewilderment, and mindful of the Neutrality Legislation passed only last year and of the desire to keep the United States out of any kind of war—and with all the American Peace Organisations saying "There is one thing we will not do: we will never, never, never fight for anything at all"—President Roosevelt projected his Chicago speech.

I will not quote the whole of it, but I ask you to reflect whether there is any British statesman in office who would have been capable of speaking so frankly to a British audience:

> Some nine years ago the hopes of mankind for a continuing era of international peace were raised to great heights when more than sixty nations solemnly pledged themselves not to resort to war as an instrument of national policy. The high aspirations expressed in the Briand–Kellogg Pact and the hopes for peace thus raised have of late given way to haunting fears of calamity. The present reign of terror and international lawlessness began a few years ago. It began through unjustified interference in the internal affairs of other nations and the invasion of alien territory in violation of treaties, and has now reached a stage where the very foundations of civilisation are seriously threatened. The landmarks and traditions which have marked the progress of civilisation towards a condition of law, order and justice are being wiped away without a declaration of war and without warning or justification of any kind. Civilians, including women and children, are ruthlessly murdered with bombs from the air. In time of so-called peace ships are being attacked and sunk by submarines without cause or notice. Nations are fomenting and taking sides in civil wars in nations that have never done them harm. Nations claiming freedom for themselves deny it to others. Innocent people and nations are being cruelly sacrificed to the greed for power and supremacy, devoid of all sense of justice and human consideration. If those things come to pass in other parts of the world, let no one imagine that America will escape, that it may expect mercy, that this Western Hemisphere will not be attacked

and will continue tranquilly and peacefully to carry on the ethics and the arts of civilisation. If those days come, there will be no safety by arms, no answer in science. The storm will rage till every flower of culture is trampled underfoot and all human beings involved in a vast chaos. Those who cherish their freedom, and recognise and expect equal rights and wish their neighbours to be free and live in peace, must work together for the triumph of law and moral principles in order that peace, justice, and confidence may prevail in the world. There must be a return to the belief in the pledged word and the value of signed treaties. There must be recognition of the fact that national morality is as vital as private morality. The situation is definitely of universal concern. The questions involved relate not merely to violations of specific provisions of particular treaties; they are questions of war and peace, of international law and especially of principles of humanity. It is true they involve definite violations of agreements, especially the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Briand–Kellogg Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty, but they also involve the problems of world economics, world security and world humanity. It is true that the moral consciousness of the world must recognise the importance of the removal of injustices and well-founded grievances but, at the same time, it must be aroused to the cardinal necessity of honouring the sanctity of treaties and the respective rights and liberties of others and putting an end to acts of international aggression. . . . The will for peace on the part of the peace-loving nations must express itself to the end that nations which may be tempted to violate agreements and the rights of others will desist from such a course. There must be positive endeavours to preserve peace. America hates war. America hopes for peace. Therefore America actively engages in the search for peace.

You may imagine the sensation which that speech caused in the United States. And my Republican friends [and I must admit most of my friends in the United States belong to the Republican Party and are political opponents of President Roosevelt] said, "We hate the President's home politics. We think what he is doing about the Supreme Court is wicked, but in this thing we are with him one hundred per cent." Next day, October 6th, this speech was published in the American Press. On the morrow, October 7th, the *New York Times* printed one of the most striking pronouncements I have ever read in an American newspaper, in the form of a letter from Mr. Henry L. Stimson, former Secretary of State. This letter, which filled eight columns of the *New York Times* in small type, bore a postscript: "Since writing the foregoing letter has come the President's Chicago speech. I am filled with hope that active

leadership on his part will result in a new birth of American courage in facing and carrying through our responsibilities in this crisis."

Mr. Stimson, of course, is a Republican, a political opponent of the President. I do not know, as I was not here, whether the letter has received in this country anything like the attention it deserves. There is a tremendous indictment of Japan, some of the things you would look for in vain in our most outspoken popular papers, to say nothing of the great organs which are supposed to represent our considered opinion. The following is an extract :

> In general, Japan is trying to take control of the development of modern China and to twist its form and nature to suit her own aims both political and economic. She is trying to develop China in a way the exact opposite of the policy of the Open Door and the Nine-Power Treaty. Japan makes no secret of this. We do not have to guess. We have the perfectly frank exposition of her plan in what she has done in Manchukuo and North China. She does not contemplate the preservation of China's territorial and administrative integrity. She is actually engaged in carving up China's territory and herself taking over China's administration. She is not proposing equal commercial opportunity amongst the nations dealing with China. She is seeking to monopolise opportunity, and has taken effective steps to do so in Manchukuo. She is thus trying completely to transform China's own business methods and character and culture and to dominate them to her own national ends. Furthermore, she is not seeking to do this by persuasion, education or other peaceful means, but by terrorism of a most brutal and barbarous kind. . . . Let me make it absolutely clear that Japan's position as a war-making nation is far from being self-contained. She is practically dependent upon the outside world for her ability to attack China. While she has ample facilities for manufacturing weapons of all kinds, she is extraordinarily lacking in raw materials with which to carry on such manufactures. In that respect she is extremely vulnerable. She has no supplies of oil worthy of the name. She has no supplies of rubber whatever. She has very little iron ore, one-seventh of what she would use in peace-time, and she has almost no cotton. Further, the peculiarity of Japan's economic condition is that she purchases her supplies of these vitally essential commodities from a very few nations, and by far the principal sellers are Great Britain and ourselves. During the eighteen months prior to June 1936 she purchased seventy-five per cent. of her oil from us and one half of her importation of iron ore and scrap iron also came from us. During the same period over eighty per cent. of her imports of raw cotton came from the United States and British India, and her principal supplies of rubber came from the British Straits Settlements. Again, in Japan the present tottering financial

conditions make her purchases of material for guns and ammunition only possible by selling enough of her own products to obtain the necessary foreign exchange to pay for her purchases. One of these principal Japanese exports is raw silk, one of the most generally distributed throughout the Japanese Empire; the production of raw silk takes place virtually in every peasant's home and farm. Of that product the United States purchased in 1935 eighty-five per cent. and in the first six months of 1936 eighty-one per cent., with Great Britain taking nearly all the rest. With the foreign exchange thus obtained Japan purchases from us, as I have said, the raw material for her ends. . . .

In the light of these facts the first question that I would ask of the American and British peoples is: Does the safety of the American nation and the safety of the British Empire require that we go on helping Japan to exterminate by the methods she is daily employing the gallant Chinese soldiers with whom she is confronted, not to speak of the civilian population which she is engaged in terrorising? Is the condition of our statesmanship so pitifully inadequate that we cannot devise a simple means of international co-operation which would stop our participation in this slaughter? I for one do not think so. I believe it can be done, and done effectively without serious danger to us.

The second great fact which the present situation brings out is the deep-seated error which has pervaded recent American thinking on international matters. I have heard Theodore Roosevelt say that he put peace above everything except righteousness. Where the two came into conflict he supported righteousness. In our recent efforts to avoid war we have reversed this principle, and are trying to put peace above righteousness. We have thereby gone far towards killing the influence of our country in the progress of the world. At the same time, instead of protecting, we have endangered our own peace. Our recent neutrality legislation was an attempt to impose a dead level of neutral conduct on the part of our Government between right and wrong, between an aggressor and its victim, between the breaker of the law of nations and the nations who are trying to uphold law. It won't work. Such a policy of amoral drift by such a safe and powerful nation as our own will only set back the hand of progress. It will not save us from entanglement. It will even make entanglement more certain. History has already amply proved this last fact.

In my view this is a very important pronouncement, and one which ought not to be overlooked or ignored in Great Britain, if we wish to retain that cohesion with the nations of the British Commonwealth which is essential to any British foreign policy.

You may have noticed the somewhat striking coincidence of

phrase and idea and of principle between the policy outlined in the extracts I have quoted from President Roosevelt's Chicago speech and from Mr. Stimson's letter, and the British draft statement of policy which I referred to earlier. In Canada, where I was before the Chicago speech and before the publication of the Stimson letter, I was given the impression that Canada is almost paralysed. If international complications occur a good many of her people will say, " Well, what are we going to do? We went into the other war and did our bit, and this is the result. Cannot we keep out? And then what is the United States going to do? How can we again go into war without knowing when the United States is coming in? " And I was assured that if the people in the United States would accept the principles laid down in our draft policy Canada's position would be much easier. Canadians could work with the United States and with Great Britain. We cannot hope to have the complete spontaneous adherence of the nations of the Commonwealth to any British policy that may be followed—when we know what British policy is—unless it be such as to command the assent of the democratic communities of New Zealand, Australia, Canada, South Africa, and so on. That to me seems to be a vital British interest which every British policy ought to take into account.

Since I returned from the United States something has developed which was not foreseen in the middle of October—the Halifax visit to Berlin. I have only had one communication from the United States bearing on that visit. But it echoes or rather crystallises a feeling which was expressed to me in several quarters in the United States, a feeling of doubt and bewilderment about British policy and of the lengths to which it is seemingly prepared to go in renouncing or not acting up to the principles on which Americans believe Great Britain and the British Commonwealth stand. It is almost as hard to put that feeling into words as it was to get at the bottom of American defeatism. But since my return I have had occasion, in quite another connection, to look through Rudyard Kipling's poems, and I re-read a poem that occurs in his *History of England* upon the behaviour of Ethelred the Unready and the advice of his wise men who could only recommend him to buy off the Danes with hard cash called Danegeld. The Danes, said Kipling, " pocketed the silver pennies, laughed and came back for more." Here are the lines, which are probably familiar to you. They express so completely the feeling which I found underlying American minds that I will quote some of them :

"It is always a temptation to a rich and lazy nation
To puff and look important and to say:
'Though we know we should defeat you, we have not the time to meet you,
We will therefore pay you cash to go away.'

"And that is called paying the Danegeld;
But we've proved it again and again,
That if once you have paid him the Danegeld
You never get rid of the Dane.

"It is wrong to put temptation in the path of any nation
For fear they should succumb and go astray,
So when you are requested to pay up or be molested
You will find it better policy to say:

"'We never pay anyone Danegeld,
No matter how trifling the cost,
For the end of that game is oppression and shame,
And the nation that plays it is lost!'"

To-day there is, in the United States and in the British Commonwealth, not to say anything of the other European countries, a feeling of wonder whether Great Britain is not on the road to the payment of Danegeld. We must be careful about it, because by the time we have paid, it will be too late to remedy the mistake. And in the *Manchester Guardian* yesterday [1] in an article from the Diplomatic Correspondent, there is this passage of which I most heartily approve:

"For this country acquiescence or acceptance of the German proposals would mean a crisis in Anglo-French relations. It would profoundly disturb Anglo-American relations, which have been developing somewhat favourably of late. It would isolate Great Britain and compel her to carry out a programme of rearmament far more prodigious than her present programme, for she would have to make up for the loss of good and powerful friends."

That is exactly what the United States is thinking.

Now, you may say, echoing what has been said to me by a good many of my fellow-countrymen since my return, "What the devil is the good of the United States, anyway? They are always rolling out platitudes. You get Mr. Cordell Hull pleading for an Anglo-American trade agreement, and thinking that the restoration or promotion of better trade will turn the minds of the nations towards peace, and all that America does is to pass neutrality legislation and to say that she is going to keep out of everything and won't play up. She came into the War late and

[1] November 24th, 1937.

went out early, and she's been collecting War debts whenever she could ever since. What is the good of counting upon these people?" I do not think anyone will deny that that sort of thing can be heard in Great Britain. And the very important Briton, to whom I alluded earlier, said to me, "Americans are always so suspicious of us." Well, there is a very wide and deep gulf between the average American way of looking at things and ours. The gulf is not narrowed by the fact that we possess an approximately common language. And this approximately common language, accompanied as it is by a wide difference of background in our minds and in American minds, often makes understanding difficult and misunderstanding very easy. But when H. G. Wells said the other day, after talking with President Roosevelt, that the President is trying to educate "a very old-fashioned people," he was quite right. In their general ways of thought, not on mechanics or business matters but of political thought, the Americans are an old-fashioned people. Their minds are hedged about with all sorts of notions that come from the eighteenth century through their constitution. The Declaration of Independence came partly out of John Locke and partly from the French Encyclopedists. Their minds are hedged about with these ideas which we have, perhaps more wrongly than rightly, discarded. And we have hardly learned, I feel quite sure that there is hardly one man in the present British National Government who has ever learned, to think American. We may talk English, but we cannot think American, and it is essential that a certain number of English minds should learn to think in American, if we are really going to work together.

It is quite true that Mr. Cordell Hull attaches great importance to an Anglo-American trade agreement. He attaches importance to it because he believes, perhaps more fervently than some of us do, in the unifying and mollifying effects of trade. We heard so much of that in the years before 1914—that war could never come when the nations were bound together with links of gold and by economic ties—and I do not subscribe to his belief with an entire absence of qualification. Still Mr. Cordell Hull believes in it, very sincerely, and believes it because he thinks that the political consequences which will flow from this solidarity and goodwill will be highly important—and there I do agree with him. I think we could do nothing better even if we have to sacrifice, or compensate a certain loss of, trade in British Columbia apples. Mr. Cordell Hull's view is shared, perhaps not quite so fully, by President Roosevelt. But President Roosevelt, anxious as he is

to do everything that he can to educate his people—and here I think I can guess what is in his mind—anxious as he is to convince his people of the fundamental truth of a doctrine which is not yet fully accepted in Great Britain, that neutrality and peace are incompatible, anxious as he is to link up with other countries, with every honest and consistent endeavour to deter aggression, to remedy proved wrongs or grievances, cannot and does not intend to be pushed into a position in which he will either stand before his people as an exponent of British Foreign Office policy, whatever that may be, or as the sort of gentleman who marches in front of the band like a drum-major waving something with a brass knob on the end of it while the people lag behind or are marching in the other direction. He is much too able a politician for that. And I am quite certain that there are one or two things which every British Minister and every British politician and every British journalist who cares for Anglo-American relations ought to bear in mind: never to expect, never even to think it possible that Washington can act upon British ideas for what we may think good British reasons. If Washington acts, Washington must act for good American reasons understood by the American people. We should never forget that no President, although his executive power is very great, though he is king and Prime Minister in one, can really march ahead of one of the most difficult and restive public opinions in the world. American opinion may surge very strongly, almost violently in a given direction, and then surge back even more swiftly. For this reason the United States will not take and will not allow leadership to be thrust upon it. It will adhere in international affairs to what President Roosevelt called a "good neighbour" policy, which he defined in a speech at Buenos Aires a year ago by saying, "The vote of the United States in pan-American affairs counts exactly the same, one vote, as that of the Republic of San Salvador." We must not expect in international affairs that the United States will come along and say, "I lead." Woodrow Wilson may have done it at a given moment. It will not be repeated. But the American people will back up any President who, seeing British policy to be running upon lines of which Americans approve, lines which are thought in America, and I think rightly, to be indispensable to the cohesion of the British Commonwealth, supports that policy without being asked. This is the key to Anglo-American relations.

The fact is that Great Britain holds the key to-day, not only to Anglo-American relations but to the peace of Europe and the peace of the world. I firmly believe that the question of peace or

war in the world will be decided by whatever a British Government—with the approval of the British people, if they are kept properly informed—may decide to be British policy in the course of the next twelve months. There is a tendency of course in Great Britain to consider that these things must not be discussed, that they are confidential and sacred. The tendency is to act upon the words of a famous journalist during the War when the German air raids began upon London and we had no air defence, "All we need is darkness and composure." We found that during the war we needed other things than darkness and composure, and we shall find to-day that we need other things. We hold the key to the peace of the world and can save the world's peace provided our policy be visibly and consistently inspired by the desire to uphold those principles of individual freedom guaranteed by representative democratic institutions of which the famous Balfour Report said in 1926 with reference to the British Commonwealth, "Free institutions are its life-blood." How can we, without treason to the British Commonwealth itself—and this is what Americans feel—encourage the anti-democratic forces by our pusillanimity, our desire to pay a little tip to dictators in the form of Danegeld, how can we discourage those nations which uphold principles that are our very own? Can we say to them, "Go off and make the best bargain you can with the dictators"? How can we do that without preparing our own complete isolation and discomfiture? For there is one haunting fear at the back of American minds. It is not often expressed but it comes out sometimes. It is this: Suppose Great Britain blunders and lands Europe in another war—as the result of the British failure to declare that Great Britain could not be neutral landed Europe in the War of 1914. Suppose that happens again and Great Britain gets badly hit. Where is the United States? It cannot afford to let Great Britain go down. It will have to come in; but at what cost? The situation may have been hopelessly compromised. Whereas if Great Britain will now say, "We stand for freedom. We stand for these institutions which are our life-blood, without which our Commonwealth cannot stand. We will not bargain away these things for ourselves or others, and we let it be known," the whole outlook will change.

If Great Britain says this the peace-loving world will regain confidence while in the totalitarian countries, now so strongly armed, those who groan under those systems will be encouraged, a brake will be applied to them from the inside and not only from the outside. Indeed, the outlook of the world might change

within six months so completely that an Anglo-American trade understanding would be hailed as the prelude to a beginning of a period of peaceful regeneration.

Summary of Discussion

MR. H. H. HEMMING doubted whether there was such a thing as a Canadian point of view. Ottawa might have an international policy, but the other provinces were very divided in their opinions and much influenced by the Americans living immediately alongside. Those who thought about foreign policy at all either thought in terms of the American point of view or of their own local provincial outlook. For instance, the French Canadian point of view was to have no entanglements with anybody, Europe, or anybody else. It was a question, therefore, if there was such a thing as a Canadian attitude to foreign policy in the usual sense of the term.

SIR RONALD STORRS said that the lecturer had stated that, at the time of the Italo-Abyssinian crisis, it had been well known in the United States that they were ready to enforce an effective oil embargo. Sir Ronald had understood at that time that the contrary was the fact, and that the British would have imposed an oil embargo had they had even the faintest official expectation that the United States would back them up.

Similarly when the question was asked: " When would Great Britain cease to be on the run? " he thought that the answer was: " When it could have the faintest confidence that it would be backed up by the United States in the accomplishment of the duty imposed by the very high ideals which the States professed."

As for Mr. Stimson's remarks, they had left him quite cold. They had not seemed any fiercer than those printed in the British Press, and were not nearly as fierce as those which had issued forth from Brussels, where the words " barbarous," " murder " and " assassination " had been uttered.

MR. C. I. C. BOSANQUET said that he thought the question put by the previous speaker to be extremely important. Was the speech of President Roosevelt at Chicago a policy or merely a mood? Those who had read his words had watched anxiously to see what had happened at Brussels. Mr. Norman Davis had been seen to arrive and to sail away. There seemed to be a very great contrast between what America wanted and what America would do. Would the lecturer agree that the right policy for Great Britain would be to act boldly not with a promise from the United States, but in the confidence that if such action were right then support would be forthcoming?

SIR FREDERICK WHYTE said that the lecturer had remarked that Great Britain would best hold the Commonwealth together if she

supported a policy which would elicit a certain amount of approval and agreement from the United States. He had heard it put the other way round, that if Great Britain conducted her policy along lines which could command the assent of, say, the Dominion of Canada, then the assent of the United States might reasonably be expected to follow.

He had been one of those who set out with the belief, until he had read the documents very closely, that nearly all that had been said by Americans in favour of Mr. Stimson had been justified. He was more and more inclined to doubt whether that was the case. The speaker did not seek to justify Sir John Simon as Secretary of State, but he did not think that in late 1931 the case against the British Government was nearly so strong either as its domestic opponents or its American critics believed. Although he thought the lecturer had been a little sanguine in his generalisations regarding the British position in the world to-day and the possibilities of British action, nevertheless he agreed that given more favourable circumstances in more than one direction, she did in fact hold the key to the future of Europe.

DR. J. C. MAXWELL GARNETT referred to a statement by Senator Borah when the Peace Pact was negotiated that it was inconceivable that the United States would stand idly by in the event of a gross breach of a multilateral treaty, to which she was a party. There had been proof of the truth of this declaration on the three occasions afterwards—in connection with Manchuria during the dispute between Russia and China and during the crisis in 1931 and the Abyssinian crisis. At Brussels there had been no such evidence that America would not stand idly by in the case of a gross breach of a multilateral treaty.

PROFESSOR SIR ALFRED ZIMMERN said that there had been a certain incompatibility between the lecturer's description of the mood of defeatism and the conclusion of his speech where he had seemed very much more confident. For the last fifteen years or so the British and Americans had so thought of international affairs as an abstraction that now that a number of facts had broken into the world of their imagination it had become rather a stupefying experience. Did the lecturer think that America was now beginning to face facts and that the defeatism he had described could therefore be linked up with the more constructive policy mentioned at the end of his speech?

It seemed that there were two sets of people in the room, those who could think American and those who could not. The latter were irritated by American policy. They also, for no particular reason, wrote off France and they forgot the British Dominions. Thus they saw this country isolated in the world and so they drifted into the policy which the lecturer had castigated. His own opinion, in forming which he did not forget the amazing movement of working-class opinion during the American Civil War, was

that the mass of the people *could* think American and desired nothing more than the closest possible relations with the people of the United States. The people who could not think American were confined to a comparatively small section who happened to be in rather influential positions. But when they were thinking in that way about the United States they were *almost* thinking in that way about Canada. We wrote off the United States, we almost wrote off Canada, and would have gone a long way towards writing off the rest of the self-governing Dominions, thus leaving a Great Britain more like the Great Britain of George III than the Great Britain of George VI. Such a Britain would indeed be alone in the world. He agreed that Great Britain was just now in a very difficult position, but he did not see any other way out than to keep in line with those who valued freedom and to follow the policy outlined in the lecturer's statement.

MR. FRANCIS DEVERELL said that he had for many years believed that the salvation of the world depended upon close co-operation between the English-speaking peoples. He considered that we had made the great mistake of supporting the vindictive and selfish policy of France, which was unquestionably responsible for most of the present troubles of the world. It was clear that, in her desire to maintain the Stresa front, France was responsible for the failure of the Sanctions policy against Italy. Her behaviour towards Germany had been foolish and provocative, and had resulted in making Germany the danger to world peace which she undoubtedly was to-day. We had made the great mistake of allowing our own foreign policy to be guided by France even to the extent of tacitly approving of the Franco-Soviet pact, which Germany was fully entitled to consider was aimed at her.

He considered that Germany had been subjected to very unfair and unwise treatment for many years past.

ADMIRAL USBORNE said that there would never be joint action between Great Britain and the United States until a new procedure was formulated. There should be formed a Joint Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs with an equal number of members belonging to the United States on the one hand and Great Britain and her Dominions on the other, and this Council should consider foreign affairs and have as its duty to evolve and report to the two governments on a joint policy which would benefit the interests of both. That policy should be published. Then in any particular situation the two countries, in the event of their signifying agreement to the joint policy beforehand, would act together.

MR. LIONEL GELBER said that in Canadian opinion the cleavages upon the subject of external relations and foreign policy were profound; political and racial factors of the most formidable kind accentuated geographical and economic divisions that in themselves

were serious enough. With nothing less at stake than the national unity of the Dominion itself Canadian statesmen felt impelled to walk warily, to avoid every possible commitment in advance Their domestic problem might, of course, be enormously simplified by a community of thought and action between Great Britain and the United States; in the absence of that their task will be even more unenviable. And such being the circumstances, no diplomatic initiative from Canada, no lead (save perhaps in questions of trade) should at present be counted upon.

As for American isolationism, it was hard to blame the United States for having attempted to take advantage of her favourable geographical position. In the modern world it might as a matter of enlightened self-interest no longer be practicable for her to stand aloof. But ideas embedded deep in the American mind since the foundation of the Republic were not easy to combat.

PROFESSOR C. K. WEBSTER (in the chair) said with regard to the Americans thinking British policy subtle, that as one who had taught for five years at an American University, they knew perfectly well what British policy was and when it was muddled and when it was not. Britain's position in the world before the War had been something like the position of America now. Then Great Britain had been isolated and two Powers had bid for her; one had been Germany, who had wanted water-tight agreements, everything written down; the other, France, had been content with an *entente* and in the end had got everything. They had been content to rely on Britain when the moment came. This should be Great Britain's policy towards the United States, not a policy of pinning her down.

MR. WICKHAM STEED said that he did not think the truth concerning the oil embargo would be found in any official document. He did know that the American Oil Companies had assured the President of the United States that they were ready and willing to apply the embargo, but that the English had not wanted to run the risk of having the Italians attack the British Navy in the Mediterranean. The officers in command had been willing to do it, and had wished to do it and had thought the order ought to have been given. If Great Britain went down, what would have been her greatest contribution to the world? That she had taught the world self-government, that she stood, broadly and with many lapses, for consistent principles of freedom which had spread throughout the world both before and after John Locke. Upon this the British Commonwealth had been built, and without it it would fall. Was there any British interest greater than this fundamental belief of her people in the virtue of toleration, human right, representative democracy?

AMERICA'S LABOUR TROUBLES[1]

MR. CLEMENT JONES, C.B.

DURING my recent visit to the United States I was brought into touch with the labour situation every day. I spent the whole time in going either to factories or docks, and wherever I went there had either been a strike, or there was one going on, or there was one brewing. I landed in New York in the middle of a heat-wave, and in the middle of labour troubles. I then went a thousand miles west to St. Louis, where there was another heat-wave and more labour troubles. I then visited two factories, one in New York State and one in Pennsylvania, at both of which labour difficulties were the main topic of conversation. I met industrialists, factory owners, factory managers, foremen and workmen, steamship agents, ship's officers, master stevedores, watchmen, policemen and all the other ratings that go to make up the population of a pier when a ship is loading or discharging. All these men were directly and personally concerned in the American labour situation. My present object is to give a descriptive account of what actually happened in the places I visited, based either on my personal experience or on what I was told by the men who had been directly involved.

The question of American labour troubles may seem to some people to be purely an American affair and not of international importance. I will, however, give an illustration to show how seriously and how quickly a strike in an American factory can affect the welfare of an English market-town, and to what extent the American labour situation is an international problem.

About a year ago a tannery at Abingdon-on-Thames in Berkshire received an order to make a certain kind of leather for a shoe factory in New England in the State of Massachusetts. The order was a large one, and shipments were to be made regularly, so much per week from Southampton. As a result extra hands were engaged at the works; there were extra wages to be spent in the Abingdon shops; an extra item in England's export trade—all very pleasant and very profitable. Shipments

[1] Address given at Chatham House on November 11th, 1937; Sir Arthur Willert, K.B.E., in the Chair.

of the leather began to flow regularly according to plan, and continued to flow until one day last March when, after about four months of good going, a cable arrived from the United States to say that, owing to sit-down strikes and a complete labour deadlock in the shoe factory in Massachusetts, no more leather would be required and that, in consequence, shipments must be stopped at once and not resumed until further notice. This was a sad blow to the works at Abingdon. Obviously, there was nothing to be done except to stop making the leather, since the order was a special one for a special customer. And with the stopping of the process there followed a further series of blows, like the bumps of trucks in a goods train: the paying off of the men specially engaged for the work and the stopping of their wages; the effect in the retail shops; and then the dole. All very unpleasant and unprofitable. Not for four months did that American customer decide to resume shipments.

Alternatively, take another case that I was told about. A clothing establishment in Oxford Street wanted a certain quantity of summer frocks; these could have been obtained either from the United States or from Europe. It was a mere toss-up as to price, there was not much in it. But owing to strikes in the United States the Oxford Street shop could not risk the uncertainty of delivery from America, and so the order went to Paris. Thus both the flow of export from and imports into the States have been impeded by the recent labour troubles in that country.

The present labour situation and the growth of trade unions in the United States, just as in England, had their origin in the greed of manufacturers in days gone by. Another reason for labour agitation in America was, I think, due to the rapid influx of millions of immigrants from all parts of Europe, determined to improve their positions and their pay. When I lived in New York thirty-five years ago I worked in a University Settlement on the east side of New York, where I had a class for lately arrived immigrants from Europe, to whom I tried to teach English. Some of the members of my class were labour agitators from Moscow and Bucharest. Two things remain clearly in my mind as I struggled to teach them English: one was their determination to improve their position, and the second was the fact that they would never be able to return to either Russia or Roumania because of the part that they had played in political affairs.

The earliest labour organisation in the United States was

known as the Knights of Labour. It was started in 1869 by a few workers in Philadelphia, and until 1882 it was a secret society. Its membership was open to all workers and increased rapidly until 1885, after which it began to decline. It favoured equality of the sexes and public ownership of land and railways. The next organisation of importance was the American Federation of Labour, formed in 1881, for which Samuel Gompers was largely responsible. He became its President in the following year. Gompers was born in London of Jewish origin and went to the States as a boy. The Federation drew into itself all the larger unions and did much in carrying reforms through the legislature. Gompers was opposed to Socialism and denounced all attempts to introduce Sovietism into the policy of the American Federation of Labour. He was a sane, level-headed labour leader of the best type, and when he died a few years ago he was succeeded in the presidency of the Federation by William Green, who holds that office to-day.

Two years ago a split occurred within the ranks of organised labour in the United States, when John Lewis, the leader of the United Mine Workers, broke away from the American Federation of Labour and set up the Committee for Industrial Organisation which had originally been intended to be a piece of machinery within the American Federation of Labour. Thus began the bitter feud between John Lewis of the C.I.O. and William Green of the A. F. of L.

The C.I.O., of which the Mine Workers' Union were the original members, at once started to gather adherents and other Unions to their side, and in this they were very successful. Unions previously affiliated with the A. F. of L. joined the C.I.O. In consequence, William Green and his colleagues suspended the Mine Workers and the other Unions who had joined forces with them, and the breach widened. Lewis took advantage of the labour unrest that existed all over the States and persuaded workers that the methods of the C.I.O. in obtaining higher wages and shorter hours were more energetic and more up to date than those of the slow-coach back-number A. F. of L. The C.I.O. went from strength to strength. In two years it enrolled four million members. It has thirty-two affiliated Unions. It comprises in one group workers in the textile, auto, garment, lumber, rubber, electrical, steel, coal, power and transport industries. The remaining membership is composed of workers in the maritime, oil-production, building, leather, chemical, retail, meat-packing, vegetable-canning, metal-mining, agricultural labour

and several miscellaneous industries. The C.I.O. is as active on the Pacific Coast as it is in the East.

While I was in New York a fierce struggle was going on between the C.I.O. and the A. F. of L. along the Pacific seaboard: "War to the finish," so I read in my *New York Times*, "is the battle-cry stretching from lumber camps in the north to the ports of San Francisco and Oakland. In saw-mills high in snow-blanketed ranges and on wharfs and docks at sea-level two Labour Unions are locked in a desperate and bloody struggle for supremacy."

The two Unions in question were the Teamsters' Union, led by a man called Dave Beck of the A. F. of L., and the Long-shoremen's Union, directed by Bridges of the C.I.O., who has gone much farther to the Left than any other of Lewis's lieu-tenants. Since obviously both the Longshoremen, who load and unload cargo, and the Teamsters, who truck cargo to and from the docks, are essential to the operation of a port, and since they cannot meet or touch the same cargo, there is a complete deadlock, except for perishable and government-owned cargo. "Already," continued the *New York Times*, "the labour warfare has blockaded ports, closed docks and silenced saw-mills and lumber camps. Throughout the entire area west of the Rockies commerce has been hindered and industry harassed."

On the Atlantic Coast, however, the allegiance of the Long-shoremen is entirely different. While in San Francisco the Longshoremen are members of the C.I.O. under the firm leader-ship of Mr. Harry Bridges, in New York the International Long-shoremen's Association, or I.L.A. as it is always called, belongs to the A. F. of L. The leader of the International Longshore-men is Mr. Joseph Ryan, an experienced negotiator with a salary, so I was told, of twelve thousand dollars a year, which is two thousand four hundred pounds, plus "pickings"! The Long-shoremen are the stevedores who actually handle the cargoes in the loading and discharging of ships, but the Union also com-prises the receiving clerks, delivery clerks, tally clerks, checkers, nightwatchmen and doorkeepers. Since Ryan is under Mr. William Green and the A. F. of L., his Union is in conflict with the C.I.O., with the result that you get the absurd but also serious position of Longshoremen on the Pacific Coast engaged in a bitter struggle against Longshoremen of the Atlantic Coast, as well as those in the Gulf ports, who also belong to the A. F. of L. The result is that a ship which loads at San Francisco and comes through the Panama Canal cannot be unloaded at New

York, because the Longshoremen there, who belong to the A. F. of L., will not touch cargo that has been handled by the C.I.O. men on the West Coast.

On a day in September when I was in New York I went down to the docks in Staten Island to see one of our ships that had just arrived from Brazil, and I therefore had an opportunity of seeing these Longshoremen at work. On that particular pier the men were either Irish or Italians, rather more Italians than Irish, but on some other piers in New York City, for instance the Cunard Pier, the stevedores are mainly Irish. It was certainly very hot, but it did not seem to me that the men worked harder than they do, say, at the docks of Liverpool. Nevertheless, my colleague from our New York Office, who was with me, told me that a strike was brewing with a demand for higher wages on grounds, it was said, of the exacting, dangerous and exhausting nature of the work. And sure enough a week later Mr. Joseph Ryan, the leader of the Longshoremen, put in a demand for higher wages and shorter hours to the employers, who are the body called the New York Shipping Association, which represents seventy shipping lines operating in the deep-water trades out of New York.

The Longshoremen demanded a new contract that would provide for a forty-hour week with pay of one dollar fifteen cents an hour, instead of a dollar, with a dollar and seventy-five cents overtime instead of a dollar and fifty cents. Five days a week, eight hours a day, involving Saturday overtime, and an assurance of four hours of work whenever a man was summoned. As an American friend of mine said: " If you say it quick, it doesn't sound so bad, but it means overtime every Saturday and any day over eight hours, and it would make a difference of thousands of dollars a year in operating expenses to the owners of the ship."

The President of the Shipping Association and the Committee then received a delegation consisting of about seventy-five Longshoremen headed by Mr. Ryan. The Committee told them that the improvement in shipping during the last year did not warrant the increase in cost that the demands would entail. He added that the Longshoremen in New York already received wages higher than those paid for the same kind of work in any other part of the world. The delegation then withdrew.

I happened to be lunching that day with a member of the Shipowners' Committee, and asked him what had happened. He said: " The meeting lasted exactly ten minutes. Ryan left in a huff, followed by the seventy-five Longshoremen." I asked

my shipping friend if he thought there would be a strike, and he said, "No." He did not think there would, for two reasons. First of all he said that Ryan did not want to push matters to a strike, because if he did he was afraid that Lewis might rush into the limelight and might get the Longshoremen to leave the A. F. of L.; and Ryan could not risk the Longshoremen going C.I.O. Secondly my friend said that the owners of the fast Atlantic liners could not afford to have their departures held up. The sailing date of the *Queen Mary* is sacred. My shipping friend was right. There was no strike. A compromise was reached. The Longshoremen received increases in wages and there were to be six men working cargo in each hold instead of four, but the shipowners were successful in resisting the forty-hour week. On balance, of course, it meant extra operating expenses. I have dwelt at some length on the case of the Longshoremen because it provides examples of the two sorts of labour disputes now going on in the United States: first the normal struggle between the employee and the employer in which the employee demands higher wages and shorter hours, and secondly the abnormal feud between the two branches of organised labour, the A. F. of L. and the C.I.O.

I will now try to define the divergence between these two organisations. The A. F. of L. objects to the violent methods of the C.I.O., and the appeal which the C.I.O. makes to the great mass of unskilled workers outside the old craft unions for which the A. F. of L. always stood. The A. F. of L. objects to what it regards as the Communist practices of the C.I.O. by means of sit-down strikes. Above all, the A. F. of L. objects to the action of the C.I.O. in taking an active part in party politics, disregarding the American tradition that trade unions should officially remain aloof and politically non-partisan. The attitude of the A. F. of L. was defined in a speech by their leader, Mr. Green, on Labour Day, the first Monday in September, in Dallas, Texas, in which he upbraided the C.I.O. for disrupting the labour movement. He described the C.I.O. as "a new foe" which labour is forced to fight at a period of its deepest concern over unemployment. He accused the C.I.O. of being Communist, and quoted Communists in Moscow and also in the United States as having approved the methods of the C.I.O. "Whereas," said Mr. Green, "the A. F. of L. spurns and rejects Communism and Communistic support, the C.I.O. welcomes it and encourages the acceptance of its economic philosophy. In its tearing, raiding campaign the C.I.O. has employed more

than two hundred and fifty known Communists as organisers." With regard to party politics, Mr. Green said that the non-partisan political policy which the A. F. of L. had steadfastly followed had been evolved out of study and experience. It was true that the political strength of labour could be used as a determining factor in the election of friends to official positions, but the formation of an independent labour party in the United States would isolate labour politically and make labour a negative rather than a positive force. The A. F. of L. is committed to a definite, sound, constructive economic policy for the welfare of the working man. "Its officers," he continued, "are not seeking political preferment. They are not moved by a consuming ambition to establish themselves as political dictators." Now, this last shot was aimed directly at John Lewis and his friends in the C.I.O. who had flung themselves into the last Presidential election and had voted a large sum of money out of trade union funds for Mr. Roosevelt's campaign. They regarded Mr. Roosevelt's victory as a triumph for themselves, and not unnaturally felt that they had established a claim upon the Government. And here beside this milestone in American party politics perhaps we might pause to consider the implications of that election.

Over and over again as I visit the United States or think about that country I am struck by the fact that, whereas we should expect her to be progressive as compared with Europe, she is really very, very backward and miles behind the times. We look for a bustling, go-ahead place where the people step lively and get a move on. But what do we find? In Europe during the last thirty-five years almost every country has seen political changes, revolutions, sweeping reforms, great extensions in social legislation. In Great Britain the Labour Party has risen and has taken office; in Ireland the Irish Free State has been created. In other countries we have seen monarchies give place to Republics or Dictatorships. And then we look across the Atlantic, and what do we find at election time? Still the same old Republican *v.* Democrat contest, with the same old political cartoons in which the Republicans are represented by an elephant with the initials G.O.P. on the saddle, standing for Grand Old Party, exactly as they were some thirty-five years ago. Small wonder, then, that in such a motionless political atmosphere President Roosevelt's programme of social legislation should strike terror into so many American hearts.

It is difficult for English people on a visit to America to

understand why so many of her otherwise calm citizens are lashed into a fury at the mention of President Roosevelt's name. To us in England the President's programme of social legislation seems not merely reasonable but long overdue, yet an American will say to you: "We shall be ruined. We cannot afford old-age pensions, we cannot afford maternity benefits, we cannot afford insurance against unemployment or sickness. We shall be ruined." The word "ruin" seems strangely familiar, and then one remembers that this is exactly what was said in certain quarters thirty years ago in Great Britain about the Asquith–Lloyd George programme of social reform. Yet many people will tell you that the insurance measures and the other benefits have saved Great Britain from revolution. It is difficult therefore to get excited about the present American programme of social reform.

It is equally difficult for Americans of means and leisure, when they come to England, to understand how our educated classes can be in favour of President Roosevelt, as so many of them are. In Philadelphia I went to a dinner-party, where I sat next to my hostess who had just come back from England. She was full of her visit and the wonderful time she had had, the Coronation, the countryside, and the numbers of interesting people she had met in London. But what had struck her most during her summer over here was to find that wherever she went, Oxford, Gloucester, Cambridge, London, so many people thought well of President Roosevelt. She could not understand it. She gave me several names of people who had spoken to her in praise of the President. "I *was* surprised," she said. "Really intelligent people like Sir Arthur Willert seem to think well of President Roosevelt."

In return for the large sum of money which, we are told, John Lewis contributed to Mr. Roosevelt's campaign fund, Lewis, accordingly, expected what are sometimes called "plums," but up to now it does not seem that the dish of fruit has been either very large or very luscious. On the contrary, in his Labour Day speech in September, Mr. Lewis publicly rebuked the President, without mentioning his name, for not having helped labour enough. Some months previously, during a violent struggle between the Labour Unions and the steel-mill owners, President Roosevelt had used the quotation "A plague on both your houses." This was too much for John Lewis. I happened to hear this speech by a mere coincidence. It was being broadcast

on the day I landed in New York. While I was driving from the Cunard Pier to my hotel, the taxi-man called out to me as we left the pier: "Would you like the radio on or off?" I said "Off," but he thought I said "On," and as we came to a standstill in the traffic jam, I became aware that a speech was going on. Those of you who know what traffic is like over there will appreciate the saying that the traffic in New York used to be fluid, is now viscous, and will soon be solid. So we sat there, completely stuck. While my taxi-driver chewed gum and said it was too bad, I suddenly realised that the voice that was barking at me over the radio was the voice of John Lewis. For the last four months this man and his C.I.O. had been making trouble in our works in Philadelphia, and now, by a strange coincidence, the first voice that I heard in the United States was the voice of John Lewis alone with me in the taxi. His address was a statement of the aims of the C.I.O., an attack on the manufacturers, a warning to President Roosevelt. He said that the C.I.O. stood for Unionism, not Communism, and then his voice pounded on in the taxi with these memorable words:

"Manufacturers and financial groups under the sham pretext of local interest are the real breeders of discontent. They bring in snoops, frinks [I do not know what those are], hatchet-gangs and Chowder-head cohens to infest their plants. They equip these vigilantes with tin hats, wooden clubs, gas masks and lethal weapons. But [shouted Mr. Lewis] no tin-hat brigade of goose-stepping vigilantes or bibble-babbling mob of blackguarding and corporation-paid scoundrels will prevent the onward march of labour."

Then he assailed inferentially the President for his middle-of-the-road attitude during the recent steel strikes, in these words:

"It ill behoves one who supped at labour's table and who has been sheltered in labour's house to curse with equal fervour both labour and its adversaries."

The fact that Mr. Lewis did not mention the President by name did not dull the point in the eyes of those who had been following labour developments. The newspapers pounced on this passage about supping at labour's table. The *Globe-Democrat* of St. Louis, where I was a few days later, had the following snappy paragraph:

"John Lewis, the C.I.O. man, reminded F. Roosevelt the other day that he had not paid for his supper. John made it pretty clear that he was not distributing free lunches."

But there was no open breach between the two men. Within a fortnight Lewis was seeing the President at the White House

and harmony appeared to be restored. People reasoned that Mr. Lewis would not make a complete severance of the breach because, if he did, he would have " no place to go ! "—since he would not return to the Republican Party, and the formation of a National Party and Farmers' Party, which Lewis himself had proposed, was still premature. The Democratic Party, moreover, still required the support of the C.I.O. and of the Lewis following which had been furnished at the last election.

There can be no doubt that for the time the C.I.O., as a result of their victories in certain big strikes, enjoyed a prestige such as the A. F. of L. had never had. During last spring, as we have seen, there were five hundred and ninety strikes going on at once. All over the country previously unorganised workers began to form unions and to seek affiliation with the C.I.O. Among the previously non-union factories was our own leather tannery in Philadelphia, and since it may be of interest to know something about the process known as " going C.I.O.," I will try to describe what takes place. In the course of a business conversation in America to-day you may hear someone say that such and such a factory or union has "gone C.I.O." And you may wonder what happens. How does it go C.I.O.? How does it begin and how does it finish?

The case of our particular factory was as follows. Our firm has owned this tannery in Philadelphia for over thirty years. The work-people are, and have always been, the usual hotch-potch of nationalities that you find in almost all American factories: English, Germans, Poles, Lithuanians, Italians, negroes. The foremen in several cases are of German descent. A good number of them are the sons of men who were working there thirty years ago. The remainder are new-comers to the works and perhaps to the country. And as you go through the factory you meet those to whom you can say, " I knew your father," and those who are and look complete strangers. For thirty years we have made leather in peace; minor disputes there have been, of course, about wages and hours, but these have been settled with the different sections concerned within the works. The works had not hitherto been unionised for purposes of collective bargaining. This year, however, all that has been changed. On a morning at the end of March a motor car covered with placards and posters drew up outside our works. The car contained officials from the National Leather Workers' Association, an Association affiliated to the C.I.O. They brought with them a supply of pamphlets and other literature about their

Union. During the lunch hour they proceeded to get into communication with our men, distributing their literature in the usual way. Now, the chances are that if you ask a Pole who has come to America to better himself whether he would like more wages and shorter hours, his answer will be in the affirmative. And if you suggest further that it will strengthen his hand in dealing with his firm if he has the support of Mr. Lewis with the C.I.O. behind him, he will probably think it a good idea. In a month like last March, when so many factories were joining the C.I.O., in an atmosphere of "everybody's doing it," it was only natural that our people should be easily affected. After a few more weeks of further peaceful picketing and persuasion from outside, a "committee of workers" who had by now joined the Leather Workers' Union put in a request to meet the management. Events then began to move rapidly. First, it was agreed at the meeting between management and workers that an election should be held to determine whether or not the Union members constituted a majority in the works; foremen, assistant foremen, the office force and watchmen were declared ineligible to vote or to become members of the Union. Such an election is obligatory. Secondly, it was agreed to hold the election under an impartial person in the presence of both sides. Thirdly, the election was fixed for July 7th. Fourthly, it was agreed to print on the ballot papers the following question on which they were asked to vote: "Do you choose to be represented in collective bargaining by the National Leather Workers' Association, the C.I.O. affiliate?" That question, it was agreed, in order to facilitate the voting (and this gives a picture of an American factory—all our notices are printed like that), should be printed on the ballot papers in English, Polish, Lithuanian and Italian. Fifthly, it was agreed that a reputable certified public accountant from the National Labour Relations Board (N.L.R.B.), part of the government machinery for dealing with labour disputes, should supervise the election. Thus the stage was set for the election. I was told in America that the Committee of Workers belonging to the Union never ask for an election until they know they have got a majority. It was therefore no surprise to anyone when this election resulted in a majority of over four hundred votes for the C.I.O., and from that day we had to regard the Committee as the sole bargaining agency.

Well, forthwith the Committee of Workers began to agitate for higher wages and shorter hours, coupling their demands for an increase of 15 per cent. on their wages with the threat of a

sit-down strike. Much has been said and written even in Great Britain about sit-down strikes, for during the past year this has been a favourite and much-used weapon of the C.I.O. It has been described as a barbarous weapon by Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, who, in a speech in September, urged that there should be new Federal and State legislation to make illegal all sit-down strikes. It is a dangerous weapon, which can not only cripple the object attacked, but can also seriously hurt the user of it. For instance, many a factory in the United States has been brought to a standstill by the sit-down strike; at the same time nothing has done more to rouse public opinion against the C.I.O. than the sit-down strike, as being the seizure of private property.

When once a sit-down strike has been threatened, the management of the works must be on guard, because large sums of money and much property will be at stake. If the threat is carried into effect, members of the C.I.O. will sit down beside your machinery, quite likely they will carry guns, and refuse to allow anyone to touch the machinery or property in process. In the case of a leather factory a large amount of leather is always in a perishable condition owing to the chemical process of tanning. If, therefore, a strike is enforced and the works are taken over to that extent by the strikers, it must follow that large quantities of this perishable stuff will be spoiled and become perfectly valueless. In our works therefore it became necessary for the management to engage an attorney, or lawyer as we would call him here, to watch the interests of the firm. The next step was to see the sergeant of police in charge of the Mayor's Labour Squad and warn him of what might happen. It might seem to us in England that there would be no need to be uneasy about getting police protection to prevent strikers damaging private property in a factory, but in America, Government support has been, I was told, very half-hearted about dealing with sit-down strikes. Hence Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler's call for State and Federal legislation. The next thing was to find a sympathetic judge in Philadelphia. That probably would not happen here. In the event of a sit-down strike it is necessary to file a bill of equity, and then the judge will give a temporary injunction with the Mayor's Labour Board to oust the sit-down strikers from the factory. After several more days of meeting and argument a compromise was reached on the basis of slightly increased wages and a partial shut-down of works. An agreement was formally signed. It was now July 27th. The trouble

had started at the end of March, and during all that time, instead of concentrating on the manufacture of leather, both the workers and the management had been turning their attention to this labour trouble which had been introduced from outside by the C.I.O. True there had been no actual strike, but all the bad feeling of a strike had been created in the works and a great deal of time and energy had been wasted.

In other leather factories and shoe factories there had been strikes, and as Dr. Butler, whom I have quoted before, said, " Workers have been forced to strike without any grievance of their own, solely for the glorification of unworthy leaders and the satisfaction of their thirst for power." In this connection Dr. Butler urges the Government to follow the lead of Great Britain in the Trades Disputes Act of 1927 after the General Strike of 1926. " This legislation," he said, " may well prove to be the Magna Carta for the wage-worker, whether organised or unorganised, in that it will open the way for him to free himself from exploitation and control by the racketeers." In the meantime public opinion is beginning to turn against the racketeers for these reasons : the attempt to deny the right of work to those who wish to work, the deliberate violation of laws which govern picketing, the seizure of private property and sit-down strikes, the unwillingness of Union labour to hold to contracts it has signed, the presentation of demands which are so exorbitant as to jeopardise the future of an industry. These are some of the tactics which have helped to turn public sentiment against the more extreme sections of Union labour.

I had another close-up experience, and that was not of a factory entering a Union, but of a factory trying to get out of a Union. I was in a town called Gloversville in the State of New York, in the foothills of the Adirondack Mountains. It is and has been for many years, as its name suggests, a centre of the glove trade. When I was there a good deal of labour trouble was in the air. But one glove factory took what, in 1937, was an unusual step : it wanted to get out of its Union. The Company was called the Domestic Glove Company, and its factory was situated on Main Street, a characteristically American address. The workers wished to leave their Union because they did not want to go on paying their subscriptions. They were not affiliated with either the A. F. of L. or the C.I.O. They gave notice in the local Gloversville paper that they were going to quit on a certain day. But this was easier said than done, because the other glove factories decided that they were not

going to have the Domestic Company drop out. Accordingly on the day fixed for the Domestic Glove Company's departure from the Union, workers from the other factories came round to Main Street during the lunch hour. They arrived outside the works at about twelve-twenty. A few windows were broken and a few shots were fired. By one o'clock it was all over, and the Domestic Glove Company had decided to continue in the Union. I was having lunch in an hotel on Main Street at the time, but the trouble was so quickly over that I heard nothing about it until afterwards. All one can say about it is that trying unsuccessfully to get out of a Union in Gloversville took exactly forty minutes; getting into a Union in Philadelphia took four months.

It is impossible not to connect these labour troubles with the present American trade setback. In American papers the causes of the trade setback are attributed to the fear of European war, the conflict between Japan and China, the unprecedented labour troubles, and general pessimism. Of these I think the unprecedented labour troubles must be held responsible for a very large part of this present setback and the general pessimism.

What, you may ask, will be the outcome of the struggle between the A. F. of L. and the C.I.O.? Many people told me that the C.I.O. would win, and might even absorb the A. F. of L. What, you may ask, is John Lewis really trying to get? Is a labour revolution imminent? These are difficult questions for an Englishman to answer, even when he is living in America, and events have been moving very rapidly over there during the last few weeks. When I was there, only six weeks ago, most of my business friends seemed to think that the C.I.O. would win. But in the elections that took place last week I see there were serious setbacks for the C.I.O. candidates. Perhaps the tide has turned.

In England it is especially difficult to follow the strike situation, because so little space is given in our papers to this subject. One day you see something in *The Times* about it, and the next day nothing. You know there is a Conference on a certain day, but it is not reported. But we do know that a serious effort is being made, none too soon, to end the feud that has rent American labour since the foundation of the C.I.O. two years ago.

Perhaps the greatest obstacle to a compromise is the personal antagonism, which the violent controversy of the past two years has intensified, between Mr. Green on the one side, and Mr.

Lewis on the other. And as to John Lewis himself, does he want to be President? Most people whom I asked said he would be "too smart to stand"; what he wants is power to nominate. One American friend of mine said: "In a short time this John Lewis that we all read about every day will be completely forgotten. In the United States people come and go very quickly. One day a fellow's a great guy, and the next day his name is mud. To name only one or two who have shone in the limelight and passed on, Father Coughlin, the radio priest of broadcast politics, or Mrs. Aimée McPherson, the hot gospeller with her Angelus Temple in Los Angeles. So it may be with John Lewis."

As to the fierce labour revolution, Communism and Socialism under Soviet influence in America, that some people predict, I for one cannot believe in it. I have too much faith in the fundamental common-sense of the main body of American public opinion.

Points in the Discussion

Sir Arthur Willert (in the Chair) said that he confessed to a certain sympathy with the C.I.O., which he derived from his experience at the end of the War as Secretary of the War Commission in the United States, when he had been brought into contact a good deal with labour and labour conditions. He had arranged a tour through the industrial Middle West for a Labour Commission sent out from Great Britain of which Mr. G. N. Barnes, then a member of the War Cabinet, was the head. At a lunch given at the conclusion of the tour an American politician had asked Mr. Barnes what he thought of industrial conditions in the Middle West, and he had replied that if conditions in Great Britain were anything like those in the Middle West, there would be revolution within a week. When he was in the States at the beginning of 1937, when the strikes were going on, he had been enormously impressed by the impetus which the C.I.O. was getting, by the sympathy of the working people, for its effort to unite unskilled labour. He had thought then that the future of the movement would very largely depend upon its power to influence the existing political parties. He did not think that Labour would be able to form an efficient party for some time to come, but through Mr. Lewis it might be able to force parties to do many of the things it wanted. In his view the future strength of the movement would depend upon the ability of Mr. Lewis to get together with the two Radical elements in the farming community, the miserable, discontented, semi-tenant farmers in the South, starving in their effort to produce cotton, and the Radical farming movement in the North, which was already in contact with Labour through the Farmers' Labour Party.

Lieut.-Colonel Charles Waley Cohen said that he did not think there was very much chance of farmers uniting with John Lewis. It might happen in the vegetable trade, where racketeering was bad, but he did not think it would happen with farmers in the milk trade, for instance, because on the whole the farmers had suffered more from the strikes than the industrialists, and many of the transport strikes in the Middle West had been broken by and with the help of the farmers themselves. It was very difficult to know whether stable agricultural labour existed at all. He did not think agricultural labour would ever combine either with the C.I.O. or with the A. F. of L.

Mr. T. G. Usborne said that many of the factors which had contributed to the trade recession in the United States had now largely been corrected, but it was very questionable if the high wages which were protected by the benevolent acquiescence of President Roosevelt could be adjusted downwards during the continuance of the present régime, and they might therefore constitute a permanent obstacle to the recovery of American business.

Another point of fundamental difference in labour conditions to-day compared with those of ten years ago was that there was now practically no immigration into America. Previously an individualistic psychology had prevailed, and this was based on the real possibility that anyone might be able to advance to the highest wealth and the highest positions. In the absence of new immigration, the labour structure of America had changed from a state of flux to one of comparative immobility. The resulting restriction of individual opportunity for advancement was bringing the two camps of capital and labour into open opposition to each other. There being less chance for the working man to manœuvre himself into a better position over the backs of a stream of new-comers, the mass of individuals constituting labour was becoming more disposed to better themselves by corporate tactics. Hence the emergence of a definite American labour party tending to override the differences between Republican and Democrat.

Was it not possible, in view of the C.I.O.'s victory over U.S. Steel, that if C.I.O. found itself forced to join in a co-operative alliance with A. F. of L., the former would probably become the leader and dominate the other organisation?

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

GENERAL

1*. CIVITAS DEI. By Lionel Curtis. 1937. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. Vol. II: xliii + 557 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*; Vol. III: xi + 131 pp. 5*s.*)

How the second volume of his trilogy came to be written is explained by Mr. Curtis in its preface. It is a sketch of world history from the beginning of the Middle Ages down to the day before yesterday; and its purpose is twofold: to marshal the facts on which the argument of the third volume are based, and to demonstrate how the world of to-day has issued from the womb of the past. This latter objective is not planned quite in the sense common among professional historians: with them, as a rule, cause and effect meander over the whole field of human activity; as Mr. Curtis presents them, they are canalised with all the inevitability of design. To say this, is in no way meant as criticism; it is merely an attempt to fix the place of the volume in the thesis of the trilogy. And should the scientific historian complain of any detail in the presentation, Mr. Curtis disarms him in advance by appealing to him to turn from his microscope to his telescope. Thus also does he forestall a demurrer to any of his historical judgments (though they are laudably few) that the reviewer might otherwise be moved to enter.

The main theme is revealed early (Chapter XIII, The Armada). From the Reformation onwards "the organisation of human society under one paramount law was its greatest need"; the paramountcy of the papacy had collapsed, and thenceforward "the problem of politics was, and is, to find a foundation of rock, which can be no other than the principle of the commonwealth, the infinite duty of each to all." In the solution of this problem the world has found itself engaged in the secular conflict between the domination of authority and the right of peoples to govern themselves. In a brilliant summary of European history (Chapter XVIII) we are shown how the conflict narrowed into the rivalry between France as champion of the one cause, and England as champion of the other, and how the latter ultimately prevailed. But the end was not yet. A new factor was invading history in the shape of man's rapid mastery of natural forces; and in another luminous chapter (XXVII, The Conquest of Nature) we are told how man has been securing control of the physical world before he has learned to control himself and the society in which he lives. Hence the principle of autocracy is armed with new and devastating weapons, and the old conflict is renewed among us to-day.

What influences now are going to change the minds of men? What is the end which men in their lives on this earth should pursue, to break the powers of darkness and evil?

Such are the questions which Vol. III essays to answer. Mr. Curtis starts by his reasons for believing in the existence of a final reality of infinite goodness, which he calls God. This Being gives knowledge and inspires right action by divine revelation; and, if a system of society is created in accordance with His laws, it "will bring into being men in His likeness." Meanwhile we must help God in the fulfilment of His purpose, and this we can best do by helping each other. Thus again do we approach the principle of the Commonwealth. But, alas, "the project of a world government is not in sight until two or more commonwealths," advanced beyond the other peoples of the globe, have "by some immense spiritual effort merged their sovereignties in one international commonwealth." To prepare for this effort is essentially work for the churches—for the Protestant churches primarily—if they hope to realise the Kingdom of God upon earth.

There is much in this powerful trilogy which will send a shudder through the theologian, as well as the historian; but he cannot refuse to say of Mr. Curtis what R. L. Nettleship once wrote of T. H. Green :—

"It was because he saw in history the self-development of an eternal Spirit, because he regarded religion as the highest form of citizenship, because he believed reason to be at once the most human and the most divine thing in man, that he could be comprehensive without vagueness, reverent without superstition."

MESTON.

2*. PEACEFUL CHANGE. An International Problem. Edited by C. A. W. Manning. 1937. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. vii + 193 pp. 5s.)

THIS book is a collection of lectures delivered at the London School of Economics. It is a very useful introduction to the various aspects of a problem which is now exciting more widespread interest than at any period of modern history. It may almost be said that "the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together" searching for a new international order. To make such a search effective it is of the utmost importance that we should not only know the historical and legal precedents for peaceful change, but also understand the psychological and material bases of the demands for territorial revision so urgently raised in so many diverse quarters. History shows conclusively that no great resettlement of territory after war, even if freely negotiated, can secure permanence, much less the dictated provisions of the Treaties of 1919. If, therefore, a violent upheaval is to be avoided, the spirit of peaceful change must be fostered and its mechanism created.

These lectures deal more fully with economic problems than with those of nationality and race, which are, in fact, practically neglected, and examine much more closely the possibility of colonial than of European transfers of territory. The contributions are of unequal value. It is unfortunate that the psychological aspect, which is of such fundamental importance, should be handled by Dr. Karl Mannheim in a jargon which may attract the expert psycho-analyst, but will certainly repel the general reader. Nor is the legal aspect powerfully enlightened by the somewhat pedantic *Zukunftsmusik* of Dr. Lauterpacht, who

appears to reject any machinery for peaceful change which does n
involve the establishment of an International Legislature. . .
amicable arrangement, however concluded, is surely far mo
important than the methods by which it has been effected. T
first thing which is requisite is, in Castlereagh's words, "to bring t
world back to peaceable habits." As Professor Webster truly poin
out, the object of peaceful change should be not simply to postpo
war—such action may merely encourage the appetite of a blackmail
—but to create justice and to produce a better and less anachronist
world order. Professor Toynbee's historical retrospect shows tha
very various methods have been employed to obtain that measure c
success which the past can display for our example.

It is essential to remember that a will for peace is not and wil
not be for the future inconsistent with the egoism of sovereign states
Peaceful change in the future, as in the past, will probably wear th
robes of business rather than of idealism. It is more likely to b
affected by direct bargaining between interested states who intend
to avoid war than by the decree of a hypothetical internationa
legislature, which could only be the result, but certainly not the
cause, of such successful territorial revision.

It is doubtless true, as Professor Robbins forcibly insists, that the
economic nationalism of the present age is more damaging to the
organisation of the world than such inequalities and injustices as
exist in the distribution of territory between the principal states
Yet it seems that this economic fever which pursues the impossible
hallucination of national self-sufficiency is itself the morbid symptom
of the territorial disease. It is at least possible that a comparatively
small rearrangement of existing possessions might undermine the
foundations of fear and hatred on which these false temples of
economic nationalism have been built. C. R. M. F. CRUTTWELL.

3. ELYSIAN FIELDS: A DIALOGUE. By Salvador de Madariaga. 1937. (London: George Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 110 pp. 3*s.* 6*d.*)

THE world is indeed too much with us to-day, haunting us inescapably with its problems. Here is Señor de Madariaga, fleeing for relaxation to the Elysian Fields, where he will write fantasy with Goethe, Mary Stuart, Voltaire, Napoleon, Karl Marx and President Washington for his puppets. But it is typical of the times we live in that there is nothing fantastical about their dialogue, save its background of astral forms. It is mainly and soberly concerned with Communism and Fascism, the organic unity of healthy societies, America's reluctance to join the League of Nations, the aims and needs of culture . . . all well-known preoccupations of Don Salvador de Madariaga in his rôle of international publicist. Perhaps because he is also a poet and a man of letters, there is unusual vision in his comments on such questions. The discussion in the Elysian Fields throbs with provocative ideas, dominated by the author's indomitable faith in "the republic of humanity at large" and the democratic liberties. "God deliver us from people who are so sure of their ideas that they are ready to kill other people for them," cries Voltaire to Communists and Fascists alike. It is irritating (though perhaps inevitable in a dialogue that cannot endure indefinitely) that in all this bandying to and fro of arguments, so many lines of thought are abruptly cut short and inconsequently shelved. This is especially true, I think, in the case of Karl Marx, who must be fuming with

indignation in the Elysian Fields to find himself so short-circuited by *trivialia*. "We must remove destitution, we all agree," declares the liberal shade of Goethe. "But how?" There the matter rests, and nobody really comes to hand-grips with the primary economic claims of Marxism in any field. Nevertheless, many felicitous things are said about the significance and effects of Communism, as for example the excellent analysis of the orthodox and unorthodox Jew's reaction to it. In prompting the dialogue on the United States, Señor de Madariaga is, I think, at his best. In his analysis of the American use of English and the essential differences of the English and American character, there is a welcome reminiscence of the skill which immortalised *Anglais, Français, Espagnols*. And in speculating on the future of Communism in the United States, Señor de Madariaga writes with an insight that may not be far removed from prophecy. To the consternation of the unknown Senator, George Washington explodes all the arguments (usually ascribed to him) against American co-operation with Europe or Membership of the League. This little book abounds in aphorisms, brilliant, humane and wise, like the mind of its author. I will not spoil the reader's pleasure by quotation.

VIOLET CONOLLY.

4. ORIENTATIONS. By Sir Ronald Storrs. 1937. (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson. 8vo. xvii + 624 pp. 21s.)

IT is easy to understand the success of *Orientations*, given the personality of the author, the breadth of his interests, and the parts which he has played in the most colourful episodes of recent history in the Near East. The reader who goes to it for the third of these reasons will soon find that the first two cannot be left out of account. For in this respect, at least, his book offers the most complete contrast to that of his first chief, Lord Cromer. It is no systematic and impersonal survey from the Olympian heights, but the record of one who was ever in the thick of the fray, both in subordinate and in exalted office.

Since, then, the subject of the book is the history of the author himself, in his private as well as his public life, to which the history of his times is more or less incidental, its value to the student of political history does not lie mainly in its account of events. Of factual data there is comparatively little that is not already well known; indeed, Sir Ronald Storrs assumes that the general setting is known to his readers. Here and there he aims to correct what he holds to be erroneous judgments, and he supplies a considerable amount of intimate detail. But its primary usefulness as an historical source is for the insight which it affords into the characters, motives and impulses of those engaged in the making of history. Those of whom he writes are always real persons, named and described individually, and the description does not lack candour. Yet the width of his sympathies is such that there are few—whether Egyptians, Arabs, Zionists, Cypriote ultras, or British officials—of whom he has not a good word to say (here again in contrast to Cromer), even when their activities gave him most trouble and anxiety. His occasional general judgments are informed by the same generosity and capacity for seeing the other man's point of view, although ignorance and presumption, whether in official or in private circles, are rebuked in brief and appropriate words.

From this side especially, therefore, the hope expressed by the

author as to the historical value of his book is more than justified. In so personal a record it is inevitable that some ideas and conclusions may be challenged, but even when Sir Ronald Storrs puts forward an unexpected point of view, the critic would be well advised to ponder awhile. On the other hand, where he sets himself to analyse a situation impersonally and objectively (notably in his "excursus" on Zionism), he is less happy. This is not to dissent from his statements, nor even from his conclusions; it is simply that the rather lengthy, and sometimes desultory, argument deprives the reader of that sense of immediacy of contact which gives the book both its charm and its main historical value. For the rest, readers will doubtless differ in their appreciation of the author's allusive style, but it is an essential ingredient; for here, if anywhere, *le style, c'est l'homme.*

H. A. R. GIBB.

5. HISTORY THROUGH '*THE TIMES*'. Selected by Sir James Marchant. 1937. (London: Cassell. Demy 8vo. xi + 619 pp. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

To the many admirable histories of recent events which are on the market, it was a happy thought of Sir James Marchant to add this series of contemporary vignettes. They are reprints of close on 150 leading articles in *The Times*, dating from 1803 up to the current year; and Sir James has added short historical notes, which fit them into their places in our nation's story and occasionally redress the balance of passing prejudice. Not that prejudice is frequently betrayed. In 1837 there was some violent abuse of Lord Melbourne, "unprincipled, treacherous and unfeeling," with his "schemes of factious and revolutionary policy"; but ample amends were made fifty years later in the article on Queen Victoria's jubilee. There was almost equally violent language about Mr. Asquith's government in 1911, for its decision to pay £400 a year to members of parliament: but there is no record of the reaction when Mr. Baldwin's government raised the figure to £600.

Such ebullitions, however, are rare. The general tone is one of liberal and humanitarian progress: "We are too upright," exclaims the leader-writer of 1834, "to be flatterers of the wealthy, and what honest man will dare charge us with having *ever* abandoned or betrayed the poor?" This unctuousness soon went out of fashion; but the wise guidance of public opinion remained. The Reform Bill of 1832 was handsomely backed; a strong plea for mercy was urged on behalf of the "Tolpuddle martyrs"; a stout protest was registered against the opium war with China; and the emancipation of slaves was welcomed with genuine feeling. Progress, however, must be cautious and orderly; there was no enthusiasm over the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1836; and the welcome given to old age pensions in 1909 was mainly contemptuous. On the other hand, the appraisement of public service has been uniformly generous and impartial; the eulogies on Queen Victoria, on the Iron Duke, on Nelson, on Fox, Gladstone and Newman, are models of funeral oratory; and a standard of noble eloquence attends the burial of the Unknown Warrior in November 1920.

He need not be a jingo who lays down this anthology with a sense of pride in the achievements of his people, and in what is even more remarkable, their level-headedness. The Chartist troubles, the general strike, the revels after Mafeking, the bearing of the nation during the Great War, the abdication of King Edward VIII—all these, and many a minor episode, are put into their proper proportion for the historian

of the future who may be moved to moralise on the steadfastness of Britain. MESTON.

6. GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS ABROAD. By Henry Russell Spencer. 1936. (New York: Henry Holt & Co. 8vo. 558 pp. $2.80).

PROFESSOR SPENCER disarms his critics by prefacing his book for "American college-students" with the remark that "since this is designed to be a student text-book, it has seemed necessary to present much controverted matter in somewhat dogmatic tone." That this has been done is true; but some will quarrel, perhaps, with the presumption that it was necessary. "When we professors don't know," it appears to say, "we must not reveal our uncertainty; for our duty is to teach the young, and so we must give them facts: we must not show them that facts are sometimes many-sided fictions." Bentham, at least, would disagree; for did he not once describe the object of a work of his as being "to do something to instruct, but more to undeceive, the timid and admiring student"? But then he was not thinking of the American, or perhaps of any other "college-student," as is Professor Spencer. This criticism does reveal, however, one of the essential difficulties in the writing of such a book—namely, that even professorial knowledge has its limits. To summarise a political system adequately in brief requires a more intimate acquaintance with it than to describe it at length, because selection then plays a more important part. Yet this study presents a picture of the governmental organisation, together with its summarised history, of Britain, France, Germany, Soviet Russia, Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, the Succession States, Latin America, Japan.

On the other hand, we must not be too hard; we must acknowledge the limits that are human. We may also remember, in extenuation, that even a dogmatic and sometimes not strictly true account of a long series of different constitutions does something "to undeceive" the student who is too ready to accept any one single political system as natural, inevitable and the divinely ordained best. What here is lost in depth is atoned for in variety. H. R. G. GREAVES.

7. WHAT COMMUNISM MEANS TO-DAY. By Hamilton Fyfe. 1937. (London: Nisbet. Crown 8vo. 164 pp. 3s. 6d.)

As a Communist's confession of faith, this book is a little disappointing; "the Communism of fifteen, ten, even five years ago," says Mr. Fyfe, "meant something different from what Communism means to-day"; but what it means to-day remains far from clear to the reader. It still means a class-struggle, confiscation, violent revolution, the "dictatorship of the proletariat," war on religion; but apparently all in a different sense from that which we should ordinarily read into these expressions. It does *not* mean Socialism. On that point Mr. Fyfe is quite distinct; and yet the Soviet System, he says, is in fact Socialism, although the Webbs and others have taught us to regard it as the triumph of Communism. Although definitions are thus left a little blurred, we are told regretfully that the ideals of Communism are going to be "realised only when the nature of Man has been raised to a higher level"; and meanwhile we must content our souls—if we have such things—with Socialism. This being so, is it quite fair to use so much vitriol as Mr. Fyfe pours upon our Socialist leaders? And is it quite accurate to ascribe the destruction of the manorial system to the invention of steam-driven machinery? One

final, if unimportant, criticism: "sovereignty," in the Benthamic sense, is not the same thing as Monarchy; and it is beside the point to say that Switzerland has no sovereignty because it has a Federal Republic. MESTON.

8. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: an introduction to the Western State System. By F. L. Schuman, Professor of Political Science, Williams College. Second Edition. 1937. (London: McGraw Hill Publishing Co. Large 8vo. xxi + 789 pp. 24s.)

THIS second edition of a book of which the first edition was reviewed in *International Affairs* (Sept.–Oct. 1933, p. 660) is almost a new version of the original thesis. The author, in the Preface to this second edition, says that he has included "many rewritten chapters and much new material on the recent and contemporary international scenes." The change in the international situation since 1933, when the first edition appeared, is indeed striking. And Professor Schuman himself has changed his academic post, from the University of Chicago to Williams College; but he remains in the school of thought of Professors Merriam and Lasswell in Chicago University, which is making valuable contributions to fundamental analyses of political life. In his new edition Professor Schuman has entirely rewritten the introductory section of the book, on "The State" and has happily, as one reader thinks, dropped Aristotle, although the alternative basis of analysis which he adopts seems too much dominated by "power" concepts. It may be that the struggle for power among groups within communities and among communities organised by ruling groups is very important in the history and present structure of States. But the nature of power itself is worth further analysis: for the real difficulty of all seekers after power and all power-institutions is to acquire moral authority. The changes in the body of the book seem to be chiefly caused by events following 1932. In the first edition it is said of the Disarmament Conference that in 1933 "nothing was certain except that it was foredoomed to failure." In the new edition the failure is recorded as portending "catastrophe for the Western World." But catastrophe, even of the Marxian kind, can always be postponed in later editions. Indeed there is a difficulty in Professor Schuman's method. He gives us an analysis of fundamental factors in international relations and combines with his analysis a detailed record and comment on recent events. Clearly the record is intended as evidence for the analysis, but recent events are uncertain guides to fundamental factors. A small change may be very vital; but innumerable events may have no new meaning, and the attempt to be always up-to-date in the record may make the book always out of date a few years after it is published. Perhaps a fundamental analysis of the factors or forces in international affairs should be more sharply distinguished from a history of recent events. C. DELISLE BURNS.

9*. DIE ZIONISTISCHE BEWEGUNG. By Adolf Böhm. 1935. (Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag. 8vo. 732 pp.)

THIS monumental work—for it is at any rate a monument of industry—is to be completed in two volumes, of which that under review is the first. The scale on which it is planned can be inferred from the fact that the seven hundred pages of Volume I only carry the story up to the end of the World War, and that the Balfour Declaration is not reached until well on into the six hundreds. It is only fair to the author (as well as to prospective readers) to make it clear that his main

object is not so much to provide a historical record of events as to describe analytically the inner development of the Zionist Movement. For this task he has many qualifications—a wealth of learning, a close personal acquaintance with the movement in certain of its aspects, and an acute and subtle mind, as witness his admirable handling of the personality and the philosophy of Theodor Herzl. His weight of learning is apt at times to overwhelm him. The story is told in such copious detail that anyone but a specialist may find it difficult to see the wood for the trees. Moreover, as a Central European Jew (he is a Viennese), Herr Böhm is naturally inclined to assume that what really matters is what Jews were thinking or doing in Central and Eastern Europe, and that there is not much to be said as to the progress of Zionism in other parts of the Jewish world, including in particular the English-speaking countries. Central and Eastern Europe did dominate the movement before the War and have always done most of its theoretical thinking; but it so happened that, in the events which led up to the making of the Balfour Declaration, English and American Zionists played the leading rôles. It might, therefore, have been interesting to inquire how it came about that Zionism took root in countries in which an obvious explanation was not supplied by the direct pressure of anti-Semitism. Of the Balfour Declaration itself Herr Böhm has nothing new to say. Nor does he throw any fresh light on the East African project associated with the name of Joseph Chamberlain; while there is only a casual reference to the still earlier discussions with the Anglo-Egyptian authorities as to the still-born El Arish scheme. Herr Böhm would doubtless reply that he deliberately touched lightly on these matters because they were only incidental to his real theme, which is not the history of Zionism in its external relations, but the growth of the movement itself. On this subject he breaks new ground. Much has been written of Zionism in its concrete manifestations in Palestine; but those who wish to go deeper will be grateful to Herr Böhm for enabling them, if they are patient, to dig down to the emotional and intellectual foundations of the movement and to follow, stage by stage, the labours of the men who built it up.

As is inevitable in a work on this scale, there are a few errors of fact. The Anglo-Jewish Association was *not* founded by Baron Hirsch (page 114), nor was Lucien Wolf ever its President (page 587). Dr. Weizmann's resignation of the Presidency of the Jewish Agency was in 1930—not 1929 (page 653). Sir Henry McMahon is referred to as Sir Arthur MacMahon (page 652). And perhaps the present reviewer may humbly point out that his first name is not Leonhard (page 654). LEONARD STEIN.

10. THE CONQUEST OF POWER. LIBERALISM: ANARCHISM: SYNDICALISM: SOCIALISM: FASCISM: COMMUNISM. By Albert Weisbord. 1937. (New York: Covici Friede. 8vo. Vol. I, 480 pp.; Vol. II, 728 pp. $7.50.)

THE keynote of this elephantine work is struck on the opening page:—

"In every case the State is the answer to the question: Through what does the ruling class dictate its will to the oppressed? Every State signifies the dictatorship of a class over other economic classes. . . . No classes, no State. The State has its origin in the class struggle."

The remaining 1174 pages are in the same key. Liberalism, which is identical with the Liberal Party and the creed of Gladstone, has

dissolved. The British Empire is doing the same, as the Abdication of King Edward illustrated. Capitalism has entered a progressive and irremediable economic crisis which has produced Fascism (it is of course Capitalism, and not State Sovereignty, which is responsible). Fascism is run by the big trusts, the petty bourgeoisie having no say in the matter. They are only the tools used to crush the workers. The workers were all anti-Fascist, but unfortunately the leadership of them had passed to cowardly and treacherous bureaucrats, who "sold the pass" in the hour of crisis.

Fascism is making war inevitable. Although it seems certain that that war will be an attack of all the capitalist States on the workers, as symbolised by Russia, the capitalists of England and France are at the moment working desperately to restore a capitalist régime in Russia as a counterbalance to Germany. The Franco-Soviet Pact is a weapon to this end; so is the Russo-Czech Treaty, which is even more scandalous

> "since everyone knows that only the greatest act of violence tore the three and a half million Germans of Bohemia from their brethren in Germany and put them in an independent rival State."

That Russia could sign such documents shows that the Soviet workers have for the time being lost control of their revolution. This has passed into the hands of the bureaucrats and specialists, who represent

> "the Thermidorean elements within Russia that are working for the restoration of capitalism."

At their head is the intellectual mediocrity Stalin.

For all that, the transfer of power to the workers has gone further in Russia than anywhere else, and the coming war will provide the chance to complete the process. Then shall be brought to pass the revolution which will be a revolution, where the leaders, having won power and privilege for themselves, do not cling on to it like selfish bourgeois, but give it away equally to all.

And may an Englishman inquire what "picayure" means?

M. G. BALFOUR.

11. ÉVOLUTION ÉCONOMIQUE DES ÎLES SAINT PIERRE ET MICQUELON. By Dr. Ferdinand Louis Legasse. 1936. (Paris: Sirey. 8vo. 182 pp. 25 *frs.*)

ENGLISHMEN are apt to forget that France is an Atlantic as well as a Mediterranean Power and that she still has a few acres of snow which she can call her own in North America. The islands of St. Pierre and Micquelon, with their little archipelago of rocks, some ten square miles in all, are all that remains of the French Empire in the north-west. The writer suggests that the home country is not doing what she might, that she is, in fact, neglectful. But the storm which was provoked in France when it was suggested that the United States might accept these islands in full quittance of her outstanding War debt, is proof that France does care. Indeed, her great fishing industry on the Banks, based as it is on St. Malo and the Breton and Basque ports, would be severely handicapped if St. Pierre were under an alien Power.

Dr. Louis Legasse, whose family is intimately connected with the islands, tells the story of the fishery as it was carried on in the eighteenth century, when the islands were being continually captured, lost, and recaptured by the English, then, more prosperously, after 1815, partly on the Banks, partly "inshore," and partly on what was called "the French shore" of Newfoundland. Since 1904 the French shore has

been French no more, the Bank fishery has more and more fallen into the hands of steam trawlers, which require considerable capital, and the inshore-fishery has dwindled practically into fishing from small craft with hook and line, while the short-lived and fictitious prosperity created by American prohibition diverted the honest fisherfolk into the lucrative business of making St. Pierre into a liquor depot and abetting the rum-runners. The repeal of prohibition left them, it is true, with a huge balance in hand, but with no schooners, no gear and but little taste for the hard life of the fisherman.

The story of the French shore is set forth at some length, but it is set forth rather in the spirit of an *ex parte* advocate than as a scientific historian expounding a stage of evolution. The whole trouble arose out of the slipshod drafting of a clause in the Treaty of Utrecht. His Britannic Majesty was anxious to prevent " the daily quarrelling " that would arise from the joint use of the same shore by two different nations. But the clause was so drafted that quarrels became inevitable. His subjects were not in any way " by their competition " to impede the French during the temporary exercise of their fishing rights. After defining the portion of the coast to which these rights should extend, he promises that he " will cause the fixed settlements which shall be formed there to be removed," as though definitely prescribing that settlements were to be formed in future with a view to their being removed. The French claimed a monopoly of the fishing rights. Newfoundland refused to recognise a monopoly. When they saw the British Navy forcibly evicting their own countrymen from the wharves, stores and stages which they had erected on what they claimed to be their own land—an eviction which, by the way, was supposed to be authorised by an Act then out of date—Newfoundland replied with the Bait Act and refused flatly to carry out the arrangements to which the British Colonial Office had pledged itself in negotiating with France. There was, in fine, no peace until Lord Salisbury persuaded France to give up all claim to " the French shore " in return for certain territorial concessions in Africa.

The fishery on the Banks was doubtless expected to make amends for this loss. But even before 1904 St. Pierre's part in that fishery had begun to decline. The number of her schooners fishing on the Banks had in 1914 fallen from 207 to 24; in 1915 it was reduced to 1.

There were contributory causes. The number of shipwrecks in two disastrous years rose as high as 15·9 per cent. and even 17 per cent. But the main reason was the advent of the large steam trawler. The schooner men did their fishing from the open " dory," we know this from Rudyard Kipling's *Captains Courageous*. The trawler crew never left the ship. The schooners had to be continually returning to St. Pierre to land the catch and revictual. The trawler held the sea for five months on end. The schooner's total catch for the season would run to 6000 quintals (or cwt.), the trawler's to 35,000: the St. Pierre men could not stand out against the competition.

Nor was it all bad fortune. There was sheer fecklessness. A large and expensive cold storage with the latest scientific equipment was installed. But without the expenditure of a further 23 million francs in deepening the harbour and without providing other plant for handling traffic, the cold storage was a white elephant. The postal service via Sydney and Halifax slipped out of their hands. Unemployment was so serious that an emigration office was opened for men to sign on for Morocco.

At the close of the book a despairing people addresses an S.O.S. appeal for aid to the mother country. They see no hope of working out their own salvation. They base their hopes on bounties and subventions. But the real remedy lies with themselves. All the means of a livelihood, or at any rate a subsistence, are there. There remains co-operation. By means of it the fishermen–farmers of their neighbours in Cape Breton are raising themselves out of a slough of poverty and indebtedness. The Catholic University of Antigonish has specialised in co-operation as its form of University extension. Under its leadership and direction the whole standard of living is being raised. St. Pierre has also much to learn from the scientific investigation which has been carried on for the past five years in the Marine Biology stations in Newfoundland. The economic problem of St. Pierre is part of the larger problem of the maritime provinces of Canada and Newfoundland. Apart from her neighbours to the north and the south-west no premiums and subventions can be of more than a temporary palliative.

J. L. PATON.

CHURCH AND STATE

12*. THE POPE IN POLITICS: THE LIFE AND WORK OF POPE PIUS XI. By William Teeling. 1937. (London: Lovat Dickson. 8vo. viii + 294 pp. *7s. 6d.*)

13. CHURCH AND STATE IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA. By William Adams Brown. 1936. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 8vo. xvii + 360 pp. *12s. 6d.*)

14. FIRST COMMANDMENT. By Martin Niemöller. 1937. (London: William Hodge. 8vo. 276 pp. *6s.*)

15. DO THE STATE AND NATION BELONG TO GOD OR THE DEVIL? By Rheinhold Niebuhr. 1937. (London: Student Christian Movement Press. 8vo. 45 pp. *6d.*)

OF the two most active world religions in recent years, communism and Roman Catholicism, it is safe to say that most of us know far more about the former than the latter. The literature concerning communism is enormous and grows every day, but hardly anything has been written about the never-ceasing influence exerted by the Roman Church in every country in the world. Mr. Teeling's book is the more welcome, therefore, in that it lifts, if ever so slightly, a corner of the veil, and affords us a glimpse of the working of this great religious and political organisation. It is further remarkable in that, though written by a sincere Catholic, the nephew of a former Papal Chamberlain, it contains a highly critical examination of the political, as distinct from the religious, policy of the present Pope. Mr. Teeling must be a courageous man, for criticism has never been welcomed by the higher authorities of his Church, and the penalties that are imposed on those who fall under its displeasure are apt to be severe. His thesis, in brief, is that the Pope is not merely a patriotic Italian, but, from his earlier experience as Nuncio in Poland, he has acquired an overwhelming distrust and dread of communism. These two factors, combined with a highly autocratic disposition, have thrown him into the arms of Mussolini and have led him to identify himself, and so the whole of official Roman Catholicism, in a large measure with the aims of Fascism. According to Mr. Teeling the Pope's attitude towards the Abyssinian conquest has done great harm to Catholic missions in many countries. It is further part of his thesis that the real future of the Roman

Catholic Church lies on the continent of America, above all in the United States, which is predominantly democratic in sentiment and likely to be increasingly out of sympathy with corporativism and other characteristic features of the Italian Dictatorship. Moreover, will the United States, which provides so large a proportion of Peter's Pence and of the funds for the Mission Field, be willing indefinitely to see an Italian in the Papal Chair and to be allowed not more than its present quota of four Cardinals? In general, he accuses the Pope and the Vatican administration of not moving with the times or realising the profound change which has been taking place in the centre of gravity of Roman Catholicism.

Mr. Teeling has written an extremely interesting book which should be widely read. But it must be confessed that it is far from giving a convincing presentation of Vatican policy. Let no one be deluded into imagining that this is serious history. Nowhere does it rise above the level of intelligent journalism : what we are given are the impressions of a man who has travelled widely and has met large numbers of intelligent co-religionaries all over the world who have freely gossiped with him. Much that he says gives the impression of being mere surmise based on fragments of information picked up in the *coulisses* of the Vatican. What is of real value, however, is the picture, firstly, of the organisation and ramifications of this astonishing body; secondly, of the difficult problems with which it is now confronted in every country; and thirdly, of a very definite undertone of criticism and dissatisfaction amongst certain sections of the Roman Catholic community with the existing political leadership of the Vatican.

Dr. William Adams Brown's book is a distinguished piece of work by a well-known American authority. In it he has analysed the various ways in which Church and State impinge on one another in the United States. In view of the multiplicity of religious bodies which is a characteristic of that country, the task was a formidable one, but it has been extremely well done. It is not merely an analysis of conditions and trends of opinion amongst members of the different American Churches; it also contains a thoughtful and able discussion of the principal issues involved in problems, for example, of war, education, the family, taxation, etc. Dr. Brown's book is a useful contribution to the vexed question of the relations between Church and State, and deserves to be read by all who are concerned with this problem.

Dr. Niemöller's unpretentious little volume consists of a selection of sermons preached by him in his church at Berlin-Dahlem during the past three years. The sermons reveal a deep but simple piety; they reflect at its best that new religious spirit which persecution has breathed into German protestantism. But apart from their devotional value they throw light on the attitude of one of the chief protagonists in the present struggle between the Confessional Church in Germany and the Nazi régime. Dr. Niemöller is of the stuff of which martyrs are made : for him there can be no compromise between the forces of good and evil, and the issue between them presents itself to him with a clarity which the outsider must admire but which he will find it hard to share. Church and State are uneasy bed-fellows, above all in a totalitarian State, but they must needs live together, and it may be doubted whether Dr. Niemöller's extreme simplification of the issues at stake is helpful in bringing about a working agreement between the two.

Dr. Rheinhold Niebuhr is one of the ablest and most influential of the younger generation of American theologians. In this small pamphlet he is crusading against the doctrines and practice of the Nation-State, in which, in its extreme form, everything is subordinated to the ruling clique who profess to have identical interests with those of the nation as a whole, both now and in the future. But his protest goes deeper than this: it is raised against the excessive subservience of even democratic peoples towards the policies of their rulers, and in general against the popular glorification of nationality. He pleads for a return to the old prophetic religion of Amos and Isaiah which would "speak in the name of a divine Majesty to every monarch, whether he be called King or commissar, and must bring every national community under judgment." C. W. GUILLEBAUD.

16*. GERMANY'S NEW RELIGION: THE GERMAN FAITH MOVEMENT. By Wilhelm Hauer, Karl Heim and Karl Adam. Translated by T. S. K. Scott-Craig and R. E. Davies. 1937. (New York: Abingdon Press; London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 8vo. 168 pp. 5s.)

THE chief value of this book is contained in the statement of the New German Religion by Wilhelm Hauer, its leading propagandist. Wilhelm Hauer, say the translators, was born in South Germany, and was of the pietistic sect of the Protestant Church. Trained in a Missionary College, he was a missionary in India, later a student at Oxford, where he was attached to Mansfield College, became an exhibitioner of Jesus College, and took a First in "Greats" in 1914. After the War he was a pastor of a congregation in Frankfurt, then in Strasburg. Drifting from Christianity, he formed a Free sect of Christians, but, soon casting it off, he became professor in Tübingen, where he still is, and whither he draws crowds by his lectures on "Race and Religion" and kindred subjects.

Karl Heim, also a professor in Tübingen since 1920, provides an antidote for an audience said to be larger than that of any other theological professor in Germany. Three of his books have already appeared in English: *The New Divine Order*, *God Transcendant*, and *The Church of Christ and the Problems of the Day*. Heim's article in this book is an exceptionally able discussion of "Responsibility and Destiny; the Difference between Hauer's View and the Message of the Bible and the Reformers."

Karl Adam, a foremost German theologian, is also professor at Tübingen in the Catholic Faculty; two of his books have appeared in English: *Catholicism* and *The Son of Man*. His contribution to this volume is a very fine Essay on Jesus Christ and the Spirit of the Age.

This really interesting and informative book would have been much more satisfying had Karl Heim and Karl Adam made a complete and direct case against Hauer's New German Faith. Nevertheless, they destroy his foundations. The translators, in an informative introduction, are responsible for some statements on the doctrine of Divine Imminence which sound strange to Christian ears. The book is valuably provocative of thought. JOHN LOVE MORROW.

17*. THE CHURCH'S ATTITUDE TO PEACE AND WAR. 1937. (London: Student Christian Movement Press. 8vo. 95 pp. 1s.)

In 1935 the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland asked the Committee on Church and State to convene a conference to discuss the

question of the Church's attitude to war. This pamphlet contains the report of that conference, together with extracts from some of the papers prepared for it. There are clear statements of the non-pacifist and the pacifist positions and emphasis is laid on the extent to which it is possible for the two groups to work together in the cause of peace. The appendices deal with particular aspects of the problem—the Commonwealth ideal, a Christian philosophy of the State, the reform of the League of Nations, etc. The arguments to be found in this pamphlet are not new. What is, unfortunately, rare and gives it importance, is its recognition of the absolute sincerity, as well as the validity, of the opposing views expressed. H. G. L.

ECONOMICS AND FINANCE

18*. WORLD ECONOMIC SURVEY. Sixth Year, 1936–37. [1937. II A. 13.] 1937. (Geneva: League of Nations Economic Intelligence Service; London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 261 pp. Cloth, 7s. 6d.; paper, 6s.)

NOT the least valuable of the features of the *World Economic Survey* are its readable and concise summaries of *World Production and Prices*, *Money and Banking*, the *Review of World Trade*, the *I.L.O. Year Book*, and the other periodical publications of the League of Nations and the I.L.O. For the general reader these specialist studies must, from their mere volume, remain largely unexplored works of reference.

The latest issue of the *Survey* emphasises the marked recovery since September 1936 in all the countries which devalued at that time except France. The situation created in France by the social legislation is aptly compared to that confronting the New Deal in the United States in 1933. "Costs rose sharply before business activity increased, and the lag in activity was increased by political factors."

World industrial activity continued to recover, and is now back to its 1929 level, even when the U.S.S.R. (where industrial production has quadrupled) is excluded. On the other hand, it is far lower than it would be had the normal rate of expansion of at least 3 per cent. per annum been maintained since 1929. One important stimulus, at least since 1936, has been rearmament, which is estimated to affect 60 per cent. of industry. The world spent two and a half to three times as much on armaments in 1936 as in 1933. But the relative importance of armaments expenditure varies widely in different countries. In Japan it represents one-fifth of the national income; in the United States one-fiftieth.

In spite of this, industrial expansion was more pronounced in the United States than in any other industrial country during the year under review. This late recovery in the United States was of exceptional importance to the rest of the world. For in the period 1925–29 the United States accounted for over 40 per cent. of the value of world industrial output, the next largest shares being those of Germany (12 per cent.) and the United Kingdom (10 per cent.).

International trade continues to lag behind industrial production, although if the U.S.S.R. is omitted the gap is not very wide, trade having recovered to 98·3 per cent. of its volume in 1929, whilst industrial production has reached 107·1 per cent. of its 1929 level. On the other hand, the recovery in trade is primarily accounted for by increased demand for raw materials. Trade in manufactured goods in 1936 was still only 75 per cent. of its volume in 1929. The crisis barriers to international trade remain, even though the factors which

may have justified their erection, exchange instability and falling prices, have disappeared.

World unemployment, at one time three times as great as in 1929, was only twice as great in the middle of 1936, and falling rapidly. Social legislation proceeded apace; a striking example being the law securing four weeks' paid holiday annually for agricultural labourers in New Zealand.

In discussing the recent "gold scare," the *Survey* argues that "the glut of gold in some countries and its scarcity in others reflects, not a superabundance of gold in general, but an international disequilibrium based upon fundamental economic and political, rather than monetary, causes. . . . Only by a greater rise in prices in the gold-receiving than in the gold-losing countries, coupled with freer imports into the gold-receiving countries, could the flow be reversed and the stock of gold be more evenly distributed." Elsewhere it is pointed out that the inflow of foreign capital into the United States throughout 1935 and 1936 amounted to "over $3,500,000 daily, including Sundays and holidays."

B. S. KEELING.

19*. RAW MATERIALS IN PEACE AND WAR. By Eugene Staley. 1937. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations. London: R.I.I.A. 8vo. x + 326 pp. $3.00, 12s. 6*d.*; to members of the Institute 10s. 6*d.*)

THIS is a comprehensive study of the problems with which it deals. The writer has no solution to offer for access to raw materials in times of war. There is, he says, "absolutely no hope of any solution to raw material problems in terms of the economy of war," and to attempt to adjust an "equitable" distribution of raw materials "in order to equalise fighting power would be worse than pursuing a will-o'-the-wisp." As long as nations are thinking in the terms of power, the question is insoluble.

The question of adjustment, once the world experiences again a sense of security and ceases to envisage the probability of war, is quite different. But it is wrong to think of the problem merely in terms of colonial raw materials. The writer emphasises once again that the major raw materials of the world are produced in sovereign States. The United States is the chief consumer of most raw materials, and the chief producer of many, but Mr. Staley believes that it is a dangerous delusion to think that an indiscriminate embargo on the shipment of raw materials to belligerent nations would keep the United States out of war.

As regards access to raw materials in times of peace, the solution, in the author's view, is to be found in a lessening of economic nationalism which reduces "the ability of importing countries to pay for raw materials and of exporting countries to sell them," but he fears the danger of raw material control schemes assuming a monopolistic character. He points out that friction often arises over questions connected with investment of capital for raw material exploitation. As regards the investment problem, he desires to "de-nationalise investments, and to substitute the supervision of permanent international agencies for national diplomatic protection." He is of the opinion that colonial territorial re-distribution, even if politically possible, would have only minor effects on the raw material problem.

The book has some useful appendices dealing with the chief uses of important raw materials, the degree of monopoly power, and a descrip-

tion of the many control schemes which are now in existence. The useful index is very welcome. BARNARD ELLINGER.

20. BRITISH BANKS AND THE LONDON MONEY MARKET. By R. J. Truptil, Ph.D.Econ. (Paris). With a preface by Sir Robert Kindersley. 1936. (London: Jonathan Cape. 8vo. 352 pp. 10s. 6d.)

MR. TRUPTIL, writing with knowledge both of the French and British systems and with banking experience in London, gives in this book a valuable account of the present structure and recent trends of evolution of London's financial organisation and methods. Bagehot's classic on *Lombard Street* and Lavington's early post-War survey of *The English Capital Market* are brought up to date in this competent study.

The first part describes the various institutions, dealing in succession with the Bank of England, the joint-stock banks, the discount houses, bill brokers, acceptance houses, the Clearing House, and other banks (Colonial, Dominion, Anglo-foreign, and foreign) with headquarters or branch offices in London. Data are given showing the magnitude of the resources they control, while ingeniously constructed theoretical or composite balance-sheets illustrate the chief activities of most of the types of institution. The discount market is described as the most remarkable feature of the City; it is unique, no other financial centre possessing a money market dependent upon three months' commercial or Treasury bills financed by specialised houses. It offers liquidity combined with revenue, and these advantages explain why in normal times foreign banks keep an appreciable part of their sight funds in London.

Interesting indications are given of the foreign origin of almost all British acceptance houses of old standing, and of their early merchant trading activities. In course of time the financial or banking side of their work has grown, and the merchant trading side has declined. In addition to financing international trade by their acceptance business, a number of well-known firms, including Baring Bros., Hambros Bank, Lazard Bros., Morgan Grenfell, N. M. Rothschild and Sons, and J. Henry Schroeder, undertake the placing of loans for various foreign governments, particularly in Europe, South America and the Far East; they also act as bankers for foreign governments, and place loans for foreign railways and harbours. The serious contraction of their business owing to the great reduction both of international trade and of international lending during recent years is indicated.

The position of foreign banks in London is outlined. They are given every facility to establish branches there, no restrictions being placed upon their activities and no special taxation being imposed upon them. Like the acceptance houses, they are primarily concerned with external affairs. France, Italy, Belgium, the United States and Japan are all well represented in the City, but German banks, which had very active branches in London until 1914, have shown no desire to re-establish themselves there since the War.

Estimates are made of the resources of the London market available for short-term lending. The nature and importance of the various types of bills circulating in London are examined, and the growing predominance of Treasury bills is shown statistically.

The second part studies the operation of London's financial institutions. The author considers that " the three dominant features of the

British banking system are *the supreme authority of the Bank of England*, a *concentration of banking* which has been carried to an almost extreme degree, and *the existence of houses which specialise in discounting*" (p. 191). He shares the widely accepted opinion that the Bank of England's decisions are undertaken with a view not to private advantage, but to safeguarding the general interests of the community.

A particularly interesting feature of the book is the comparison made between London and Paris as financial centres. London is favoured by its geographic, historical, economic and moral advantages, but also the technical organisation of its financial system is incomparably superior to that of its rivals. Mr. Truptil notes that the resources of the smallest of the Big Five are nearly three times those of the largest French bank, and that London clearings total three times those of Paris. The process of banking concentration has proceeded much further in Britain. The British deposit banks do not suffer from the competition of the central bank as in France, where the Bank of France combines the functions both of a deposit bank and of supervisor of the money market. The French banks are shown to have more liquid assets, but this advantage is outweighed by the greater stability of deposits in the British banks, especially in times of crisis. Reference is made to the much smaller gold basis for the superstructure of credit in Great Britain compared with that in France. The rule of the Bank of France not to interfere with the market by open-market operations is noted. Many of the French money-market difficulties are attributed to the unsatisfactory management of French public finance, budget deficits having rendered bankers, and especially the Bank of France, very suspicious of the floating debt.

Controversial matters are raised in the review of British monetary policy during and since the 1931 crisis. Mr. Truptil makes the usual French criticism of this policy. He claims that Great Britain could have returned to the gold standard early in 1933, and that this would have materially assisted in the solution of the crisis by re-establishing conditions of monetary stability in the world. He asserts that the pound at that time stood at a level which gave the British exporter an advantage over all his competitors; yet he also says that the pound was approximately at an equilibrium rate in relation to prices in the gold *bloc* countries.

Mr. Truptil regards the function of the British Exchange Equalisation Account as being to maintain as long as possible the benefit of the depreciation of the pound in foreign markets, and he blames this depreciation for throwing an unbearable burden on the countries of the gold *bloc*, and in consequence forcing upon them a drastic deflation. This was written before the devaluation of the French franc in September 1936. On these questions Mr. Truptil's review is inadequate, being based upon a support for one type of monetary policy, while neglecting the arguments in favour of others. He also fails to take sufficiently into account the differences between the monetary conditions in the various countries and the measures which, for political and psychological reasons, were favoured in different parts of the world.

In discussing the future of the City, a restoration of the gold standard is strongly urged, and a return to a gold coinage is advocated as a means of restoring confidence. On the latter question, however, British and French conditions are quite different, and in Britain, under the present circumstances, a gold coinage would have very little effect upon confidence in the monetary system. Mr. Truptil

regards the absence of adequate provision of medium-term credit for trade and industry as the missing link in the organisation of the City, and he suggests the development of such provision. He gives a brief review of the banking policy proposed by the Labour Party, and notes also that since 1931 there has been a trend towards increased control over monetary policy by the Treasury. Nationalisation of the Bank of England would, he considers, be largely a change in outward form, while he does not think that nationalised joint-stock banks would be more efficient than under the present system.

J. HENRY RICHARDSON.

21*. PROSPERITY AND DEPRESSION: a theoretical analysis of cyclical movements. By Gottfried von Haberler. 1937. (Geneva: League of Nations Economic Intelligence Service. 8vo. xv + 363 pp. *7s. 6d.*)

WHATEVER its other failures, the League of Nations has put the world greatly in its debt by its admirable series of green publications, collecting, summarising, analysing and commenting on statistical information. In the present volume it has carried its scientific work one stage further. Dr. Haberler, an economist of great distinction, working under its auspices and utilising its machinery for research, has produced a volume which sets out to classify existing theories of the trade cycle and then to build up out of the common elements and with the aid of his own theoretical powers a synthetic view.

The League is much to be congratulated upon organising work of this kind. The trade cycle pursuing its own ineluctable course is apt to cut across all plans for international economic co-operation; and political and economic co-operation are closely interconnected. No plan is likely to be successful which does not take account of the trade cycle; but to take account of it effectively it is necessary to understand its mode of operation and, as far as possible, its causes.

And so, to make a start, Dr. Haberler has brought together the results of the scientific investigations of authors of diverse nationalities and of diverse methods of approach. Although each author is bound to have a sense that some of his fine points have been neglected, Dr. Haberler is to be greatly praised for his impartial handling and his astute penetration. In addition to discovering common ground wherever possible, obscured as it often is by a tangle of conflicting terminologies, Dr. Haberler has rightly endeavoured to reveal irreconcilable points of divergence, in the hope that they may ultimately be settled by the test of experience.

Dr. Haberler has now moved to another sphere, but the work of the League proceeds. In its enlightenment it has appointed Dr. Tinbergen, a young statistician of great brilliance and resource, to apply to the problems left for settlement by Dr. Haberler precise statistical tests. We may thus hope for further publications on the same topic of pre-eminent interest.

It is an excellent thing that the League has concerned itself with this matter. For we need not only knowledge and understanding, but also authority, to bring scientific findings forcefully to the attention of those who govern our destinies. The toll taken by a great slump, both in economic loss and human suffering, bears comparison with that of a great war.

R. F. HARROD.

22. ORGANISED COMPENSATORY TRADING. By Professor Edgard Milhaud, Professor of Economics in the University of Geneva. 1937. (London: Williams and Norgate. 8vo. 305 pp. 5s.)

GENEVA is without doubt the strangest city in the world, and, as might have been expected, Professor Milhaud is no ordinary professor.

For many years Professor Milhaud has been editor of one of the most interesting periodicals in the world, the *Annals of Collective Economy.* This covers all subjects connected with the economic activities of States and local authorities, control of public utility services, agricultural marketing schemes and the work of all types of semi-public concerns. The periodical has hardly received the support it deserves from English readers, or—published as it is in four languages, and dealing with administrative and economic problems in a great number of countries—from readers throughout the world.

During the last few years Professor Milhaud has been devoting an increasing amount of space to the world monetary situation, to the virtual exclusion, indeed, of all other problems. The "Milhaud Plan" for the restoration of international trade, and the solution of financial, exchange, and currency crises is the provision of international clearing certificates. Each country is to be encouraged to import freely such goods as it requires, and to pay for them by the issue of a certificate, backed by a newly created international authority, undertaking to deliver exports from that country, of a certain value. These certificates would, in effect, form a new international currency additional to gold or gold exchange, and Professor Milhaud's idea is that they would be traded and exchanged so that they would eventually "find their way home" to the issuing country.

Such a method, on the face of it, has clear advantages over the orgy of bilateralism which has characterised the hundreds of trade agreements between pairs of countries throughout the world in the last six years.

It is equally clear, unfortunately, that numerous difficulties would be encountered in working this plan. It is also rather an unfortunately chosen time to produce a book dealing with this project at a time when world trade is booming, and indeed probably approaching a level which is not likely to be surpassed for a number of years in the near future. But who knows? This plan may turn out to be very valuable as an emergency measure in the next crisis.

COLIN CLARK.

23. CAPITAL AND EMPLOYMENT. By R. G. Hawtrey. 1937. (London: Longmans, Green. 8vo. xi + 348 pp. 15s.)

IN the first half of this volume Mr. Hawtrey devotes his subtle brain to explaining the intricate ways in which monetary and industrial factors interact so as to produce variations in the volume of output and employment. The two chief contributions he has to make towards an explanation of depressions and a refutation of the explanations made by other economists are, first, his distinction between "widening" and "deepening" forms of investment, and, second, the relative importance of long-time investment and short-time credit by banks for working expenses and for speculation. Both these distinctions have been overlooked or disparaged by most of those who have dealt with the disequilibrium between capital and consumption visible in times of "glut." According to the older classical doctrine, no lasting or general disequilibrium was possible; for the normal play of prices,

including the price of savings, did not admit of waste save such as was embodied in errors of calculation or mischances.

But a closer and more realistic view of the modern situation shows that a distinction must be made between the trade cycles of earlier date, with their fairly quick processes of rectification, and the violent fluctuations of recent times. Though there is a widespread disposition to regard the depression of a few years ago as a quite abnormal occurrence, due to post-War political, economic and financial disturbances, there can be no doubt that modern technological advances, with the changes of income distributions which they cause for nations, groups and individual consumers, must be regarded as recurring dangers in the future unless important economic remedies can be discovered and applied. Mr. Hawtrey holds that Mr. Keynes has gone wrong on a good many points, but particularly in his failure to give due attention to the function of banks in short-time loans. A sound agreed control of these loans when "booms" are on the horizon would go far to check the worst depressions which follow periods of excessive speculation.

The larger part of his book devoted to criticism of Mr. Keynes, Professor Pigou, Mr. Hayek and Major Douglas makes exceedingly difficult reading, and though disclosing the errors involved in monetary exposition, largely due to slippery terminology, does not contribute much to positive understanding of the situation. Taking the term "profit," for example, an important incentive to business activity: we are told that it is "essentially a margin between selling prices and costs and is in proportion of turnover" (p. 38), and that "so long as the value of sales depends on the skill, the efforts and the opportunities of the traders, the characteristics of profit as we know it will remain" (p. 40). This appears to merge profit in wages of management *plus* luck (presumably balancing losses from bad luck), and does not meet the socialist charge that profit is the advantage of the employer in bargaining with labour.

Though there are passages in Mr. Hawtrey's book where he appears to assign some causation for depressions to insufficiency of consumers' demand, he nowhere admits that modern industry, while raising real wages for workers, prevents them from rising sufficiently to furnish a demand for consumption goods adequate to the productivity of modern capitalism. Both long-term investment and short-term loans are periodically superabundant, clogging the productive system and producing periods of under-investment, under-production, under-saving and under-consumption, upsetting the home and foreign markets, the monetary systems for domestic and foreign purchasers, and afflicting the workers with unemployment and destitution. Mr. Hawtrey handles the monetary aspect of this trouble with consummate skill, but he does not give the same attention to the processes of bargaining which distribute income, and therefore consuming power, in accordance with conditions of inequality of access to land, capital and education.

J. A. HOBSON.

24. THE TRADE CYCLE. By R. F. Harrod. 1936. (London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. xi + 234 pp. 10s.)

MR. HARROD rejects several "explanations" of the trade cycle. It is not due to errors of optimism and pessimism. Again, "The view that the slump is in any way due to the fact that methods of production become inappropriately capitalistic in the boom, or more capitalistic than is appropriate in subsequent conditions, must be altogether

rejected." Finally, monetary policy and the rate of interest play only a subordinate part. The essence of his own theory is that "the cycle results from the joint operation of the Relation and the Multiplier."

The Relation is between the growth of capital goods (net investment) and the growth of consumption. For example, with consumption advancing at the rate of 2 per cent. per annum, the amount of net investment required is only half that required with consumption advancing at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum. Hence activity in the capital goods industries fluctuates much more than activity in the consumption goods industries.

The Multiplier is borrowed from Mr. Keynes. It is "the ratio of the increment of income (= the increment of output) required to make people save an amount equal to the increment of investment." Thus if people save one-tenth of their additional incomes, a given amount of new investment will increase incomes by ten times its own value.

Let us now consider a period when output is increasing, unemployed resources are being absorbed, and everything is going ahead merrily. What checks the advance? If net investment falls, drastic consequences follow. First, incomes and consumption must fall enough to cut down saving until it equals the reduced value of net investment. In consequence, owing to the Relation, there will be a great fall in the amount of net investment, followed—in accordance with the Multiplier doctrine—by a further fall in incomes and consumption. "We have the absurd and tragic result that the whole level of activity has to be drastically curtailed till net investment reaches 'the bottom'."

But why does net investment fall in the first place? Because as incomes increase the proportion saved increases (partly owing to the growth of profits)—in other words, the proportion consumed falls. And, according to Mr. Harrod, the increased savings do not lead to a corresponding amount of new investment. It would be a "blessed coincidence," he says, if they did.

Mr. Harrod seems really to believe that in a few thousand words of formal analysis he has solved the riddle of the trade cycle. Would that he had! FREDERIC BENHAM.

25*. THE THEORY OF FORWARD EXCHANGE. By Paul Einzig. 1937. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. xxii + 520 pp. 21s.)

DR. EINZIG is known throughout the financial world as a fluent and lively writer on banking and currency. Eight years ago he published a short but important study of international gold movements; and since then books have flowed from his pen at the rate of almost two a year. This astonishing output is not the result of a mere *cacoethes scribendi*: on the contrary, Dr. Einzig always has something to say, and usually says it clearly and well. Nevertheless, many of his books have shown signs of hasty compilation, and he himself would have been the last person to claim a higher significance for them than they merit. Now, however, he has produced a work of really first-rate importance—a work which puts him at the forefront among monetary economists.

"Forward exchange" is the name given to the buying and selling of one currency against another at rates agreed on now, but for delivery at a specified date in the future. Even before the War, flourishing forward exchange markets existed in Berlin and other financial centres, though not in London, owing to the conservatism and laziness of British merchants, who insisted on quoting prices in sterling, leaving it to their

customers to bear the brunt of any exchange risks that might be involved. But post-War disturbances have both increased these risks and have brought sterling itself within their influence—with the result that the forward exchange market has become an essential part of the country's financial equipment. It is familiar to the foreign exchange departments of all the big banking houses, and is regularly used by many commercial and industrial firms, who find in it the best way of covering themselves against the danger of exchange losses in their foreign business. And yet until now it has received no adequate study by economists, and is barely even mentioned in commercial text-books.

Dr. Einzig is magnificently qualified to fill this shocking gap. He knows all that has been written on forward exchange, whether in English, German, French or Italian; he has intimate practical experience of all the complicated operations of which the forward exchange markets permit; and he has reflected deeply on the theoretical significance of forward exchange and on the problems of monetary policy which it raises. His book is large and at times difficult—for he takes us into unfamiliar and tricky ground—and some theorists may be inclined to dispute or qualify one or two of his conclusions. But of its path-breaking importance there can be no serious doubt. Dr. Einzig has earned the gratitude of all who are interested, whether practically or theoretically, in international economic problems.

L. M. FRASER.

26. PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY. By Frederick C. Mills. 1936. (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, in co-operation with The Committee on Recent Economic Changes. London: Macmillan. 8vo. xv + 581 pp. 16s.)

DR. MILLS has produced a study of great economic interest. He realises that "prices cannot themselves be in any sense final causes," but rightly adds that "prices may be important intermediate factors in a circulatory relationship."

The perspective of the picture which he draws is broadened by relating post-War data to 1913 figures and to those of the fall in prices which started in 1873. One amongst many interesting points which he raises is the widening of the margin between raw and processed goods from 1913 to 1936, the margin representing fabrication and distributional costs. Will stable prosperity be deferred until the 1913 ratio has been restored? What should happen to the margin resulting from increased productivity since 1913? He suggests at the end of the book that the safest destination would be a reduction in selling prices of the finished goods immediately affected by the productive gain, a reduction equivalent to the saving in production. But he wisely adds, "For goods of elastic production this would mean immediate absorption of all or part of the energies released by the gain. For goods of inelastic demand a shifting of productive resources to other employment is necessary."

The analyses of the causes of the crash in 1929 and of the exact effect of the N.R.A. and other measures for recovery are particularly well balanced. The book should be of interest to those who are trying to square the circle by seeking to keep the rate of interest low and credit plentiful without upsetting the price level. The book is well documented and has valuable appendices. C. WALEY COHEN.

27. THE LIMITS OF ECONOMICS. By Oscar Morgenstern. 1937. (London: William Hodge. 8vo. vii + 160 pp. 7s. 6d.)

PROFESSOR MORGENSTERN is a leading Austrian economist, well qualified to discuss the limits within which economic theory can be used as a guide to policy. His main thesis is that "theoretical economics is neutral as between all the possible circumstances to which it may be applied. Economics can never, and should never, be made dependent on any particular ideology or attitude towards economic policy." But the economist can, and should, trace effects to their causes, explain the probable consequences of particular actions or policies, and show whether incompatible aims are being pursued.

The German edition of this book appeared in 1934. The present edition has been considerably revised, and is very well translated.

FREDERIC BENHAM.

28*. STATISTICAL YEAR-BOOK OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 1936/37. (Series of League of Nations Publications, 1937. II.A.7. Geneva: League of Nations. London: Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 330 pp. Cloth 12s. 6d. Paper 10s.)

As in previous years, this volume gives a view of the chief demographical, economic, financial and social phenomena. Most of the statistics are brought down to the end of 1936, and some include the first quarter of 1937. The tables are arranged so as to facilitate, so far as possible, a comparison between one country and another in respect of such subjects as territory, population, labour conditions, production, public finance, prices, etc. New tables this year, containing information hitherto unpublished, cover such questions as air traffic, movements in capital markets, and the fertility and reproduction rate of the population in a number of countries.

29*. REVIEW OF WORLD TRADE, 1936. (Series of League of Nations Publications, 1937. II.A.9. Geneva: League of Nations. London: Allen and Unwin. 91 pp. 2s. 6d.)

The 1936 edition of the *Review of World Trade* contains a general synopsis of world trade during the year and a comparison of the figures for 1936 with the years immediately preceding and with 1929. Special attention has been paid in this edition to recent changes in the distribution of each country's trade by countries of provenance and destination, brought about by variations in competitive power or by new methods of commercial policy. Sections are also devoted to value and quantum of world trade in the years 1929 and 1936; trade by main groups of articles; trade by continental groups; trade by countries; analysis of the trade of principal countries in 1936; trade in certain staple products; and geographical distribution of trade as influenced by discriminatory measures. Statistical tables are given in three annexes.

30*. REMARQUES à propos de la mise en valeur de l'ensemble des zones désertiques qui s'étendent sur l'Afrique du Nord et l'Ouest de l'Asie. By Robert Tournier. 1936. (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner. 8vo. 69 pp.)

31. PROBLEME DER MEISTBEGÜNSTIGUNG. By Dr. Walter Quack. 1937. (Hamburg: Evert Verlag. 8vo. 96 pp. *Rm.* 3.80.)

A thorough and painstaking dissertation on Most-Favoured-Nation treatment. The discussion is theoretical rather than practical. Dr. Quack is not convinced that the principle of M.F.N. has outlived its usefulness, and holds the view that in one form or another it is essential to the German economy.

W. J.

32. Les Ententes Économiques Internationales. By Laure
Ballande. 1937. (Paris: Librarie Technique et Economi
8vo. 374 pp.)

The lady author of this work has put together much available
formation about 140 international price-fixing or production-regula
agreements. Professor W. Oualid, of Paris, remarks in a preface
Mme. Ballande has compiled the completest existing list of s
agreements. The book is well indexed, so that the reader can a
glance discover, under the title either of a product or commodity or
country, what agreements, if any, have been entered into.
details of such agreements, with sources of information, are bri
and clearly shown, and as far as possible (without pretending
complete up-to-dateness in knowledge often so recondite)
author indicates whether the agreements are actually in force
effective. She appends a statistical analysis of the agreeme

C. J. S.

POPULATION AND MIGRATION

33*. Colonial Population. By Robert R. Kuczynski. 1
(London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. xiv + 101 pp. 5s

This small book, the work of an outstanding authority on pop
tion statistics, is the result of great labour of largely a pionee
kind. Within the space of less than 100 pages the author covers
available vital statistics (or estimates) of all the colonial count
which aggregate about 270 million persons, or 13 per cent. of
world's total population. There are four main chapters—T
Population, Population by Race, Population by Continent of Bi
and Birth and Death Records. An appendix of 60 pages evalu
the sources, country by country. The problems of colonial stati
are discussed in a masterly introduction of 8 pages.

It is odd that data on colonial population, so necessary not
for an understanding of basic social facts, but also for current adm
trative purposes, should still be in so primitive a condition; as
Kuczynski says, they are, for the colonial population as a whole
"a most unsatisfactory state," "utterly inadequate." This ren
applies to British colonies no less than to others. Permanent ce
staffs do not exist, and when decennial censuses are taken they
normally in the hands of seconded officers with no previous experi
of the work and inadequately provided either with instruction
with assistance. Thus, in the last year of census, 1931, the decen
census in Northern Rhodesia was in the hands of a seconded office
director, one lady clerk and one Native office-boy, and this improv
staff assumed work only a short time before the census was ta
In the model colony, Nigeria, £5000 were allowed for the 1931 decer
census, out of a budget of over £5,000,000 (much more than £5,000,
if the budgets of the Native Administrations are included) and
counting over 20 million persons. Dr. Kuczynski refers to the re
as a "census," not a census. He warns against the far-reac
conclusions drawn in the official reports from the scanty data
collected, and he characterises the extent to which the temptatio
draw such far-reaching conclusions has been yielded to as "appalli
especially as regards explaining changes in the population. He
an instance of the 1934 report to the League on the mandated terri
of the British Cameroons drawn up by the Government of Nig

The present reviewer saw something of the 1931 census in Nigeria, and can affirm that Dr. Kuczynski under-states the deplorable limitations of understanding and of technical practice that marked it.

Dr. Kuczynski urges that the problem now is not how to improve existing colonial statistics, but rather how to convince the Colonial Offices that what is needed in most colonies is an absolutely new departure: no better case for the reform could be presented than in this work. The recent creation of an Economic Department in the Colonial Office suggests that something might at length be done. We shall then no longer have to depend for an estimate of the population of Hong Kong (it so happens, an erroneous estimate) based upon the amount of night-soil collected.

One small point Dr. Kuczynski does not touch upon, though it is of considerable sociological and demographic importance, namely, that it will for long be impossible to know the age-composition of most colonial populations on account of the fact that the average native inhabitant does not know his age. W. R. CROCKER.

34*. MIGRANT ASIA: A Problem in World Population. By Radhakamal Mukerjee. Introduction by Corrado Gini. 1937. (Rome: Comitato Italiano per lo Studio dei Problemi della Popolazione, Serie III, Volume I. xlv pp.)

THIS is an important book, worthy of its author's high reputation. The subtitle suggested in Professor Gini's introduction, "The Pressure of Population as a Factor in International Equilibrium," gives a good indication of its range. The Asia of the title is "Monsoon Asia," *i.e.* India, Indo-China, Malayasia, China and Japan, an area which contains half of mankind, 1,000,000,000 human beings. The emigrants from this region are very few in proportion to the population concerned. Less than a million Indians and not more than two million Chinese and Japanese live outside the Monsoon Region. Within that region perhaps fifty million emigrants have moved from their native land to other countries. Thus the migration of the Asian peoples is as yet a smaller thing, both absolutely and relatively, than that of the West European peoples during the last hundred years. It is probably less than the compulsory migration of Africans in the Slave Trade.

The greater part of the book describes the pressure of population in the homelands, the distribution of the emigrants, and the conditions under which they migrated to, and worked and settled in, the lands in which they now live. Naturally the author has paid more attention to Indians than to the other Orientals; and, since almost all Indian emigration is within the British Empire, the book surveys most of the migration within the inter-tropical lands of the Empire. There are many statistics, which in general illustrate the author's thesis without interrupting his argument. It is unfortunate that he gives no indication of the very different standards of these figures; *e.g.* the figures for India are those of a reliable census, while those for China are estimates in regard to which authorities differ very widely. It is also interesting to note that while stressing the influence of Indians in the British West Indies, he notes the high proportions in British Guiana, *ca.* 40 per cent., and Trinidad, *ca.* 30 per cent.; but not that the proportion does not reach 0·2 per cent. in any other colony.

Many of the fundamental assumptions which underlie the book are not clearly stated, and need clarification. "Any fear of the consequences of racial admixture should not unduly trouble a scientific

world" (p. 36); but "both Mestizos and Mulattoes have proved themselves among the most unstable . . . of mankind" (p. 150). Professor Mukerjee says, quite justifiably, hard things of the "Nordic myth" and of assumptions of racial superiority. He asserts (p. 55) that "civilisations are built not by race but by region," an assertion which is defensible if his "region" is that of the Human Geographers. On p. 52 is the statement that the "Standard of Living is a matter of Race and Region." The first part of this rests on differences of physique and of physiological metabolism, which may be due to the adaptation of race to region; but the whole section, and the references to double standards of living elsewhere, ignores the trend towards equalising such standards throughout the civilised world. The description of the Australian standard of comfort as "wasteful and inefficient" (p. 53) is not clearly related to economic or other values. There is some suggestion that, under prosperous conditions, the peasant-farmer economy of the Hindu is a more desirable standard than that of urban workers in the unstable industrial civilisation of the West. But no discussion of standards of living can be conclusive so long as it is limited to economic values; for the economic man is not the whole man.

Another assumption is that emigration can relieve the pressure in the overcrowded lands of Asia. Here one may estimate possibilities. The population-capacity of Australia has been variously estimated at from 20 to 100 millions. (Professor Mukerjee records, on p. 193, an estimate of 450 millions, without reference.) The increase in India in the decade 1921–31 was 10·6 per cent., and in Japan 1920–30, 15·2 per cent.; that of China is unknown. But if all Monsoon Asia increased 10 per cent., then the full occupation of Australia by Asian emigrants could only remove the population increment of one decade, without making any reduction in the numbers of those left. The whites in Australia would be submerged by fifteen times their number of Asiatics; and Asia would have gained no relief. Fortunately a migration of ten millions a year is beyond the powers of transport to, and absorption in, Australia or any other continent. No feasible emigration can relieve the population pressure of India and China. And the repeated assumptions (*e.g.* p. 156) that over-population gives the crowded people a right (it does give a motive) to settle in less crowded lands, and that pressure of population is an irresistible force (p. 192) need justification.

In so brief a notice it is impossible to do more than indicate some of the matters dealt with. This book deserves the attention of all students of world affairs, and in particular of those interested in the British Empire. Few are likely to agree with Professor Mukerjee in all his conclusions; all will find him a stimulus and a challenge to thought.

C. B. FAWCETT.

35*. UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE LEARNED PROFESSIONS. By Walter M. Kotschnig. 1937. (London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. xii + 347 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

WHEN the International Association on Unemployment was resuscitated in 1923 and placed on its agenda the question of unemployment of professional workers, many people considered this to be a relatively unimportant, and certainly temporary, phenomenon. Ten years later, when this unemployment was one of the factors in the German revolution, that view could no longer be held, but the problem was still thought to be confined to a limited group of countries. Even

this rather comfortable thought (for the countries not concerned) has to be abandoned to-day, and it is now recognised that, in a very large number of countries, the problem of unemployment among professional workers is one of considerable gravity. Great Britain has, so far, escaped it to a large extent, except during short periods, but that is no reason for not studying the situation as it exists elsewhere with a view to learning from the experience of others and contributing to a solution of their difficulties. In the search for information this book will prove an admirable guide.

Starting out in 1933 to survey a field in which there were hardly any reliable data available, the author succeeded in collecting a large mass of material which he presents for our consideration in a very readable and interesting way. He shows the enormous increase in student enrolments as compared with pre-War days and explains the reasons. The demand for professional workers has also increased, but less slowly, and there is consequently unemployment, not merely during a depression like that of 1929 onwards, but of an apparently permanent character. Counter measures have been adopted: good, bad and indifferent. But the real problem has hardly been touched, and that, according to our author, is a reform of the educational system. Before we do that we must obtain better information on occupational distribution and the probable demand for the different kinds of professional workers. We should then reform the secondary schools so that they are no longer merely stepping-stones to the university, but provide an adequate education in themselves for all but a minority of highly qualified students able to take real advantage of a university education. These conclusions are no doubt controversial, but they provide an admirable basis for discussion, and it is to be hoped that economists, educationalists and others concerned will hasten to express their views on them, so that practical results may be achieved. D. CHRISTIE TAIT.

36. DIE INTERNATIONALEN VERTRÄGE ÜBER DIE AUS- UND EINWANDERUNG. By Dr. iur. Erich Noher. 1937. (Affoltern am Albis: Weiss. 8vo. xiii + 193 pp.)

THE question of the international organisation of migration, either by multilateral or bilateral agreements among governments, has been widely discussed since the War. Although interest in it died down during the depression when migrants, instead of going out to settle in the newer countries, were returning in considerable numbers to their home lands, it is reviving now that prosperity is returning and openings for migrants are once more presenting themselves. Evidence of this interest is to be found in the discussions at this year's Assembly of the League of Nations and in the extensive programme of work which the International Labour Office is undertaking as a result of decisions by its Governing Body. The book under review does not pretend to break new ground. It contains a large amount of information taken from published sources, and presents an argument in favour of dealing with migration internationally rather than by unilateral action. Starting with certain theoretical considerations, the author then goes on to review existing legislation and past experience in the matter of international regulation, mainly by means of bilateral agreements. It concludes with a reference to the work of the International Labour Organisation in this field. Dr. Noher's general

point of view is that of a student of law, and he barely touches on the economic aspect of the question. It was not his object to do so.

To those who find the official sources of information too detailed for study in the limited time at their disposal, this book provides an interesting summary, together with an adequately presented argument in favour of international agreement to facilitate and organise the movement of migrants. D. CHRISTIE TAIT.

37*. SIEDLUNG UND MACHTPOLITIK DES AUSLANDES. By Rupert von Schumacher. [*Macht und Erde*, Heft 5.] 1937. (Leipzig: Teubner. 8vo. 74 pp. *Rm.* 1.50).

Describes very briefly the various migrational activities which have taken place of recent years throughout the world.

LAW

38*. THE BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1937. Eighteenth Year of Issue. 1937. (London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. 282 pp. 16s.)

As is customary with the Year Book, the current issue contains many valuable articles of timely and practical importance, together with an excellent commentary on recent decisions of international tribunals and of national courts raising points of international law.

The series begins with an admirable exposition of the judgments given by the Supreme Court of the United States on questions involving international law. Its writer, Charles Cheney Hyde, the distinguished Professor of Columbia University, traces the gradual development in the application of that law in its bearings "upon the life of the United States in its contacts with the outside world." The view taken by the Supreme Court on the enforceability of international law is adequately reflected in Mr. Justice Gray's decision in *The Paquete Habana*, where he held that "international law is part of our law and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination." Many of the outstanding decisions of the Supreme Court in prize law could find a parallel in the judgments of Lord Stowell and Sir Samuel Evans.

In an article entitled "Some Problems of the Spanish Civil War," Professor H. A. Smith gives a comprehensive account of the controversies raised by the question of recognition and the application of the laws of war to the case of a civil war. As he well argues, "All rights are correlative to correlative duties, and it is not therefore part of the duty of neutral Powers to accord belligerent rights unless they are satisfied that the combatants are both willing and able to discharge their belligerent duties." Mr. Ian Morrow contributes an illuminating survey on the "International Status of Danzig" based on treaty provisions and its legal relationship to Poland. Mr. Lazare Kopelmanas, in a closely reasoned article on "Custom as a Means of the Creation of International Law," expounds the doctrine that all subjects of law, which are in touch with international relations, contribute to the formation of international custom. It is, however, difficult to follow the writer when he argues that there is a psychological element obliging the States to follow custom on the ground that "in acting as they act they are fulfilling a legal obligation."

The remaining articles are on private international law. Mr.

J. H. C. Morris pleads convincingly that, in spite of recent pronouncements that the question of "renvoi" as affecting the "law of the domicil" has been finally set at rest, there still exists considerable controversy as to the effect of the decided cases. He is of the opinion that it is open to an English judge to hold in a new case that a reference to "the law of a foreign country" should be construed as meaning a reference to its municipal law only. Mr. D. J. Llewelyn Davies contributes an important article on the great influence exercised on English private law by Ulrich Huber's chapter "De Conflictu Legum" published in 1689. He appends to his article the Latin text of this chapter together with an accurate translation in English prepared by himself. Finally, Dr. F. A. Mann, in an article on the "Proper Law and Illegality in Private International Law," expounds the doctrine that "a contract is governed by the law by which the parties intended to contract," and that the exceptions to this rule formulated by Dicey, Westlake and other eminent writers should be disregarded. The only two exceptions which Dr. Mann is prepared to concede are confined to the mode of performance of the contract and are based on considerations of (*a*) public policy and (*b*) the law of *locus solutionis.*

The Year Book concludes with exhaustive reviews of books and current periodicals. Particular attention should also be drawn to the article contained in this issue on the recent Treaty of Alliance with Egypt, which, after an excellent historical sketch, examines in detail the various provisions of this treaty. C. JOHN COLOMBOS.

39*. L'ORGANISATION JUDICIAIRE, LA PROCÉDURE ET LA SENTENCE INTERNATIONALES. Traité Pratique. By J. C. Witenberg. 1937. (Paris: Pedone. 8vo. 436 pp.)

As the number of international legal proceedings, whether before the Permanent Court of International Justice or other legal or arbitral tribunals, increases, the subject of international practice and procedure acquires greater importance and demands separate treatment. The treatise of Mr. Witenberg, the distinguished Polish jurist and member of the International Law Association, prepared with the collaboration of M. Jacques Desrioux of the French Bar (Cour d'Appel de Paris), fills what has hitherto been a gap in legal literature in French, at least since Méringhac's work was published in 1895—a date now very remote if we have regard to the course of development and not merely to the passage of time; it does for French-speaking practitioners and students what the classical work of Ralston (1926) has done for those of another tongue. Perhaps the ideal "International Practice" could result from the collaboration of an Anglo-Saxon and a Continental lawyer.

This last sentence is no disparagement of M. Witenberg's work. His book is admirable in method and exhaustive in treatment; it is no exaggeration to say that it should find a place in the library of every international lawyer, just as the English practitioner is bound to his yearly copy of an Annual Practice—or its equivalent. In particular the book possesses that indispensable adjunct of a book of reference—an index; too often this is wanting in books published on the Continent.

No source of information seems to have escaped notice, and in particular much attention is given to the proceedings of cases in which this country or the United States has been concerned. An English critic might perhaps demur to the frequency of references to the procedure of the defunct Court of Central American Justice, whose

life (alas !) was hardly long enough to acquire a commanding position. And he will observe that in one case at any rate, that of "briefs" (p. 214), the learned author assumes that an American practice prevails in this country, whereas in fact the English "brief" is something quite different from the document to which American lawyers give the same name. Similarly, "demurrer," not altogether to our advantage, as the late Lord Phillimore used to say, has disappeared from English practice; the "point of law" is not an adequate substitute. To note other points of English law or practice ("discovery," "estoppel," "affidavit") where the collaboration of an English lawyer might have been useful, would take too much space, and they are minor matters.

The practice of international tribunals must differ in important respects from that of a municipal court. The same weight cannot be given to points of procedure where sovereign States are concerned as where individual litigants are seeking justice from a sovereign. An international court cannot take a line which would be possible to a Master or Judge "in Chambers," and it either does not possess or fears to use the power of curing the wounds received in the process of litigation by the all-healing remedy of costs. Hence international procedure is necessarily more supple and less peremptory than municipal practice.

Again, in international litigation before a tribunal instituted *ad hoc* (and the Permanent Court of International Justice is far from having a monopoly of international legal proceedings) the court or arbitrator is often as much in need of guidance in matters of practice as the advisers of the litigating parties; thus a large part of a work on international practice, such as M. Witenberg's, is devoted to the guidance by precedent and precept of the court itself in the discharge of its own functions, not excluding the preparation of its judgment.

All which things add to the value of M. Witenberg's work.

J. FISCHER WILLIAMS.

40. GRUNDLAGEN UND METHODEN INTERNATIONALER REVISION. Von Werner Gramsch. [*New Commonwealth Institut Monographen, Reihe B, No.* 6.] 1937. (Stuttgart: Kommissionsverlag Deutscher Verlags-Anstalt. 8vo. 181 pp. *Rm.* 6.)

IN the author's view neither the League of Nations nor the Permanent Court of International Justice should be entrusted with "International Revision." He suggests the creation of a new International Tribunal which would function independently of the League and would decide the questions before it on the basis of general principles to be laid down for it (or by it?). The problems of revision present obvious difficulties (see a summary of recent controversies by Le Fur in *Receuil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International*, 1935, vol. 54, pp. 214–46). The book of Dr. Gramsch is a valuable contribution to the study of practical possibility of international revision.

V. R. IDELSON.

EUROPE

41*. ITALY AGAINST THE WORLD. By George Martelli. 1937. (London: Chatto and Windus. 8vo. xii + 316 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

NEXT to the second volume of Professor Toynbee's *Survey of International Affairs* for 1935, this is the fullest account which has yet appeared of the Italo-Abyssinian War in all its aspects. Mr. Martelli

achieves a high degree of impartiality in his presentation of facts, and shows a remarkably dispassionate judgment in his estimates of motives and consequences. The last word has not been written, and will not be written for many years to come, on this contentious question. But students of international affairs will not go far astray if they take Mr. Martelli as their guide.

The subject has two aspects which are really quite distinct, though Mr. Martelli treats them concurrently: the story of the war in Abyssinia, and the story of the actions, inactions and reactions of the other Powers.

Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of Mr. Martelli's account of the military operations is his scepticism about the popular theory that Italy's victory was due to her use of gas. This theory found ready acceptance at a time when people were emotionally predisposed to believe anything which seemed to excuse the Abyssinian defeat and to add to the shame of the Italian victory. It does not perhaps matter much. Italy used gas, and earned the moral opprobrium which this use brought on her. But whether she would not have won almost as easily without it will appear doubtful to anyone who has studied the evidence sifted in these pages.

The sections of the book relating to the attitude of the rest of the world will, however, probably attract greater attention. Mr. Martelli seeks neither to censure nor to excuse, but to explain. Even Sir John Simon comes in for a measure of understanding. He interpreted "with a lawyer's exactitude" the thoroughly confused attitude of the Government—and, it may be added, of public opinion—towards Germany. Unfortunately, when your policy is confused, the last quality required in its exponent is exactitude—for exactitude inevitably exposes its shortcomings; and this was Sir John's fate. The chapter "Britain Rebels" is a brilliant exposition of the growth of British opinion against Italy in the late summer of 1935, culminating in the Albert Hall meeting of October 30th. By that time the country was almost "solid for the League." But (the fatal but) "what the League ought to do had not been specified"; and profiting by this vagueness, "the Government, having bowed to public opinion with secret misgivings, made use of it to try and bluff the Italians." The other trouble about this demonstration of solidarity was that, while Englishmen thought that the power of Great Britain was being put behind the League, most foreigners felt that the power of the League was being put behind Great Britain. Most truths have two sides.

Mr. Martelli gives a careful and accurate account of the Hoare–Laval plan. But, like Professor Toynbee, he misses the point that the motive of the plan was not at all to save Abyssinia, and only secondarily to avoid the oil sanction, but primarily to save Italy. This is shown by the fact that the driving force behind the plan came not from Great Britain, but from France. France had no desire to save Abyssinia; and there is no reason to doubt that at this period both French and British military experts were still predicting that Italy would be unable to conquer her. (It is true that Sir Samuel Hoare, in his apologia in the House of Commons, confessed to having been "terrified" with the thought that Abyssinia might be lured to her destruction. But it was only afterwards, when this turned out to be an ominously exact prophecy, that much attention was paid to this isolated phrase.) As regards the oil sanction, this embarrassment weighed heavily on Great Britain (and was one of her reasons

for accepting the plan), but hardly at all on France. If this had been the primary motive, Great Britain would have been the main instigator of the plan; and France, who needed no such pretext for rejecting the oil sanction, merely lukewarm. What really worried M. Laval, and in part at least the British negotiators, was the fear that Italy, if she could not be extricated from Abyssinia by a partial but face-saving victory, might sustain a defeat which would destroy her power in Europe, and open Austria to Herr Hitler. This was the real purpose of the plan; and the British public, I think, dimly sensed this. If the public had thought of the plan as the only way (short of fighting for her) of saving Abyssinia, the reaction would have been altogether different. But it was felt (in substance, truly) that the plan was devised to give to Italy by fair means what she was believed to be unable to get by foul. The Hoare–Laval plan, like the earlier procrastinations of the Council, was a sacrifice on the altar of that dismal idol—the "Stresa front."

Mr. Martelli goes wrong on a couple of minor points. On pp. 59–60 he assumes that no written agreement about Abyssinia was concluded by M. Laval and Signor Mussolini in Rome in January 1935. The existence of such an agreement was admitted at the time, though the French claimed that it related only to economic concessions, and its terms have never been divulged. On p. 156 he describes as "a decision of the Council" what was, in accordance with Article 16 of the Covenant, a pronouncement by individual members of the Council. But the confusion of the subsequent procedure makes this mistake a venial one.

E. H. CARR.

42*. THE FRAMEWORK OF FRANCE. By H. G. Daniels. 1937. (London: Nisbet. 8vo. 264 pp. 10s. 6*d.*)

DR. DANIELS was from 1926 to 1936 *The Times* Correspondent in Paris, and was thus exceptionally well qualified to write this survey of the individual, social, economic and political aspects of French life. There are many influences bearing on the structure of France, and the spectacle of a great people grappling with the complex organisation of a modern society is one of the most fascinating of to-day. The point peculiar to France is that she is facing three major national problems at once. The Third Republic was the child of two revolutions, one constitutional, the other, sprung from the growth of industry, social. Neither of these revolutions had worked itself out by 1914 and, since the War, an agricultural revolution has been added to the stresses of the social order. England was fortunate in having resolved her constitutional problem before having to face the social disruption of industrialisation; that is a fact to be borne in mind by the critics of French institutions, the ill-functioning of which they are inclined to attribute only to defects of national character.

Dr. Daniels brings to his task, not only sympathy and understanding, but also those notably French qualities of acute analysis and lucid generalisation which make this work one of the best books on France yet published.

Although a powerful, unifying central government appears to make Paris the focus of creative energy, the author strikes a balance between the capital and the provinces which he recognises as the true units of national life. He has some interesting pages on the growth of Paris; indeed the problem of the ordered development of the capital, not easy to solve if one judges by the horrors of the

"Banlieue," is in miniature the problem of France herself—how to merge harmoniously smallness and individualism, essential French characteristics, into the large-scale collectivities of the modern world.

The first part of the book has also chapters on Alsace-Lorraine and regionalism, and the French conception of imperialism is well brought out in a chapter on the Colonial Empire, where the author gives proper emphasis to the valuable contribution of the Catholic Missionary. The middle section discusses the social changes caused by the Industrial Revolution, the effects of which began to be felt only after the War, and by the serious situation in agriculture to-day. There is a chapter on the educational system whose defects are at the root of much of the mental confusion among the youth of modern France, and which, unless remedied, are likely to prejudice the future of the Republic.

In the concluding chapters the author treats of politics, and guiding the reader through the maze of the electoral system, party groupings and parliamentary tactics analyses the present crisis in democratic government. It is not easy to write interestingly, clearly and accurately on French politics, and it is a measure of Dr. Daniels' skill that he does this with notable success. But was it merely a professional inhibition that caused the absence of what would have been most illuminating pages on the press of France? It is a regrettable omission in an admirable and authoritative work.

E. D. GANNON.

43*. L'EXPÉRIENCE BLUM : un an de Front Populaire. 1937. (Paris : Éditions du Sagittaire. 8vo. 188 pp. 15 *frs.*)

L'Expérience Blum is an account of yet another of the many experiments in government in a country which, save in an emergency, appears to lack any spirit of national unity.

The book gives a clear account of the internal conditions in France immediately prior to the Blum Government taking office in May 1936. These conditions presented a striking contrast to the rest of the world which had shown good progress from the world depression.

Increased purchasing power as opposed to the deflation under the Laval Government was the new watchword. French labour conditions have always been poor, and the Blum Government programme included higher wages, the forty-hour week, collective contracts, reform of the Bank of France and the disestablishment of the "200 families," paid holidays, an unemployment fund and the nationalisation of the armament industry. The franc was devalued in September 1936, but owing to the cost of the foregoing reforms its beneficent effects were neutralised. Before the commencement of this stupendous plan for social and economic reform serious labour troubles developed and the now historical "sit-down" strike was first seen. An amusing story is told of the workers on strike in one factory who, wishing to save their employer's electric light, provided themselves with candles : the employer, not to be outdone, switched on "un brilliant éclairage" ! "L'accord Matignon"—the workers' charter—laid it down that "le chômeur est un soldat du travail, provisoirement mis en reserve : la société doit assurer sa subsistence."

As regards agriculture, which was far from prosperous, the "office de blé" guaranteed a fixed price to the growers and reduced the power of the "négociants" to plunder the public.

Shortly after this book was published the Blum Government fell

and was replaced by another so-called "front populaire" administration. The Blum Government collapsed over the economic question, and a careful perusal of this book shows the dangers which were approaching. The French capitalist is extremely fearful of any socialistic reform, and so long as France remains a capitalistic country any government in power will have to subordinate its socialistic ideals to the power of orthodox finance. C. B. ORMEROD.

44*. L'EXERCICE DU POUVOIR : Discours prononcés de Mai 1936 à Janvier 1937. By Léon Blum. 1937. (Paris : Gallimard. Cr. 8vo. 358 pp.)

THIS little book contains a report of the principal speeches delivered by M. Blum in the Chamber, throughout the country and over the radio, between May 1936 and January 1937.

The collection, which has been grouped under seven headings, opens with the address at Narbonne shortly before the 1936 elections, when M. Blum outlined the programme of the Socialist Party. Part II deals with labour disputes, Part III with the subject of peace and collective security and includes his address as leader of the French Delegation to the League of Nations Assembly in June 1936, and his broadcast speech following Herr Hitler's pronouncements at the Nuremburg Congress in September of the same year. Parts IV and V cover speeches on the Spanish Civil War and Financial Problems respectively; Part VI is devoted to the subject of the press and includes M. Blum's words of farewell on the death of Roger Salengro. Part VII is an account of the achievements of the Popular Front Government. J. J.

45*. UNE RÉVOLUTION DANS LA PAIX. By Oliveira Salazar. Introduction by Maurice Maeterlinck. 1937. (Paris: Flammarion. 8vo. 293 pp. 18 *frs*.)

To this valuable, standard collection of the political addresses delivered by Dr. Oliveira Salazar between 1928 and 1936, M. Maurice Maeterlinck contributes a charming foreword, in which he contrasts the present renascence of Portugal with her decadent past, and pays tribute alike to the qualities of her leader and of the people who have accepted his reforms with such good will.

Salazar's own preface, or introductory essay, analyses the chaotic conditions under which he took office, and the principles that have animated his "peaceful revolution." From the outset he determined that New Portugal was to be a Corporative State. While protection and control of the common interest is the function of the government, public liberty through corporative representation must be the basis of the State. Behind the façade of the formal Constitution must be a constitutional *spirit* to transform its organs and institutions into national life.

The eighteen addresses that follow are milestones along this route—the date and occasion of delivery being supplied for each, with a useful Table of Contents.

In these Dr. Salazar discusses the internal and external aspects of the National Revolution; the problems of corporative organisation; colonial policy; political factors in the country; relations of the New State with other European Powers; education; principles of government. FRANCES A. WELBY.

46*. THE FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918–1935. By Felix John Vondraček, Ph.D. 1937. (Columbia University Press; London: P. S. King. 8vo. 451 pp. 22*s*. 6*d*.)

THE foreign policy of Czechoslovakia is as simple in its aims as it is complex in its application. Its main object must be, as with every other satiated State, to hold what has been gained and to live at peace with all the world. But, simple as it sounds, the maintenance of the *status quo* is in practice an anxious and complicated business—especially for a State that has so few friends among its immediate neighbours and has so vast a length of frontier to defend as Czechoslovakia.

Dr. Vondraček has told the story of the search for security from the birth of the Czechoslovak Republic in the last year of the War down to the end of 1935. He first describes the creation of the State by Masaryk, Beneš and Štefanik working in Paris, and Kramař working in Prague; then the difficult process of consolidation at home and the reconstruction of Central Europe as a whole. Domestic and foreign affairs can seldom, as Dr. Vondraček rightly points out, be absolutely separated, least of all here, where a State was being established not only with outside help, but also in spite of outside opposition. Czechoslovakia settled down more quickly than its neighbours, and under the able direction of Dr. Beneš a consistent foreign policy was soon evolved. This, in brief, consisted of a "western orientation," reliance but not dependence on France, and sincere support of the League of Nations. Very soon also, as an answer to Hungarian irredentism, the Little Entente was formed. From these main lines the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia has never departed down to the present time. But, since the advent of Hitler, Hungary has been somewhat outshone by Germany as the main preoccupation of the Czechoslovak Foreign Office.

The story is not an easy one to tell because of its infinite variety. The deliberations of the Little Entente, the quarrels with Poland over Teschen and with Hungary over everything, the question of the recognition of the U.S.S.R. and the problem of Austria are, amongst others, recurrent themes, whose independence of one another makes it difficult to discern any main thread in Czechoslovak policy. It is, therefore, not altogether the author's fault that the work is discursive. His material is immense and unwieldy. But the reader is left rather too much to draw his own conclusions—there is no plain high road and there are too few signposts. The work is also over-documented. Its 1533 footnotes bear witness to the industry of the author, but many of them add little to the weight of the evidence. When, however, these unsubstantial criticisms have been made, there can be nothing but praise for an extremely thorough and valuable piece of work. If some of the material is served up a little raw, it is all there for the quarrying, and we should all be grateful to Dr. Vondraček for producing the first complete review of Czechoslovak foreign policy since the War.

DAVID STEPHENS.

47. THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, 1870–1935. By Jacques Bainville. Translated from the French with an introduction by Hamish Miles. 1936. (London: Jonathan Cape. 8vo. 253 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

"An exceptional case of self-preservation." That is the verdict pronounced, somewhat grudgingly, on the Third Republic by the late Jacques Bainville, who was a serious historian, but was perhaps more

widely known as a polemist in the foreign policy columns of *L'Action Française*. Of his literary swordsmanship in dealing with international affairs there is little or no trace in this book. It is—as it claims to be—an "explanatory narrative" of the administration by patriotic Frenchmen of their heritage in "the régime that sunders us least."

M. Thiers, whose modest estimate this was, takes on here a glamour of greatness as sponsor of the Republic which may well surprise the student of French history. In the atmosphere of war-weariness after Sedan this quintessential bourgeois, for whom order in the streets and respect for property were the supreme good, no doubt typified the mood of the unpolitically-minded property-holders. But his "terrible repression" of the Commune can scarcely have commended him to the forces of progress, and it was more by luck than judgment that his passionless, negative "line" prevailed over the conception of a constitutional monarchy which was generally anticipated after the fall of the Empire. A Gambetta, one feels, if he had lived—he died at the age of forty-four—might have inspired the men of the Republic to higher things while averting the graft scandals and the cynicism which marred its formative years.

On the chancy nature of the Republic's origin M. Bainville's facts are, of course, entirely accurate. It was the setting up of a Provisional Government at the Hotel de Ville (in Paris) "by popular acclamation," *i.e.* under threat of rioting, which forced the hand of the political leaders. But the country as a whole (the contrasting rhythm of Paris and the provinces was already a constant factor) was in no mood for militancy, and if the Republican régime was to have any chance of survival, business circles had to be promptly reassured. The first election, 1st February, 1871, proved the necessity of moderation by returning a conservative assembly, with a majority composed of Legitimists and Orleanists. It elected as its first president Jules Grévy, who in 1848 had said, "I will not have a Republic which might frighten people." In that assembly, we are told, the ruling tone was Orleanist; men visualised a Monarchy on the 1830 model, while "Cæsarism and revolution were the twin bugbears." That tone is patently reflected in the Constitution of 1875, which, it is recalled, was actually voted into being by only one vote. "Joylessly conceived, this was no love-child," is the author's comment. That the Monarchist cause went under was simply, according to M. Bainville, on account of the refusal of the Comte de Chambord, standing on his royal dignity, to accept "a ready-made, therefore imposed Constitution," though he readily agreed to the idea of constitutional monarchy.

One cannot help feeling that M. Bainville under-rates the political ferment of the time, or at least the impetus of revolt against the past. But in any case the mould was set, a parliamentary system, tolerance, made inevitable by the circumstances, and no truck with social revolution. Within ten years the Monarchy was a lost cause; and the Left, as soon as they attained a majority in 1884, made no bones about adding to the Constitution two new basic laws, one making members of royal families ineligible for the presidency, and the other affirming that the Republican form of the régime could no longer be called in question.

The Senate, as the author says, has continued to fulfil admirably its function of breakwater. Thus the régime has been able to resist any and every alliance of Left groups, with its watchword ever since the 'eighties of "no enemies on the Left." The Presidency takes a

subordinate place, as befits an office designed really for a future constitutional monarch. M. Bainville, as a Royalist, is evidently fascinated by the presidential factor. His account of the qualities and actions of successive holders of the office is impartial and entirely admirable. The history of French politics is carried up to the resurgence of Gaston Doumergue, "welcomed as a saviour," but, as soon as he began to try to modify Parliamentary ways, "almost banished for an attempt on the life of the Republic." That is significant of the power of the *Chambre*. But M. Bainville's study is useful in reminding us that President and Senate, too, are integral parts of the well-tried structure.

W. HORSFALL CARTER.

48. NEOPAGANESIMO RAZZISTA. By Mario Bendiscioli. 1937. (Brescia: Morcelliana. 8vo. 113 pp. *Lire* 5.)

THIS is a useful abridgement of the author's larger work *Germania religiosa nel III Reich*, which appeared in 1936. The aims and notions (I hesitate to say principles in such a case) underlying the present German Aryan cult and the persecution of Christianity, the leading personalities involved in the campaign, the methods or pressure and propaganda employed by the Nazi chiefs and the reactions of the Catholic and Protestant churches to the attacks on their corporate existence are clearly summarised. The author writes as a fervent Italian Catholic, outraged by the persecution of his co-religionists in Germany (his book bears the mark of ecclesiastical approbation). He finds the key to the various "idolatries" of modern times—Communism with its worship of the collectivity, the anarchical exaltation of the individual, the Teutonic religion of blood and race—in the repudiation of the Christian revelation. The Fascist totalitarian State is curiously absent from this list, and as a citizen of that State and a Catholic, Signor Bendiscioli seems naïvely unaware how vulnerable his own position is, should the heads of the Church and State in Italy push their dogmas to their logical and quite irreconcilable conclusions: a situation which has only hitherto been avoided by the masterly *savoir faire* of Pius XI and Mussolini.

In the chapter on "The Catholic Defence" there is only unadulterated eulogy of the handling of the German religious problem by the Vatican and the German Catholic hierarchy, though there is plenty of room here for at least a critical analysis of alternative policies. The whole description of the conflict between the Hitler régime and the Catholic Church would gain immensely if set in its proper perspective: the relations between the Church and the Nazi Party before their advent to power. But this is not even mentioned. The heroic resistance of the Protestant Church in Germany to the new paganism is properly and duly recognised.

On a point of detail I venture to disagree strongly with Signor Bendiscioli. Relying on a reported translation of one of General Ludendorff's anti-Christian polemics, by the Russian atheist society, he infers a certain solidarity between the Russian anti-God movement and the German anti-Christian worship of blood and race. There is, in fact, no basis whatever for this assumption. The anti-German feeling in Russia at the present time is far too strong to permit of any overt gestures of such a kind, and in any case the religious issue is now relatively moribund in the U.S.S.R. As the barbarous innuendoes of the new German cult of itself are recalled by the pages of this slender book, one wonders for the hundredth time whether the adult

human mind was ever attacked by any microbe more petty, stultifying and sterile than this, labelled Teutonic *in excelsis*?

VIOLET CONOLLY.

49. DUSK OF EUROPE. By Wythe Williams. 1937. (London: Charles Scribner's Sons. 8vo. xix + 329 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

IN the period of just over a quarter of a century since he first came to Europe, Mr. Williams has been everywhere, seen everything and known everybody. He has worked in the main for American newspapers, but for a short time also for the English *Daily Mail*. He reported the funeral of King Edward VII. He visited the front line at Fort Dorramont in 1916. He was in Paris on Armistice night. He was in Berlin in the first months of 1919. He has attended innumerable conferences at Geneva—so many, in fact, that he once made a determined effort to get the League of Nations moved to Vienna. He has interviewed—but it would be far shorter to give a list of prominent post-War statesmen whom he has *not* interviewed. He has stories even about the few noteworthy post-War events at which he has not been present. This is a pleasant and comfortable book. If you read it, you need not fear that you will be bored for a moment. If you do not read it, you need not feel that you have missed something vitally important.

E. H. CARR.

50*. VIERJAHRESPLAN UND WELTHANDEL. By Joachim von Ribbentrop. [*Schriften des Instituts für Aussenpolitische Forschung*, Heft 1.] 1937. (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt. 8vo. 28 pp.)

The trade provisions of Germany's Four-Year-Plan are here expounded, particular stress being laid on the need for colonies and raw materials.

51*. DIE GESCHLOSSENE DEUTSCHE VOLKSWIRTSCHAFT. Geopolitik-Autarkie-Vierjahresplan. By Johannes Stoye. [*Macht und Erde*, Heft 6.] 1937. (Leipzig: Teubner. 8vo. vi + 113 pp. *Rm*. 1.50.)

States briefly the case for " Autarky " in Germany, going back to pre-War writers (Kjellén, Fichte and Ruhland) and emphasising the arguments for the need of raw materials.

52*. DIE SDP IM PARLAMENT. Ein Jahresbericht 1935–6. Im Auftrage der Hauptleitung und des Vorstandes des parlamentarischen Klubs der SdP und der KdP von Ing. Konstantin Höss zusammengestellt. 1937. (Karlsbad: Verlag Karl H. Frank. 8vo. 335 pp.)

Gives an account of the work of the Sudetendeutsche Party and the Karpathendeutsche Party during the year 1935–6.

53*. DER DEUTSCHE ARBEITER UND DIE PÄPSTLICHE SOZIALPOLITIK. By Heinrich Härtle. [*Sozialismus im Dritten Reich*, Heft 3.] 1937. (Berlin: Hochmuth. 8vo. 32 pp. 10 *pf*.)

The author contrasts the Catholic and the National Socialist ways of dealing with social questions.

54*. SÜDOSTEUROPA UND DAS ERBE DER DONAUMONARCHIE. By Hans Hummel. [*Macht und Erde*, Heft 4.] 1937. (Leipzig: Teubner. 8vo. 64 pp. *Rm*. 1.40.)

A description of the alternating destiny of South-East Europe in the course of the history of humanity, showing this part of Europe as an incendiary in the politics of the European continent, but also as mediator between Europe and Asia, and as an independent political entity.

55*. DAS DÄNISCHE SCHICKSAL. By Louis von Kohl. 1936. (Berlin: Volk und Reich Verlag. 8vo. 125 pp. *Rm.* 3.50.)

The Danish author, who has lived in Germany since the War, tries in this book to explain to German readers the Danish attitude towards Germany, in connection with the natural forces of "Blut und Boden."

56*. VOLKSTUM AUF VORPOSTEN. By Franz Heger. 1936. (Czechoslovakia: C. Weigend. ddmo. 112 pp.)

Describes the position of the Sudetendeutsche in Czechoslovakia.

57. A WAYFARER IN ESTONIA, LATVIA, AND LITHUANIA. By E. C. Davies. 1937. (London: Methuen. 8vo. xi + 280 pp. *7s. 6d.*)

This is an excellent addition to the Wayfarer series of travel books. There is a useful account of how to get to the Baltic and the approximate cost, and there are interesting descriptions, not only of the principal towns, but also of the countryside in each of the three States. Particular attention has been paid to their historical associations and folklore. A number of illustrations and a sketch-map are included. D. B. B.

58*. LA POLOGNE D'AUJOURD'HUI. By Vaclav Fiala. 1936. (Paris: Hartmann. 8vo. 280 pp. 15 *frs.*)

THE author of this little book is a Czech journalist of standing, who annoyed many Poles for years because of the none-too-kindly comments on men and events he sent during the hard years to his paper in Prague. Something of the same spirit went into a volume published in his native tongue, which was not given too good a press in Poland as a result. Many things said there, however, were the truth, as Fiala saw it; and the only question was whether the telling of it at that time was a help or not to the situation.

The material of the essays brought together in the volume under review have appeared already in *Le Monde Slave*. The title is a misnomer, for the Poland of to-day is not politics, nor even public affairs. These are only a small part of the picture. Mr. Fiala passes by a score of great issues, such as education, industry, agriculture, the press and the pulpit, with scarcely more than a glance; though he finds space even to repeat himself when dealing with the events at home and abroad that have been in the limelight of publicity.

Due significance has been given to Poland's difficult geographical position, which compels her insistence on neutrality as a major principle of policy. Writing in the days following the Marshal's death (summer of 1935), the author rightly called the régime an interim one, and expressed doubts as to its stability. What has happened since then has served to calm his fears. The rehabilitation of the French alliance (there never was any with Berlin) has made many things clearer and easier, both at home and abroad. In the main the nation's leaders have shown less and less of the romanticism Mr. Fiala talks much about, and does not like: and more of realism, as they go on. Most of us would say that this is inevitable, in the world we live in. Yet we hope that the splendid vision of a better world seen by the Messianist thinkers of the nineteenth century may not be wholly forgotten, either in Poland or elsewhere. W. J. ROSE.

U.S.S.R.

59. A HISTORY OF RUSSIA. By Sir Bernard Pares. Revised Edition. 1937. (London: Cape. 8vo. xxiii + 570 pp. *21s.*)

THIS is a very welcome second edition of Sir Bernard Pares' *History of Russia*, which originally appeared in 1926, and has not yet found a

rival for completeness and general accuracy. The main body of the work (*i.e.* all except the last chapter) quite properly remains unchanged. It is a pity that the same conservatism has been observed in the appendices. The statistics of trade still stop short at 1913, and the bibliography fails to record any book published since 1921.

What is in part new, then, is the last chapter, dealing with events since the revolution of 1917. The first part of this remains substantially as it appeared in 1926, but has been bowdlerised or re-written here and there to bring it more nearly into line with the present-day Soviet view of history. The thesis with which Sir Bernard concluded in 1926 was that Communism had been defeated, remaining only as a *façade*, and that "a federative system, but without any Communist or other dictatorship, is the only outcome which can offer a real answer to all the problems of Russia." All traces of this view have now disappeared. A brief statement of the Menshevik case against Bolshevism has been expurgated. The references to the terror are very much toned down. We are no longer told that "there was no other way in which the small group of fanatics could impose its will on others"; and an enthusiastic description of the brief, illusory moment of freedom under the Provisional Government has been omitted—apparently lest it should provoke odious comparisons. The statement that "on Lenin's death, apparently after a sharp struggle, the fanatics regained the undisputed control" is replaced by a long account, on strictly Stalinist lines, of the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky.

The last paragraph of the book refers to the Zinoviev trial of August 1936, about which Sir Bernard cautiously refrains from expressing an opinion. It is not, however, strictly speaking correct to speak of the court as a "court martial." E. H. CARR.

60*. SOVIET GEOGRAPHY. The New Economic and Industrial Distributions of the U.S.S.R. By N. Mikhailoff. Translated by Natalie Rothstein. 2nd edition. 1937. (London: Methuen. 8vo. xviii + 229 pp. Maps. 10s. 6*d.*)

THE first edition was published in 1935. The second edition has been brought up to date, though no statistical figures later than 1935 are given. This is not the fault of the author, because Soviet official statistics are normally published with considerable delay—for instance, the Statistical Annual of the Central Administration of National-Economic Accounting of Gosplan for 1936 only appeared in the spring of 1937, and contained nothing later than 1935, in most cases the results even for that year being marked "Provisional." A Soviet author, of course, must be extremely circumspect and say nothing that has not been officially sanctioned.

The U.S.S.R. occupies about one-sixth of the land space of the world ranging from the Arctic to subtropical regions and possesses enormous natural wealth. *Soviet Geography* contains information on the country's natural resources and their distribution in space not easily obtainable elsewhere. It describes the advances that have been made in industry to exploit these resources and the extension of agriculture to land hitherto considered unsuitable. Like most Soviet authors, Mikhailoff is rather apt to confuse plans with facts. To the true Bolshevik, of course, a thing planned by his party is as good as done; the ordinary disinterested foreign reader, however, would prefer to have a more distinct line drawn between realised fact and future

plans. But the information about the economic progress of the U.S.S.R. is none the less valuable, and extremely interesting. The book is also a useful work of reference on most economic aspects. One unfortunate omission is a large general map in addition to the small diagrammatic charts throughout the text. L. E. HUBBARD.

61. SOVIET EXPORT. By M. Zhirmunski. 1936. (New York: Bookniga Corporation; Moscow: Mezhdunarodnaia Kniga; London: Collet. 8vo. 121 pp. 3*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS belongs to the class of brochures written by Soviet officials for foreign consumption, though it is perhaps rather more objective than the general run of such productions. In planning foreign trade, the volume of exports is determined mainly according to the need for foreign exchange to pay for planned imports. In planning what to export the question to be decided is what commodities can best be spared from internal consumption, and whether the goods that can be imported in exchange are of more utility to the country than the commodities exported. In capitalist countries this is automatically indicated by price, but price in Soviet foreign trade is not a deciding factor. It must often happen that the foreign exchange received for a certain article when converted into roubles at the official rate is less than the internal rouble cost of that article. It would be interesting to know how this paper loss is adjusted, but on this no information is vouchsafed.

The greatest value of the book lies in its descriptions of the various trading organisations and their development from the early days of the Soviet régime. L. E. HUBBARD.

62. SOVIET JUSTICE AND THE TRIAL OF RADEK AND OTHERS. By Dudley Collard. 1937. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 208 pp. 3*s*. 6*d*.)

THE purpose of this book, which is introduced by Mr. Pritt, is to show that the trial of " Radek and others " last January was a model, not merely of " Soviet justice," but also of justice. Mr. Collard, who was present at the trial, takes *au pied de la lettre* everything that was said at it, and remarks that " in the result the court was more merciful than I should have been." On this point, Mr. Collard must obviously be left to speak for himself. But comment is provoked by his statement that Vishinsky "never once lost his temper or bullied a defendant." Judging from the records, Vishinsky was on this occasion comparatively moderate and correct. This may be explained either by the fact that, as the principal accused had been promised his life, it was a little difficult for the prosecutor to let himself go, or else by the adverse criticisms in the foreign press of his behaviour at the Zinoviev trial. If Mr. Collard wants a classic instance of bullying a defendant, he should read Vishinsky's final speech at that trial.

The account of the trial is prefaced by what purports to be an account of Soviet criminal procedure. It is correct as far as it goes, but is less remarkable for what it says than for what it leaves unsaid. It does not explain the procedure under which Tukhachevsky and his fellows have since been tried and shot; and it says nothing of the thousands—including Rykov, Bukharin and Romm—who have been tried and condemned by secret process during the past twelve months without any publicity of indictment, trial or sentence. E. H. CARR.

63. FOR PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP: being a Verbatim Report of the Second National Congress of Peace and Friendship with the U.S.S.R. 1937. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 202 pp. 4*s*. 6*d*.)

THE first congress of Friends of the Soviet Union enjoyed so much success that a repeat performance was naturally called for last March. The speakers included the Soviet Ambassador, the Dean of Canterbury, M. Alexis Tolstoy, Messrs. Cole and Strachey and several Liberal and Labour M.P.'s. The proceedings were on the whole marked by more enthusiasm for, than knowledge of, the Soviet Union. Their propaganda value was no doubt considerable: but the printed page is a severer test and it cannot be said that they pass it very successfully.

E. H. CARR.

64. TROTSKI ET LE TROTSKISME: Textes et Documents. 1937. (Paris: Bureau d'Editions. 8vo. 96 pp. 2 *frs*.)

The first half of this pamphlet collects all the passages in Lenin's works, both before and after the Bolshevik revolution, in which Lenin spoke or wrote against Trotsky. It ignores the passages in which Lenin praised or defended him except one which, torn from its context, can be made to look like an attack and is placed on the title page. The second half contains the usual allegations against Trotsky with which the last five years of Soviet propaganda have made us familiar. E. H C.

65. SELECTED WORKS. By V. I. Lenin. Vol. VIII: The Period of War Communism (1918–1920). 1937. (London: Lawrence and Wishart. 8vo. xi + 460 pp. 5*s*.)

The previous volume of the English edition of Lenin's *Selected Works* was reviewed in the issue of *International Affairs* for July 1937. The present volume contains articles and speeches of the period of "War Communism" (1918–1920).

AFRICA

66. FUAD, KING OF EGYPT. By Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah. 1936. (London: Herbert Jenkins. 8vo. 317 pp. 15*s*.)

IN these days Egypt cannot complain of lack of chroniclers. That is intelligible seeing the interest and continuity of her history, despite the fact that some who undertake the task seem to do so with imperfect acquaintance of the country and its inhabitants. There are periods of Egyptian history difficult to understand or tell, unless the relator is fortified with adequate knowledge, and of no epoch is that truer than of the confused political history of the last fifty years. The author of the book under review gives no hint of his credentials to write the story. He appends no bibliography, he gives no references: he indicates no documents he has consulted, he mentions no sources of information. Thus the reader must take on trust the writer's explanation of the events he sets out to describe.

The opening paragraphs of the book supply the key-note to this study of the late King Fuad.

"No sovereign [declares the Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah] in modern history has been so ill served by his ministers, no sovereign, even in turbulent Europe, has found himself in a position so amazingly ambiguous, and certainly no alleged constitutional ruler has maintained such a fierce and insistent warfare with those whose purpose in life was to emulate Aristotle in crystallising the will of the people."

Public opinion may accept the first two judgments; it is less likely to be convinced of the truth of the third. Fuad's reputation as a sovereign must surely rest rather upon his conduct of Egypt during a period of

transition, always a difficult phase of government, than upon "crystallising the will of the people." His procedure, though perhaps in the interest of Egypt, was decidedly unconstitutional; his frequent suppression of parliamentary government highly unpopular. These years of transition needed a cool head and an iron will: for Egypt was drunk with the spirit of independence. That was an inevitable consequence. For two thousand years she had been a victim of conquest and occupation, and from the humiliating experience the Declaration of 1922 had rescued her. This was the situation Fuad had to confront, and he met it by making the throne the only stable and authoritative element in the Kingdom.

The Sirdar Ikbal begins his biography of Fuad with the story of Ismail, the King's father: reviews the Khediviates of Tewfiq and Abbas Hilmi, plunges into the perplexities of the Sudan, glances at Fuad's early years in Italy, Constantinople, Vienna and Cairo, and so comes to the outbreak of the Great War, the declaration of the Protectorate and the accession of Fuad to the Sultanate of Egypt on the death of his brother Sultan Hussein. His account of this and the succeeding history is vivacious and picturesquely told, even if the narration falls short of the dignity expected from history. His judgment is impartial, and last but not least, Fuad is from beginning to end the central figure of the story. Here and there the writer is guilty of odd slips: he talks of Fuad and Hussein as *Khedives*; he speaks of the High Commissioner calling upon Fuad in 1917 to announce Great Britain's decision to nominate him to the Sultanate, when it was Prince Fuad who called at the Residency to hear the news. But the book as a whole is laudably free from small inaccuracies.

The final chapters leave a definite impression of Fuad's intention to be master in his own house: not, in short, to be a figure-head, "forced to bend to the compelling blast of opportunism and chicanery." Difficult days obviously were ahead, and of them the author speaks dispassionately. Modern Egypt no doubt owes much of her notable recent progress to this prince. He created the Egyptian University, the Geographical Society, the Institute of Hydrology, the Egypt Promotion Association, the First Aid Society; he was also responsible for modification of Islamic marriage laws, and reform of the Wakfs Administration. His most cherished ambition, the Caliphate of Islam, did not come his way, and he was too shrewd to press the claim.

The initiate will hardly need this book, but to readers unacquainted with the history of the British Occupation of Egypt it may be recommended.

P. G. ELGOOD.

67. THE NILE IN EGYPT. By Emil Ludwig. 1937. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 344 pp. 16s.)

IT is impossible in a few words to do justice to this splendid picture of Egyptian history. Though this history covers six thousand years and many rulers along the Nile, the author has to wait till Lord Cromer came before it can be said that the ruler had the "interest of the Fellah" at heart. Credit is given for all that Lord Cromer accomplished, and in spite of all the handicaps, so fairly recorded, the author is definitely severe on the small progress made with education. It is interesting to note here that one of the present difficulties confronting Egypt is to find employment for the products of education.

I might perhaps correct the idea that the renewal of the lease of the Suez Canal was turned down because of the feeling against foreigners:

the refusal arose from the hope that fathered the thought that the income collected from the Canal would remain at the same level and become the property of Egypt when the lease fell in.

French advisory engineers are exonerated for the failure of the Delta Barrage to raise the level of the Nile more than two feet instead of the fourteen for which it was designed, but it is not mentioned that the Assiut Barrage, which was designed for Low Nile work, was used to raise the flood level so that two-thirds of its cost was saved in its first year of use and famine, over a large area, thereby prevented. The British engineers were advisory, too, but they ensured that cement, and not Nile mud, was used in the building of dams and barrages.

Dr. Ludwig's suggestion for the prevention of Bilharziasis, by the issue of rubber boots, seems simple and satisfactory, but it only deals with one possible mode of infection. V. S. HODSON.

68*. ECONOMIA AFFRICANA: LE COLONIE PORTOGHESI. By Carlo Cya. [Biblioteca di Studi Coloniali, I.] 1936. (Florence: Poligrafia Universitaria. 8vo. 153 pp. *Lire* 10.)

THIS volume, apparently the first of the series, gives a brief summary of the history and present economic situation of the Portuguese colonies, and hints that, at an epoch when those Powers which do not hold firmly to their colonial possessions may find them objects of barter, Portugal would do well to put into practice in hers those political and economic principles of Fascism to which she purports to subscribe.

The value of the book as a contribution to scientific research may be gauged from the section on "economic and social conditions," which argues that the labour for the Rand mines is recruited by compulsion on the sole ground of the inherent probability that their numbers would otherwise be so great "in view of the native's disinclination for work," but that the labour on the cocoa islands is entirely voluntary. L. P. MAIR.

69. LA MISSIONE DELL'EUROPA IN AFRICA. By Rosetta Pittaluga. (Rome: Formiggini. Sm. 8vo. 94 pp. *Lire* 5.)

Signorina Pittaluga's book was awarded the first prize in a competition organised by "Universalità Fascista." It is a clear and workmanlike account of European penetration and colonisation in Africa. She deals fairly with the many and varied motives of explorers, missionaries, hunters, concession seekers and governments, which have lead by so many strange and devious ways to the division of Africa amongst European States. M. C.

70*. BIBLIOGRAPHIE CRITIQUE DE L'AFRIQUE OCCIDENTALE FRANÇAISE. Par J.-L. Georges Tuaillon. 1936. (Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle. 8vo. 50 pp.)

ETHIOPIA

71*. LA GUERRA D'ETIOPIA. By Pietro Badoglio. 1936. (Milano: A. Mondadori. 8vo. 253 pp. Case of maps. *Lire* 30.)

71A. THE WAR IN ABYSSINIA. By Pietro Badoglio. With a Foreword by Mussolini. 1937. (London: Methuen. La. 8vo. xv + 208 pp. 15 gravure illus., 9 coloured maps, 6 facsimile documents. 30*s*.)

72. LA CONQUÊTE DE L'ETHIOPIE. By Paul Gentizon. 1936. (Paris: Éditions Berger-Levrault. 8vo. 295 pp. 15 *frs*.)

73. AN ETHIOPIAN DIARY: A Record of the British Ambulance Service in Ethiopia. By J. W. S. Macfie. 1936. (Liverpool: University Press of Liverpool; London: Hodder & Stoughton. 8vo. xii + 132 pp. 5s.)

La Guerra d'Etiopia is written by a great soldier. The style is that of a military despatch, and the material has the appearance of having been somewhat drastically handled by the Ministry of Propaganda. Every loyal Italian will want to read it at least once, and it has already gone into five editions, and an English edition has now been published. Both the Italian and the English publishers are to be congratulated on the beautifully printed letter-press and on the reproduction of some splendid panoramic photographs which show the difficult mountainous country over which the Italian troops had to operate. The maps are ample to give a clear idea of the contours and troop positions, and as they presumably contain all the corrections to previous charts that the Survey Department were able to make during the campaign, they should be a valuable contribution to geography. It is surprising, considering the title of the book, that so little mention is made of the operations on the Southern or Italian Somaliland front.

The Maresciallo gives a very lucid exposition of his strategic and tactical plans on the northern front, and pays high tribute to the efficiency of the army handed over to him by Marshal de Bono; he speaks with pride of the stamina, marching powers and resistance against climatic conditions of the troops, also of the marvellous engineering and road-making feats for which the Italian genius is historic, and of the perfect organisation of supplies.

Among the factors of success a prominent place is given to the application of the futile Sanctions which determined and enabled Il Duce (as he himself declares in his foreword to the book)

> " to multiply men, operatives and war material by five so that where 100,000 soldiers were to be used there would now be 400,000 and more than 100,000 operatives. Thus the war, instead of being waged in the leisurely fashion of colonial wars in general, assumed the character of a European conflict, and Italy was fighting not only the Negus, but also against time and the League of Nations and other enemies open and concealed."

In this connection it is interesting to compare Sir Robert Napier's march of 400 miles to Magdala in 1868 with a force of 32,000 men without losing a man and General Maude's capture of Baghdad with an army of 150,000 men against a well-equipped Turkish army in entrenched positions. Another factor that contributed to the conquest of the Ethiopian Empire and the completion of the war in seven months, which had been estimated to require six years, was an unopposed and overwhelming air force, which made it impossible for the Ethiopians to use effectively the only form of attack employed by them (in mass). The Maresciallo was served by a most efficient Intelligence Service, which succeeded in tapping all communications between the Emperor and his Generals. The Italians were also able to profit by the rivalries and quarrels between chieftains by buying the allegiance of one at the expense of the other and he made full use of very well-trained colonial troops as " feelers " against surprise. In the Italians' favour, too, was the mixing of styles in warfare by the Ethiopians due to the counsel of misguided European military advisers and to the use by primitive troops of a heterogeneous collection of mechanical weapons which were a greater source of embarrassment and danger

to themselves. No mention is made of the use of poison gas by the Italian Air Force, although its moral effect must have been considerable.

All these factors which contributed to the Italian victory rendered their so-called battles (five of them are claimed as such) merely armed advances as compared with the engagements of any other war in history. A comparison of casualties is illuminating on this point. In fact the battles would be better described as battues. From a military critic's point of view the Italian-Abyssinian campaign was too one-sided to be informative. One cannot, for instance, conjecture what would have been the result had the air force been opposed by even a small number of enemy planes or the Italian troops been met by an enemy as well equipped as their own, and the effect of heavy bombardment on the morale of the Eritrean native levies cannot be gauged.

Many will therefore not agree entirely with the author when in one of his concluding sentences he says:

> The war, as a whole, was won by the competence of the leaders and by the splendid virtues of the rank and file. Both displayed the qualities inherent in our race. . . . It is the race which has been able to triumph over every difficulty, every danger, every sacrifice, and has once again proved to the whole world—a world amazed even if hostile—Italy's right to the highest destiny.
>
> The fighting forces of Italy, whose valour was proved in the Great War and proved again in this great enterprise, are today second to none.
>
> With such soldiers Italy can dare anything.

MONSIEUR GENTIZON, who was a war correspondent with the Italian forces in the Italian-Abyssinian war, has given in this book a graphic and detailed account of the campaign, but when he claims to be launching his book into history, one is left wondering whether historians will not turn to more unbiased writers for their material.

He gives an overlong tirade against press representatives, more especially those of the British newspapers, *The Times*, *Daily Express*, *Daily Herald* and *Illustrated London News*, who all come under the edict of his displeasure, for their refusal to accept without question, as he did, the official communiqués issued by Italian Military Headquarters, although in another place he naïvely explains that the rôle of these communications is to create and spread most favourable impressions and influence international opinions. One of the most interesting chapters gives a not too technical account of the accurate survey work carried out by the Italian Air Force by means of aeroplane photographs to set right existing maps; these were apparently much in need of correction, for in them one town was shown ten kilometres north of its true position. The author also omits to emphasise the important fact that the air force was unimpeded by any chance of effective opposition, as the defenders had no fighting planes, nor does he mention the Ethiopian natives' reactions to mustard gas.

An Ethiopian Diary is a stirring odyssey of high adventure in the cause of humanity. Dr. Macfie writes his own experiences as one of a small band of medical officers, transport officers and men, led by Dr. John Melly, who went to Abyssinia with a British Ambulance Unit in an attempt to alleviate the sufferings of the wounded in the Italian-Abyssinian War.

Originally intended for service on the Southern front, and therefore equipped for work in the hot lowlands, the unit was at the Emperor's request transferred to the bleak high altitudes of the Northern front

at Dessie, and later to Lake Ashangi. Here they were handicapped by their own wheeled transport on roads fit only for pack-mules, and were "bogged" by heavy rains. Their experiences included the treatment of "mustard-gas" patients as a daily routine and the destruction of their camp by Italian aeroplane bombs. The defeat and retreat of the Emperor's army enabled the ambulance to reach the capital ahead of the advancing Italians.

A few members of the Unit remained in the city during the disorders that broke out when the Emperor left for Europe. Here, unprotected and at great personal risk, they worked among the wounded, and Dr. Melly received from a rioter the wound from which he died, giving his life for the mission which he had served so well.

R. E. CHEESMAN.

74*. LA PREPARAZIONE E LE PRIME OPERAZIONI (LA CONQUISTA DELL' IMPERO). By Emilio de Bono. Introduzione di Benito Mussolini. 1937. (Rome: Istituto Nazinala Fascista di Cultura. 8vo. xi + 217 pp. *Lire* 20.)

MARSHAL DE BONO'S book is a reply to those who declare that the Italo-Abyssinian war was the outcome of a long laid plot on the part of Italy. Had this been true the High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief would have found a very different state of affairs from that which existed when he landed in Eritrea on 16th January, 1935. There was one totally inadequate port, equipped to handle little more than a weekly steamer; the only railway had to climb a pass about 8000 feet high before reaching Asmara, it was a single line with a narrow gauge, the engines could only drag a few trucks up the steep gradients and there were hardly any sidings. "There was not," remarks General de Bono, "what we should regard as a road fit for motors in the whole country." There was great anxiety about water until adequate supplies were discovered to exist in the sub-soil. In the tropical heat of the lowlands, in the cold nights of the mountains, in the torrential rains of the wet season, there was neither shelter nor food for man nor beast. In this desolate and inhospitable country a force of nearly 300,000 white men—200,000 troops, 50,000 workmen and uncounted camp followers (including journalists!) had to be maintained in health, security and reasonable contentment at a distance of over 2000 miles from their base. The Commander-in-Chief apologises at intervals for repeated references to these problems. "Nobody," he says, "who was not there, knows the difficulties we had to overcome."

From the military point of view General de Bono points out the handicap which the Suez Canal represented to the Italians; it deprived them of the element of surprise; every man, every gun, every ton of stores was noted and reported.

It is hard to realise that this is the book of an old man, it shows as little sign of age as the Marshal's alert figure and quick movements. It is written with all the zest of youth, and with that ability to tell a story which is so often given to a man of action. It is pleasant to read a "war" book in which there is no bitterness or carping, nothing but the most generous appreciation of the men who served under him; not even his own supersession by Marshal Badoglio wrings a word of complaint from the old soldier. He does not deny his disappointment, but he comforts himself with the thought that he had been allowed to end his career on active service.

M. CURREY.

75. Eye Witness in Abyssinia. By Herbert Matthews. 1937. (London: Martin Secker and Warburg. 8vo. 320 pp. *12s. 6d.*)

The Italian-Abyssinian war was followed by an avalanche of books on the campaign written by war correspondents. Mr. Herbert Matthews, an American who was one of them, in the service of the *New York Times*, kept in closer touch with the scene of operations than many others, for he sailed on a troopship from Naples to Massawa, was never far from the battlefields on the Eritrean front, and eventually accompanied Marshal Badoglio from Makale to Addis Ababa.

Perhaps the best parts of his book, *Eye Witness in Abyssinia*, are his brilliant descriptions, and more particularly those of the side-shows of the campaign. He was one of two journalists who were allowed to go with Brigadier-General Mariotti's column, composed of native levies under regular Italian officers, which, leaving the Red Sea from Zula Bay, crossed the desert, and on rising to the plateau was ambushed in a ravine, and more by luck than good judgment escaped annihilation and came in on the left flank of the central Italian army at Agula. The author's claim that they had crossed country over which no white man had ever trod should have been qualified by mentioning that it was from Zula Bay, then called Annesley Bay, that Lord Napier's force started on their march to Magdala, and they must have traversed much the same route. An adventurous flying column crossing the Danakil desert was visited by air at Sardo in the Sultanate of Aussa, and on yet another aeroplane expedition the author was flown over the Simen mountains and had a bird's-eye view of General Starace's column that had just reached the shores of Lake Tana. Mr. Matthews confesses to an impish enjoyment in relating that the Italians, by occupying Gondar, were having a gorgeous time twisting the lion's tail, and it would seem ungrateful, in return for many hours' real enjoyment in reading the book, to say the few words that would deprive the author and the Italians of their illusion.

Mr. Matthews, although appreciating the many kind actions he received, and giving his hosts the full meed of credit for their remarkable feats of arms, by no means confines himself to their point of view. The Italians deserve the comparison he makes between Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, and Kassala, the chief town of a province in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Of Asmara he writes that "it was the negation of everything desirable, comfortable and charming," and that "fifty years of a lackadaisical and impoverished colonial government had merely endowed it with a church . . . a filthy hotel and a nondescript collection of brick houses, shops and dirty restaurants serving inedible food," and Kassala, where he was able to spend four pleasant days, he describes as "really an awful place, but the English carry their country with them to the far corners of the globe. They bring comfort, cleanliness, civilisation, good-fellowship and sometimes even happiness. I learned in those four days why the British were such great empire-builders."

R. E. Cheesman.

76. Italy's Conquest of Abyssinia. By Major E. W. Polson Newman. 1937. (London: Thornton Butterworth. 8vo. 316 pp. Illus. map. *12s. 6d.*)

Major Polson Newman admits that the sources of information on which this book is based were obtained chiefly from Italian

records. A perusal of the Ethiopian official documents as well would have given just the balance which it needs, but he expresses doubt whether they will ever be available, or that they even exist.

Both the author and Sir Arnold Wilson, who contributes a short preface, write in sympathy with Italian aims and with Italy, and are even inclined to " be to her faults a little blind and to her virtues ever kind," if a Surtees misquotation may be allowed.

The Walwal incident which took place eighty miles within Abyssinian territory, according to contemporary Italian maps, the use of poison gas, and the aerial bombardment of Red Cross camps are not allowed the space which they deserve, and the Italian point of view only is given. The descriptions of the stupendous achievements of the Italian Navy, and of the communication, supply and medical services, comprise some of the best chapters, but the work done by political officers, and their successful use of " silver bullets " in front of the front line, bringing about the disaffection of tribes and chieftains, might have been given a greater share in the credit of the victory.

Mussolini is not one who favours the employment of the young or even middle-aged in positions of high responsibility. Marshal de Bono was sixty-nine and Marshal Badoglio was sixty-four when he appointed them to the supreme command. The inspiring genius of *Il Duce*, and his presence in spirit with his troops, are well brought out.

The honours of the war must go to the air force, but the experience gained is little more than manœuvre value, for it was entirely unopposed. Major Polson Newman has done a distinct service to history by restoring the Southern army, commanded by General Graziani, to its rightful place in the conflict. The war was fought and won on two fronts, but hitherto the northern army has appropriated more than its share of the limelight.

A few geographical corrections are needed. In the text a column from Gondar reached Bahrdar by the east shore of Lake Tana, but in the sketch map it is shown as passing to the west shore of the lake. Gondar is not the capital of, and is not in Gojjam. The source of the Blue Nile is 9500 feet, not 7000 feet, and Lake Tana is 6000, not 7000 feet, above sea level. Mr. Thesiger's explorations have shown that the Awash river does not lose itself in Lake Aussa, as was once supposed, but flows through it and ends in Abhebad Lake.

R. E. CHEESMAN.

77*. PERCHÈ ANDIAMO IN ETIOPIA? Le ragioni storiche, politiche e geografiche e sopratutto le ragioni economiche. By P. d'Agostino Orsini di Camerota. 1936. (Roma: Cremonese. 8vo. 84 pp. *Lire* 5.)

Economic considerations are given as the main reasons both for Italian aggression in Abyssinia, and for the opposition of Great Britain.

INDIA

78. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY. 1936. (London: The Bodley Head. Demy 8vo. xiv + 618 pp. 15*s*.)

79. INDIA AND THE WORLD. By Jawaharlal Nehru. 1936. (London: Allen and Unwin. Cr. 8vo. 262 pp. 5*s*.)

No one who believes in progress can be indifferent to the mental processes by which an intelligent man becomes a rebel against the existing order. There is thus a peculiar attraction about the autobiography of Pandit Jawahir Lal Nehru, the gifted and cultured leader of the irreconcilable section of the Indian Congress party,

convicted time after time of sedition and accepting with entire complacency term after term of imprisonment. The only disappointment in the book as a study in psychology is that it skips almost entirely the formative stage of Nehru's mental development, and lands us direct in the rigid ultra-Marxism which is now his spiritual home. One would have welcomed some indications of how his unbending doctrines of violence and martyrdom were evolved out of the "cyrenaicism" which he describes as having been his attitude to life at Harrow and Cambridge. Apparently, the change came rapidly; for before he was twenty he had decided against joining Mr. Gokhale's Servants of India Society, in spite of its advanced views and the disinterestedness of its patriotism, because its politics were too moderate for him. If, however, the narrative is silent about any period of transition, it is eloquent enough on Nehru's present position. Russia is his model; uncompromising Communism his gospel; coercion and violence his weapons if necessary. The exposition runs to enormous length, for the composing of it was his chief occupation and amusement during the years of his prison life; but it is written in choice and graceful English, with an air of sweet reasonableness which is most attractive.

When the Pandit turns from explaining his ideals to criticism of the institutions which stand in their way—the British Government, of course, the Ruling Princes, even Mr. Gandhi himself—the reader hardly needs to be reminded that there is another side to the picture. It presents itself at once when one asks the natural question why a man of this brilliancy and polish was so constantly being clapped into jail. The narrative would leave one to surmise that some malignant force was bent on thwarting Nehru's legitimate activities; and the reader is left to find out for himself the state of anarchy which Nehru was active in fomenting, and the terrible strain imposed on the British officials in India of maintaining law and order against the insurgent forces of which he was the leader. The extreme consideration which he received in prison is apparent at every turn; for example, when his sentence was suspended in order to let him visit his sick wife in Switzerland; but there is no recognition of the causes which led to his repeated arrests and convictions.

In the volume of Essays, the veil of reasonableness is cast aside. They were not written, like the autobiography, to impress a western audience; many of them being fighting speeches and articles in the Indian press. Here accordingly we have the rant and claptrap which shake one's confidence in the writer's sincerity. During the years when the Government was striving to put down anarchy and terrorism, India, according to Nehru, was advancing "on the prostrate bodies of her martyred sons," and her millions were "living through a nightmare of horror." The new Constitution "bars the door to social progress," and is "meant for the protection and perpetuation of the numerous vested interests that exploit the Indian masses." British rule is "based on an extreme form of widespread violence, and the only sanction is fear." And so on: it all sounds very childish, but it can be abominably mischievous.

How far is Nehru's doctrine of extreme Communism likely to spread in India? What section of Indian thought and aspirations does he represent? He gives an answer himself in the Epilogue to his autobiography:

"I often wonder if I represent anyone at all, and I am inclined to think that I do not, though many have kindly and friendly feelings towards me. I have

become a queer mixture of the East and West, out of place everywhere, at home nowhere. Perhaps my thoughts and approach to life are more akin to what is called Western and Eastern, but India clings to me, as she does to all her children, in innumerable ways; and behind me lie, somewhere in the subconscious, racial memories of a hundred, or whatever the number may be, generations of Brahmans. I cannot get rid of either that past inheritance or my recent acquisitions."

That is pathetically true, and as dangerous as it is true. The result is a complex character, subtle and inscrutable, which might conceivably acquire a domination over the credulous masses as Mr. Gandhi did in his prime. If that were to happen, the new administration in India would indeed have its hands full.

MESTON.

80. THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. By G. N. Joshi. 1937. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. xxix + 464 pp. 7s. 6*d*.)

As pointed out in a foreword to this work by Sir Chimanlal Setalwad, the author " is eminently qualified to deal with the subject-matter by his past training and academic position. He was a Professor of History and Economics in one of the leading Colleges of Bombay and is now a Professor of Law at the Government Law College. He is also in active practice in the High Court of Bombay, and has the necessary critical and precise mind to deal with the subject upon which he has written this book." The author has set before himself the task of expounding the constitution, without any political bias, with reference, however, to the history of constitutional government in India. His primary object is to supply the need of a comprehensive text-book for students of the Indian universities, but also to satisfy the demand of others, both in India and abroad, for a handy volume dealing with all aspects of the new Constitution. Like other writers who have dealt with this subject, Mr. Joshi remarks on the extremely complicated nature of the Constitution created by the Government of India Act of 1935. Perhaps one should rather say contemplated than created, as the scheme was only to come into operation on the adhesion of a certain number of Indian States. The creation of a federal constitution was the result of different factors to those which usually operate in such cases. Generally independent States create a federal government when they desire to unite for some purposes, but to retain their internal independence for others. Here we have a strongly centralised State relinquishing much of its control over its component provinces in order to satisfy a necessity not strongly felt in those provinces, but influencing the legislature which passed the act. The problem was to grant the maximum amount of self-government, whilst guaranteeing the highest degree of security, this object being secured by bringing into the central legislature representatives of bodies opposed to revolution and violent change, namely the Indian States. The inclusion of these States is not so much desired for its own sake as for the increased security it will give to the Central Government. The author comments on the rigid nature of the Constitution which cannot be changed except with the consent of all the adhering States. The author deals fully with the various aspects involved, showing the importance of the functions of the Viceroy and Governor-General as well as the continuance of the Paramountcy of the Crown over the Indian States, and the present position of the Secretary of State for India. In all it may be allowed that the author has succeeded in his declared aim.

H. S. CHATFIELD.

81. THE CHALLENGE OF THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER: A Contribution to World Peace. By C. F. Andrews. 1937. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 208 pp. 3s. 6d.)

THIS is a work by a convinced believer in unfettered self-government for India, not at some future date, but now. Mr. Andrews, who has, one might almost say, naturalised himself in India, deals with one of the problems which are usually regarded as presenting an obstacle to the realisation of this. The North-West Frontier of India is the gateway through which invaders have come throughout the centuries and by which it has been feared that a Russian army might pass in the future. It is also the home of wild and lawless tribes who are fond of raiding their more peaceful neighbours. The author suggests that the danger of invasion from Russia has passed owing to the present preoccupation of that country with its neighbours to the east and west, so that the maintenance of a large army in this frontier is no longer a necessity for India. The validity of this reasoning may be doubted, as international relations are apt to change very rapidly, and the enemies of to-day may become the friends of to-morrow. It is further contended that a large force need not be retained in order to over-awe and restrain the North-West Frontier tribes. The latter are not so implacable as has been alleged, and might be won to civilised habits by welfare work such as has been carried on by Medical Missions for some time. Their misdeeds are attributable to the inhospitable nature of their mountains and to the incursions made on them by their infidel enemies, the British. It is suggested that a co-religionist as Minister for Defence would be better able to come to terms. Presumably, however, "Defence" must always be a matter for the Central Government, and as the Mahomedans are in a permanent minority in this country, it seems doubtful whether a Mahomedan Minister could hope to hold such a key position. A strong word is said against the practice of bombing villages on the Frontier as a retaliation for raids. On the whole this is a well-written work and one which deserves reading and answering.

H. S. CHATFIELD.

82. THE WHITE SAHIBS IN INDIA. By Reginald Reynolds. 1937. (London: P. S. King. 8vo. xiii + 410 pp. 12s. 6d.)

THIS is a work by a convinced supporter of the Congress Socialist Party in India, the leader of which, Mr. Jawarhalal Nehru, has written a foreword to it. The writer is an orthodox disciple of Karl Marx, but must not be called a Communist, as he dissociates himself from the Third International and the Government of the U.S.S.R. With the former he disagrees on the question of co-operation with the Congress Party, and he disapproves of the Russian Government's relations with capitalistic countries. Mr. Reynolds has two aims in view. He desires to show that Great Britain has throughout the last three centuries systematically exploited India, and that this exploitation continues, and must continue so long as India remains within the Empire. For this purpose he has quoted a number of distinguished persons, including Bishop Heber and Lord Salisbury, choosing naturally only those statements which favour his views. No hope is expressed of any improvement from the new constitution, which is merely an attempt to continue the misgovernment of India in partnership with the Indian Princes, landlords and other reactionary elements. The Labour Party's handling of the Indian situation, when it was in office, comes in for special condemnation. In short, the blackest picture is

painted, one which those who have spent their lives in India will find it hard to recognise.

The remaining object of the author is to justify the co-operation given by Indian Socialists to the Congress Party. This support, however, is only to be continued so long as the Congress remains an "objectively revolutionary" movement, and will cease if any inclination is shown to work in alliance with "Imperialists." One cannot help feeling that the Indian Socialists regard the non-Socialist elements in the Congress as the young lady of Riga was regarded by her steed, and that their ultimate fate is intended to be similar. This is not a book to recommend to those who wish to obtain an unbiased view of the present situation.

H. S. CHATFIELD.

83*. THE LEGACY OF INDIA. Edited by G. T. Garratt, with an Introduction by the Marquess of Zetland. 1937. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 8vo. xviii + 428 pp. Illus. 10s.)

84. INDIA REVEALS HERSELF. By Basil Mathews, with the collaboration of Winifred Wilson. 1937. (Oxford University Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. vii + 192 pp. 5s.)

MOST people concerned with India will be glad to have *The Legacy of India* on their bookshelves. It consists, beside the introduction, of fourteen chapters by well-known experts: India in European Literature and Thought, by H. G. Rawlinson; Language and Early Literature, and Language and Literature, by Professor F. W. Thomas; Indian Art and Archæology, by K. de B. Codrington; Philosophy, by Professor S. N. Das Gupta; Caste and the Structure of Society, by R. P. Masani; Buddhism, by Professor de la Vallée Poussin; Muslim Architecture, by M. S. Briggs; Hinduism, by Sir S. Radhakrishnan; The Cultural Influence of Islam, by Sir Abdul Qadir; Music, by A. H. Fox Strangways and F. W. Galpin; Science, by W. E. Clark; Vernacular Literatures, by J. C. Ghosh; and Indo-British Civilisation, by G. T. Garratt.

The authors have not all of them had the same audience in view. At the two extremes we find that Lord Zetland and Mr. Garratt have obviously written for the great public, whereas Mr. Clark and Mr. Fox Strangways are only intelligible to specialists in their subjects. It would greatly increase the value of the book as a whole if in its next edition the technical Indian terms used in the text (of which some are not explained) were made the subject of a glossary index.

The casual reader will be a little puzzled by the contrast between the etherealised version of Hinduism by Professor Radhakrishnan, in which the impression of the Hindu God makes the Hindu gods appear almost negligible, and the chapters by critics of the first rank on Indian art, archæology and literature, in which the Hindu pantheon looms so large. Professor de la Vallée Poussin applies the historical method in his authoritative discussion of Buddhism.

Mr. Garratt's pessimistic thesis that the contact between British and Indian civilisations has been disappointingly sterile is criticised by Lord Zetland, and, as many Englishmen will think, with reason. But neither writer has pointed to the great fabric of law and justice built up during the past century by British and Indian hands jointly, a sociological phenomenon of the greatest significance; still more surprising, they say nothing of the education and the political emancipation of women. There are other aspects of the relations between India and the West on which both Gokhale and Tagore (the latter especially in his book on Nationalism) have written eloquently,

but at too great length to be quoted here. All will agree with Mr. Garratt's desire that his book should contribute to a more fruitful mutual understanding. Mr. Rawlinson's chapter on Indian influence on European life and thought, and that by Sir Abdul Qadir on the cultural influences of Islam, and the book as a whole, will assist towards this end.

Mr. Mathews' book reveals the impression made by India during a three months' stay in the country on a man of culture, sensitive, sympathetic, fair-minded, often an artist in words, and with a large dose of common sense. But, quite frankly, it does not say much that is new to those familiar with the Indian scene—how could it? Here and there the author's personal experiences supply some fresh details, but the book will be of most value to those unacquainted with India and with Indian men and women. P. J. HARTOG.

85. INDIAN STATES IN THE FEDERATION. By N. D. Varadachariar. 1936. (Oxford University Press. 8vo. ix + 156 pp. 5s.)

THE author of this modest little book republishes certain lectures delivered by him in Madras. In it doubts are expressed as to the working of that part of the New Constitution which involves the co-operation of the Indian States. These States claim to possess Sovereignty, a claim which the author rejects on account of the large and undefined powers of control exercised by the Crown and summed up in the word "Paramountcy." The concessions made to these claims in the Government of India Act will create difficulties in working the New Federal Constitution and indeed are said to be inconsistent with a true federation (as distinct from a confederation). Alterations in all constitutions are necessary and are usually provided for but no such alterations can be made in the case of the Indian Constitution which will affect the terms of the documents of accession executed by the individual Rulers. The only remedy in case of difficulty will be the exercise of the Paramount authority of the Crown. This prospect does not satisfy Mr. Varadachariar. H. S. CHATFIELD.

86. INDIAN FEDERAL COURT. By Sir Brojendra Mitter. 1937. (Simla. 8vo. 24 pp.)

A paper on the constitution and jurisdiction of the Federal Court of India read before the Indian Institute of International Affairs, by the Advocate General of India, on August 28th, 1937.

87. ASIA CENTRALE SOVIETICA CONTRO INDIA. By Arnaldo Cipolla. 1935. (Milan: Casa Editrice "Est." 8vo. 311 pp. *Lire* 12.)

AN interesting account of a journey through Russian Turkestan and Afghanistan, in 1934. The author, one of Fascist Italy's most popular traveller-publicists, is dominated by two obsessions: the formidable preparations of the Soviet military forces for war against India and a rather childish parade of Anglophobia. Signor Cipolla is convinced that the danger of a Soviet attack in the Far East is negligible while Russia is quietly getting ready to attack India through Turkestan. Or rather these were his views in 1935, when the book was written. He was very much impressed by the fine physique and discipline of the large numbers of Red Army officers and soldiers he saw everywhere in Turkestan. The number of foreign travellers who have succeeded in wangling a visa for Soviet Turkestan is so very small in the last ten years that every word that any of these lucky pilgrims writes is greedily read. These discursive notes from an

Italian pen are a welcome addition to the few works we already possess on this forbidden region by Ella Maillart, Ethel Mannin, etc. Cipolla's photographs are attractive. VIOLET CONOLLY.

FAR EAST AND PACIFIC

88*. RED STAR OVER CHINA. By Edgar Snow. 1937. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 464 pp. 18s.)

THE author of this book is the *Daily Herald's* correspondent in China. Its immediate occasion was a visit he was able to make to the Chinese Soviet region in the north-west. The account of his journey into this region makes a simple but telling story. Not only the political situation which made it possible for him to cross the no-man's-land between the Nationalist and Red armies, but the small incidents of his crossing are full of interest. Once in the territory—the first foreigner to penetrate there and indeed the first person, foreign or Chinese, free to report what he had seen—Mr. Snow made good use of his opportunities. He was able to meet, talk with and photograph the leaders of Chinese communism, to secure their biographies, hear from their own lips the story of the almost incredible march from Kiangsi west to Yunnan and north to Shensi, learn their principles of political and military strategy and their plans for the future. Here was rich material indeed, even if later events had not lent it topical interest.

Obviously no reviewer is in a position to check the statements of the only reporter who has ever had access to such material at first hand. It has been evident for some time that the Chinese Soviet organisation had tenacity and resilience. Harried over a large part of China, it had survived the repeated grandiose efforts of the Nanking Government to exterminate it. It was reasonable to suspect not only uncommon leadership, but also much popular support in such a movement. Little, however, was known of its so-called "bandit" leaders or their organisation. Mr. Snow gives us this information and, however unwelcome his appraisal may be and whatever discount may be thought necessary before accepting his judgments, few of his readers are likely to dismiss the problems he raises as unimportant. For the peasant problem is "the" problem of China. Not only at the present juncture, but for the whole future development of China the prospect of awakening such a vast mass of people, giving them elementary education, instilling simple but effective political ideas and freeing them from the abuses of usury and landlordism, is one that must be regarded as of great significance.

It so happened that just after Mr. Snow left the Soviet region the growing *rapprochement* between the communists and Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang led to the amazing series of events connected with the capture and subsequent release of the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The account which is given of these events should be read in conjunction with those given independently by General and Madame Chiang and by Mr. Bertram. Mr. Snow's interpretation is not very flattering to General Chiang, to whom and to the Kuomintang generally he is at times not very fair. It is at least as reasonable to credit Chiang with political wisdom in holding his hand against Japanese aggression until he was more prepared to offer effective resistance and there was a united China behind him, as to regard him as the tool of compromising Shanghai bankers and industrialists. There is a somewhat cynical and satirical flavour about Mr. Snow's explanations of

the devious political methods by which various "faces" were kept, while in fact the Kuomintang yielded, after Chiang's release, to the Communist plan for a united anti-Japanese front. The exact meaning and purpose of such delicate manœuvring, however, is of far less importance than the fact that in 1937 the alliance that made possible the advances of 1925–7 has been renewed. The "nationalist revolution" is a reality again, and the Red Army against which no fewer than five "annihilation campaigns" have been conducted is at the moment playing a characteristic guerilla rôle on the Japanese flank as an integral unit of the Chinese government forces. There is an oddly prophetic ring about much of the strategical talk which Mr. Snow reports from the Soviet leader Mao Tse-tung. The short attack, mobile tactics on the flanks and along lines of communication, the use of detached enemy units as sources of munitions and equipment—all the devices of guerilla warfare—have been worked out by the communists in their ten-year struggle with the Kuomintang, and are now being used against the Japanese. Whether, as Chinese optimists believe, they are successful in hampering the present Japanese attack, or, on the contrary, they become the last line of Chinese resistance in a long struggle waged mainly from the interior, events seem likely to give larger power to the Soviet leaders and their intellectual sympathisers throughout China. It is probable that Mr. Snow's book will not only have a large immediate sale, but will also remain an indispensable source of information on important personalities and events that have hitherto been shrouded in almost complete mystery.

J. B. CONDLIFFE.

89*. CHINA'S POSTAL AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES. By Dr. Chu Chia Hua. [*China To-day Series, No.* 9.] 1937. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. 8vo. ix + 259 pp. 10*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS book, like the other volumes in this series, has for its main object to demonstrate for the benefit of foreign readers the considerable measure of success that has attended China's efforts to transform herself into an organised State with an efficient central government. Facts and figures relating to the administrative organs grouped under the control of the Ministry of Communications are set out (a little disjointedly) in chapters describing the Postal Administration, the Postal Remittances and Savings Bank, the Marine and Navigation Administration and the Tele-Communications Department. A separate chapter is devoted to Commercial Aviation, which occupies much of the Ministry's attention, and a final somewhat naïvely written chapter deals with the question of Accountancy. The chief merit of the book is its frankness—its refusal to cover up faults and failures. Its chief demerit arises from Mr. Tang Liang Li's well-known obsession with sovereign rights and the unequal treaties—an obsession unfortunately shared by a considerable class of "returned students" and Kuomintang politicians. One of the favourite parrot cries of this school is the absurd charge, repeated on page 113, that the Maritime Customs Administration as organised by Sir Robert Hart was an encroachment on China's sovereign rights forced on her by the unequal treaties.

There was, in fact, no more loyal servant of the Chinese Government and no more strenuous upholder of China's sovereign rights than Sir Robert Hart. It was he who unobtrusively organised under the wing of the Customs Administration a Postal Service which in due

time developed, budded off and became a separate Administration as fully under the soverign control of China as the Customs Administration itself. Unfortunately the Marine and Navigation Department was not allowed to follow the same line of evolution. Instead a foolish attempt has been made to filch away from the Maritime Customs Administration the functions which it has for many years efficiently performed in relation to merchant shipping and navigation, and at a time when China was straining every nerve to prepare against the day of Japanese aggression, money and effort have been wasted in setting up at various centres Navigation Bureaux which performed no useful services but preyed upon commerce to provide sustenance for a horde of officials and underlings. But China's progress has been steadily upward, and it would be ungracious to lay too much stress on the occasions when she has stumbled by the way.

JOHN BRENT.

90. LA CINA E GLI STRANIERI. By Giuseppe Biondelli. 1936. (Padova: Tipografia del Seminario. 8vo. x + 413 pp. *Lire* 25.)

THERE is little in this long compilation of 413 pages dealing with the rights and possessions of foreigners in China which is not readily available to the English-speaking reader in the *China Year Book*. The first chapter recapitulates the entire history of China so tritely and briefly as merely to confuse the neophite and to annoy the specialist. The following chapters describe the early relations between China and the Western Powers, the causes determining the development of foreign influence in China, the origin and administration of the International Settlement in Shanghai. There are also detailed notes on all the treaty ports and foreign possessions in China, laying special emphasis on the Italian interests in these places. All the spade work of research on these questions has long been stored in a number of excellent treatises by English scholars. This new Italian book for the most part merely rehashes relevant material from their works. In view of the paucity of Italian documentation on most Eastern problems (with the notable exception of that indispensable *rara avis Oriente Moderno*), this might have been excusable some years ago. At the present time, however, when the whole framework of foreign interests in China is in jeopardy, a review of the situation which does not even attempt to sift and analyse the disruptive forces at work within and without China and their effect on the status of the foreign Powers in that country must be reckoned singularly inadequate. The vital question to be faced at the present time is what, if anything, may be saved from the wreck; but Signor Biondelli entirely shirks this problem.

Italy's newly born interest in the Near and Far East is shown by the publication of an increasing number of books of this kind in recent years and by the inauguration with considerable ceremony, in 1935, of a special *Istituto per l'Estremo Oriente* in Rome. This interest is undoubtedly serious, and should be accompanied in the future by more scholarly contributions from Italy to the study of Eastern problems.

VIOLET CONOLLY.

91. JAPAN CAN BE STOPPED! By Freda Utley and David Wills. 1937. (London: *News Chronicle* Publications Department. 8vo. 63 pp. 6*d*.)

MISS UTLEY here re-expounds the arguments of *Japan's Feet of Clay* with the same vigour and clarity, but with special reference to the question of economic sanctions. Japan is virtually self-sufficient

in foodstuffs, but very dependent on foreign supplies of raw materials. 30 per cent. of her imports consist of raw cotton, while the great bulk of her iron ore and petroleum has to be imported. No less than 50 per cent. of her exports consist of textiles (chiefly cotton piece-goods and raw silk), while the same proportion is taken by two political units—the United States and the British Empire. The question of stocks is of obvious significance in view of the record volume of imports in 1937. But we are assured that, given economic sanctions, "it is certain that the machine would run down in a matter of a few months, if not weeks. . . . And a complete stoppage of oil supplies alone would bring the end very rapidly indeed." As against this opinion, it should be remembered that the Oil Law of 1934 requires oil companies to maintain six months' supplies stored in Japan.

To the argument that Japan might retaliate to economic sanctions by an attack on Hong Kong three answers are given. Firstly, "if the British show sufficient goodwill, honesty of purpose and initiative," American support is assured, and "it is inconceivable that Japan should attempt to attack the United States and the British Empire at the same time." Secondly, such an attack would increase Japan's speed of consumption of war materials, and thus render her still more vulnerable to economic pressure. Thirdly, the alternative to a boycott is a victorious Japan menacing "not only Hong Kong, but the Dutch East Indies and even Australia." B. S. KEELING.

92. DIE "GELBE GEFAHR." By W. K. Nohara. 1936. (Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft. 8vo. 215 pp. *Rm.* 4.80.)

THE author's aim in this work is to explode the Western bogey of the yellow peril. Its immediate effect on the reader is to convince him of the Japanese peril, for no overt enemy of Japan could describe the Japanese policy of expansion in China with more cold-blooded effrontery than this strangely frank German-writing Japanese writer. History, according to Mr. Nohara, has vilified the extraordinary campaigns of the Mongol hordes of Ghengiz Khan, and thus given rise to the yellow peril "myth." The second point in his argument (and here he is on far more solid ground) is that there is no solidarity to-day between the various Eastern peoples: Indians, Chinese, Japanese, Malayans, Mahomedans of Central Asia *vis-à-vis* the white man or Europe, so Europe has nothing to fear from the numerical superiority of the Eastern peoples. The real Yellow Peril, concludes Mr. Nohara with a desperate attempt at frivolity, is the beautiful, sensuous, intelligent Chinese woman. And woe betide Europe, should she be let loose upon it! Fortunately for the interest of his book, Mr. Nohara wanders far afield in his treatment of his yellow peril theme, though as a result of these tangents, it is also extremely disjointed and difficult to follow. He discusses Sino-Japanese relations, Japan–Russia–Communism, the industrialisation of China, the Japanese in Manchuria, with many novel and provoking comments. The general effect is, however, tedious and banal, as the author does not seem to know the difference between sound sense and nonsense. There is no beating about the bush in his statement of Japanese aims in China, no apology for a ruthless policy which calls for the control of the five Northern Chinese provinces and everything lying between Japan and Sin Kiang. In this struggle, it seems, *Geo-Politik* is the supreme arbiter. Neither conventional political morality nor the psychological reactions of the mere Chinese have any place in the story. Japan, we are frankly informed, is using Communism as a stalking

horse against Soviet Russia, not because she has the slightest fear of Marxist propaganda at home, but to gain sympathy for her activities abroad. Is the Japanese Government really so naïve? In fact this deprecation of the possibility of Communism in Japan is far too sweeping and debonair, in view of the actual economic and social tension in Japan, to convince anybody. Mr. Nohara touches lightly on the intriguing subject of the oft-reported Japanese subsidies to Lenin and the Bolsheviks in pre-revolutionary days. It is a pity this question has not been more thoroughly investigated. The recurrent charges of Japanese bribery levelled at Lenin's old colleagues in Soviet trials to-day have revived interest in it. Is history merely repeating itself? In a penultimate chapter full of pseudo-scientific mystigoging, reminiscent of the worst Germanic tradition of the kind, Mr. Nohara develops his private theory of the new world peril of the future, *i.e.* the Indian Peril. In this age of rampant ideologies, it is fitting, he declares, that the world bogey of to-day should be philosophical rather than economic or, in other words, we should pray to be delivered from the subtle paralysis of Indian thought rather than the harmless flood of Japanese textiles.

Mr. Nohara makes no secret of his admiration for the "mythos" governing Nazi Germany. It is not so clear (to one knowing nothing of him or his work save this book) how far his hard-boiled, unimaginative presentation of the Japanese case in China is inspired by the spirit of German national-socialism, how far it is pure Japanese.

VIOLET CONOLLY.

93*. FRENCH POLICY AND DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA. By Thomas E. Ennis. 1936. (University of Chicago Press; Cambridge University Press. 8vo. 230 pp. 13*s.* 6*d.*)

THIS conscientious study of an interesting problem is, though partial, the more welcome as French Indo-China has been largely neglected in this country, even at Chatham House. Whilst the paper cover states the author's qualifications to be exceptional, his personal acquaintance with the topic does not appear.

That cover invites a discussion of the ultimate fate of the white man in the tropics. Whatever happens, no European race will form a large part of the population of these tropical and often humid countries. The 15,000 square kilometres of rice-fields are three metres above sea level and, stimulating though the question is, it is not one to be faced in this note.

Mr. Ennis's authorities are ill-assorted. He frequently speaks of M. Albert Sarraut, but omits his *Grandeurs et Servitudes Coloniales.* He does not mention the Indo-China of M. Octave Homberg's *La France des Cinq Parties du Monde*, and, strangest of all, ignores M. Paul Bernard's recent work *Le Problème Économique Indochinois*, which covers a large part of Mr. Ennis's ground. He pays no heed to many of the official reports published by the Indo-Chinese Government at the time of the Colonial Exposition of 1931, and puts on the same plane documents of greatly varying value. There are quotations from pamphlets published in 1909 by native firebrands like Phan Chau Trinh, banished for Francophobia (p. 61).

It is unfair to contrast the French capital invested in Indo-China in fifty years with that by the Netherlands in Dutch East Indies in three hundred. No weight is given to the fact that the 70 milliards francs, Mr. Ennis's figure, is the equal of 350 milliards of to-day (p. 4).

M. Bernard shows that between 1924 and 1932 France invested in Indo-China nearly three milliards, a formidable effort for a country of 39 millions, staggering under the Great War and helping its other colonies.

It is hard to understand why, if England and Holland are to colonise, France may not (p. 6). Why were her seamen to bring home no share of the heritage of Adam?

Mr. Ennis does not tell us the source of the 5683 at which he puts the number of French officials (pp. 7, 8 and 70). The latest local budgets give 4401, whilst native officials, including police, are 31,981.

In every case the proportion of salaries attributed to the Whites is exaggerated, whilst no place is found for the growing trade and nothing is said of the budgets, which everywhere show an excess of receipts over expenditure which the Western world might envy.

Mr. Ennis suggests (p. 62) that the railways are reserved to the Whites. In 1935 they carried in fourth class 7,300,000 natives at the lowest tariff in the world.

No believer in Western civilisation can shut his eyes to the pacification of Indo-China in thirty or forty years, and whatever Mr. Ennis may find in the writings of discontented critics of the past, no impartial historian will overlook the great work for the advancement of the native which France has done in the twentieth century.

There is much to be done. The vast and rapidly growing population, the low standard of living, the development of these fertile lands, the lack of harbours, the rigidity of local culture, the lack of co-ordination of information in French official circles and a less firmly closed door are amongst the problems of the present and near future on which Mr. Ennis throws light, even if it be a somewhat uncertain ray.

H. Scott Tucker.

CORRESPONDENCE

To The Editor,
International Affairs.

Sir,

I was surprised to see in a notice of my pamphlet "La Rébellion espagnole devant le Droit international," published in the September–October issue of *International Affairs*, that your reviewer asserts that I "condemn the European Powers for *attempting to invoke the law in their own favour and then proving that their attitude is just*." And it is on this single "quotation" that he bases his condemnation of my pamphlet. I would therefore appeal to your well-known spirit of impartiality by asking you to insert the present rectification.

In fact I never wrote the absurdity attributed to me. I quote below the only passage to which your contributor could have been referring, the meaning of which has nothing in common with that given by him:

> "With regard to the Spanish civil war the different European Powers have followed various and contradictory policies. In so doing, they have all tried to invoke the law in their favour; they have all claimed that their attitude was just and correct.
>
> "What was, in fact, the attitude laid down to them by International Law? How had the Powers to act in order to comply with legal precepts as regards the Spanish war? This is the *legal* problem which we shall endeavour to elucidate in the following pages, ignoring all considerations not of a purely legal nature."

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

PROFESSOR ALLAN G. B. FISHER holds the Price Chair of International Economics at Chatham House. He was formerly Professor of Economics in the University of Otago, New Zealand (1924–35), and in the University of Western Australia (1935–37). He is the author of *The Clash of Progress and Security* (1935), *Some Problems of Wages and their Regulation in Great Britain since 1918* (1926), and other works.

THE HON. GEORGE PEEL, who was formerly in the Treasury, is an authority on French finance. He is the author of *The Economic War* (1930), *The Economic Policy of France* (1937), and other works.

SIR JOHN FISCHER WILLIAMS, C.B.E., K.C., is British member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. He was formerly Assistant Legal Adviser to the Home Office and British Legal Representative on the Reparation Commission (1920–30).

MR. GEORGE WEST is Lecturer in Portuguese in the University of London and was formerly Reader in English at Coimbra University.

MR. A. ROWAN-ROBINSON, an Assistant Master at Charterhouse School, recently spent a year in Germany as a teacher in one of the newly-founded State boarding schools.

DAME JANET CAMPBELL, M.D., J.P., is a member of the League of Nations Health Committee. She was formerly Senior Medical Officer for Maternity and Child Welfare under the Ministry of Health and Chief Woman Medical Adviser to the Board of Education.

INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE

Inaugural Address by

ALLAN G. B. FISHER
Price Professor of International Economics at Chatham House. [1]

THE position of an academic economist whose main duty it is to " pursue continuous researches " in the science of international economics is, at first sight, a very happy one. All of us who have been engaged in university teaching have, on suitable occasions, delicately hinted, with an appropriate air of modesty, at the extraordinarily valuable work which we were capable of performing, if only we could be released from the intolerable shackles of routine toil. But when the shackles are removed, and we have to begin in earnest our pursuit of continuous researches, the extent of the field where our operations are to be carried on is a little alarming, and it is necessary to exercise a good deal of care lest we should be overwhelmed and confused by the multitudinous problems which everyone would agree were relevant to the subject of international economics, but many of which, however interesting and important they may be, nevertheless do not carry us to the heart of the grave economic evils which afflict the whole world to-day.

I cannot pretend that I am certain to win unanimous assent for my own ideas of what in fact constitutes the heart of modern world economic problems, but this is certainly a field where differences of opinion need not diminish the scope for co-operative activity. That it is necessary to endeavour to avoid being distracted by the current details of immediate so-called practical problems, and to examine specific issues with some measure of detachment, in their appropriate general background, will, I hope, be generally agreed. Nor is it merely from the standpoint of the evolution of a rational long-term policy that we ought to encourage the habit of taking long views. " Distracted by the crises of the day," as Commander King-Hall has reminded us, " we

[1] Given at Chatham House on January 25th, 1938; The Right Hon. Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, K.C., in the Chair.

sometimes forget the slow-moving continuity of history. Chatham House exists to deal alike with the emergency of to-morrow and the problems of the next generations," [1] and one suspects that our methods for dealing with the emergency of to-morrow have often given disappointing results, precisely because, in our feverish search for immediately effective policies, it is so easy to forget about the problems, if not of the next generations, say of the next twenty years.

The title of this evening's address, International Problems of Economic Change, was selected partly for the obvious reason that it was so wide that, whatever I chose to say, nobody could accuse me of irrelevance. But an analysis of the title is also useful because it suggests that at bottom the international and the national problems, which arise when the background of economic activity changes, are very much the same. Even among those who are not attracted by the philosophy of thorough-going autarky there is often a half-conscious impression that international complications are a nuisance, and that if we could reduce them to a minimum and push ahead with internal development, our task would be much easier. This view, I believe, is a delusion. There are, of course, special and well-known complications which arise in the field of international relations, but when we examine the fundamental reasons why the course which rational analysis suggests to be desirable is often rejected, we reach much the same conclusion, whether we are thinking in terms of international economic relations, or in terms of the problems of a more or less independent national economy.

"International Economics is concerned with all economic transactions involving passage across a national frontier," [2] and we are all familiar with the topics of migration, capital movements, imports and exports, and the like, which at once come to mind when the wider subject is mentioned. Nor is it necessary to elaborate here the grounds usually accepted as a justification for at least provisionally treating international economics as an independent subject of study—the increased immobility both of labour and of capital, caused by the existence of national frontiers, the complications which arise when those who engage in trade transactions are living within different legal and administrative frameworks, and the existence of national systems of currency and banking, which, especially in the post-War world, seldom extend beyond the national boundaries.

[1] *Chatham House*, p. xi.
[2] R. F. Harrod, *International Economics*, p. 4.

It is usual and wise to emphasise that the importance of these factors must not be exaggerated, that they are merely qualifications which do not destroy the fundamental identity in character of internal and international trade. Of these obvious and elementary considerations I have no criticism to offer, but I wish to suggest that there is still another, and, for practical purposes, a more important point of view from which it is possible to insist even more emphatically upon this fundamental identity.

It was pointed out early in the post-War period that one of the most potent causes of confusion at that time, both in thought and in action, was the contradiction between the ideas which well-informed persons knew ought to be the basis of public policy, and the ideas upon which statesmen and politicians, some of whom really knew better, were compelled by the pressure of prejudiced public opinion to base their policies. Unfortunately this contradiction has not yet disappeared. At least since the onset of the Great Depression, in practically every part of the world people have been repeatedly told that an essential condition for the resumption of normal economic development is a relaxation of the restrictions which everywhere have cramped and sometimes strangled the ordinary activities of international trade. "Prohibitions, quotas, licences and other restrictions on international trade," a League account of the preparatory work for the Monetary and Economic Conference of 1933 told us, "have in recent years become exceedingly widespread, and are so numerous that they now constitute an almost insurmountable barrier to international exchange. . . . The abolition of these measures, which have grown up around, and in addition to customs tarriffs, constitute the most urgent problem in bringing world economy back to a more normal condition." But despite the high degree of unanimity of opinion on this point, the progress actually made in mitigating the severity of these repressive measures has been disappointingly slow.

It may be that the slowness of our movements is in part to be attributed to technical defects in the methods which we have discussed, or even on occasion endeavoured to apply. Technical questions, of course, have their importance, but it seems that discussions which go no further than technicalities will continue to produce disappointing results unless we attempt to probe rather more deeply below the surface and ask ourselves what are in fact the fundamental factors on which is based the widespread resistance to the adoption of policies, the case for which, on purely intellectual grounds, is overwhelmingly strong. And it is because

in attempting to answer that question we also encounter exactly the same influences which check the adoption of sensible policies in our internal affairs that I suggest that we should not press too far the distinction between international economics and economics in general. The rocks which we have to dissolve, or perhaps to blast away, before we can get our economic policies firmly based upon a rational foundation, have, in both cases, much the same character.

The question of the influences which check the adoption of rational economic policy has not, of course, been ignored in the past. Professor Cannan put the question in relation to international trade in 1926; "the simplest explanation that may be proposed," he said, "is that nations, trying to think collectively, are stupider than ordinary householders thinking individually, so that they do by mere stupidity what the householder will not do."[1] As a rule, the householder is quite happy to co-operate unconsciously with other people, and does not insist on baking his own bread and making his own clothes, because he fears that the baker or the tailor may suddenly be filled with an access of fury and refuse to have anything more to do with him. "But," Professor Cannan went on to add, "there is probably more in it than that . . . the true explanation is to be looked for in the fact that such harmony as is found between the pursuit of self-interest and the general good is dependent on the existence of suitable human institutions," such as serve more or less effectively to regulate the relations of members of a single political unit. Individuals living together within the borders of a single State can co-operate and carry on their ordinary business activities on the assumption that the legal and social institutions which have grown up will more or less effectively keep in check any predatory or anti-social tendencies which some of them may display, and, further, that machinery exists to remedy defects in these institutions, even if the machinery is often slow-moving and imperfect. Economic activities affecting persons living in different States are, however, carried on in quite a different background. As compared with even the most disorderly of States, the relations between national States are still most accurately to be described in terms of anarchy. "The nation in contemplating its foreign trade is always asking, 'what if there is war?'" and the fear of war makes action which would seem obvious prudence to the head of a household appear to be indefensible rashness to the ruler of a nation.

[1] *An Economist's Protest*, p. 428.

This explanation is undoubtedly true, so far as it goes, and there is no necessity in 1938 to emphasise the importance of the political barriers in the way of economic appeasement. I believe, however, that it is necessary to push the analysis a stage further. Professor Cannan was himself a little troubled by the fact that nations, between whom the risk of war was quite non-existent, were often just as restrictive in the trade policies which they adopted in relation to each other as were the nations to whom his explanation more obviously applied. No citizen of Australia or of New Zealand seriously contemplates the possibility of invasion from the neighbouring Dominion, and yet the arguments which justify in the one case the exclusion of Australian wheat, and in the other the exclusion of New Zealand potatoes, are of precisely the same character as those which are commonly used by nations to whom the fear of war is grim reality. Professor Cannan explained this as the result of the " mere force of imitation," but this suggestion seems not to go quite far enough.

In undertaking the search for a more radical and complete answer to the question, there are two central ideas, related but distinct, which emerge, and both of which are, I suggest, proper subjects for study in the field of international economics. It is, of course, a commonplace that we live in a changing world, but the equally elementary implications of change in the economic sphere are unfortunately not so widely appreciated. If change means technical improvements in methods of production, that at once opens up the possibility of higher average levels of income and standards of living. But whether we desire higher standards of living or not, such changes inevitably demand re-adjustments in the allocation of both labour and capital. " Economic progress is the orderly assimilation of innovation into the general standard of life," [1] but such assimilation, however orderly it may be, is impossible unless at the same time there are changes in the relative volumes of employment and of investment in some and perhaps many fields of economic activity. Such changes bring with them risks of unemployment and of capital depreciation, and they may also threaten inconvenient competition for those already entrenched in the fields of employment or investment where expansion more rapid than the average is now desirable.

Two fundamental questions then have to be faced. First, what in fact are the ends which people strive in their economic activities to attain? And, as a corollary to that question, what are the consequences if different communities place before them-

[1] Sir J. Stamp, *Science of Social Adjustment*, p. 5.

selves different ends, the attainment of one of which may make impossible the attainment of some of the others? And second, what is the nature of the adjustments which are necessary if the end at which we are aiming is to be attained? It may be that the adjustments required for certain purposes appear so awkward and difficult for some of us that we prefer to sacrifice that end and be satisfied with something else. But usually we cannot evade the difficulty that way, and in the end we are likely to find that difficult adjustments are still inexorably imposed upon us, and we can merely change their character a little. The problem of the transfer of productive forces, of labour and of capital, from one field to another must always be faced. And if those sections in the community who in consequence find themselves threatened with loss, either absolute or relative, resist the changes which are necessary, we must also investigate the consequences of their resistance for the maintenance of general equilibrium, and how best such resistance can be circumvented or overcome. A discussion of both these questions seems to me highly relevant to nearly every problem of international economics.

English economists have usually taken it for granted that the proper, the " natural," end of economic activity is the attainment of higher income levels. It is not, of course, assumed that everybody is eagerly engaged in the process of " bettering themselves," but it is assumed that the pace of economic development is set, so to speak, by people who are anxious to increase their own incomes, which often, though not always, means to increase the aggregate volume of production. On this subject I cannot pretend to have an open mind. To me it seems an obvious platitude that material progress of this kind is still an end which it is worth while to pursue. It is not an end in itself, something to which all other ends must necessarily be sacrificed, but at the present time, when even in the most highly developed countries the average standard of living is still so deplorably low, it seems evidence of defeatism of the worst kind to suggest that a halt should be called, and that we should rest content with what we have already achieved. Whether the older methods for achieving material progress will be as effective in the future as they were in the past is of course another question.

Unfortunately the view that material progress is the proper end of economic activity is by no means universally accepted. Here, as elsewhere, it is often not enough to rely upon the explicit declarations made by political and business leaders, and risky though it may be, we are entitled sometimes to deduce their

implicit beliefs from statements made in some different context. At the end of each year we are accustomed to read annual " stocktakings " of economic development in various parts of the world during the preceding twelve months, and it is an instructive exercise to note how frequently the writers of these surveys report a " good " year or a " bad " year, without any reference, either avowed or implicit, to any improvement or decline in average income levels or standards of living. And even when these things are mentioned, it is often implied that a nation is entitled to congratulate itself on its economic development, even when there has been no improvement or perhaps even retrogression in average income levels.

In recent years, and for obvious, and in some respects legitimate, reasons, many economists and publicists have tended to take the view that the proper end of economic activity is not so much the provision of rising average incomes, as the provision of employment. Whether the attainment of either of these ends is necessarily inconsistent with the attainment of the other, is a question which I need not now pause to consider, but certainly many popular and influential writers appear to suppose that the provision of employment is an end in itself, and not something to be regarded as subordinate to the provision of higher incomes. And whether we aim at the highest possible income level or the maximum volume of employment, the kind of policy which we are likely to pursue will also be influenced by the importance which we attach to the diminution of the glaring inequalities in income distribution which at present are to be observed everywhere. Or we may prefer more leisure to a greater volume of material production.

This is far from being an exhaustive list of possible or actual objectives, but clearly there is a possibility of clash within the borders of a single State. But there may also be fundamental differences between the economic objectives of different States and, as Professor Ohlin has said, " rational international organisation in the economic sphere is impossible in so far as the goals pursued by the different nations are divergent or contradictory." [1] I find it a little difficult, however, to accept his optimistic view that " fortunately, differences of aim in economic policy are, as far as most countries are concerned, not very considerable."

Some States still adhere to the traditional British objectives of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but where the attainment of these objectives depends in part on a similar out-

[1] *International Economic Reconstruction*, 1936, p. 22.

look in other countries, they frequently run up against trends which are the result of acceptance of quite different objectives, in which higher income levels play a quite negligible part. Those who are responsible for such policies would scarcely disavow in set terms the desirability of material progress, but in effect its realisation is indefinitely postponed, and for the immediate and perhaps a more remote future too, the attainment of other social and political ends, and the service of what is known as national prestige, are regarded as the tests of successful economic policy. It would, moreover, be a mistake to regard this conflict of ideals as exclusively a post-War product. We are all familiar with the unhappy alternative, Guns or Butter, but even before the drive in the direction of autarky had become so intense as it is to-day, no small part of the world's economic troubles was due to divergences between the objectives which different countries regarded as desirable ends. The French, for example, have always, it seems, been less interested in material progress than the Americans, and the whole story of the imperialist exploitation of undeveloped areas can well be told in terms of the divergent purposes of peoples at various stages of civilisation. I suggest that one essential task for the worker in the field of international economics is a fundamental analysis of " the principal determinants of the financial and commercial policies of the various countries," interpreted in terms of these and other similar general ideas. This is no easy task, because few people have clear-cut notions on this subject, and in the absence of clear-cut ideas, it is fatally easy to attempt to realise inconsistent and contradictory ends. It is notoriously dangerous to attempt to analyse ideas which do not enter at all clearly into consciousness; " it is trite learning," we were told more than 400 years ago, " that the thought of man is not triable, for the devil himself knows not the thought of man." But the statesman and the economist must sometimes attempt what is forbidden to the judge, and in this field the very fact that unconscious ideas have such a powerful influence upon everyday action makes it all the more important to make the attempt.

It has been argued, indeed, that economists as such are not, or should not be, interested in ends. But whether this is so or not, it is certainly their business to analyse the consequences which are likely to arise when national economies or groups inside a national economy place before themselves ends which are inconsistent or contradictory. And it is also their business to make clear to those who decide to sacrifice material progress to some other

objective exactly what they are doing. Sometimes the sacrifice which they are prepared to make is intended for the most part for other people, and they should not be allowed to delude either themselves or other people into believing that they are going to get the best of both worlds.

My second point may most conveniently be introduced by pursuing a little further the suggestion that both in international and in national policies we often attempt to realise ends which are contradictory and mutually destructive. We may agree in general terms that higher income levels are desirable, that material progress is " a good thing," but trouble is likely to arise if at the same time we make the implicit reservation that certain other interests or ideals which we value are not to be interfered with. Better living standards in general? Yes, but not if their attainment necessitates the abandonment of the idea that peasant life is morally superior to other modes of life, nor if it means the admission of traders of other countries into markets which we have come to regard as our own by natural right, or, most important of all, not if it means a deterioration, either absolute or relative, in our own individual economic position. I conceive the central problem of any long-term economic policy, which aims at material progress, to centre around the fact already mentioned, that the appropriate use of the increasing volume of means at our disposal for the attainment of higher income levels is impossible, unless there is a continuous adjustment in the allocation of the available supplies of labour and of capital, a continuous flow of resources into types of economic activity which when we were poorer we were unable to afford.

This continuous adjustment creates two related sets of problems: first, those concerned with getting out of the old fields of activity, and second, those concerned with getting into the new. The individuals and groups who are threatened with inconvenience and loss naturally object, and take steps to protect themselves. The result is failure to realise the broader end at which we should be aiming, and sometimes the introduction of new causes of disequilibrium which ultimately lead to retrogression. In other words, the problem of vested interests is one which the worker in the field of international economics must place high upon his list of subjects for scientific investigation. It is not only in dealing with international trade in the narrower sense that these issues are fundamental. There is scarcely, indeed, a single important economic problem to-day, either international or national, whose solution is not, to a greater or less extent, bound

up with this wider question. The nutrition question, for example —the question of providing both adequate food for the world's population and adequate rewards for those who produce it— depends ultimately upon our success in making the transfers of productive resources which are invariably a condition of rising incomes.

The adjustments and transfers of resources of which I speak have, of course, frequently occurred in the past, and are still occurring at the present time. But they are frequently too long delayed, so that their net volume is inadequate, and when the diversion of resources along certain channels is checked, over-development in other directions can scarcely be avoided.

When we reflect upon the enormous mass of literature which has been devoted to the study of monopoly organisation, it may seem a little odd to suggest that vested interests is a subject which economic theory has so far been inclined to neglect. Apart from monopoly, the references to it are of course numerous, but I believe that we have not yet systematically attempted any complete scientific analysis of all that is involved in the endless ramifications of this problem. As might have been expected, socialist writers have had a good deal to say on certain of its aspects, but even they have seldom attempted to classify and analyse exhaustively the various manifestations in which vested interests present themselves, and still less to show clearly the nature of the changes which vested interests can often check, and the repercussions which follow their successful efforts to resist change. I believe that if we are not simply to " hold our noses and avert our eyes from the disgusting mess " which much popular economic thinking presents to us to-day, if we are to respond to Professor Cannan's plea for simpler economics, and do more " to make economic organisation understood by the people," [1] economists must in the future pay much more attention to vested interests.

In the *Encyclopædia of Social Sciences* the subject of vested interests had three full pages allotted to it. No doubt there are numerous incidental references scattered among the other articles in the Encyclopædia, but it is significant that when the subject is dealt with under a specific heading, the discussion turns in large measure on mere legal and constitutional points. Vested interests are obviously by their nature difficult to shift, and " it must not be forgotten that the world does not easily adapt itself to reforms which attempt too much at once." [2] But the easy line of least

[1] *Economic Journal*, September 1933, p. 378.
[2] W. Kotschnig, *Unemployment in the Learned Professions*, p. 192.

resistance which, however regretfully, accepts vested interests as hard facts which must be taken for granted, often leads ultimately to further confusion and disequilibrium, and it is a little disappointing to find reforms in educational policy, for example, for which a thoroughly water-tight case has been made out, postponed to an indefinitely remote future on account of " the storm of protest that would rise if anyone seriously attempted to introduce a measure which would virtually exclude some of the children [of the upper middle classes] from higher studies." It is much more important to remember that " gradualness implies action, and is not a polite name for standing still." [1] Perhaps even more distressing than the reluctance to grapple firmly with all the theoretical and practical issues which the existence of vested interests creates, is the tendency which also has been common in recent years to suggest that, though vested interests no doubt exist, they are often, after all, of little practical significance. Mr. Meade, for example, has recently told us that " the solution of this problem [*i.e.* of unemployment] requires no change of heart and offends no vested interests." [2] One can only say that one wishes that this were true. In the long run, Mr. Keynes may be justified in his belief that " the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas," [3] but the short-run effects of the efforts of vested interests to resist rational economic adjustment are often so disturbing that one feels irresistibly drawn to the conclusion that, among the ideas for whose gradual encroachment one should most energetically work, are those likely to emerge from a study of the causes, the technique and the consequences of vested interests.

I am myself convinced that the eager attention given in recent years to all kinds of projects for monetary reform, orthodox, semi-orthodox and unorthodox, is in large measure due to a natural, but at the same time futile, desire to evade the issue of vested interests. The importance of monetary policy is not of course to be questioned, and it must play its part in any rational programme of economic reform, but a considerable part of the discussion of this subject is little more than an uneasy wriggling away from the unpleasant, but important, fact that a thoroughly sound economic policy is inconsistent with a refusal to do anything which may inflict inconvenience upon powerful social and economic groups.

[1] A. C. Pigou, *Socialism versus Capitalism*, p. 139.

[2] *Economic Analysis and Policy*, p. xiv.

[3] *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*, p. 383.

The phrase "vested interests" is, perhaps, not the most suitable for use in a detached scientific study, because almost inevitably it has bad associations; if we say that anything is initiated or controlled by vested interests we do not, as a rule, intend to be complimentary. Veblen, for example, defined a vested interest as "a marketable right to get something for nothing." [1] This is much too narrow for my purpose—a vested interest is not necessarily the same thing as a racket—but it illustrates the atmosphere of disapproval which the phrase usually suggests. A more recent writer says that "when an activity has been pursued so long that the individuals concerned in it have a presumptive claim to its exercise and its profits, they are considered to have a vested interest in it." [2] I would prefer to widen the meaning of the phrase a little further, and to suggest that whenever action which would be in the general interest—a concept difficult to define precisely, I admit, but I believe sufficiently clear to absolve me from the necessity of further analysis here—is prevented or checked or resisted by people who believe that such action would damage them, or would exclude them from the prospect of economic gain or of social distinction which they had confidently expected to enjoy, we are face to face with a vested interest. This does not necessarily imply any moral obliquity on the part of the person to whom a vested interest is imputed. Most of us have, or think we ought to have, a vested interest in the work which we happen to be performing, or at least we tend to resent any suggestion or action which seems likely to disturb our normal activities or to dry up the sources from which we have been accustomed to draw our income. This is perfectly natural, even if it is sometimes very dangerous, and it is not for one who has been fortunate enough to select a part of the field of academic activity for the scene of his work in which the range of employment has enormously widened in recent years to pretend to any moral indignation when he observes the struggles of those who have selected employments the demand for which is not expanding, and which may indeed be actually contracting. It is all the more important to emphasise the fact that vested interests and wickedness are not synonymous, because excessive concentration on those forms of vested interest which are obviously selfish and anti-social is one reason for the comparative neglect of other types, which morally seem less reprehensible, but are no less

[1] *The Vested Interests and the State of the Industrial Arts*, p. 100.
[2] Max Lerner, *Encyclopædia of Social Sciences*, XV, p. 240.

damaging to the maintenance of economic equilibrium and the raising of standards of living.

It would be easy to give a lengthy list of ways in which such vested interests obstruct rational policy in fields which at first sight seem to have little international significance. Extensions of education are opposed because they are likely to widen the range of competition for the more highly paid kinds of work. New methods of work are resented because they threaten existing employment, or are likely to make existing capital equipment obsolete, and so on *ad infinitum*. We were recently reminded that the development of gas was in its early days opposed by the whaling industry on the ground that the new method of lighting by gas would destroy the demand for oil. This kind of thing makes its influence felt very widely. It is certainly not the whole explanation, but we shall not fully understand the drive towards rearmament in the States disarmed by the Treaty of Versailles, or the reluctance in other countries to divest themselves of the responsibilities of imperial administration, unless we bear in mind the influence of important groups which believe that they, and their children, have a right to privileged employment in these spheres.

Exactly the same sort of resistance, however, lies behind, or is intimately associated with, nearly every effort by governments to protect their subjects from the impact of changes in the economic world outside, and nearly every failure to work out rational reforms in international economic policy. Nor are the resistances of vested interests which affect internal policy to be placed alongside those which affect international policy merely for purposes of comparison. In fact they interact upon each other in all sorts of complicated ways. If producers in some country from which we import goods increase their efficiency, the rational reaction for us is to slow down or perhaps to reverse the process of expansion in industries which compete with these imports, and to divert the stream of productive resources into new channels. This will, no doubt, often be difficult, but it may be quite impossible if the new channels are already blocked by vested interests, who directly at least may not feel themselves in the slightest degree concerned with international economic trends.

If one is very optimistic, it is possible to believe that inside a national State vested interests will eventually be broken down in the course of time, without the necessity of paying very much attention to them directly. But when the maintenance of a vested interest rests upon action by the State in reference to

people living in other countries against whom it is fatally easy to arouse irrational prejudice, the optimism which believes that we should trust to time to correct any temporary mistakes becomes something little short of fantastic self-deception. There is certainly no invisible hand to reconcile the divergent purposes of national groups, which have been subjected to the powerful pressure of their own vested interests. It would be tedious to elaborate a list of recent utterances on the mitigation of trade restrictions which analysis shows to be merely a polite way of saying that nothing of importance can be done, because certain vested interests are not to be disturbed. Nearly everybody approves of such mitigation "in principle," but too often approval "in principle" is quite compatible with a steady refusal to do anything which would really affect the situation; that view, in a world where plain speaking was the custom, would be better expressed not by approval "in principle," but by a categorical rejection. Even when there is a willingness to expand trade with certain specified countries, that willingness is too often combined with a tacit understanding that goods from other quarters are to be excluded to an equivalent extent, an attitude which attempts to place the burden of adjustment on other shoulders, and leaves the net position very much as it was. International trade negotiations frequently degenerate into unedifying wrangles as to who shall take the first step. "Let the other side begin first" is, however, merely another way of saying that the troublesome business of readjusting employment and investment is to be left to someone else. Along that path clearly little progress is to be expected.

In passing I may be permitted to remark that it is here that there seems to me to be the closest connection between economic maladjustment and the causes of war. It is probably rather futile to discuss what is *the* cause of war, for any theory which attempts to explain the occurrence of wars must be complex and inclusive of many influences. But the ill-feeling which arises when groups of producers who can rely on the support of their governments seek to push off on to each other the responsibility for making awkward adjustments in their programmes of production is certainly not conducive to international amity, and even if it does not itself set in motion the forces which lead to war, it may do much to embitter and accelerate their action.

Much of this is no doubt commonplace, and I do not dilate upon the baleful effects of narrow vested interests upon our efforts to improve the economic conditions of the world merely in

order to enjoy the emotional satisfaction which we get from denouncing evilly-disposed or short-sighted economic and social groups, other than those to which we happen ourselves to belong. It may sometimes be useful to denounce vested interests, but denunciation is certainly not enough. We must, of course, in the first instance, at least, take the world as we find it and in the world as we find it these resistances to change are hard facts which will not disappear merely as a result of pretending or wishing that they were not there. It is not my purpose at this time to evaluate the case for a return to policies based upon the traditional ideas of a "liberal" economy, but I would say that as a practical measure the case is most seriously weakened by the failure of many who support it to grapple with the problem of vested interests. It may be true that "the *logical* consequence of the principles upon which capitalist society is founded is an inherent tendency towards equality of remuneration for all," [1] but we should be foolish if on this account we insisted on the rigorous application of "liberal" principles, without paying due regard to the vested interests which have always stood in the way of anything like a complete realisation in fact of this logical consequence, and which, at the same time, and by the same processes, check the proper use of our expanding resources of production. But taking the world as we find it should also mean realising that the situation which confronts us is never something given once and for all; it is always to a greater or less degree plastic, and whether our efforts to mould a plastic situation along lines which eventually encourage material progress are to be successful, depends in large measure on our success in bringing into the light of consciousness the half-hidden motives to which I have been referring, and which are just as much facts in the economic situation as the more obvious facts which can be reduced to concrete statistical terms. There is no doubt something to be said on tactical grounds for submitting measures for economic appeasement to governments and other parties interested, so as to avoid arousing unnecessary antagonism, but one does not need to be unduly cynical to have the fear that such previous submission may have the effect merely of sterilising or eviscerating the essential elements of such measures, leaving behind little more than the polite but insincere generalities of which we have already had too many.

Denunciation is not enough, but an analysis of the actual facts of vested interest, useful and indeed essential as it is, is also unlikely to be enough. We must further examine such methods

[1] B. Wootton, *Plan or No Plan*, p. 22.

as seem appropriate for circumventing or outflanking the vested interests which delay the attainment of our objectives. The essential problem is that of smoothing over the transitions from one kind of work, or from one field of investment, to another, without which our objective, whatever it may be, cannot be attained, but which so frequently impose hardship and suffering upon innocent individuals. The direct attack is often disappointing, but we certainly need machinery for making movement within the economic structure easier than it seems to be at present. The individual losses incidental to economic change can scarcely be altogether avoided, but they need not be so crushing or overwhelming as in the past, and the process of exploring relatively new avenues of economic activity need not be such a chancy leap in the dark. Here there is a wide field for investigation, the results of which will have a close bearing upon both international and national economic problems. There has, for example, been a good deal of fruitless controversy about so-called "technological" unemployment; it may be agreed that the extent of unemployment of this kind is frequently much exaggerated, but the fear of such employment is a powerful factor in the situation which I am examining, and it is an important task to examine in detail just what happens when a new technical device necessitates a large-scale re-arrangement of the labour force. As long ago as 1835, Babbage made a plea for statistical information on this subject of labour transfers, a plea which, as Dr. Gregory put it in 1933, "one is still forced to echo." Some useful work of this kind has recently been done in the United States and perhaps elsewhere, but for the most part it is still a subject on which our ignorance is profound. Here is one field where Sir William Beveridge's plea that economists should cease "to speculate without facts"[1] is without doubt valid.

The correct allocation of our capital supplies is clearly no less important than the correct allocation of labour. In the field of labour the checks in the way of entry into the new employments which are necessary are perhaps a little more important than the natural fears and doubts which make us reluctant to leave the old. Many individuals might be quite happy to enter fields of employment of a different kind from those which are traditional for members of the economic group to which they belong, but costs of training and other factors make the change impossible for all except a few. In capital investment the relative importance of these two barriers to progress is often the other way round. There

[1] *Politica*, September 1937.

is no barrier which prevents the individual saver from venturing his capital in new and comparatively untried fields; often, however, he has neither the time, the inclination nor the ability to balance accurately the needs for capital arising from old and new industries, and the institutions, which have evolved to establish links between the individual saver and the economic units which require further additions to their capital equipment, may sometimes be a little conservative and complacently satisfied with familiar traditions, even if on occasion they also err in the opposite direction and divert a disproportionate amount of the community's savings into highly speculative ventures. Can we be quite confident that traditional institutions will, in the changing circumstances of production and demand of the present and the future, perform their functions as efficiently as in the past? It may be, as many people suppose, that we should give an affirmative answer to this question, but that is a conclusion which we can scarcely take for granted. Important changes have occurred, and are still occurring, both in the sources from which the stream of savings flows and in the attitude of savers to various forms and methods of investment, and it requires a good deal of optimism to suppose that all our investment machinery is being promptly adapted to meet, at the same time, these changes on the side of capital supply as well as the changes which are occurring in the character of the activities where capital investment is most needed to-day.

The most important cause of change in economic structure is without doubt the numerous additions which are being continuously made to the knowledge which enables us to control our material environment. It is clear that the economic consequences of new discoveries in science, which from the point of view of pure science may appear to be of equal importance, are certain to vary enormously. The scientific significance of new discoveries which make possible the mass production of cheap watches may be no less than the significance of new discoveries which make possible the mass production of cheap motor-cars, but it was a sound instinct that led Henry Ford to ignore the former and to concentrate on the latter. It is of course extremely difficult to predict the directions in which scientific discovery is going to break out in either the near or the remote future. But it would still be worth while to attempt at least a logical classification of scientific discoveries, on the basis of their economic consequences, for, if this were available, some of the more violent shocks, such as we have received in the past, could be anticipated

and their consequences rendered less disturbing. An invention which affects some commodity with highly elastic demand, a commodity which will, if offered at a lower price, attract a large group of new consumers, will have quite different economic repercussions from one which affects things of which we will be unwilling to buy much more, even if there is a drastic reduction in price. The varying effects upon the rate of obsolescence of capital equipment are equally important. This is a field whose exploration will demand much skill and experience, but I believe that realistic studies of international economics would be much indebted to further investigations along some of the lines suggested by Mr. Julian Huxley's *Scientific Research and Human Needs.*

The list of illustrations of the kind of work which a study of the international problems of economic change suggests could be much further extended, but those which I have already briefly mentioned are sufficient to show that the work will not be finished within a short period of time. Even a Five Years' Plan of continuous large-scale activity would scarcely exhaust their ramifications; and they do not lend themselves very readily to the process of being set out neatly in symmetrical schematic form, though perhaps they are none the worse on that account. It is obvious that, where vested interests are affected, the difficulties in the way of collecting accurate information are enormously increased. We cannot get very far here without treading on someone's corns, but I fear that disillusionment awaits anyone who supposes that significant advances in applied international economics, or indeed in applied economics generally, are possible if we first lay down the principle that tender spots are not to be probed. At the same time we need not exaggerate the difficulties. The resistance of vested interests has frequently been overcome in the past. Otherwise the history of international economic relations would have been quite different, and the extent to which material progress has in fact been registered would have been much less. Hopes may be dupes, but certainly fears are often liars. Here, as elsewhere, we must insist on following the argument whithersoever it may lead. In so doing we can be confident that we shall be rendering useful service both to the understanding of international economic problems and to the formulation of policies which may relax the present threatening tension and enable the world to resume again the interrupted process of using its varied resources of production for the benefit of all who are able and willing to make a contribution to the common cause.

CHAIRMAN'S INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

THE VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: We have met this afternoon to welcome Professor Allan Fisher to the Chair of International Economics which our generous benefactor, Sir Henry Price, whom I also welcome here this afternoon, has founded at Chatham House.

I am delighted to see that we have with us also on this occasion representatives of two of our sister institutions, the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, and the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, of Paris.

Though he is a New Zealander, Professor Fisher comes to us from the University of Western Australia, where he held the Chair of Economics, and he is probably best known to economists and others in this country from his published work, more especially his volume on *The Clash of Progress and Security*, which he wrote partly as a result of investigations carried out when, as a Rockefeller Fellow, he visited this country and the Continent of Europe a few years ago.

We all hope that the Research Professorship to which we now welcome Professor Fisher will provide him with just those opportunities for original research in International Economics which his previous training and work will enable him so brilliantly to take advantage of; for it is the purpose of the Chatham House Research Professorships to enable distinguished scholars in the various subjects which come within the scope of International Affairs to carry out original work, it may be over a period of years, unhampered by the interruptions of the class-room or the seminar, or by the day-to-day routine of an administrative office.

The importance of the particular subject of this Professorship is obvious from an international point of view. I might perhaps be allowed, however, to say a word as to the importance of the founding of this Research Chair to the work of our Institute as a whole. In doing so I am tempted, but I am going to resist the temptation, to recall the names of those who have worked so hard to create this Institute. Several of them, I am glad to notice, are here, including my old friend, Mr. Lionel Curtis, to whom we owe the foundation of the whole of our work.

This Price Chair of International Economics which we are inaugurating to-day is the first of our own Research Chairs, based on the Stevenson Research Chair of International History in the University of London, and inspired by the work of Professor Arnold Toynbee, our distinguished Director of Studies. These Research Chairs are the logical development of the idea of the Institute which the late Lord Grey expressed, when, at the Inaugural Meeting in 1920, in proposing "That an Institute be constituted for the study of International Questions," he suggested that that Institute should not only give us the facts, which is knowledge, but should show us the relation of these facts to each other, which is comprehension, and the respective importance and value of these different facts, which he described as per-

spective. This seems to me to be a most adequate definition (type of research which Professor Fisher will be called upon to out in his future career in this Institute.

VOTE OF THANKS TO THE CHAIRMAN

PROFESSOR ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE : I have the honour and ple of proposing, on behalf of Chatham House and of our guests her afternoon, a vote of thanks to Lord Cecil for his kindness in takii Chair at Professor Fisher's lecture.

Lord Cecil is one of three statesmen—the other two were Balfour and Lord Grey—who supported the Institute with their authority and experience from the moment when it was found Mr. Lionel Curtis during the Peace Conference of Paris in 1919.

To say that someone is a statesman is as much as to say that in the arena of political controversy. But there are two kin politician : one rather common and the other very rare. The coı kind is up to the ears all the time in the political dog-fight. Th kind is the statesman who is fighting the battle, not only of his po supporters, but also of his political opponents. With statesmen c rare second kind, their opponents know that, while they may temporarily on points of ways and means, the statesman is all the the champion of a cause which is, fundamentally, his opponents' too. Now, Lord Cecil is quite obviously a statesman of this To-day we cannot tell what is going to happen to the world into we have been born—whether it is going to succeed or fail in grap with its present difficulties. But we do know, I suggest, that, whe history of this generation—however this may have turned comes to be written hundreds of years hence, in a distant perspe Lord Cecil's work and life and character will be remember expressions of our generation's better and nobler self.

To-day Lord Cecil has come here to give his blessing to the esta ment of the first of the projected series of Chatham House Chai the study of different aspects of international life. It is the Cou hope that the establishment of the Price Chair of Interna Economics may be followed before long by that of a Chair of E Commonwealth Relations (which are, as you know, an integral of our field of work at Chatham House under the terms of our Cha And then we look forward—perhaps next in the series—to seeir establishment here of a Chair of International Law and Institutic

The foundation of the Price Chair, which Professor Fisher ha inaugurated in his lecture this afternoon, is particularly timely, be there is an important economic side to almost every aspect of our For instance, I myself am the first to benefit by Professor Fi arrival, because the first piece of work that he is taking up afte inaugural lecture is the writing of the economic chapters of our *S of International Affairs* for 1937. For the past seven years these been most ably written for us by Mr. Hodson, the Editor of the *F*

Table. But there is, of course, a technical advantage, which we cannot afford to neglect, in getting all our economic work done inside the house—especially when we have been short-handed on the economic side. Professor Fisher and I have some very able economists among our younger colleagues on the staff of Chatham House, and I know that these colleagues welcome, as I do, the very notable and effective reinforcement of our economic work through Professor Fisher's coming to join us.

This is also a reinforcement, in a more general way, to the research division of the staff of Chatham House. We have been reminded again this afternoon that the function, and the strength, of Chatham House is in providing facilities for co-operation, in disinterested study, between men of action and scholars. This happy and fruitful co-operation, which you see going on on a larger scale between the members of Chatham House and on the Council, is also reflected on a smaller scale in the relations between the different branches of the staff. This harmonious and intimate co-operation between the two kinds of workers is one of several reasons why, in my experience, Chatham House is such a stimulating place to work in.

But neither scholarly nor administrative work can be done without what Aristotle calls the *choregia*, which in British Parliamentary language means " supply." It is a very ancient English tradition that, for learned work, " supply " should be forthcoming from private sources. Every college at Cambridge and Oxford, Nuffield College last but not least, is a monument of this English way of doing this particular thing. We have not departed from the tradition at Chatham House; and when I tell my foreign colleagues that we do all that we do here without drawing a penny of public money, this is always the feature of Chatham House that they envy the most. But being too prudent to ask for public money—which the Treasury perhaps anyway would be slow to give—does not automatically bring private money into the Finance Committee's coffers. There are three people who have to collaborate in order to make our work possible, and you have all three in this room at this moment. You see before you the elder statesman and the expert; well, *there* is also the founder and benefactor. Let me be a pedant for a moment and put my point in classical terms—and as the author of *Civitas Dei* is present, I shall take care to use our Augustine's Punic pronunciation. If this hall in London were the theatre of Dionysus at Athens, and if you had been listening not to an English lecture but to a Greek play, then Lord Cecil in the Chair would be the Priest of Dionysus, and Professor Fisher would be the *Choryphæus*, but Sir Henry Price would be the *Choregus*; and without a *Choregus*, your Treasurer will tell you that you cannot have a play. So our gratitude is due, and is heartily forthcoming, to Sir Henry Price on this notable day in Chatham House's history.

The Proceedings then terminated

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN FRANCE[1]

THE HON. GEORGE PEEL

THERE are several reasons why we should attend to the economic situation in France to-day. Although in all technical aspects our two economic systems are completely different, we should notice that during the years since the War there has been a growing intercourse between them.

In the first place, in the great French crisis that ran from the opening of 1924 to the middle of 1926, our financiers came to the assistance of France. In the equally great crisis that occurred with us in 1931, the French financiers came to our assistance; and both in 1936 and in 1937, our bankers came to the assistance of French finance. Besides that, there has been the Tripartite Monetary Agreement which was made in September 1936, in which, for the first time in history, I think, the British Government expressed its interest and concern in French finance.

In the second place, turning from the purely fiscal side of that intercourse to its commercial side, one may notice that amid all the changes and chances that have operated upon commerce in the last few years, Great Britain is still the best client of France, if the imports and exports of France are taken as a whole. And, in the third place, owing to the circumstances of politics into which I do not propose to enter, the stability of France has become more valuable to ourselves in recent years. We must recognise that the stability of the Republic depends in the long run upon its economic stability. France in the past has been the scene of the two greatest administrations that the world has ever seen, that of the Cæsars, and that of the French monarchy. There is reason to think that both those administrations were destroyed on the soil of France by the bad fiscal policy which those governments pursued. That was why the sceptre of the Cæsars crumbled. That was why the axe of the guillotine fell.

My theme is that the economic situation of France is that of a nation whose fixed capital is well administered by the people, and whose floating capital is badly administered by the Government. It is with the latter that I propose to deal.

[1] Address given at Chatham House on November 18th, 1937; Mr. F. W. Hirst in the Chair.

The great thing to grasp in regard to the floating capital of France is the intense confusion, turmoil and effervescence that characterise it. During the last ten years only there have been four monies of account, four francs. In the first place, we started with the old franc that we all knew in our youth, the franc of *germinal*. It was called the franc of *germinal* because it was instituted in 1803 in the seventh month, as it so happened, of the revolutionary calendar. It was a silver franc, but, owing to the fact that France was a bi-metallic country and maintained a ratio between silver and gold at the rate of fifteen and a half of silver to one of gold, it became by that bi-metallic bridge a gold franc. In June 1928 that franc of *germinal* was superseded. It was cut down by very nearly four-fifths of its value and became the Poincaré franc. It was rated at 65·5 milligrams of gold. In the year 1936 it was disestablished and became the Auriol franc, so called from the name of the Finance Minister at that date. And that franc was rated at 49 milligrams of gold. In the swift current of events that franc was again disestablished in July last, and has become the Bonnet franc, so called from the name of the Finance Minister of France at that date. It is a very enigmatic franc, called the floating franc, and is officially rated in the accounts of the Bank of France at 43 milligrams of gold.

The confusion and turmoil in the floating capital of France extend to those who administer it; in the first place to the Bank of France. The Bank of France was founded in 1800 by the First Consul. Napoleon was extremely decisive on the point that it should be the function of the Bank of France to lend money at a fixed rate and at a low rate to all the people doing business in France. He wrote that in 1810 to his right-hand man, Mollien, and that policy was maintained entirely up till our own time. For instance, during the years 1900 to 1914 there were fourteen changes in the French Bank rate, as against seventy-five changes in the rate of the Bank of England. But in the year 1935 there were eleven changes in the French Bank rate, and in the year 1936 twelve. In the last few weeks of 1937, there have been three changes in the French Bank rate. I mention that because it is of importance as indicating the same point: the turmoil, the confusion, existing in the floating capital of France.

Now let us look at the same point from another point of view: the point of view of the national accounts. I noticed the other day that the Finance Minister of France said that he had balanced the Budget, and it was true. But it was not the whole truth; for he was referring, no doubt perfectly honestly, to the Ordinary

Budget of France. Besides the Ordinary Budget of France there are no less than seven annexed Budgets that circulate, so to speak, round the main Budget, and, in addition, there is the Extraordinary Budget—only they do not call it by that name now. And if you add up the expenditure for 1937 of the annexed Budgets and add on to it, as you are entitled to do, the expenditure of the Extraordinary Budget, those two expenditures come to 24 milliards. As the Ordinary Budget, as estimated for 1937, had 48 milliards of expenditure, you will see that no less than one half of the budgetary expenditure of France is outside the purview of the Ordinary Budget.

This complication is added to by the constant changes which occur in the form and technique of the Ordinary Budget. For instance, one year (*e.g.*, in 1922) they will put, on both sides of the Ordinary Budget, the expenses and receipts of the Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones, a very great expenditure. In the next year it comes out. Then they put it back. Again, from time immemorial the fiscal year of France has corresponded with the calendar year, ending in December. But in 1929, for no very strong reason, they decided to have a year of fifteen months, so that the year should end, not at December 31st, but at the end of March. Then, having had one year of fifteen months, and, next, two years running from April to April, they thought they would have a fiscal year of nine months. Since then they have gone back to the old fiscal year corresponding with the calendar year.

Then, look at the people who administer the floating capital of France, the Finance Ministers. We were very lucky in 1937: we had only two of them. But one year not long ago there were no less than six Ministers of Finance. And they are not exactly transient, embarrassed phantoms; they are transient but not embarrassed. I remember one of them was in office in December 1925 for eighteen days, but during that time he brought in eight important measures of finance. Though he was turned out at the end of the eighteen days, he managed to carry through Parliament one of the eight measures, a very remarkable achievement.

This has had the result of a constantly shifting economic legislation. Take only very recent years. M. Doumergue was in office in 1934. He was given the power by the French Parliament to pass Decree Laws on financial matters. He passed a little over a hundred Decree Laws. Next year M. Laval was in office, and he was given the same power. He was in from July 1935 to January 1936, not a very long time, but during that time he passed five hundred and forty-nine Decree Laws.

Take the year 1937. The existing Parliament gave M. Chautemps power for two months to pass laws on finance. And during that short time, July and August, he passed one hundred and seventeen laws on finance. Therefore there is an incredible confusion and chaos in the fiscal and economic legislation of France.

I have an official report made to the French Chamber in the year 1934, before all these new Decree Laws were passed, and the Reporter points out that there were then a hundred and twenty-eight categories of taxes in France, and that they were so badly arranged, so badly organised, that eighty of these categories of taxes practically yielded only a trifle. These eighty categories yielded altogether a milliard of taxes, while the remaining forty-eight yielded 39 milliards of taxes; surely, a very bad, wasteful and extravagant economic system. And he pointed out further that, owing to the pressure of the different interests in Parliament, there were four hundred exemptions for special interests in those taxation laws. Legislation is pitted, honeycombed, with exemptions for this interest or for that. Surely that is as bad and unwise a system as it could be.

I think therefore I have said enough to establish my first and very simple proposition, that chaos, confusion and effervescence exist in the floating capital of France and in the conduct of those who deal with it.

In the second place, what is the result of that confusion? It leads to the hoarding of this floating capital. The experts of the Bank of France, in a document which was presented not long ago to the Chamber, made an estimate of the amount of hoarding done by the French public. They calculated that there were 6 milliards of gold hoarded in France, 24 milliards hoarded outside, and 30 milliards of notes hoarded inside France. For this there are more reasons than one. In the first place, there is the habit of hoarding which is rooted in the French public; and, in the second place, for the small man to hoard gold in bars would be very difficult; it is very difficult for him to get hold of gold. And, in the third place, gold itself is sometimes in discredit. In the City, in some past months of 1937, people were going about saying that the day of gold was over, that the reign of gold was done. Well, if people think that, then they might as well hoard notes.

What is the result of this hoarding upon the economic situation of France? If gold is discredited, as it was during part of 1937, the holders will rush to get rid of their gold and buy francs. If, on the other hand, the franc is discredited, then francs will be

sold to avoid the coming disaster. Therefore, the fact of this hoarding adds to and accentuates the uncertainty in the French economic situation. There is a further repercussion: this uncertainty must oblige industry to borrow at fluctuating rates on short-term, and at exorbitant rates, on long-term. Industries want not only short-term money for their operations, but also long-term money. But in France they must borrow at fluctuating rates, because of the very uncertainty which I have mentioned as regards money. And they must borrow at exorbitant rates on long-term; for the lenders on long-term must charge high rates of interest in order to cover themselves against the uncertainty of the franc in the future.

What is the result of all this? When the great economic world crisis of 1929 broke, that crisis which has caused such untold misery and havoc in the world, France was able to withstand that havoc and that disaster for some years. This was owing partly to the prosperity that she had enjoyed after the War and partly to the very wise policy of Poincaré, who had ruled from the middle of 1926 up to the middle of 1929. But Poincaré retired just about the time that the great crisis of 1929 started, very unfortunately for France. Nevertheless, France withstood the impact of that crisis up to the opening of 1932. After that, she fell into the general decline. But, once having fallen, she was not able to share in the world recovery that occurred in 1935. She has not been able to share in it because she has been unsupported by a stable currency. Look for a moment, in order to verify these conclusions, at the impact upon her of recent events, first from the industrial, then from the commercial, and then from the fiscal, point of view.

The Finance Minister of France made a speech recently in which he said that the industrial production of France is twenty-five to thirty per cent. less than in 1929 and 1930. If you take the index number of the production of France for 1929 as one hundred, then to-day it is only about seventy-two or seventy-one, a very great fall. And that does not reveal the whole of the evil, because even that figure is being maintained by the great call for armaments.

Now let us look from production to commerce. French economists are very greatly perturbed by the adverse commercial balance against France. And it is running at the rate of about 18 milliards a year. I think one might say that 8 milliards of that can be satisfactorily accounted for by the receipts from tourists and by the receipts from the foreign investments of France. But

the remaining 10 milliards cannot be so accounted for, and must weigh very heavily upon the franc exchange. That very adverse trade balance is due to the want of productivity.

I have also looked at the trade of France from a different point of view. I have taken it not in values but in tons, and, to avoid too many figures, I have taken only one half of the characteristic exports of France, the manufactured articles. In the four years from 1927 to 1930 the average of tons of manufactured articles exported from France was 5,200,000 tons. In 1931 to 1935, when the great crisis began to impinge upon them, it was 3,200,000 tons, and in 1936, when the economic crisis was, you may say, doubled by a social crisis, it was only 2,400,000 tons. So that you see in that very short space of time such an old-established country as France has found that its most lucrative and most important source of revenue from commerce has been halved.

Let us turn from that to the fiscal field. The Finance Minister of France presented the following outlook for 1937. He pointed out that France would have to borrow in 1937 alone the sum of 36 milliards. There was the Budget deficit, which he estimated at 4 milliards. Then there were military and public works, the Pension Fund, and all that has to be paid to public undertakings, and so forth.

What is the cause of it? I have stated the fact; I have mentioned the results; but what is the cause? And here for a moment I must go back to history. After the war of 1870 France made a great effort to renew her power in the world, and she founded and acquired a great Colonial Empire. Whether this roused the rivalry or jealousy of Germany I do not know, and I will not inquire, but the fact was that Germany began to rearm. All this developed into what was known as the Armed Peace. These two factors ran side by side in the finance of France—the expensive acquisition of a Colonial Empire parallel with arming for some eventual war. The result was a profound disturbance that began in the finances of France.

The following three extracts provide corroboration of this. In the Annual Register of 1883 it is written:

> "France has the largest debt in the world, a growing rapidly and unmanageable floating debt, a constantly increasing expenditure, and on the whole a slackening yield of taxes and a recurring deficit of indefinably large amounts."

Ten years later the greatest authority on finance in the France of

those days, Paul Leroy-Beaulieu said in his *Science des Finances*, 1898:

"At no epoch have we witnessed a greater prodigality. We seem to wish to endow our democratic finances with all the vices of the *ancien régime*."

Ten years later again René Stourm in his work *The Budget 1908* said:

"Our Budgets are swollen by irregular undertakings, by overspent credits, by unconcealed waste and other abuses to which all the world is party."

To cut the matter short, if you analyse the Budget of 1913, the last before the War, you will find that forty-one per cent. already of the expenditure of France was for the Army, Navy, Colonies and Pension List of the Combatant Forces. The Armed Peace of Europe weighed on the finances of France more heavily than on those of any other people.

M. Caillaux, who as you know was Prime Minister of France and Finance Minister more than once, said in his work *Où va la France, où va l'Europe*:

"The Powers of Central and Eastern Europe, Germany above all, had railways which compensated for their debts, reducing them in fact almost to nothing. Of all the countries of the world France was the most heavily burdened."

That was the situation before the War. What happened during the War? I can summarise it all in two or three sentences. I quote the French economist, Charles Gide: "Taxation contributed practically nothing towards war expenses." And that is quite true. They had their Lancashire and their Yorkshire occupied and their men were at the front. Instead of taxing, they borrowed. So that the French Minister of Finance could write afterwards, looking back on the War: "The weight of debt which the war period directly bequeathed to us can be estimated at about 144 milliards."

Immediately after the War was over France was faced with the question of the reconstruction of the devastated areas, and she acted very rightly, I think, in determining to reconstruct them. Though it was a policy financially bold, it was fundamentally prudent; for, after all, there is no wealth but life. This reparation of the devastated areas was done on a very lavish and extravagant scale. France so acted on the plea that Germany was going to pay her reparations, and you know how much she got from Germany!

Immediately that borrowing was over, from 1927 up to date, she started rearmament on modern lines. She began the Maginot Line. In March 1935 this policy was much accentuated, when Germany tore up Part V of the Versailles Treaty and adopted conscription; and further still when, in March 1936, Germany entered the Rhineland. From that moment France felt that her first line of defence was gone. From that moment France felt in terms of the last message that the dying Poincaré issued to his countrymen as he pointed with his finger eastwards from his home in Lorraine: " Some day They will come again."

Thus the result was that when the Front Populaire, the most peacefully minded of Governments, came into power in June 1936, it at once embarked upon a very heavy extra programme of rearmament. What was the result from the opening of 1930 to 1936? It can be put in a single sentence. The National Debt of France rose from 264 milliards at the end of 1930 up to 370 milliards at the opening of 1937. As the Reporter of the Senate on the Budget of 1937 puts it:

" the progress of the public indebtedness has thus been extremely important and extremely rapid. It is quite clear that it is impossible to continue very long in this way. The charges of the public debt, whether due to the debt raised by loans or the debt due to pensioners of State, represent about fifty per cent. of the expenses of the Ordinary Budget."

During 1937 a very rapid and most expensive borrowing was again in process.

I think I have said enough to explain the profound causes of the instability of the floating capital of France. For forty, fifty, sixty years, the economic policy of France has been on a war footing. According to what the French statesmen themselves claim, the debt of France is, proportionately to the national revenue, the heaviest in the world.

Every one of you will have been saying by this time: " Why not remedy this by taxation? Let them pay. If they are patriotic, let them pay their taxes." The Revolutionary statesmen of the Constituent Assembly were very much opposed to indirect taxation. They were in favour of direct taxation. Of the 300 million of the Budget of 1792 240 million were direct taxation, a very large proportion. But when Napoleon came into power his views on finance were different. He was in favour of indirect taxation. The last Budget of Napoleon in 1813, which was his last full Budget, shows the arrangement completely turned round and two-thirds of that Budget was raised by indirect

taxation. The precepts of Napoleon were obeyed in that respect right up into our own time. So that during practically the whole of the nineteenth century up to 1914 nothing was done as regards direct taxation.

The Budget, not of 1813, but of 1913, shows that the direct taxes of France were only nineteen per cent. of the total tax revenue, a very small proportion compared with the ratio of direct taxation in the Budget of Great Britain at the same date, which was forty-eight per cent. When the War broke out, the direct taxation of France was wholly out of contact with the living realities of the wealth of France.

Some French statesmen thought that a very dangerous situation, and they determined to introduce an income tax. For thirty years before 1914 they fought the matter, and it was only five days before the War broke out in 1914 that they passed the income tax. Even so, it was such a lop-sided and ham-strung measure that it had no effect at all until 1917.

In his work published in 1937 on the *Public Finances of France*, the Professor of Economics at Nancy writes these words :

> " We need only consult our fiscal statistics to convince ourselves of the reality and the scale of fraud in connection with this tax [he is speaking of the *impôt général sur le revenu*]. Owing to fraud, equality in taxation no longer exists."

I will not burden you with the figures of the whole income tax, but let us take only the figures of the *impôt général sur le revenu*, which corresponds to our super-tax or sur-tax. In 1929 that tax yielded 2·7 milliards, and the extraordinary thing is that, with France hard-pressed for revenue all that time, the yield of that *impôt général* has fallen every year with the exception of one year when, owing to some incident, it was slightly increased. From 2·7 milliards in 1929 it fell practically regularly until in 1936, the last complete year, it only yielded 1·3 milliard, or less than half the figure of 1929, although the franc had been cut down in 1936.

To deal with all the schedules of the income tax would take too long, but I will take as example the schedule of revenue from securities. The French Minister of Finance wrote on this matter a few years ago :

> " No one can doubt but that a very important part of the revenues arising from securities escapes the general income tax. It is certain that the escape of large revenues derived from securities opens up a very wide breach in the assessment of our taxes and withdraws an important part of our wealth from its fiscal obligations."

Let us look now at the Budget estimates for the year 1938. The total revenue to be levied in France in 1938 is 53 milliards, and of that 45 milliards are tax revenue. Yet of that, in spite of the tremendous pressure upon the French people, twenty per cent. only is direct taxes: compare that with Great Britain, where the ratio of direct taxes to total tax revenue is fifty-four per cent.

But, you may say, if you cannot get your direct taxes paid, cannot you increase indirect taxation? My answer to that is that indirect taxation in France is extremely heavy. Consider the Customs revenue yield, 9 milliards, more than the whole of the direct taxes of France. Further, there is the tax on production, another indirect tax, which yields 9 milliards, again more than the whole of the direct taxation of France. Therefore, I think it extremely hard to see how indirect taxation can be raised any further.

Then, everybody will say, remedy the matter by reducing expenditure. That is obvious. The total of the expenditure of France in the Budget of 1938 is 52 milliards. But if you analyse that expenditure in the Ordinary Budget you find that of that 52 milliards, 11 milliards is for military purposes. Now, besides that, there is the charge on the debt which you cannot cut down, and which is in itself really a charge in respect of wars past, present, and to come. Take also into account the military expenditure in the Extraordinary Budget. That comes to another 11 milliards. Therefore you have got the debt charge, the military expenses in the Ordinary Budget, and the charges for rearmament in the Extraordinary Budget. All this comes to a total of 46 milliards. Therefore, if you take the total of expenditure in France of the Ordinary Budget, 52 milliards, and the Extraordinary Budget, 26 milliards, you get a total 78 milliards, out of which 42 milliards is in respect of war or armaments. How can you expect very much reduction in the remaining 32 milliards now devoted to the civil expenses of France?

Nevertheless, although all that is true, a great attempt has been made in recent years to cut down expenses. The Governments of 1932–36 have tried it. I have an official report of the Chamber which says that during those years, 1932–36, the effort was so considerable that wages and salaries in France were cut down by thirty per cent., a great deal of it being Government expenditure. But the remarkable thing is that, if you turn at the same time to those years of French expenditure, you find that every year there was a heavy deficit on the Ordinary Budget, and that, besides this, in the Extraordinary Budget there was huge ex-

penditure too. Therefore, at the same time that the French Government was practising deflation, inflation was going on to the extent that the national debt increased by over 100 milliards. So, though it seems extraordinary in the case of so logical a people, they were practising deflation and inflation at the same time.

This has had the most momentous consequences. At first, deflation, aided by the general deflationary tendencies of the world, the fall of prices during those years, was the dominant fact, and the cost of living, retail prices, fell heavily. There was no trouble. People got less wages, but the cost of living was falling step by step, the fall, at least in the retail index, being twenty-four per cent. Now came the turning point. In the middle of 1935, just as the deflationary policy was coming to its apogee with Laval, inflation began to have its effect, and the prices in the retail index began to rise. The following figures verify that. Taking the retail index of 1914 as 100, at the opening of 1932 it was 560, mainly because of the Poincaré franc. Then there was a great fall to the middle of 1935, and then a rise began. It has gone up since then to 642. So that what was happening from the end of 1935 up to the beginning of 1936 was that the workmen of France were caught in a cleft stick. They found their wages and salaries falling in nominal amount and simultaneously the cost of living rising. That fact, I think, more than the activities of Moscow, was the reason for that great revolutionary, or semi-revolutionary, movement that swept into power, and justified the entry into power, of the Front Populaire at the elections of May 1936.

M. Blum thus became the new Prime Minister, at the head of a Government quite unparalleled in the history of France. For it was composed of Radical Socialists, Socialists and Communists. M. Blum was confronted with a terrible situation. France was on the verge of an explosion, and he took action which was well justified. He determined to raise the wages of the people according to the theory of the extension of purchasing power, as it was called. It is very difficult to ascertain by how much he has raised wages. I have got three estimates. One of them says he raised them by forty per cent., one says thirty per cent. and another says thirty-five per cent. It is difficult to decide. Unfortunately his act was nullified by another economic fact, namely that during the course of the Blum Government from June 1936 to June 1937, as the nominal amount of the wages rose, so step by step did there rise the cost of living. And the cost of living is estimated to have risen by thirty per cent., so that, unless the workers of France got more than thirty per cent. increased wages, it was eaten up by the

rise in the cost of living. And there was another factor, the forty-hour week. I see Mr. F. R. S. Balfour, and he and I are associated with an organisation which has shown its sympathy with this movement by introducing a five-day week—that is to say, no work on Saturday. The hours of those workmen have been reduced from forty-seven hours to forty-five hours in the week—that is to say, nine hours' work daily for five days a week. But I think Mr. Balfour will agree with me that it is impossible to conduct modern industry on the basis of a forty-hour week. I have just seen an expert examination of the matter in *L'Europe Nouvelle*. It is stated that "in reality, French industry cannot work at an average of forty hours, since the forty hours are a maximum and the average is necessarily lower." After all, in order to secure and fortify and stabilise a rise in wages, there must be in the long run an increase in production. Unfortunately the forty-hour week has in some cases created great disorganisation in industry, with the result that instead of absorbing all the unemployed, as M. Blum hoped, it has not done so. Half the industries of France are in small units of about a hundred workers each, and therefore you cannot get extra expert labour easily. So this has disorganised for the moment, but I hope not permanently, the industries of France.

Since M. Blum has gone, the Chautemps Government have made a gallant attempt to right matters. Whereas M. Blum did not pay sufficient attention to finance, the Ministry of M. Chautemps is paying great attention to that aspect of affairs. They have imposed extra taxation, and so forth, and they hope to balance, as I have explained, the Budget of 1938. But they cannot balance the Extraordinary Budget, which remains outside their power of taxation, with the final result that in the future, though the Ordinary Budget may be balanced, I am afraid that 26 milliards still remain to be borrowed by the French Government. True, 4 milliards of that is to be met by the Sinking Fund, but the burden is still very heavy.

Behind all the veil of the technicalities and the jargon of economics, behind the flux and reflux of fiscal affairs, are we witnessing a great new movement in France? Are we witnessing the fact that France is on the way to becoming economically an autarkic State? I will confine myself to putting the arguments on each side. In the first place the Socialists and the Communists form two-thirds of the Front Populaire, and outside of them there is the General Confederation of Labour, an extra-

Parliamentary body with five million adherents, who aim at the socialisation of industry, insurances, and the banks and so forth. In the next place, let me point, as tending towards Socialism, to this policy of the Decree Laws. As the *Société d'Information Économique* puts it: "The flood of Socialism has been carrying the Government of France down-stream without intermission since the War. The Decree Laws of 1935 have substituted the arbitration of the State for the respect of contracts freely concluded between individuals. The Decree Laws in a certain measure have done the work of Socialism." Then, besides this, one sees the action that the State has recently taken in fixing the price of wheat, and in taking the Bank of France really under State control. Finally, in favour of the same argument, if war is dominant in French economics, that leads, naturally, towards the autarkic State.

But, on the other hand, the policy of these Socialists and Communists has been the increase of purchasing power. That seems to me not to be socialism, but individualism. And, besides that, the industrial units employing less than one hundred workers, and the peasants too, a very considerable element, are not disposed for control. Then there is the immense resistance of the taxpayers to taxation, as indicating the enormous strength of individualism in France. Finally, will people be willing to accord unlimited State powers to such statesmen as have governed their finances hitherto? All this is for the future.

The situation is that an industrial system of high efficiency is compromised and undermined by a political system of the opposite character. Economists cannot fail to watch with immense interest the inestimable experiences they will gather from the evolution of French economics. Statesmen will watch with more bated breath the stability, or otherwise, of the Republic, knowing that in this is involved the last hope of European freedom. Finally, the scholar, untouched by these high considerations of science or of statesmanship, will extend to France his humble meed of admiration still, as to one who is the intellectual heiress of the Cæsars and is our last living link with the Athenian mind.

Summary of Discussion.

MR. F. W. HIRST (*in the chair*): If we go back to 1837 and examine the intervening century we shall find few statesmen or rulers either at home or abroad who have shown genius or even exceptional talents in the region of public finance, or even of political economy, and still fewer who have used those exceptional talents for the benefit of their

fellow-countrymen or the greatest happiness of the greatest number. But our own otherwise humdrum record at the Exchequer is redeemed in public finance by three great men, remarkable alike in their capacity and their achievements, Peel, Cobden and Gladstone. The first, Sir Robert Peel, was in a sense a pupil of Cobden, and in a much greater sense the predecessor of Gladstone. From Cobden, and also from experience, Sir Robert Peel learned the science of political economy and the laws of exchange. To Gladstone he taught the art and duty of enforcing economy on all the spending departments of government. From that sprang the strict control of the Treasury and the Audit, which has made our Budget a model for the world.

My friend, Mr. George Peel, his grandson, has inherited not only Sir Robert's flair for finance, but his practical sagacity and economic grip of realities; and he has applied himself with as much earnestness to the embarrassments of France as Sir Robert Peel in the 'forties devoted himself to our own. I remember it was said that the great Whig Chancellor who preceded Peel was sitting on an empty chest by the pool of bottomless deficiency, fishing for a budget. Now Mr. Peel has elucidated the mysteries of the French Budgets with all their seen and unseen complications. His books have solved many riddles. They have exposed many sleek illusions and plausible sophistries.

Mr. George Peel is the first authority and the trustiest guide to a very difficult and important subject. An understanding of it provides one of the master-keys to the great problems of how peace, security and prosperity can be restored to Europe.

The only remedy, which is perfectly open to the French, is to do as they did in 1860 when they came to terms with England through the Gladstone–Cobden Treaty with Napoleon III. That treaty of commercial reciprocity was completely effective. Both countries reduced their navies and gave up the idea of going to war with one another. Lord Palmerston was so certain that the French would invade England that he insisted on fortifying the south coast. Meanwhile Gladstone and Cobden made the treaty. Now, or within the next year or two, the best solution of the present problem will be for the French to make a treaty of a similar kind with Germany in which England and possibly the United States ought to take a share.

BARON D'ERLANGER said that it had rarely been his privilege to read a book on political economy as instructive and as lucid as *The Economic Policy of France* by the lecturer. Though a staunch friend of France as the speaker was himself, and indeed because he was such a friend, he had had the courage to make it plain that he took a critical view of the fiscal system in France and her financial situation. He had explained very fully the causes of the French Government's financial embarrassment, taking very great care to distinguish between those causes over which the Government had no control and those

which could be attributed to the defective administration of the public purse.

The present French crisis was defined by most politicians as a *crise de confiance*, but credit was not only a question of confidence, but also of well-placed confidence, and well-placed confidence meant well-deserved confidence, and the elements of that well-placed confidence were totally lacking at the present moment. Indeed, it was to be feared that if the financial and fiscal matters of France were allowed to drift on in their present course the position would worsen and the franc fall to even lower levels. Some of those elements in which confidence should be based and which were at present lacking were within the sole power of France herself to create. There were, however, others, and to the "others" he would apply the old adage that it took two to make a bargain. In speaking of those elements of which France was the sole potential creator he meant, of course, the field of home politics. This was dangerous ground for any foreigner, but it seemed inconceivable to the speaker how any government could carry out a programme of important reforms if it were not sure of a sufficiently long term of office to carry these out, if it were threatened from the very outset, and throughout its precarious existence was fighting for respite, instead of applying its time to the solution of the great problems with which it was confronted. Reform of the Constitution which would involve a general election simultaneously with the fall of the Ministry seemed one of the simplest and surest ways of establishing a more stable government and a better means of administration than plenary or exceptional powers granted for a very limited time which induced an insecure Premier to issue post-haste some five hundred decrees within his very short life. Given time and freed from petty political strife, he thought that the heads of government could work out a complete fiscal reform, abolishing in the fiscal system at present existing a multitude of incidental taxation which paralysed the development of trade and industry. They would thus reap a much richer harvest from direct taxation than they could ever hope to glean with the present confused state of finance and the impoverished condition of the country.

As to the other element of well-planned confidence, it could be found in the field of foreign politics. While an unbeliever himself in what was termed collective security, the speaker ventured to consider close understanding, entente cordiale or whatever it might be called, between England and France essential to the security of both countries. But for many years he had never lost an opportunity of telling his friends on the other side of the Channel that the very best security for this would lie, could it be achieved, in a true and lasting reconciliation and understanding with Germany. And what applied to France applied to England, if, and only if, the reconciliation and understanding applied to the three countries simultaneously. That was why he had said that it took two to make a bargain, because he took pleasure and pride in considering France and England jointly to be one party in

the two-party bargain to be struck. He fully realised the difficulties inherent in such an achievement, which had been increased rather than decreased by the efflux of time since the Great War, by opportunities which had been not only missed but completely ignored; but why not try even at this eleventh hour, and why despair of success? With stability in home politics and sound indispensable reform in the fiscal system and, if possible, security and peace, not solely due to preparedness against attack but to better understanding, France would rise in a bound from its present depression to a state of prosperity greater than it had ever known, and it was the speaker's ardent wish to live long enough to see that hour.

COMMANDER ROSS said that he was not an economist, but had been to France every year for the last twelve years and spoken with men and women all over the country, and had always been struck by the lack of confidence in the administration and in the integrity of the Civil Service. Nearly all of them, hotel-keepers, peasants, all classes, thought it a merit to swindle the income tax because of the lack of integrity in the administration. Most people seemed to think a reform of the governmental machine was necessary and to deplore the swift succession of incompetent governments.

QUESTION: Was exchange control likely in France within the next six months, and if so what would its effect be?

SIR CECIL KISCH said that, in common with the first speaker, he had read the lecturer's book with intense interest and gratitude. Mr. Peel had shown himself, though critical, extraordinarily sympathetic with the difficulties of the French.

When M. Blum came to power a serious mistake, so it seemed, had been made. That was the time when devaluation ought to have been carried out, because the social policy adopted was bound to raise costs in France, and this increased the difficulty of handling the budget deficit at the then value of the franc. But at that time M. Blum had been faced with the danger of violent outbreaks in France, and as both parties in the election had plastered "No devaluation" on their banners, he could not for political reasons take the course which on economic grounds was required. The jump of the franc to the intermediate stage of the "Auriol" franc seemed a mistake from an economic point of view. But the French had had the idea of a fixed gold value for so long that a transition at that time to a floating franc would perhaps have produced a greater disturbance than transition to another gold value which had proved eventually to be impossible to maintain. Now, however, there was a floating franc, and this was the elastic factor in the adjustment of taxation to the requirements of the budget. Indirect taxation in excess laid the burden unevenly upon the people, and was bound to cause discontent. If there were not an adequate scale of direct taxation, nature would effect this in another

way by imposing a levy on capital through a reduction in the value of the franc. Unless measures were taken to clear up the present situation, economic laws would take a hand sooner or later.

The speaker did not think that the French would be driven to autarky, for this reason, that the autarkic system was not a monetary system at all. It was a police system, putting shackles on trade in all directions. People had to be threatened with concentration camps, etc., if they evaded the exchange regulations, and the French character would not stand for that, and that was a good thing, because France and Great Britain, so far as the Great Powers in Europe were concerned, were the chief upholders of a free exchange system. It had been seen that every country which went in for an autarkic system had to suffer a diminution in its volume of trade in relation to the increase outside the autarkic areas. For instance, the growth in trade recovery in the British Empire had been out of all proportion to that achieved by the autarkic States of Italy and Germany, where capital levies, open or disguised, and restrictions of all sorts were necessary.

There were really some hopeful signs. In the first place, the reduction of the franc from seventy-five to a hundred and fifty in twelve months had brought prices and costs of production into a relation where business could make profits. There was increased activity in many directions. In the Bank of France returns just issued it could be seen that a substantial amount of gold had returned, the equivalent of approximately £20 million sterling. It could be seen that the French were overcoming the excess of their own logic. For instance, on coming to power, M. Blum's Government had decided, quite logically and in accordance with the spirit of the time, that exporters of capital from France should not be allowed to make profits from their action in "bearing" the franc, but such a policy, though right morally, was not practically enforcible. Now that people saw that the franc had reached a more durable basis after a considerable reduction in value, they were becoming more confident and bringing home their foreign funds. As capital returned it would be found that money rates would cheapen and that the securities of the French Government, which already showed a certain rise, would rise still further. Moreover, with a cheaper franc the exports of the country should be substantially stimulated, if an undue rise in internal costs could be avoided by some modification of the forty-hour week policy and by other measures for increasing production.

MR. JOSEPH NISSIM said that he thought death duties in France were very heavy. With regard to direct taxation, they had the turn-over tax already mentioned, and that was something in the nature of direct taxation. When there was a large turn-over tax it was very difficult to obtain much from income tax. Again, in this connection there was conscription in France, and in their two years of service these young men contributed in monetary value something like several million pounds, say two hundred pounds a man. This should

be considered. Then agriculture was let off very lightly, and the peasants in France were extremely well treated, which must redound to the strength of the country, whether in peace or in war. This could be seen when it was contrasted with the state of agriculture in England, due to English death duties, which bled the country white in many respects. The speaker said that it had never been his good fortune to listen to a more valuable appreciation of the position of France from a financial and budgetary point of view.

QUESTION: Was the French fiscal machine capable of administering efficiently a complicated system of direct taxation such as existed in Great Britain?

THE HON. GEORGE PEEL said that the fourth speaker had answered very fully the question about exchange control. It really amounted to control of trade, and the French Government and Opposition were absolutely opposed to it on these grounds.

The amount of local debts had been rising very fast, and now amounted to 40 milliards, a very large ultimate responsibility for the French Government. Again, with regard to the measure of the weight of taxation in France this must be taken relatively to its national income. In 1923 the British revenue of taxes to the national income had been 18·8 per cent.; and the figure was arrived at by taking the national income of that date at 3,800 million sterling, taxed revenue at about 780 million. In France in the same year there was 20·5 milliards net revenue of taxes, and the national income at that date recorded by the French Government was 125 milliards a year. Therefore the ratio of national taxation to national income in France was sixteen per cent., while the same ratio in Great Britain was 18·8 per cent. This showed that France was not as lightly taxed relatively to the national income as might be thought, because the national income of France was far smaller than that of England. *The Economist* of January 1935 said that the French burden of taxation was rising to, if it had not already equalled, that of Great Britain. According to a recent speech of M. Bonnet, the lecturer thought that the national income of France must have fallen in recent years by about twenty per cent. Certainly the productivity of France had been going down. At the same time the French taxes had been rising. So that now it was probable that the ratio of taxation to national income must be considerably more, something like the ratio of twenty per cent. The whole point was that France was not lightly taxed but was not taxed rightly.

With regard to the French Civil Service, the lecturer thought that they might be much fewer than at present, and those who did stay on might be much better paid. Most of them were now paid the miserable sum of a hundred pounds a year, or less. However, a real remedy as regards taxation could be taken from his grandfather, Sir Robert Peel, who, when he had come into office in 1841 and found an enormous mass of indirect taxes yielding very little, seven hundred and sixty-nine

taxes, had abolished them or reduced them enormously or amalgamated them, and by so doing greatly increased the revenue from Customs. He had simplified the economic expenditure and raised the revenue. Some such method might be employed in France.

Concerning direct taxation, ever since the revolution the French had based this upon *les signes extérieurs*, or what a man seemed to have. This was now abolished regarding the French Government taxes, but was kept on regarding local taxes. Under that system, bad as it might have been, they had obtained nineteen per cent. of their tax revenue. The French people would not have affidavits or assessments, and in this case there was no alternative but to charge a man according to the amount of his apparent wealth. The lecturer thought that it was conceivable that some such system might be reintroduced successfully. For, as the first speaker had said, it really was not fit that so great a country should pay so small an amount in direct taxation, or some system could be found as had been found in Great Britain.

It had been asked whether the French fiscal system would be capable of measures of direct taxation. It must be remembered that in England this had been a very slow process. At one time it had been so unpopular that the House of Commons had decided to burn all the returns, so that when Sir Robert Peel had come to power he had to start anew. It had taken a long time to build up the present system of taxation, and in France it had only been started in 1914, and then had come the War. But there was no reason why the French, who were fully as clever a people as the British, should not be able to evolve a system of direct taxation.

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE LEAGUE[1]

By Sir John Fischer Williams, C.B.E., K.C.

I propose to attempt to examine the nature of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the League itself, and then to consider what are the obligations of Great Britain under the Covenant.

The questions which emerge from a consideration of the nature and provisions of the instrument which constitutes the League are not quite as simple as might at first appear. A lawyer is only too well aware how often documents, even those which at first sight may appear to be of great simplicity, raise difficult questions of interpretation, especially when the circumstances in which they were executed have undergone considerable change. It is not always easy to answer the question whether a particular interpretation is right or wrong. Indeed, discussion may continue almost indefinitely, especially in a case where there is little probability of an appeal to final authority with power to give a final decision. A practising lawyer, when asked to interpret a document, can only express his opinion as to how the instrument will strike the minds of other lawyers and, in particular, lawyers who hold a judicial position. He has, therefore, to make a guess as to how other minds will approach the question which he is asked to solve. When the document is an ordinary document of private law—a commercial contract or the will of a testator—it is always possible to bring a legal opinion to the test of a decision of a court. But in the case of the Covenant of the League it is much more difficult to do this, and indeed it is highly probable that some of the most important questions which arise under the Covenant will never be submitted to the authoritative decision of a court, not even to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague; nor would a decision of that Court necessarily set the matter at rest, for it is always open to the Court not to follow a previous decision; like the Supreme Court of the United States, it may give a later decision which reverses one that is earlier.

[1] Address at Chatham House on December 14th, 1937, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Edward Grigg, K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., D.S.O., M.C., M.P., in the chair.

Again, this is not the only point in which the practical conditions for the interpretation and utilisation of an international document differ from those which obtain in domestic affairs. In international matters there is not available the resource of an appeal to a legislature when the ultimate court of law produces an unsatisfactory decision. In our recent history the legislature has more than once intervened to alter the law in cases where a decision of the House of Lords in its judicial capacity has given a result which has not been acceptable to the great mass of public opinion. The world has, however, no international legislature, so the final settlement of a disputed international point by a legislative act is not a possibility.

I can therefore claim no sort of finality for the conclusions which I submit and, if anyone does not agree with me, it will not be possible to find a convincing solution. Still, argument and discussion may help towards producing a general consensus of opinion which is not likely to be disturbed, and it is highly desirable to arrive at such a general consensus. It is of the first importance that in the guidance of our policy we should be clear at any rate as to our own opinion of what our international obligations are.

On this subject the beginning of wisdom in my judgment is firmly to grasp the principle that the Covenant of the League is not merely a " treaty " in the sense in which that word is most commonly used, not, that is, a contractual arrangement, or a settlement of rights and claims as between existing States, but is an instrument intended to last for all time, and to found a permanent political institution. " Covenant," indeed, is not a term which completely fits the instrument to which it is here applied. The Covenant of the League was a creative document. It made a new thing. It was not merely the expression of the rights and obligations of a number of contracting Powers. It made a new entity, what an international lawyer calls " an international person," and to this person it gave the name of the League of Nations. The League is something distinct from the States which combine to form it. It is a being with rights and duties of its own, which are not the rights and duties of any one or more of the States which combine to make it. This is indeed indicated with greater clearness in the French text of the Covenant than in the English text. According to the French text of the Covenant the high contracting parties " adopt the present pact which institutes the League of Nations" (*adoptent le présent Pacte qui institue la Société des Nations*). This is a more accurate

description of what the Covenant does than the balder English text, according to which the high contracting parties simply " agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations." It may be thought that this is a mere lawyers' refinement, but in very truth and fact it is something more. It brings the Covenant up into the class of instruments of which the most conspicuous and admired member is the Constitution of the United States of America. That great instrument, no doubt, was a compact; Jefferson and Madison said so in the Resolutions which they drew up for the Legislatures of Virginia and Kentucky in 1798.[1] But the term " compact " was far from being an exhaustive or adequate description of the Constitution of the United States. Chief Justice Marshall emphasised the other aspect of the Constitution. He called it " a creation intended to endure for ages to come and consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." [2] Chief Justice Chase, in a later generation, proclaimed the view now triumphant that the admission of a State to the Union is " something more than a compact." [3] Just so the Covenant of the League is something more, something intended to be perpetual, and I would add, taking the language of Chief Justice Marshall, something which, as being perpetual, is " consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." The Covenant, in fact, is the constitution of a new creature in the international world. The " General Association of Nations," which according to the last of President Wilson's Fourteen Points had to be formed, is something with a life of its own, I hope we may say with an immortality of its own; it has a " constitution " which is not merely a contractual obligation between a number of existing States. And a " constitution " is not exposed to all the accidents of a contract. A part, even an important part, of a constitution may be violated or not observed or not enforceable, but this does not mean that the constitution has ceased to be in force or that the international body of which it is the creator exists no longer.

Of course, there is nothing new or anomalous in the creation of a social or political entity upon the foundation of a contract. Philosophers of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries—and they were not alone in their views—conceived society as originating in a contract. The Hebrews, and some Scottish

[1] See *The Supreme Court and the National Will* by Dean Alphange (1937, London, Hodder & Stoughton), pp. 33–34. For all the American references the lecturer is indebted to this valuable work.

[2] *Cohens* v. *Virginia.* 6 Wheaton 264 (1821).

[3] *Texas* v. *White.* 7 Wallace 700 (1869).

and other theologians, made of a covenant of Man with his Maker a fundamental element of religion. And if a contract or covenant may legitimately be conceived as being the root of human society, though I suppose no one now thinks that this is where the origin of society is as a matter of history to be found, surely a contract may be made the basis for the constitution of an entity or personality which is to play its part in the international world. When a body corporate is to be formed in English law, the authority of the State or of the Crown is needed as well as the agreement of those who mean to be members of the new body. We have at present in international matters no " Crown " and no universal State, and therefore the creation of a new body corporate must find its basis, as the United States found it, in the agreement of the States and the peoples which establish the new body, and in nothing more. There is, indeed, nothing else.

Now, upon what do I rely when I make this seemingly rather dogmatic statement and call the League a separate and independent international body? Partly I rely upon the Articles of the Covenant itself. The League has what is called an " action" (Article 2); it has servants, in the shape of the Secretariat (Article 6); and it has a seat (Article 7). Changes of membership do not affect its existence. New Members may be admitted (Article 1). Old Members may be expelled (Article 16 (4)). But these changes of membership do not affect the corporate existence of the League. No new League is made when Germany comes in or goes out. The League has agents—they are called " mandatories " (Article 22). It has the direction of international bureaux (Article 24).

And when we pass from the Articles themselves, and see how the outside world looks at the League, we find the British Official Commentary calling the League " a living organism," and the French Government on more than one occasion speaking of the " property of the League of Nations." The Swiss Government, too, officially recognises this international personality, and so, I believe, does the Canton of Geneva, for the League, as I understand it, is the formal registered owner of its own premises in that city. More than this, the League is a " trustee " ; Article 49 of the Treaty of Versailles uses this expression to define the nature of its action in respect to the government of the basin of the Saar. Another Article of the same Treaty makes the League the protector of Danzig. In fact, it is not too much to say that while there may have been doubts as to the limits of the functions and capacities of the League, or as to the exact title which should

describe its nature, there has been a general recognition that the Covenant of the League created something new in the international world, something with rights and duties of its own; the Covenant of the League is a document which expresses the outlines at any rate of a constitution.

For myself, I would go further, and say that the League so instituted is not limited to the thing created by the first twenty-six Articles of the Treaty of Versailles and, what is remarkable, three other of the Treaties which put an end to the Great War—those of St. Germain, Trianon and Neuilly.[1] The League has, if not as a part of itself, at any rate as something very closely connected with itself, the institution known as the International Labour Office, an institution of international character whose activities may well prove in time to be not the least important element in the international work centred at Geneva.

I have said that this is not a mere lawyers' technicality; not only, as I have already indicated, does it mean that the League is independent of the fortunes of particular nations and possesses a kind of immortality, but it also has an important bearing on the method by which the Articles of the Covenant have to be interpreted in international law. The Covenant, if it is a Constitution, must be interpreted in the spirit in which the great judges of the Supreme Court of the United States have interpreted the provisions of the American Constitution. Such constitutional provisions are something more than bargains between contracting persons. They are not simply contractual arrangements made once for all and to last for all time. The question is often raised in international law as to the existence or, at any rate, the limitations, of the doctrine of what is known as the clause as to existing conditions, *clausula rebus sic stantibus*, the doctrine that contractual obligations hold good only so long as the governing conditions of the situation in which they were incurred, and to which they are related, remain substantially unchanged. Some

[1] Is it not a strange thing that the States which, by their ratification of the Treaty of Versailles on January 10th, 1920, brought the League into existence, should have treated themselves some months later at other suburbs of Paris as again bringing the same League into being, and this by the use of language which does not in every respect bear exactly the same meaning? Thus " this present Treaty " (Article 5) is not the same thing in all the four versions of the Covenant. Nor are all the statements contained in these versions of the Covenant strictly accurate at the present day. Thus the statement in Article 4 of the Covenant that the Council and the League shall consist of—" se compose de "—representatives of the " Principal Allied and Associated Powers " is not now true. The United States contributes no such representative. See Kelsen on *The Separation of the Covenant of the League of Nations from the Peace Treaties*. (Publication of the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies.)

commentators have claimed to see in this doctrine merely an attempt to escape from contractual obligations which ought to be observed. I do not share that view. In truth, such a doctrine is an essential element in the application of all obligations which are intended to be perpetual in point of time. Lawyers such as Sir Frederick Pollock, following the teaching of philosophers such as Spinoza and publicists such as John Stuart Mill, have recognised the doctrine, that " it seems impossible " on any political or ethical principles whatever to lay down as an absolute proposition that the obligation of treaties is perpetual. " Whence," says Sir Frederick, " can governments derive the right of binding their subjects and successors for all time by improvident undertakings? " [1] And if this doctrine of progressive adjustment is true of a treaty, it is *a fortiori* true of a constitution, abundantly true of an unwritten constitution such as our own, and true also of written constitutions such as that of the United States. Indeed, I may say that doctrine is true even of contracts between individuals; not very long ago our own legislature gave it a blessing when it allowed the modification of plans of the lay-out of a district under a building scheme, in cases where the conditions of the neighbourhood have undergone such a change as to make the scheme inapplicable.

Now it is certainly presumptuous for an English lawyer to discuss the interpretation of the Constitution of the United States by the Supreme Court of the great Republic. It appears to me, nevertheless, that there is to be found in the interpretation which has been given to the American Constitution the translation into actual practice, on a nation-wide scale, of something akin to the doctrine that written instruments which are intended to endure in perpetuity or for a very long period of years, must, in so far as they are contractual in nature, be interpreted as binding in a literal sense in relation to any particular subject-matter only so long as the subject-matter itself retains the same general nature as that which it possessed when the instrument was made. Great lawyers of the United States have interpreted, and by interpretation have moulded, the Constitution of the United States. Nothing is further from the fact (although you find contrary opinions often expressed at the present time) than the belief that the Supreme Court of the United States has been consistently rigid and formalist in its handling of the constitutional question. Chief Justice Marshall (to go back to early years) inspired by, or sympathising with, Alexander Hamilton,

[1] Pollock, *Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy.* 2nd Ed., 1899, London, p. 307.

"advocated (I am quoting from a recent American writer of authority) [1] what he called a loose construction of the Constitution." "The Constitution," says the same authority, "has proved an exceptionally flexible instrument of government due to a continuous process of amendment by political usage and judicial interpretation." The judges have not treated the Constitution merely as a contract, the meaning of which has to be sought in the intentions of the contracting parties at the time when the contract was made. They have sought to find in its language the expression of a spirit which should illuminate the path of approach to new problems of which the original parties to the Constitution were wholly unaware. Already in 1816 a great judge, Mr. Justice Story, said of the Constitution that it was "an instrument not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years, but was to endure through a long lapse of ages, the needs of which were locked up in the inscrutable purposes of Providence." [2] More than a hundred years later the same thought emerges (I do not mean to say that it had sunk under water in the interval) in a judgment of Mr. Justice Holmes. "When," says Mr. Justice Holmes,[3] "we are dealing with words that also are a constitutional act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realise that they have called into life a being, the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realise or hope that they had created an organism: it has taken a century, and has cost their successors much sweat and blood, to prove that they have created a nation." And only about four years ago Chief Justice Hughes of the United States expressed in these words the conclusion by which he turned the flank of the constitutional prohibition of legislation by the individual States impairing the obligation of contracts and pronounced just such legislation valid under the conditions of the modern world:

"It is manifest from this review of our decisions (says the Chief Justice) that there has been a growing appreciation of public needs and of the necessity of finding grounds for a rational compromise between individual rights and public welfare. . . . Where in earlier days it was thought that only the concerns of individuals or of classes were involved and that those of the State itself were touched only remotely, it has later been found that the fundamental interests of the State are directly affected; and that the question is no longer merely that of one party

[1] Dean Alphange, *op. cit.*

[2] *Martin* v. *Hunter*, 1 Wheaton 326 (1816).

[3] *Missouri* v. *Holland*, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).

to a contract as against another, but of the use of reasonable means to safeguard the economic structure upon which the good of all depends." [1]

And therefore State legislation, which cut across private contracts, was valid in accordance with the true interpretation of the Constitution of the United States.

This is not to play fast and loose with what ought to be binding obligations. The maxim "*Pacta sunt servanda*," the vehement asseveration of the sacredness of contract which is the basis of Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*, as it is the basis of much of the theology of the Old Testament, must be applied with a certain amount of common sense and moderation. The maxim is manifestly false if it is taken as meaning that the language of a perpetual pact must for all time be interpreted in exactly the same way. On such a foundation neither national nor international society is secure. The earthquake of changing conditions must bring such unphilosophical constructions to ruin.

Now, with this preface, let me turn to the question of the rights and obligations of separate States Members of the League under the Covenant. I do not of course mean to attempt to go into the question of the exact nature of all such obligations and rights. I will confine myself to the two Articles which have been the subject of recent discussion, and have been thought to involve especially the onerous duties of military commitments. I refer, of course, to Articles 10 and 16, between which, indeed, there is a certain overlap. First let me read Article 10:

"The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."

Now, the first point we may observe here is that though the last sentence speaks of "this obligation," there are really two duties imposed by the first part of the Article. One is the duty of respecting territorial integrity and political independence, a duty which indeed is, or ought to be, easy enough to perform, and second, the duty to preserve that same integrity and independence "as against external aggression." And to this second duty two main difficulties of interpretation arise. (1) How far is it a duty for Members of the League to take action single-handed or nearly so?; and (2) does the duty depend on the Council giving advice as to the means by which it is to be performed?

[1] *Home Building and Loan Association* v. *Blaisdell*, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).

As to both these questions there are other passages in the Covenant, and at least one Article in the Treaty of Versailles, which throw light upon the answers to be given. As to the first question the Preamble of the Covenant speaks of one object of the League being the achievement of international peace and security, and this treatment of peace as an aim of the League is emphasised in the Preamble of Part 13 of the Treaty of Versailles and the corresponding passages in other treaties (the part relating to the International Labour Office), which states that the League has for its object " the establishment of universal peace." Now, universal peace, plainly, would not be favoured by instituting a licence to each Member of the League to take military measures whenever in the uncontrolled and independent judgment of the Member taking action some other Member of the League had been guilty of external aggression. And there is another relevant passage in the Covenant which points the same way: Article 8 (the Article which deals with the reduction of armaments) indicates that the only armaments which Members of the League ought to maintain should be such as are consistent with " the enforcement by common action of international obligations." I stress the words " by common action." This is surely an intimation that the duty under Article 10 is to be discharged by *common action*, and not by independent action. Thus we are brought to the common-sense conclusion that action under Article 10 is action undertaken on behalf of the League.

When now we pass to the second question of construction which the language of Article 10 raises, the view that the advice of the Council is a necessary condition to the institution of any such action is supported by this conclusion, that action under the Article is action on behalf of the League. And this interpretation is reinforced by the view that the League is an entity or an international body corporate. It cannot be the right or, in the absence of any clear language, the duty of any one corporator to decide for itself that it will take individual action without the authority of the corporate body on whose behalf the action is to be taken. The more firmly we grasp the idea that the League is a living thing, distinct from its Members, just as Justice Marshall grasped and emphasised the view of the paramount power and authority of the American Union when compared with the power and authority of the separate States, the more certainly are we led to the conclusion that action on behalf of the League must be action which the generality of the Members sanction and approve. And such sanction and approval must be given by an organ of the

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League, which organ under Article 10 must be the Council, whose function it is to "advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled." One further consideration: when we look at Article 16, we find an obligation (the exact nature of which at the present time I will discuss later) to combat by economic sanctions the violation of the Covenant by a wrongful "resort to war." It would be an anomaly if Article 10 prescribes the more serious obligation to resort to military action without the authority of the central organ of the League in the event of the not dissimilar violation which is constituted by external aggression.

The view which I now advocate has been the view taken in practice up to the present time. Although cases have occurred of external aggression, no attempt has been made by individual Powers without the authority of the Council to act on Article 10. No advice under Article 10 has ever been given by the Council, although in the Manchurian dispute the League took the view that there had been a violation by Japan of her duty to respect the territorial integrity of China. It seems to have been assumed that, in the absence of formal advice by the Council, calling for action by Members of the League for the preservation of that integrity, no obligation existed on the part of those Members to resort to military or indeed any other action. And be it noted that what the Council gives is advice not orders. Advice by another person may be a condition *sine qua non* to legitimise action, but this does not mean that the advice must necessarily be followed. The person advised may prefer inaction. The Covenant as it stands is very respectful of the sovereign independence of States Members of the League. It remains a question which only the future can answer whether in time a practice will develop by which it will not be constitutional not to follow the advice of the central body in certain matters, just as it is not constitutional in the British Empire for the King to refuse to follow the advice humbly tendered to him by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Which way will the League develop? Will it be towards enlarging the practical power of the central body on the analogy of the history of the United States, or will the separate authority of the separate Members of the League continue for all time in practice and fact unimpaired?

I pass now to Article 16. Before considering its language in detail, one fact of overwhelming importance must be recognised. All the obligations under this Article are vitally affected by the change in conditions since the date of the signature of the Covenant. In 1919 the League was intended to be an institution

of which every nation in the world was to be a member. The exclusion of the Central Powers was to be temporary and provisional only. The inclusion of the United States of America was to be immediate. In fact to-day it is doubtful whether the League includes one half of the military power of the world. It may even be true that an attempt to use military force in support of the Covenant would be actively resisted by forces which, at any rate on land, and possibly in the air, would be as strong as those which the League could command. This revolutionary change in the disposition of forces is a far graver alteration of essential conditions than the changes in the American situation which have determined the wider interpretations given by the Supreme Court to the provisions of the American Constitution. From the moment that the League ceased to control an overwhelming proportion of the military and economic forces of the world, the obligations imposed by the letter of Article 16 are no longer obligations to co-operate in the application of irresistible force. They are engagements to take action which is not necessarily decisive and which might result in letting loose another universal war. The engagement has radically changed its character, if you construe it literally. The literal interpretation has lost both legal and constitutional validity.

These considerations have also their weight, but not quite the same weight, in relation to Article 10. For if Article 10 be interpreted as requiring the authority of the Council before the obligation to take coercive action against an aggressor arises, it is reasonable to suppose that the Council will not lend its authority to a course which would not be likely to be successful without provoking evils as great as those which it was desired to cure.

Now let us look more in detail at the language of Article 16. The Article[1] is much more precise and a little more like the text

[1] 1. Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13, or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.

2. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval, or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

3. The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support

of an Act of Parliament than Article 10. The Article deals with the action to be taken by the League in the event of what is in effect one form of the aggression which has been dealt with in Article 10 but you will observe that this Article 16 nowhere uses the word "aggression." This form of aggression is described as a "resort to war" by a Member of the League "in disregard of its Covenants under" certain preceding Articles. Such a Member is "*ipso facto* deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State . . . whether a Member of the League or not." Nothing could be more sweeping and comprehensive. And the Article goes on in its second paragraph, "It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several governments concerned what effective military, naval or air forces the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League." Now, what are the obligations that this Article imposes? The only definite undertaking is in the main, I think, non-military. I say "in the main" because a naval pacific blockade is apparently contemplated, but obviously the possibility of military measures being necessary cannot be omitted. The sanctions of this Article may mean war, though the action which is obligatory is not in the main military action. I do not think that conclusion is affected by the language in Paragraph 3 of Article 16—the paragraph by which Members of the League agree mutually to support one another in the financial and economic measures taken. I think that the obligation there is to give economic and financial support, not to take military action. That is borne out by the fact that the last sentence of the paragraph contains the obligation to give free passage to military forces of any of the Members of the League co-operating to protect the covenants

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one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League.

4. Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon.

of the League. If there were an obligation on behalf of each Member to use its own forces, the less onerous obligation of allowing passage to the forces of other Members would be out of place.

Next, on whom is the duty to take action under Article 16? Again, I think we have to say it is on the general body of the League. Unanimity is not necessary. No formal resolution of the Council or Assembly is needed. This was apparent in the handling of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute. (Where any such formal resolution is necessary, no doubt the absence of unanimity means a failure to pass the resolution.) But if unanimity is not required, equally I think separate action is not contemplated. And I doubt, though here I know authority may be quoted against me, whether separate action, which in this very imperfect international world may not always be inspired by the highest motives, is even allowed. It is, indeed, a matter of common sense that the action of one single Power in severing trade and financial relations could have no influence upon the conduct of the aggressor, and equally it is common sense—the sense of the plain man and woman in the street—not to interpret the Covenant of the League as giving a licence to each and every member to proceed to military measures on its own account. So Paragraph 2 of Article 16 does not seem to contemplate any separate action by individual Powers, but speaks of the contributions of Members of the League to the armed forces which are to be used " to protect the Covenants of the League." It is said that the text of the Article, as it imposes an absolute duty immediately to sever trade and financial relations, is not consistent with denying the right at any rate of the individual Member to make such a severance. The answer is, I think, that such action, even if it would be legal, is certainly not constitutional, as it would be directly contrary to the whole conception of common action on behalf of the League. The law compels no one to do the impossible. *Lex cogit neminem ad impossibilia.* I would like to add another tag in not very good Latin: *Constitutio cogit neminem ad futilia.* A constitution compels no one to futile action. So, taking the Covenant as if it were a purely legal contract, it must not be interpreted as compelling each and every Member of the League to restrain an aggressor, no matter what is the extent of its own power, and no matter what the other Members of the League may do. The law does not compel anyone to do the impossible. Equally, if we take the Covenant as we ought to take it—that is, as a constitutional instrument—we may say that its constitution does not compel its Members to futile action. The

constitution does not compel Members of the League to take action which may not indeed be impossible, but which is incapable of producing the desired effect.

This constitutional aspect of the question has its application in connection with the word " immediately "; it was this wider human view of the action to be taken under the Article which inspired the very important Resolutions which the Assembly passed in the year 1921. The broad effect of these Resolutions was that immediate action could not be deemed to be a duty of the Members of the League, but that the action taken must be gradual, and must progress from measures of less to measures of greater severity. Now, it may be doubtful whether these Resolutions of 1921 have any legal effect if the Covenant is to be construed as a contractual instrument, but if it is to be regarded as a constitution, resolutions by substantially the whole of the parties interested as to the manner in which the text of the constitution is to be interpreted cannot be lightly put aside. The result is that the exact text of Article 16 does not express the real existing law, just as the enacting formula of our own Acts of Parliament, or the freedom of contract clause in the United States' Constitution, does not give a correct picture of the existing situation. There has been a change, and the constitution must and does recognise it in practice.

Further, Article 16 calls for another observation. The Article is an attempt to get an automatic reaction to a situation which is to arise in the future, and therefore can be described only in words which may or may not seem appropriate when it is sought to apply them to a given set of facts. Some words of the Article—and those not the least important—are not wholly new in history. They recall, probably unintentionally, the formulation of a similar policy in the year 1815 by the unstable intellect of Alexander I of Russia. That monarch laid down in an instruction to his ministers abroad the main lines of the programme of international organisation which he had in mind, and in those instructions the phrase occurred, " within the great European family a State which embarks upon aggression is to be considered as having *ipso facto* declared war upon all the others." (Thus the theory of the automatic war can be traced back to the least respectable of the many different ancestors of the League.) But unfortunately for the reality of such proposals you cannot get States, by automatic reaction to words, to enter on war in obedience to a contractual obligation binding them to take such a step in an indefinite future and in conditions which

cannot be exactly foreseen. An attempt to produce this result is defeated by the fact that your formula in an international matter must be dependent for its efficacy on the way in which each Power " finds the facts," as a lawyer would say, of the case. In that operation of " finding the facts " it is impossible to control the independence, or (if you like) the sovereignty, of the several Powers. Thus in the Abyssinian case Austria, Hungary and Albania, in effect, found as a fact that Italy had not resorted to war in disregard of her covenants. This was a remarkable finding. But it could not be made the subject of any appeal. An American correspondent points out to me that a similar difficulty may be found to arise in connection with the American neutrality legislation which confides a power of fact-finding to the President.

And this has an important bearing on the vexed question of the definition of " aggression " or " the aggressor." The necessity of allowing individual States to reach their own conclusions upon the question of how far the facts in any given case fall under the description which is to be found in the written instrument, is a conclusive obstacle to the success of attempts to bind States to take action by laying down a water-tight definition of the word " aggression." All such attempts involve a description, sometimes fairly long, of international actions or international situations. Thus one such attempt, which was accepted and adopted, rather rashly I think, by the Security Committee of the Disarmament Conference at Geneva, included, in a definition of the various forms of aggression, these remarkable words:

> " The provision of support to armed bands formed in the territory of another State, or refusal notwithstanding the request of the invaded State to take in its own territory all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection."

Now, a little analysis of this remarkable definition will show that it involves at least five distinct and not very simple issues. It is a chimerical idea that any State would be ready to employ its armed forces, in a case in which it was otherwise unwilling to do so, by determining, against what it considered to be its own interests, that all those five questions were to be answered in a certain sense. You cannot, in fact, produce automatic declarations of war. States will not go to war on a technicality or on what seems to them to be a technicality. They will take broad views in accordance with their general sympathies.

This brings me to another and more general point which

would have its effect in any attempt to operate Article 16 as a compulsory provision, and indeed in any attempt to operate successfully the earlier Article 15 which gives the Council of the League a qualified power of settling international disputes. The success of an important part of the machinery of the Covenant has, in the years which have passed since its institution, been compromised, perhaps hopelessly, by the existence of separate pacts or alliances between Members of the League. All such pacts and alliances are incompatible, according to what I conceive to be the true constitutional doctrine, with the obligations of Members of the League. It is idle to describe such pacts as being constructed " within the framework of the Covenant." The Covenant is not a frame into which you can put any picture you please, or which you think corresponds in its general temper to whatever may be the artistic character of the frame. A frame, indeed, in most, though not in all, cases is of less importance than the picture within it. The Covenant, on the other hand, is, or ought to be, infinitely more important and significant than any other treaty or partial alliance. The basis of Article 15 and some other parts of the Covenant, notably Articles 11 and 19, is the capacity of Members of the League to form independent judgments on the merits of the case when disputes arise or threaten, or when violent action is taken, or when treaties come up for reconsideration. It is wholly impossible for States to take independent and impartial action when they are in special relations with one or other of the Powers directly involved.

Coming back to Article 16, it is a matter of common sense that action under that Article, though it need not be universal, must not be individual. It must be sufficiently general to have a fair prospect of success. There can be little doubt that, according to the original intentions as to what was to be the character of the League, action under Article 16 would have meant the application of irresistible force on the lines of the pacific blockades, which, during the nineteenth century, were used to enforce submission to the decisions of the Concert of Europe on the part of some minor Power. What was contemplated was a police operation, not war between more or less equal forces. And I resume my general argument by saying that if and in so far as action under Article 16 involves those taking part in it in a danger of serious war, it does not seem to me that there is any legal or constitutional duty upon the Members of the League to run that risk. But let me guard myself against the possibility of misunderstanding. I do not say that Members of the League,

so far as the Covenant is concerned, are not at liberty in many cases to take a general action which will lead to war if they consider such action necessary or desirable to avert worse evils. But such general action (and I would emphasise the word "general" as distinct from individual action) would be undertaken not as an obligation imposed by the Covenant, but in pursuance of an option or licence which the Covenant gives.

You may ask, perhaps, whether it is not possible that on all these questions of interpretation the Permanent Court of International Justice may play the same part as the Supreme Court has played in the development of the Constitution of the United States. Such a development of the powers of the Permanent Court is, at any rate in the immediate future, improbable. It is not likely that China will attempt to submit to the Court a claim for damages against other Members of the League (including Great Britain) for their failure to employ the machinery of Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant against Japan; and if the attempt were made, I doubt whether, in spite of the existence of the so-called Optional Clause and its acceptance by Great Britain, the defendant States would be ready to submit without demur to the jurisdiction. Ultimately, on such issues, it will be the conduct and practice of States, not the decisions of a court of law, which will determine the meaning of the Covenant. And if the American precedents are to be cited, it is well to remember that the vital issue of the right of secession of the Southern States was never submitted to the Supreme Court before the guns opened on Fort Sumter. The final word on that issue was uttered at Appomattox Court House, not in Washington.

Let me conclude by a few reflections on the question of the amendment of the Covenant. The movement for amendment is not unnatural even if, on further consideration, amendment turns out to be unnecessary. The truth is, in my view, that the Covenant rationally interpreted is not in need of reform in any important particular, and the difficulties in the way of amendment are very serious. The Article of the Covenant which allows amendment, Article 26, requires ratification of the change by all Members of the Council (now fifteen in number) and by a majority of the Members of the Assembly. It is obviously very doubtful whether these conditions would in fact be realised in relation to any proposal for amendment. Amendments to stiffen the obligation to take military or economic action would have no chance, any amendment to weaken it would similarly

excite hostility in many quarters. It is worth while also to remember how rare it has been, since the first year or two of American independence, for permanent amendments of the American Constitution to be accepted. We may surely learn wisdom from the views expressed by some statesmen from the Dominions on the nature of the League as it now stands or as it was originally constituted. General Smuts, in November 1934, told us he could not visualise the League as a military machine :

> "It was not conceived or built for that purpose. It is not equipped for such functions, and if the attempt were now made to transform it into a military machine, into a system to carry on war for the purpose of preventing war, I think its fate is sealed. I cannot conceive of anything more calculated to keep the United States for ever out of the League than its transformation into a fighting machine pledged to carry out its decisions by force of arms if necessary, and remember, the United States has still to join the League before it will ever be its real self."

And much in the same sense, Mr. Bruce in Geneva in September 1936 said :

> "With regard to Article 16 and the obligations which it imposes upon the States Members of the League, my Government desires merely that the existing practice should be recognised and put beyond question. At the moment the automatic provisions with regard to financial and economic sanctions are not being operated. . . . To endeavour in a non-universal League to operate the strict letter of the Covenant would be a menace to the League, for I believe it would drive some Members out of the League, and it would certainly act as a deterrent to the entry of those Powers outside whose co-operation is so desirable."

In the same spirit Canada told the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1936 that " automatic commitments to the application of force are not a practical policy." But it is right at the same time to recall that the New Zealand Government this year took a different view. On the other hand, there would be natural unwillingness, even now, on the part of many Powers, to weaken or water down formal obligations which in the future, if conditions change, may still have great importance. Nothing would, I think, be gained by the alteration of the text of the Covenant so long as it is clearly understood what interpretation in existing circumstances must be given to that text. On the other hand, a time may come in some distant future when the League will be practically universal and the operation of overwhelming force against an offender may be possible, although even then there may not be a legal obligation to employ military measures. It

may be well that the text of the governing international instrument should authorise in the last resort the employment of pressure, if and when the great body of the nations of the world are willing and able on suitable occasions to resort to it.

A separate question is that of the separation of the Covenant from the Treaty of Versailles, and similarly from the Treaties of St. Germain, Trianon and Neuilly. It would doubtless be highly desirable to have one separate text of the Covenant accepted by Members of the League at the present time. And I would add that it would be highly advisable to take the clauses relating to the International Labour Office out of the Treaties, like diamonds out of so much blue clay, and insert them in a new instrument as part of the constitution of the League, without insisting that membership of the International Labour Office is only open to Members of the League. That particular point, whatever might have been said originally, has now been decided by the fact of the membership of the United States in the International Labour Office without membership of the League.

The effect of this would be to recognise that the permanent Articles for the organisation of the world which were established in 1919 are totally distinct from the terms imposed on Germany and her allies. The League will appear, with the International Labour Office at its side, as what it ought to be : the beginning of a universal framework of the organisation of the world, an international body corporate with a constitution whose development will be regulated by the course of future history. What this will be I am not rash enough to speculate, much less to prophesy. Let me only deprecate the superficial view that consultation and conference are something inferior to, and to be distinguished, sharply and to their disadvantage, from what is called " action," a term which usually means some form of violence; and let me add also that I do not contemplate or even desire that the League will develop into a world " State " or into a direct and despotic " government " of the whole world.

Summary of Discussion.

DR. MAXWELL GARNETT said that the positive and creative functions of the League were in the long run far more important than the negative side of preventing war. But if these activities with regard to education, human welfare, social justice, raising the standard of living were to yield any fruits, there would have to be " a long run," which would not be the case unless the negative side of the Covenant, the prevention of war, succeeded.

He was glad that the lecturer had recognised the League as

a separate organism. He thought it futile to imagine that the continent of Europe could be governed by twenty-five sovereign States without some central co-ordinating authority to do the work that the separate entities could never individually accomplish. If this was true of Europe, it was true of the world as a whole, and this was the main ultimate purpose of the League, to become the central authority for the world supplementing national or federal authorities. This did not mean a world State, but it did mean that sovereignty was not necessarily concentrated in one single spot, but might be distributed. There might be, as in the United States of America, some sovereignty in the States and some in the Federation, but there would also have to be some sovereignty in the central world authority.

MR. F. N. KEEN said that he could not agree with the lecturer when he advocated no amendment or revision of the Covenant. In 1919 two things had been done. There had been the peace arrangements and the drawing up of the Covenant. The peace arrangements had been largely departed from now, and were held to be both unwise and unjust in many parts. But they had not been revised by the League. Germany had taken the law into her own hands and effected changes herself. This was an undesirable method of revision, and in regard to the Covenant it would be better for the question of revision to be deliberately faced. It was imperative that the League should be reconstructed to enable it to meet the great need of the world, adequate and peaceful adjustment of international relations. If the League was to work effectively, it ought to be universal; that was one change which was very necessary. Then obviously some means must be found for controlling the type of thing now taking place in China. Then there was the remedying of injustices. The League had been incapable of doing justice to Germany when she was a Member, and would probably be incapable of doing justice to her to-day if she came in. The Council of the League required to be unanimous in order that action might be taken. What chance would Germany have of obtaining justice when one single vote could put a veto on any change suggested? A reform of the Covenant of the League was vitally necessary to enable it both to do justice and to maintain order among its Members.

LORD ARNOLD said that were the League capable of functioning as its founders had hoped, it would be a most valuable institution, but in point of fact the League had so utterly failed in all that it had set out to do for peace, that it would be far better to scrap it altogether and to try to begin some new organisation on different lines. The League was so utterly discredited and so very much objected to, to use no stronger phrase, by Germany, Italy and other nations, that it was quite impossible for it ever to form a satisfactory world court unless force were taken out of the Covenant.

The lecturer had referred to the old analogy of the League and the police force, but there was no prospect of a League based on force ever functioning. The League had nothing approaching two-thirds of the

force of the world. As Baron von Neurath had said, there was no hope, even had the League the requisite force, of implementing this force unless all the nations of the world had community of aim, which at present they most certainly had not. But even supposing, for the sake of argument, that all the nations of the world were united against Germany, that would not necessarily stop her from going to war. She would know that the small nations right up against her would not dare to join in. France would not fight Italy, because Italy could bomb her towns on the Riviera. In the same way there would never be a case in which all the nations of the world would be united against one country. The League had never been properly thought out. It had never been put into practice, and the way in which it had failed since 1919 was quite incredible. Instead of producing peace it had produced precisely that balance of power which it had been designed to prevent.

Another great danger of the present League based on force was that Great Britain might be drawn into wars which did not really concern her. A good example of this was the case of Czechoslovakia. Every League supporter seemed to regard the defence of Czechoslovakia as a sacred cause. For Great Britain to wage a successful war, there would have to be two conditions. First, ninety per cent. of the people in the country would have to be in favour of the war, not only at the beginning, but right through to what would be probably a very bitter end. Secondly, she would need the support of the Dominions, and as Sir Edward Grigg had pointed out in an interesting speech in Manchester, the Dominions did not like continental entanglements.

The only course was to take force out of the Covenant. A leading article in *The Times* had come to the same conclusion, not on pacifist grounds, but on grounds of practical consideration, because there was no practical alternative. It had pleaded for a world conciliation Court. All nations might come into such a Court, whose moral authority would have far greater effect than a League based on force which could not be implemented and which was a danger to civilisation.

MR. VANDELEUR ROBINSON said that he thought the lecturer had rendered a great service to the complacency of the nations, because he had thrown a cloak of legal respectability over the selfishness of countries which would only do what seemed convenient to them. There was no doubt that such an interpretation of their obligations was held by statesmen in Great Britain and in other countries. The remedy was to take away a large part of the existing sovereignty of the nations—a great deal more than they had been willing to give up hitherto, when they had signed the Covenant of the League of Nations. A Federation should therefore be formed, to begin with in Europe, which would have so much power in the hands of the central body that it would be able to control the forces of the different countries, effect treaty revision, and, if necessary, intervene to ensure that minorities were duly protected. If this were not done, sooner or later there would be a war in Europe which would destroy civilisation.

MR. THOMAS DUNBABIN said that he was rather surprised by th pessimistic speeches of some speakers, including the speaker before th last, who thought the League Powers so much weaker than the ant League Powers. What was the matter with the League Powers? The included fifty-seven nations, and Italy could not leave for two years.

The lecturer had mentioned external aggression, but nearly all th wars since 1919 had been internal wars between Members of the League Japan, a Member of the League, had cut a large slice off China, and eve now was only out of the League because she had left it. Paraguay and Bolivia had both been Members of the League. Ethiopia was still a Member of the League. Italy while still a Member of the League had gone to war with the legal Spanish Government, also a Member of the League, in alliance with General Franco, not yet a Member of the League.

MR. M. ZVEGINTZOV said that public opinion here had never been fairly shown what Great Britain's obligations, not in a legal, but in a general moral sense, were. That appallingly misleading affair, the Peace Ballot, had never put the essential issue simply: only two questions were necessary. (1) Did the people believe in the League of Nations and those things for which the Covenant stood? (2) Were they prepared to fight in the last resort to see that these things were carried out? Everything else was unimportant. An answer to those two questions would have given some indication of public opinion. But the answers to the questions which had been set had given no solution, because the majority of people who answered the question on economic sanctions did not know what it really meant, had thought vaguely that one could get away with economic sanctions without war, which was impossible.

With regard to the lecturer's point about there being no positive automatic obligation in the Covenant as it stood for really drastic action, it seemed to the speaker that provision for this had been the idea behind some of the pacts so-called, "within the Covenant of the League," *i.e.* as a guarantee more binding than that contained in the Covenant which was not obligatory. Therefore if the lecturer maintained that the Covenant did not impose automatic obligations, surely he could not maintain that these pacts aimed at supplying machinery to enforce the Covenant were incompatible. These were issues which would be of vital interest to the public, and it was a pity that the many elder statesmen, politicians and ex-ambassadors of all shades of political opinion who spoke from public platforms and in the Press did not concentrate more on the simple essential issues of principles.

The speaker said he would like to conclude by quoting a letter from a foreign friend who had been professor in an English University for many years and had now retired. He had said that Great Britain seemed to be a country which was determined in no circumstances to go to war whatever the cost might be to any other nation, in spite of the high moral declarations of Mr. Eden and others and this was now being realised by the native populations of Abyssinia, Spain and China.

This, in the speaker's opinion, was a grave indictment. Because one of the outstanding features of the Covenant had been that it did give the weaker and less developed nations the feeling that there was a new security, and there was, therefore, the hope that they would develop a new conception of international responsibilities based on public opinion. This feeling was now disappearing, and there was the danger that as these peoples developed (and nations like China were developing rapidly), they would go to the other extreme and obtain security not by methods of agreement and co-ordinated action, but by those very methods against which the League had been formed, *i.e.* methods of smash and grab.

SIR EDWARD GRIGG (in the chair) said that he had found himself in very great agreement with the lecturer. He liked his conception of the League as having a life of its own, independent of the Member States, and he could understand the view that the League had an immortal personality. But he had felt puzzled about this conception when the lecturer had said that the League must be dependent, to some extent, on the conditions in which it had originally been laid down, which suggested that the immortality was contingent on and conditioned by national support, because if all the Member States were free to repudiate their obligations, what would become of the immortality of the League? Only Lewis Carrol would be capable of doing justice to this conception with the smile of the Cheshire cat. The reality which emerged from the discussion was that there were two conceptions fighting for recognition and superiority. The trouble was that the League was incapable of dealing with the major questions which were now threatening the peace of the world. It could not deal with the trouble in the Far East nor the dictatorships in Europe, nor, less difficult but still perplexing, the problem of relations between Great Britain and the United States of America. When Great Britain broke a treaty like the payment of War Debts to the United States, the League could do nothing, and no one expected it to do anything. How was the League to be enabled to deal with the situation? There were two ideas on the subject. Firstly there were the people who wished to give the League more power by taking away some sovereignty from the Member States. There were great difficulties about this, because nationalism was the strongest force in the world to-day. If it was impossible to get the nations of the British Commonwealth to give up one iota of their sovereignty, how could the other nations of the world be persuaded to surrender any of theirs? Yet if the League were to function, there must be a Federation in which the Member States would give up a certain amount of their sovereign power. In the history of the Federation of the United States, at the beginning the central authority had had no power and had failed; then came Alexander Hamilton, and the States had really surrendered their sovereignty. What did surrender of sovereignty really mean? It meant that the central authority had to have power over the life and property of the subjects of the sovereign States. If this was

the goal, all power to those who were working towards it, but the speaker did not feel that they would get anywhere near it for many generations. There could be no compromise. The only alternative was to work for a League which would be a world conciliation court to which people would bring questions for discussion round a table. If it was to be effective, it must be a meeting-place where all the great Powers of the world would come. The speaker considered this the only practical solution at the present moment. It was the only League of which both Germany and the United States would consent to be members.

Finally, when people spoke of power, it was most dangerous to reckon military power by counting heads. On this basis the League was immensely powerful. In the matter of numbers China was at the moment far the superior of Japan. The fact remained that if matters between Japan and Great Britain came to a division, the former had a very powerful fleet in the Far East, while the latter had four cruisers with six-inch guns. And if Great Britain removed the rest of her fleet from European waters to the Far East, difficulties would arise which she was not very anxious to face. The League certainly did not command more than half of the military force in the world, and it was to be doubted if it commanded as much. Therefore it was useless to consider the League as having overwhelming force behind it which could implement its verdicts. It was, therefore, to be hoped that Great Britain would endeavour in the future to make friends, and not enemies, so that at some future date all might be willing to come to this court of conciliation, which certainly ought to be inspired by the old ideals of the League of Nations.

SIR JOHN FISCHER WILLIAMS said that his object during the evening had been the rather dull and prosaic matter of Great Britain's real legal obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations, because until these were known it seemed premature to go on to see if there were any moral duties beyond the legal obligations. He would explain to the third speaker that he did not think that in the existing circumstances there were any legal obligations for Great Britain to take military action. Therefore he considered his address quite consistent with the letter in *The Times* which bore his signature.

The real question was whether it would be possible to advance the general standards of humanity so as to become worthy of the League. If such an improvement could be brought about, then there would be material for the League as originally conceived to work upon. Whether the Covenant should be altered or not was a matter of political judgment, but the lecturer thought that it would be a difficult matter, and the League might be thus destroyed altogether by such attempt. A more prudent course would be to leave the structure of the Covenant as it was and to interpret it, necessarily, according to the existing circumstances. It was of no use trying to construct a new building when the necessary materials were not ready to hand.

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN PORTUGAL[1]

S. George West

No one who has been in a position to take an intelligent interest in Portugal since 1926 and to compare the general state of the country as it then was with its present condition can fail to be aware that remarkable achievements have been effected in financial regeneration, economic reconstruction, political organisation and social welfare. During the period of the Republic attempts to work an inorganic system of parliamentary government repeatedly broke down. Between 1910, when the monarchy ended, and 1926, when the Army's coup on May 26th ushered in the present régime, there were not less than sixteen revolutions and forty changes of ministry. The history of the period is one of continuous anarchy, governmental corruption, rioting and pillage, assassinations, arbitrary imprisonment, and religious persecution. The country, embarrassed for more than a century by financial difficulties, was faced with bankruptcy. Things to-day are very different.

In 1926 the Army set up a military dictatorship and re-established public order. In 1928 Dr. Oliveira Salazar, Professor of Economics at Coimbra University, became Minister of Finance, and since then a series of eight budget surpluses, unbroken even during the world-wide economic crisis, is evidence of the honesty and stability of his administration. The gold reserve has steadily increased. The escudo was stabilised at a hundred and ten to the pound in 1931, and the note circulation remained steady when Portugal followed England off the gold standard on to sterling. The Bank rate, which stood at eight per cent. in 1930, was reduced last year to four and a half per cent. Treasury Bills were permanently suspended in 1933. The floating debt was extinguished in 1934. No external loan has been contracted since 1928, and Portugal to-day is almost independent of international finance.

These reforms were not effected without sacrifices. Drastic measures were necessary if the country was to be saved from

[1] **Address given at Chatham House on October 28th, 1937; with Sir Claud Russell, K.C.M.G., in the Chair.**

complete financial collapse. New taxation was inevitably imposed, and every effort was made to reduce expenditure. Revenue was collected on a uniform principle and departmental budgets were rigidly fiscalised. Conscious that the success of this experiment was their last hope of salvation, the Portuguese people responded to Dr. Salazar's appeal to the nation for co-operation and sacrifice. The disappearance of the burden of unproductive debt and contingent financial difficulties renewed hope for the future, and the Government, which now included several university professors, embarked on a programme of social and economic rehabilitation, the steady pursuit of which is affecting every branch of national life and transforming the material and spiritual values of the people. The administrative services have been drastically re-organised, and are subject to periodic inspection; and the excessive graft and corruption, which were their worst features prior to 1926, have been eliminated. Improvements in public services include the rebuilding and re-equipment of roads and railways, the extension of the telephone system, the establishment of a National Broadcasting Station, harbour reconstruction, the preservation of national monuments, the development of production in electric power, and important irrigation works which, when completed, will profoundly influence agricultural development and the distribution of the people. The fighting forces are being modernised. Housing estates are being laid out for the benefit of the industrial worker. More than a thousand elementary schools have been built in an attempt to reduce illiteracy from its present high percentage of sixty-five. It is probable that there has never existed in Portugal such intense internal activity as there is to-day, manifesting itself not only in public works, but also in an increase of agricultural and industrial production. One cannot enter the smallest or remotest village without being able to observe evidence of renewed endeavour. The number of registered unemployed on December 31st, 1935, was forty-two thousand, or less than one per cent. of the male population. Emigration has declined from forty thousand in 1929 to nine thousand in 1935, although this may be due to restrictions imposed in Brazil. The country is now in the second year of a Fifteen Year Plan of economic reconstruction providing for an expenditure of sixty million pounds.

In their proclamation of 1926 the military leaders pledged themselves to evolve an acceptable form of constitutional government which would not subject the country to the disorders of the past. The New Constitution approved by plebiscite in 1933

provides for a President, a Council of Ministers, a National Assembly elected by direct suffrage and a Corporative Chamber. The principles on which the Constitution is based are comprised in the *Decalogue of the New State*, and may be summarised as values derived from the genuine traditional elements in Portuguese national life—namely, family, faith, fatherland, and the right and obligation to work. In the New State the individual exists socially as a member of a group, which may be a natural group such as that of the family; a professional group such as the Corporation; or a territorial group such as the Municipal Council; and it is in this social quality that all his necessary rights are recognised. The smallest association is the family, and, in the first degree, only heads of families are allowed to vote. I would stress that the family is at the basis of the new system in Portugal. The Constitution defines the family as "the first basis of social education, discipline and harmony and the backbone of the political order." It is on this "association" that the edifice is erected. The family votes for the Parish Council, the Parish Council has a corporative vote for the Municipal Council, the Municipal Council in turn votes for the Provincial Council. All these units are defined as Corporations in their social and administrative functions. Economically also Portuguese society is being organised on a corporative basis. It is a fundamental tenet that production must be regulated for the benefit of the State as a whole. The citizen is not only a consumer; he is also a producer, a potential and actual agent of welfare, and as such a primary factor in State organisation. An important step towards the realisation of this concept of the Corporative State was the enactment in 1933 of the Statute of National Labour, or the Portuguese Workers' "Bill of Rights." The effect of this Statute, and of subsequent decrees, is that productive activity is being rationalised on a corporative basis. The Corporative Chamber, with its twenty-four Committees, representing all aspects of the economic, administrative, moral and cultural life of the nation, is the mainstay of the New State. By definition a corporative republic, the New State, in effect, identifies itself with the Nation. The New State *is* Portugal.

Portugal shares with all the smaller European Powers a desire for peace and order, which are essential for her internal policy of reconstruction. Her general foreign policy, therefore, is based on the maintenance of the *status quo* and a respect for international law. Though her people have shown no great

enthusiasm for it, Portugal has consistently supported the League of Nations and the principle of collective security. Her representative was Chairman of the Committee of Thirteen in the Chaco dispute, and Chairman of the Committee of Eighteen in the Italo-Abyssinian dispute. It was not the fault of Senhor Vasconcellos that the oil sanction was not applied against Italy. Prior to July 18th, 1936, Portugal's chief concern in the field of international relations was to pursue a policy which would secure her Colonial Empire. After the outbreak of the Civil War in Spain, emphasis has been laid on a policy which will safeguard her independence in Europe.

In approaching the question of Portugal's attitude towards the Spanish Civil War, it is essential to remember that the Portuguese and Spanish are two different peoples, united geographically by a peninsular consciousness and spiritually by an allegiance to the Catholic Church, yet separated historically and politically. The Portuguese have never forgotten the Spanish domination of 1580–1640, and the Spaniard is the traditional enemy. The recent history of Portugal has seen a progression of monarchy, republic, dictatorship. In Spain the sequence has been different: monarchy, dictatorship, republic. During Primo de Rivera's dictatorship relations between Portugal and Spain improved appreciably. A dispute over the waters of the Douro was settled in 1927, communications were developed and reciprocal relations established in 1928. General Carmona, the President of Portugal, paid an official visit to Spain in 1929. That these relations grew worse after Primo de Rivera's fall in 1930 was not due to Portugal. Spain moved more and more to the Left and became more and more pugnacious. Señor Largo Caballero ostentatiously welcomed Dr. Salazar's enemies, the tension grew and the Portuguese frontier became one of the most nervous in Europe. The Portuguese dictatorship, on the other hand, moved more and more successfully towards the Right, while in the five years of the Second Spanish Republic chaos grew as statesmanship declined. July 18th, 1936, saw the beginning of a struggle, the issue of which Portugal interpreted, and interprets, as meaning life or death to her continued existence as an independent nation. Her interests were, and are, more nearly affected than any other European Power. Her sympathies were inevitably for General Franco. The Madrid Government tolerated, and so represented, all that was anathema to Portugal—irresponsibility and irreligion. Hence the Spanish Civil War became for her another Crusade against the Infidel—The Re-

conquest of Spain. It is as well to remember that Portugal owes her existence, her very origin, to the Christian religion, for she dates her history from 1147, when Lisbon was captured from the Moors in the Second Crusade. Portugal's sympathies would be the same if she were situated in the middle of the Pacific. Her geographical position merely intensifies her attitude.

If the Valencia Government were to win, the victors would undoubtedly endeavour to stir up revolution in Portugal, for any Federation of Iberian Soviet Republics must include her. Portugal, for her part, is determined to prevent a spread of the Spanish anarchy within her borders and the consequent destruction of the last ten years' achievements. Hence the Portuguese Legion and the Youth Movement are identified with the crusade against Communism. "It is natural," said Dr. Salazar on July 6th last, "that we should protect ourselves from the consequences of such hatred. It is not a question of the life of this or that person; it is a matter affecting the whole nation, our history, and the future of our people."

If the Valencia Government were to win and fail to stir up revolution in Portugal, the victors might make an attempt on Portuguese sovereignty. By the Anglo-Portuguese alliance Britain is pledged to safeguard Portugal's independence. But Portugal's confidence in Britain's rôle as protector of the smaller, defenceless countries against aggression was shaken by our attitude over the Italo-Abyssinian dispute, and she is taking no chances. "It is not incumbent upon England," declared Dr. Salazar, again on July 6th last, "to defend all our interests before we ourselves do so or even against our wishes." Hence the rapid rearmament of the army. Spain numbers twenty million as against Portugal's six and a half million, every one of whom, however, is determined to defend his country's independence. If the New State were overthrown and Portugal became a Socialist Republic or a Spanish Province, she would lose her Colonial Empire and disappear from Europe. Her loss would be disastrous in every sense of the word, for she has a glorious history, and is to-day setting a remarkable example of the way in which a small nation can, by internal order and progress, contribute towards world peace.

Portugal, however, does not believe that the Valencia Government will win. General Franco will secure control over a substantial part of Spain if not the whole of it, and the probability is that the new Spain will be reconstructed on lines similar to those pursued in Portugal during the last eleven years. All

that Portugal desires for Spain is that she may have a régime which will have a respect for order and international law such as she has in her own country. In her sight, the Valencia Government, by its irresponsibility, has forfeited all right to endeavour to establish a régime. Despite this, for the sake of international collaboration, Portugal has adopted an attitude of strict neutrality since the Non-Intervention Agreement of August 21st, 1936. Some armaments may have been supplied during the early months of the war, but to-day her sympathies are restricted to supplying non-prohibited material. She has broken off diplomatic relations with the Valencia Government long since, but, unlike Germany and Italy, she has not yet extended recognition to General Franco.

Portugal's attitude, based on her anxiety to secure her metropolitan territory, has, in the eyes of the "neutral" Western European States, placed her in the camp of the Fascist and Nazi Powers. Portugal's relations with other Powers have, in consequence, undergone some modification. With Russia she has no diplomatic relations at all. Russians are not admitted to Portugal or to the Portuguese colonies, and it will be remembered that Portugal vigorously opposed Russia's entry into the League of Nations. Her relations with Czechoslovakia were severed last August, due to the failure of the Czechoslovakian Government to approve the export of arms ordered from a Czechoslovakian armament factory, in pursuance of Portugal's policy of rearmament; suspicion on both sides was evident. Brazil, united to Portugal by special ties of history, race and language, has shown an intelligent comprehension of Portugal's delicate position. Early this year a special delegation came from Rio de Janeiro to Lisbon to affirm the loyalty and support of one million Portuguese colonists in Brazil.

Portugal's relations with France are not too cordial, following the imposition of import duties in 1934, the Franco-Soviet Pact, and the attitude adopted by the less restrained elements in the French Popular Front over the Spanish question. Surreptitious intervention is alleged on both sides. It may be of significance that the French course in Portuguese lyceums has been reduced from five years to three.

Germany and Italy have not been slow to exploit Portuguese apprehension with regard to the outcome of the struggle in Spain, and to enlist her support in their policy of delay in the Non-Intervention Committee. Italy openly regards the Portuguese Corporative system as Fascist and based on her own.

She plays on Latin sympathies, draws an effective parallel between their respective dictatorships, contrasting their successful achievements with the disorder which prevailed under their parliamentary régimes, and aims at including Portugal in a hegemony of Latin nations. There are Italian centres of culture in Lisbon, Coimbra and Oporto akin to those existing in other countries of the Mediterranean basin, but their activities are neutralised to some extent by their lack of continuity and by the fact that Italian is not a class-subject in Portuguese lyceums. The Portuguese people have not forgotten Abyssinia, or the death-blow which Italy dealt to the principle of collective security.

Germany, like Italy, is encouraging Portugal in the belief that peace in Europe can be maintained only by presenting a common front against the menace of Communism and that those Powers, the liberal democracies, which have entered into alliances with Russia or passively tolerate her subversive activities, are decadent and untrustworthy. Since 1924 Germany has taken considerable pains to cultivate Portugal. Portuguese-speaking Germans from East and South-West Africa have come to settle in Portugal, and immigrants from the Fatherland, accustomed to a depressed standard of living since the Great War, have readily adapted themselves to Portuguese conditions and mix easily with the people. During the last thirteen years there has been a steady approximation between the two countries, commercially, culturally and politically. The question of Germany's War debt to Portugal was finally liquidated in 1936. Mutual trade agreements have been made and large contracts placed for machinery and armaments. Cultural interpenetration has, perhaps, been less spectacular, but more effective. Germany has set up centres of Portuguese culture at Hamburg, Cologne and Berlin, apart from Ibero-American Institutes (Germany has never made the unforgivable sin of confusing Portugal with Spain), and these centres are active and flourishing. This year (1937) Portuguese has been put on a level with French as an optional romance language in German gymnasiums. Frequent missions of study, visits of professors, lecturers, journalists and scientists have been arranged between the two countries, and even visits of students and workers on a large scale. At international congresses held in Portugal Germany is always effectively represented. German, re-introduced as a school subject in the 'twenties, is now on the same basis as English in Portuguese secondary schools. In the universities German is taught jointly with English. There are German centres of culture in Lisbon

and Coimbra, German teachers visit Portuguese lyceums, and a German-Portuguese Club in Lisbon co-ordinates and fosters Luso-German cultural and social relations. There are political similarities in such organisations as the Portuguese National Foundation for Delight in Work, founded in 1935, the Portuguese Legion, and the Youth Movement, founded in 1936 under the ægis of the Minister for National Education. "Germany is now bold to proclaim that Portugal, after centuries of subservience, has at last thrown off her fetters—*i.e.*, the English connexion." [1]

Portugal is under no delusion as to Germany's real intentions, but she is in the unusual position of receiving overtures from major Powers, and not unnaturally she is taking full advantage of her position. There is a very real danger that if the other major Powers continue to treat her with indifference and to ignore or deprecate her very considerable achievements since 1926, she may be tempted to a step which, while disastrous for herself, would be most embarrassing for others.

While concern for her own independence is at the moment the keynote of Portuguese foreign policy, her determination to retain her colonial Empire is equally strong. As a small country in Europe with large tracts of territory abroad, she has no militant intentions beyond her borders and is anxious, as I have said before, only to preserve the *status quo*. In the nineteenth century it was Portugal's perpetual fear that her financial embarrassments, the instability of her governments, the disorder of her colonial administration and her inability to play any part in the concert of nations would be considered sufficient pretexts for other Powers to dispose of her colonies over her head. It was, indeed, a political axiom that Portugal owed her existence solely to the rivalry between the great European Powers and was allowed to retain her overseas possessions only by the maintenance of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. This was forcibly brought home to Portugal by the British "Ultimatum" of 1890, which has not been forgotten, and I am afraid never will be. Portugal's faith in England's goodwill was severely shaken by the private agreement which Great Britain made with Germany on the eve of the Great War (over Portugal's head) as to a possible future division of her colonial possessions should Portugal one day be inclined or "induced" to sell them. Portuguese fears were increased in 1919, when the accusation that Germany was "not

[1] Prof. W. C. Atkinson, "Portugal and Spain," in *The Dublin Review*, July 1937.

fit to have colonies" was regarded as sufficient warrant to dispossess her of them. Portugal's first care, after the movement of May 26th, 1926, was to present to the world a nation at peace with herself and a balanced budget. Only by the former could she establish beyond question her right to national independence; only by the latter could she avert temptation to sell her colonies.

The necessity of reforming the colonial administrations was recognised early in the present régime, and has since been successfully dealt with. "The Resurrection of the Portuguese Empire," or the Fourth Empire as the Portuguese prefer to call it, has been due largely to the efforts of Dr. Armindo Monteiro, who, when Minister for the Colonies, made an exhaustive tour of the African possessions, and, overcoming the opposition of many vested interests, succeeded in balancing all the colonial budgets. Since 1931 there has been steady development, and an active interest has been taken at home to promote the social and economic welfare of the colonies. Roads and railways have been extended, port and harbour reconstruction works put in hand, and irrigation and drainage schemes planned and begun. Angola, whose state was the most serious, has shown a balanced budget and a favourable trade balance since 1931. Exchange visits of students and journalists have been arranged, as well as flights and cruises. The corporative system is now being introduced, although slowly and with the greatest care.

The colonial impulse has always been deeply radicated in the Portuguese national consciousness; if it has not been developed as much as it might have been during the last hundred years, the fault has been due, not to any inherent weakness of the people, but to the lack of a planned colonial policy and to financial embarrassment. Popular interest, which has always been keen, has been stimulated in recent years by the Colonial Week, now an annual event; by the extraordinarily successful Colonial Exhibition, held at Oporto in 1934; and by the no less impressive Historical Exhibition of the Occupation during the nineteenth century, held at Lisbon this year. On the scientific side mention must be made of Portugal's contribution to the Twenty-Second Meeting of the International Colonial Institute at Lisbon in 1933; to the proposal tabulated by the University of Coimbra in 1936 for the institution of a Colonial Faculty; and to the first Congress of the History of Portuguese Expansion in the World, held in Lisbon this year (1937). Political and economic problems are examined by the Imperial Council, the triennial Conference of

Colonial Governors (Conferences were held in Lisbon in 1933 and 1936) and the Economic Conference of the Colonial Empire (the first meeting was held in 1936). General and specific guarantees are provided in the Colonial Act of 1933 which is integrated in the Constitution. Article 7 affirms that " The State will not, in any manner whatsoever, part with any part of the colonial territories and rights of Portugal, except in the case of rectification of frontiers and after approbation by the National Assembly."

The inflexible resolve never to release the colonies or any part of them has been expressed publicly on more than one occasion. In 1935 Portugal formally denied the rumour that she intended to cede Macao to Japan. In the same year she repudiated the rumour that her possessions could be made a subject for discussion in the Anglo-German conversations held in London. In August 1935, in reply to the despatch from the London correspondent of the *Echo de Paris*, suggesting a new partition of the African colonies as a means of avoiding the Italo-Abyssinian War, a categorical denial was issued in the following words :

> " Firstly, the Portuguese colonies, an integral part of the national territory, cannot be made the object of any diplomatic or financial transaction. Secondly, the present financial situation of Portugal, which can be cited as a model and an example, renders absurd all eventuality of financial compensation, of which Portugal has no need. Thirdly, no reason could be invoked to put in question the rights of the sovereignty of Portugal over her possessions overseas, rights which she holds both by centuries of occupation and by colonial administration which does not fear comparison with any other. Fourthly, it would be illusory to believe in the possibility of a pacific spoliation of any part of Portuguese territory, for the profit of anyone, for the Portuguese Government and people would stand firm for the defence of their rights with all their strength and by every means to the end. . . . We wish to transmit integrally to our children the patrimony we have inherited from our Fathers. It is above us. We cannot permit it on the table of any conference."

On July 15th, 1936, Senhor Julio Dantas intervened at a League of Nations meeting of the International Committee of Intellectual Co-operation to declare that the Portuguese Government would not admit, under any title, the cession to Germany of the Portuguese colonies. In December 1936 it was rumoured from Switzerland that the Portuguese colonies would be sold to Germany. This was formally denied. It was thereupon rumoured that Angola had been leased to Germany for ninety-nine years. At

this juncture Dr. Salazar himself issued a formal Note, ending with these words :—

"We refuse to be drawn into political machinations, and we will not sell, surrender, lease or share our colonies, under any conditions whatsoever. Such transactions are entirely forbidden by the principles of our Constitution, and, in default of those, would be directly contrary to the conscience of the nation."

To attempt to induce Portugal to sell her colonies would, therefore, meet with the strongest opposition. It may be remembered that when, shortly after the War, Belgium required a minute portion of the Portuguese territory near the mouth of the Congo in order to provide an alignment for a railway from the coast to the interior, Portugal, afraid of creating a precedent which might lead to enforced alienations on a larger scale, was induced to sell only with the greatest difficulty. If such was her attitude when disorganised and financially embarrassed, it will be readily appreciated how much greater would be her resistance now that she is organised and solvent.

South Africa's attitude is being watched very carefully. In fact it may be that at the moment the Portuguese Government is more interested in the intentions of South Africa and the South African Government than in those of Great Britain. Relations are cordial. The *Patronage of the East*, guaranteed by the Colonial Act, is being developed with the approval of the Governments of South Africa and India. Recent utterances, however, by the South African Minister for Defence have not allayed Portugal's fears. Mr. Pirow's thesis is that, while it is unthinkable that Germany should be allowed to regain possession of Tanganyika and/or South-West Africa, it is equally unthinkable that Germany should remain without any possessions whatever. Portugal is naturally suspicious, and remembering charges of irresponsibility that have been made against her in the past and the charges of misgovernment, slave-trafficking, etc., made against Abyssinia more recently, is preparing herself for all contingencies. If Portugal lost her colonies she would become politically and economically reduced to a province of Spain, an appendage to a possible bloc formed by Spain, Italy and Germany. It would indeed be a shameful betrayal if, at the moment when Portugal is successfully setting her house in order, Great Britain were to abandon her oldest ally to the ambitions of any other Power.

Portugal is genuinely anxious to retain Great Britain's friendship and interest. She still believes in our impartiality (witness

her invitation to Great Britain to appoint British observers on her land frontiers as against her refusal to permit international control). She welcomed British rearmament (as which of the smaller Powers does not?), and reaffirms the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, while making it clear that the alliance is not the whole of her foreign policy. But she is frankly puzzled that, after a long period of neglect—however justified—Great Britain should make such little attempt to understand what she has accomplished since 1926, and what are the motives for her present attitude towards the Spanish conflict. She is also puzzled that Great Britain, the representative of peace and order, does not join more actively in supporting the forces of order, puzzled that she should tolerate the subversive activities of forces which lead to disorder. This is especially true of the Spanish War, and Portugal believes that public opinion in Great Britain (and France) is ill-informed as to the true nature of the problem. Portugal's geographical situation and peninsular affinities give her peculiar advantages for appreciating the position. "Some people," said Dr. Salazar on July 6th last when reaffirming the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, "do not believe in the Communist peril; we, on the other hand, feel it, see it, and fear that Communism with the connivance of other countries may take root in Spain, and so destroy any chance of the Spanish people working out their own political salvation—for there could be no national liberty or independent choice in a State largely controlled by several Internationals." For Portugal the Spanish War is not a question of dictatorship versus democracy, but dictatorship based on authority versus dictatorship based on irresponsibility. The issue, in short, is order versus chaos. "Freedom" in England is synonymous with "order and progress." In other countries it has often a reverse connotation. The State, as Portugal sees it, must seek order and responsibility above all things.

> "Portugal stands now where she stood on the first day, and is prepared to go to such lengths as may be necessary to ensure peace in Europe and to shorten the inhuman strife in Spain. All that she demands from other countries is the right to maintain peace at home, and the security of her borders." [1]

Her attitude has been logical and consistent throughout.

Misrepresentations in the British Press have not passed

[1] *Portugal, Bulletin of Political, Economic and Cultural Information*, No. 1, Lisbon, May 1st, 1937.

unnoticed, and the consequence has been an increase in German and Italian influence to Great Britain's detriment. Of course, from the British point of view, it is easy to criticise. The Portuguese Constitution grants basic liberties and its practice annuls them. There is "freedom of expression," but a rigid press censorship. "Inviolability of domicile and of correspondence" is conceded, but exception is made against "attacks on the security of the State." There is "immunity from arrest except on a proper charge," but the "free" citizen is at the mercy of the secret police. The judgments of the tribunals are seldom reported. There is no *habeas corpus*. Political prisoners may be deported, without appeal. "It is forbidden to discuss politics" is a sign frequently to be encountered in hotels and cafés. The standard of living is deplorably low. There is a high percentage of illiteracy. But all this is to judge the New State by British standards, and is not a fair comparison.

The New State must be judged by the progress it has made since it came into being, and by comparing its achievements with those of its predecessors, the liberal parliamentary régimes of the Republic and the Monarchy. Portuguese individual and collective psychology must be taken into account. What is the truth? Order has been established, financial stability has been attained, some economic and social progress has been effected. The national conscience has been aroused, and the innate colonial consciousness developed. Portugal is not committed to General Franco, to reaction or to any foreign political creed. The New State is a Corporative, but not a Fascist, State. It is not totalitarian, it is not deified. Authoritarian it undoubtedly is, for its authority cannot be questioned, but authority is only its instrument, not its end. It is in fact illiberal only in that it subordinates individual freedom to the common good. It is guided by a moderate, non-provocative dictator, who is a professional economist assisted by a consultative body of experts. Government in Portugal is now regarded as a science to be applied by the specialist instead of an art to be practised by the careerist or dilettante.

What have the people lost? Wherein does the disappearance of their "liberty" consist? Firstly, the citizen may not voice or organise political opposition. Secondly, the individual may not pursue his economic interests without regard to those of his fellows. How would the Portuguese use these liberties if they were granted to him? The history of the failure of a hundred years' attempt at parliamentary democracy gives the answer.

The individual in Portugal is not interested in political self-government, nor is he capable of it.

As a whole, the nation is satisfied with its present leader, and would vote for his continuation in office unequivocally. Opposition there is, but it is unco-ordinated and unconstructive, consisting of disappointed political careerists, students and army officers, discontented at seeing the power which they expected to enjoy from the revolution of 1926 pass into the hands of the "professional dictators." Bomb outrages only serve to weld the nation more strongly behind the leader, and are in fact useful for propaganda purposes. The sacrifices which the Portuguese have been called upon to make—and are still making—are turning them from dreamers into realists. Any immediate alternative to the present system would result in chaos—and they know it.

Portugal is fortunate in having a leader possessed of a probity unknown in politics for a century; profoundly religious, ascetic, modest, Dr. Salazar shuns publicity and lives as a private citizen. Determined to build the new Portugal on secure foundations, he has proceeded slowly, relating progress to his country's potentialities, and basing ideals on ideas and ideas on facts. Casualness is inevitable where initiative has to be delegated, and Dr. Salazar does not under-estimate the human factor. An acute perception of his countrymen's psychology has enabled him to guide them through the first decade of restoration; he calls for further sacrifices to make the second decade one of development. Given freedom from external disturbances, there is no reason to assume that the programme will not be fulfilled. Portugal to-day promises nothing that cannot be achieved, undertakes nothing that cannot be paid for.

What of the future? Dictators cannot last for ever. Dictatorships, even when they are different, remain imposed from above, and the fate of the majority is dependent on the honesty and capability of a few. Dr. Salazar's task is to make the Portuguese as a people civically and politically conscious, to unite them to a comprehension of their rights and obligations, to educate them to a personal and collective sense of responsibility—in short, to eradicate those national defects which make dictatorship possible and necessary. If his work is to be blessed with continuity as well as stability, the restoration of the monarchy in the person of D. Duarte would seem a not unlikely possibility. Dr. Salazar's personal views indicate that he would not be averse from such a course. But the time is not yet. Years of sound administration and unremitting effort are required to bring the

work of social and economic reconstruction to full fruition. While pressing forward with its programme, the Portuguese Government will maintain peace and stability within. It is to the interest of Great Britain that Portugal should not be threatened from without.

Summary of Discussion

SIR CLAUD RUSSELL: We are grateful to Mr. West for an interesting and comprehensive lecture. I could wish that what has been said this evening could reach a larger audience than is present in this room, as it might help to correct a widespread misapprehension in regard to the Portuguese which has often been forced upon me. There seems to exist an idea that the Portuguese are *per se* a comic people, and that there is something innately ludicrous about them. This attitude of mind is exemplified by the habit of certain people not here represented, I feel sure, who are incapable of referring to a Portuguese as anything but a "Portugoose." The joke is produced with mechanical regularity. Now, I need hardly tell my audience that the Portuguese are no funnier than the rest of humanity. What is even more regrettable is that they are also widely credited with being a very unpleasant people. I remember an Englishman saying to me, when I was in Portugal, "I suppose it would be all right living here, if it wasn't for the Portuguese." I am afraid this conception receives a good deal of currency from English fiction. The Portuguese in fiction is usually a disagreeable personage. As far as my reading extends, the only exception I can think of is in *Robinson Crusoe*, at the beginning of whose adventures Defoe depicts a Portuguese invested with all the virtues. I do not idealise the Portuguese national character. There are grave defects in it. But as regards the superficial, social virtues which are so important in everyday relations—I mean amiability, good manners, kindness, obligingness—you can hardly find a more likeable people. On more than one occasion English visitors to Portugal have expressed to me their pleasure and surprise at finding the people so different from what they had been led to expect. There is only one other point I want to touch on, which arises out of the Portuguese national character, and which is important in view of our alliance, and that is their supposed deficiency in the military virtues—and primarily in courage, which, as Mr. Churchill tells us in his last book, is valued among men because it guarantees the other virtues. You may have heard of the occasion in the Peninsular War, when the Duke of Wellington, addressing a Portuguese force which was about to attack, concluded his exhortation with the words: "Remember that you are Portuguese." Now, that has been quoted to me as an amusing example of the great Duke's capacity for satire. I see no reason to think that he spoke otherwise than in good faith. He was addressing men of a nation who had led the world in the exploration and conquest of three continents, who had

liberated their country from the Moors, who had thrown off th
Spanish yoke, and whom the Duke was now calling on to turn ou
the French. In the Duke's despatches from the Peninsula there ar
many references to the good quality and services of his Portugues
allies, and what is still better evidence is a minute of the Duke's t
the British Government, which is on record, written when Napoleo
had left Elba, requesting that a strong Portuguese contingent shoul
be included in the force which the Duke was to command in th
coming campaign. That request, as we know, was not given effec
to. There were no Portuguese at Waterloo. Possibly the 100 day
was too short a time to bring such a force from Portugal t
Flanders.

I think it is not in question that the Portuguese did badly in th
Great War. I confess I don't know what explanations there may b
for that failure. I can imagine that they were untrained and badl
officered, but, in any case, it is fair to remember that, if under intensiv
shell-fire they abandoned their positions and retired in disorder, ther
were occasions in the Great War on which the troops of other nation
did the same. I notice in the October 1937 number of the *Arm
Quarterly* an article on the Portuguese in the Great War by a Britis
officer written from a favourable point of view. Perhaps member
who are interested may care to read it.

A MEMBER said that he had every sympathy with a people wh
were probably as amiable and kindly as any in Europe, but it wa
permissible to question whether, in the constant use of the wor
Portugal, the lecturer had not really meant, on occasion, the presen
Government of Portugal, because, he had said, there was opposition
He had been in Portugal and the island of Madeira lately and had bee
shocked, not only by the standard of living, which was deplorabl
low, but also by the fact that the hours of work were fourteen a day
and the wages for that work thirteen shillings a week; and there wa
no liberty of association, or protest, or remedy for those who suffere
from it. In a pamphlet issued by the Howard League for Pena
Reform the penal and police system of Portugal appeared to be amon
the very worst even in present-day Europe. In Oporto there was no
only the official prison, but also a secret prison which people wer
not shown. People were often held in prison for forty days befor
being brought before a magistrate; people had been kept in priso
for three months and then released without trial or explanation o
their arrest. All this might be excusable and outweighed by th
positive achievements of the Government, but it should be take
into account when the Portuguese complained that the British did no
understand them. The tragedy of the Iberian peoples was that th
two things of which they stood most vitally in need, order and pro-
gress, could not be given to them by the same Party, those who gav
them order would not give them progress and *vice versa*. He was no

blind to the defects of the Valencia Government, but when Portugal complained about the lack of understanding in Great Britain for the side upon which she had ranged her sympathies, or upon which the Government had ranged herself (because he had met many people heart and soul upon the side of the Valencia Government; people were not so content and things were not so perfect when the two ships of the fleet mutinied as friends of Portugal would wish people to believe), she should remember that she would not be so anxious about the success of the Valencia Government if there were not a very real prospect of a rising in Portugal, and there would not be the prospect of such a rising unless there were widespread discontent amongst the people of Portugal.

It was said that Portugal was not Fascist, but in the shops there were streamers on view with the colours of Germany, Italy, Franco and Portugal intertwined, and post-cards were sold with the pictures of Mussolini, Franco, Hitler and Salazar in the four corners. It was said that Portugal feared the success of the Valencia Government because it would undermine the independence of that country. Was there the slightest authority for such a statement? It was astonishing to hear that even a conquest of Portugal was contemplated.

Mr. West said that many of the contentions of the last speaker were true; he had endeavoured to show in his lecture that there was a good deal of opposition, but that it was unco-ordinated and unconstructive.

However, with regard to the fourteen hours' work a day in Madeira, if this were done by the peasants (as it was), it was not because it was compulsory (on the contrary, the Government was trying to show the peasant that he could employ some of his time to greater advantage), but because the peasant had worked from dawn to dark for generations, and he preferred to do as his great-grandfather, his grandfather and his father had done before him. There was a law limiting the hours of work. Provision was made for association in the Rural Institutions which had been set up for peasants and fishermen. The lecturer had visited one of them, and found that it was being well worked and organised and that the people greatly appreciated the creation of such an institution.

Concerning the prisons, people were arrested sometimes and kept "incommunicável" (a word which it was difficult to translate into English), and people had been kept in prison for lengthy periods without trial and then released with no explanation. Incidentally, during the lecturer's stay of two years in Coimbra, when he had associated with many students of the Left who had sometimes been imprisoned, he had found no evidences of any cruelty in the prisons.

With reference to the mutiny of the fleet in September 1936, two ships did not constitute the whole fleet, and that the whole fleet was

not of the same opinion could be shown by the fact that the remaining vessels had not mutinied.

A MEMBER said that when he had first gone to Portugal in 1921, democracy, or the decline of democracy, had been accelerating to a climax. There were successive revolutions which were absolutely unconnected with the mass of the people. It would simply be found that the shops were shut one morning, soldiers and toughs hired by each side would be posted in strategic quarters of the town, there would be skirmishing, and later, if the Government surrendered, as it usually did if anyone started a revolution, the party who had created the disturbance came into power in the evening of the same day. The next day the people would go about their ordinary business completely unconcerned with what had happened. This political game was played in an atmosphere of abject corruption. The Navy at that time was traditionally revolutionary. An influential Portuguese had at the time told the speaker that the system was for each ambitious politician of any standing to have so many men upon whom he could call, fifty or twenty-five or so, and when pressure was needed to be put upon the Government, it was pointed out to them that these men would be called in to overthrow them if they did not give way. The revolution of the two ships in September 1936 might have been a last flare-up of this old spirit. But of the common folk of Portugal sixty-five per cent. were now illiterate, and before there had been a great many more, and these people were completely divorced from the wire-pulling politicians. Corruption had been so bad that at one time when an audit was to be taken of the books of a public concern the place had been burned to a cinder so that no books could be found. Dr. Salazar, the present leader of Portugal, had swept all this away, and in doing so had swept away the people responsible for it, who had left the country and endeavoured from without to upset his régime. The " politico " of the old régime was about the worst thing possible to be met upon earth, because he cared about nothing in the world except putting himself back in power, and then pulling strings.

With regard to the prison system, it was certainly very different from the British system, but it had one good feature, that some of the prisons were run entirely by the prisoners, or almost, one of them having eight hundred prisoners and twelve warders, one of the prisoners being selected to be over the others. He had been to see a British subject in prison, and the man had seemed to be remarkably well-treated. He had been kept for a long time without trial, and then acquitted, but the speaker had seen him since and he had not complained.

Dr. Salazar had put the finances right and had made roads. There had been a time when it was almost impossible to go from Lisbon to Estoril without grave risk to one's car; and of the Cintra road it was

said there was only one car which could make the journey, and, if a pot-hole was accidentally filled in, it threw the chauffeur out completely! Now things had been cleaned up and good roads made. The Government, too, was once more integrated in the nation. There had been dictatorship in a sense even under the old régime, because people in any way connected with politics had their houses raided. His own view was that, although he leaned rather to the Left in politics, Portugal must be forgiven if to-day, sitting on top of the Spanish situation, she took a different view from Great Britain and a far less detached one. The progress of a nation depended upon the education and good-feeling and sound sense of its citizens. This education could not be hurried with regard to fundamentals. Portugal as a whole was backward and had to be brought on slowly.

Some might think that the talk about the Communist menace was exaggerated. Some years ago British cruisers, submarines and destroyers were in Lisbon. When the ratings came back from their shore leave, they handed in Communist leaflets and pamphlets they had received in the streets. The speaker had heard of a case of two able seamen and a young rating who had been taken along to a wine shop where they were filled with drink and heard speeches and denunciations of the dictator; then it came to "down with King George V," and a rough house had started. The "A.B.'s" were laid out, but the young sailor had taken them to hospital, and then somehow had managed to get them back to the ship. One Communist practice had been to provide a dancer on the quay for those staying behind on the ships, and while the sailors watched her, leaflets were thrust into the portholes. In Great Britain people were always sceptical about talk of Bolshevik propaganda because they were accustomed to thinking over anything that was handed out to them, but the Latin peoples, who were more emotional and less educated, politically, were more subject to temptation, and therefore the Portuguese might be excused for being frightened of such propaganda, as they knew the soil on which it was falling.

DR. J. D. ROLLESTON said that with regard to the lecturer's remarks about the progress in science, his old friend Professor Ricardo Jorge, of the Ministry of Health in Lisbon, possessed a very high international reputation as a public health authority and medical historian. There had also been a very successful International Congress held on the subject of tuberculosis last September in Lisbon.

How far did the lecturer think that the clergy were responsible for the high proportion of illiteracy in Portugal? This was in contrast with the interest shown in literature and learning by the members of the Republic.

In connection with the alcohol problem, it had been said that Portugal had bullied Iceland into buying her wine, otherwise she

would not have purchased Iceland's fish.[1] Could the lecturer throw any light upon this matter?

MR. WEST replied that it was very pleasant for him to find among the audience a friend of Dr. Ricardo Jorge, one of the leading Portuguese doctors and a member of the Royal Society of Medicine in Great Britain.

It was a little difficult to say how far the clergy were responsible for illiteracy in Portugal. Prior to the Republic of 1910 the clergy had undoubtedly had a very great influence on such education as there had been. After 1910, the fall of the monarchy, and the reduction of the Church through persecution, they had had much less to do with education. The present state of illiteracy was due to the neglect of the Government in the last sixteen years of the Republic. The Church might perhaps be said to be gaining influence again; for instance, the crucifix was to be seen in all primary schools. Charges of obscurantism were made against Dr. Salazar because he had said that the "three R's" were sufficient for the Portuguese peasant. But the President of the Council realised that, for the present, the Portuguese peasant needed other things more urgently than an education beyond the three R's. This, of course, was only provisional, and was not intended as a permanent policy.

Concerning the alleged forcing of Portuguese wine upon Iceland, the lecturer knew nothing about this.

LIEUT.-COLONEL R. J. C. THOMPSON asked what was the reaction of the native in the Portuguese Colonies towards the present administration. He seemed to remember that some years ago the natives of Mozambique not far from Delagoa Bay had not been living under very good conditions. Also, could the lecturer say how the Portuguese Colonial administration was formed, were trained men sent out, or was it, as in another African colony, a case of a man, having embezzled some money, being told that he could either do ten years' penal servitude or go to a job in the colonies?

MR. WEST replied that he had conversed with French, Belgians and Swiss on this matter, and they had all been of the opinion that the natives under Portuguese administration were now more content. Two years ago a Swiss had told him that he thought that the natives were more content in the Portuguese territory than in British territory. The colonial service, of course, had undergone and was undergoing re-organisation, and this had only been undertaken since 1931. Consequently the complete training course had not yet come into existence. There was a Higher Colonial School in Lisbon which trained students from the universities and sent out experts to deal with relevant problems on the spot. There was also a colonial depart-

[1] Legrain, *Les Grands Narcotiques Sociaux*, 1925, p. 382.

ment in the Institute of Economics and Finance in the Technical University of Lisbon. With regard to general colonial recruiting there was not very much emigration from the population of Portugal to the African colonies. In 1933 the total had been from two hundred and ninety to three hundred, and in 1934 there had not been more than four hundred. This did not mean that the colonies were not being developed, because there were already many Portuguese out there. At the meeting of the Colonial Institute in Lisbon in 1933 it had been estimated statistically that in Portuguese possessions in Africa there were eighty Whites to ten thousand natives, the average in other European colonies being only twenty-five Whites to ten thousand natives. There was no lack of material in the Portuguese colonies; what was lacking was traditional experience and, until recently, a colonial policy. This, through the Imperial Council, the Conference of Colonial Governors and the Economic Colonial Conference, the Portuguese Government was endeavouring to rectify.

MR. G. HADLEY said that reference had been made to the fear of a conquest of Portugal by the Valencia Government. He would have thought that the danger of conquest would have come rather from a Fascist régime established in Spain. Communism might attack with arguments and dangerous thoughts, but a Fascist administration in Spain might develop more material appetites. Was it altogether fantastic to suggest that a Spanish Rosenberg might arise with the discovery that the Portuguese were a long-lost Spanish minority yearning for union with the mother country?

MR. WEST replied that he had not discovered anyone who seriously entertained such a fear, but the Portuguese attitude to Spain was always conditioned by the fact that Spain was the traditional enemy. Whether Spain became Communist or Fascist, Portugal was determined to resist any attempt upon her sovereignty to the very last. There were several Portuguese proverbs. One was: "There comes from Spain neither a good wind nor a good marriage." Union or pan-Iberianism in any form was quite untenable.

COMMANDER W. B. C. ROSS said that the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance had been mentioned as being a part of Portuguese foreign policy, but not the whole of it. The Peninsular had been of vital and historic interest to Great Britain for centuries: our relations with Portugal were the outcome of that fact. Everyone knew the long story of past foreign interventions in Spain; the last British one that had taken place being in 1837, to save the legitimate Government from the Carlist revolt. The future of present-day Spain was still in doubt, and so was our future position in the Mediterranean, in view of Abyssinia at one end and Spain at the other: it was in the interests of Great Britain to cling firmly to the old Portuguese alliance, whatever

that country's form of government might be, and to guarantee her from interference either with Portugal herself or with her colonial empire.

MR. WEST said that from the British point of view the alliance was, of course, as valuable as it had been a hundred years ago. As long as Britain possessed an empire, the communication between the various points of which was, throughout its course, neighboured by the Portuguese empire, the alliance between the two countries was of mutual advantage. Portugal's seaboard ports would be valuable in any future war not only as naval bases, but also as air ports on the south Atlantic route. An agreement had already been signed between Imperial Airways and Pan-American Airways for a twenty-five year concession to explore and exploit the possibilities for developing a South Atlantic route via Southampton, Lisbon, the Azores and so right through.

With reference to a remark made earlier in the discussion by the Chairman, Defoe was not the only English author who had depicted an agreeable Portuguese. In Sir Thomas More's *Utopia* it was the amiable Portuguese sailor, Raphael Hythloday, who described the condition of that " best state of a commonwealth."

THE TRAINING OF THE NAZI LEADERS OF THE FUTURE[1]

G. A. Rowan-Robinson

Before considering the type of education that is being given to the youth of Germany to-day, and more particularly to that section which has been singled out to be the leaders of the future, I think it is necessary very briefly to outline the development of education in Germany during the last hundred years, for it is impossible to understand the present position fully without at any rate a few references to pre-War Germany.

The foundation of every State is the education of its youth. That is an old saying deriving from the time of the Greeks, but it is one, I think, that is true of most times and most places. Any system of government that is to remain permanent must provide for the upbringing and training of the next generation, so that they may be inspired by the same ideals and enabled to carry on along the same lines. The essence of this education will be to make clear the relationship between the individual and the community in which he lives. Thus in the majority of cases the educational system will be subservient to the political system. In Germany particularly is this the case, for her system of education has been built up essentially by statesmen and legislators and has been imposed upon the nation from above. This is in marked contrast, for example, to the British system which has grown up from a hundred different roots, all planted by different people, and at different times, and all grown to different sizes, and which to the German mind presents an extremely illogical and unsymmetrical appearance. The difference roughly is that the German system is so State controlled, so centralised, that any change of policy on the part of the Government can be reflected almost immediately in all the schools throughout the country, whereas in the British system the decisions of the Government take an immeasurably long time to filter through to the schools under its control, while there is in addition a large number of influential schools comparatively speaking free from

[1] Address given at Chatham House on January 27th, 1938; Major B. T. Reynolds, M.C., in the Chair.

governmental control. The British system is based on co-operation and compromise, Germany's on law and logic.

Education in Prussia in the beginning of the nineteenth century was used as an instrument for arousing and sustaining a spirit of nationalism which had previously hardly existed. After the defeat of Jena, Fichte in his *Reden an die deutsche Nation* declared that education was the only means of raising the German people out of the slough of despond into which it had sunk. There was a synchronisation, therefore, in Prussia between the spread of education and the rise of nationalism. We sometimes tend to forget this fact, because in England nationalism was a thing that could be taken for granted long before there was any idea of spreading education to the masses, and we are not apt, therefore, to associate the one with the other.

In the course of the nineteenth century Germany built up a huge State-organised system of education which won the admiration of the whole of Europe, but its deficiencies were gradually realised. It was seen to be too mechanical, too impersonal. Education came to consist solely of intellectual development and to mean nothing else. School did not extend beyond the four walls of the classroom. The result was bureaucracy, uniformity, and excessive intellectualism. The critics of this form of education were growing rapidly throughout the nineteenth century, and finally found expression in the Youth Movement at the turning of the century. That was essentially a revolt against authority and a desire to widen the conception of education based largely on the ideas of Pestalozzi. This movement continued to grow until the War came and threw everything into confusion. After the War its ideals were still there, but the general depression and humiliation of defeat seemed to prevent anything positive or constructive coming out of them. The youth of the country had lost its sense of purpose, was groping blindly in the dark, hesitating, depressed, not knowing really in which direction it was heading. It was the time for a leader, and it was at this moment that Adolf Hitler emerged. As you know, the Germans are by nature a military-loving people, and they ask for nothing better than to be organised. When, therefore, Hitler started organising the youth of the country into semi-military formations and preaching a doctrine which gave a purpose and pride to their lives, the response was tremendous. Further, there was the secrecy of the organisations, the whole idea of adventure which appealed to them tremendously. And he undoubtedly did give them something

to be enthusiastic about. They were to be the chosen instruments by which Germany was to free herself from the shackles of Versailles and regain her former glory. They felt that they were being instrumental in the rebirth of the nation and their enthusiasm was perfectly genuine.

Having won their support for his cause, Hitler lost no time in starting to educate them. Like Fichte, he realised the importance of education in arousing a spirit of nationalism. In 1925 he wrote these words in *Mein Kampf*:

" Our German nation, which now lies in a state of collapse, kicked at by everyone, needs the suggestive strength produced by self-confidence. This self-confidence must be cultivated in the younger members of the nation from childhood onwards. Their whole education and training must be directed towards giving them a conviction that they are superior to others. Through bodily strength and skill the youth must recover faith in the invincibility of his nation."

" Through bodily strength and skill "—that is to be the basis of education. That Hitler regards the training of the body as more important than the training of the mind has often been levelled against him as a sign of the barbarism of modern Germany. He explains it by saying that service to his country is the first law for every German, and that it therefore follows that, if he is to serve, he must make himself capable of service; and this can only be effected by a strict training of the body. The second task is to acquire the readiness to serve, which involves the training of the will and courage and character as a whole, which Hitler has declared to be the ultimate aim of all education. The training of the mind is hardly mentioned, but it is said that this is a thing that can be taken for granted in Germany. But Germans, who were once proud when they, as a nation, were called " Das Land der Dichter und Denker," a land of poets and thinkers, are now taught to regard such an epithet as a sign of national decay. I once listened to an ardent young Nazi schoolmaster explaining this point to his form. " Foreigners," he said, " are always lamenting and crying out ' What has become of Germany, the land of poets and philosophers? ' Why should they lament? We look back with contempt on the days when Germans were capable only of using their minds. It is action we want, action, and it is that National Socialism has brought us!"

All this is merely part of the reaction to the pre-War over-emphasis on the intellect, which they are determined to destroy; for they consider it was largely responsible for their collapse.

The fact that the State did not mean enough to each individual, the deficiency of the will to conquer, led, it is held, not to their defeat on the battlefield, but to the crumbling of the resources behind the lines and the consequent disintegration. Therefore the cult of the State must be inculcated in everyone. The Government realises, too, that if National Socialism is to survive, it must be so thoroughly drilled into everyone that no alternative shall so much as even occur to them. The methods of inculcating this new faith cannot, therefore, be too thorough or exhaustive.

In one of Mr. Aldous Huxley's books, *Brave New World*, he envisages a world in which human beings are produced scientifically and graded into alphas, betas and gammas. The alphas are the aristocracy, and the gammas (or whatever the lowest letter is) the serfs; and in order to ensure that the gammas may not suddenly become a bit "uppish" and try to usurp the betas' and the alphas' position, a kind of loudspeaker is put in the gammas' bedroom when they are young, which speaks to their subconscious selves. It tells them unceasingly through the night that they are miserable little gammas, the scum of the earth, whose business it is to serve everyone else. The result is that next morning any gamma who may on the previous day have been suffering from a swollen head wakes up appropriately subdued. In the same way the alphas are made to realise that they are the *élite* of the world, and must not be allowed to fall from their lofty pedestals. Mr. Huxley calls this form of education "hypnopedia," and it has a very great deal in common with the methods employed by the German Government to-day. The constant repetition of slogans, generalities and platitudes is one of the most distressing signs in Germany to-day. But, curiously enough, the people, or at any rate the young people, are not yet bored by it. It is, I think, because it still gives them something to be enthusiastic about. They are still, as it were, hypnotised by the myth of Hitler. They regard him as some demi-god, incapable of doing wrong. And they hang on his every word. And if he repeats himself a hundred times (and in fact he constantly repeats himself a hundred times), that is not too much for them.

Now, what are the instruments through which this new education is being given? As I said, the pre-War conception of the school in Germany was merely a collection of classrooms. Anything beyond pure academic instruction was given at home. But now the family as an instrument of education has been relegated into the background. Instead, the State has under-

taken to provide the political, physical, moral and religious instruction of the youth of both sexes. This is provided for, firstly, through the *Hitler Jugend* and the other official branches of the Youth organisation. Their first object is to train the body and to create a spirit of "Kamaradschaft." People are to cease to think of themselves primarily as individuals, but rather as members of a group. Loyalty to his unit is therefore the first demand made on every young German. Secondly, to ensure that the younger generation to-day may in its turn be capable of handing on these new ideas, the Government is selecting the most promising of them and giving them a still more thorough and special education. For this purpose a number of new boarding-schools have been created for these boys, and which therefore serve as the nurseries for Germany's future leaders. It is with these schools that I wish to deal particularly.

Apart from a number of pre-War Cadet schools and a few odd "Landheime," or country homes, which were created at the beginning of the century in response to the demands of the Youth Movement, the boarding-school in Germany was, before 1933, a comparatively unknown institution. It was not unnatural, therefore, that those responsible for the formation of these new schools should cast their eyes towards the Public Schools of Great Britain. In our Public-School system they saw an instrument for training leaders in all branches of life. Further, a casual visit to a Public School is liable to convey the idea that the boys spend almost their entire time pursuing balls of various shapes and sizes round the grounds. This, in the German view, was admirable, and in keeping with the cult for physical fitness and reaction to classroom instruction. Sport as an instrument for developing character—that also should be embodied in the new schools. The prefect system was not regarded with unqualified approval. It tended to give the senior boys a somewhat exaggerated idea of their own importance. Fagging, for instance, made the fag-masters lazy and conceited, and developed in the fags a sense of servility, which was one of the traits in the German character which they were out to eradicate. Discipline, obedience, yes; but servility, no. But the prefect system had the great merit that it inculcated a sense of responsibility into the boys; that part of it at least must be incorporated. These new boarding-schools, therefore, fifteen in number, started in 1933, were modelled in more than one respect upon our English Public Schools. They bear the formidable name of *Nationalpolitische Erziehungsanstalten*, mercifully

abbreviated for conversational purposes to Napolas or Napolis. As the title implies, the chief aim is to give a political education. But the word "politics" in Germany is made to cover anything you can possibly think of. Until this year they were the only schools with these pretensions, but it has been found that between seventy and eighty per cent. of the boys have been making their careers afterwards in some branch of the fighting forces, and that, therefore, they will hardly have much opportunity for politics in their after-life. So this year a new type of school is being started, the "Adolf Hitler Schools." They are to contain only those boys who are going to make politics exclusively their career. They are to be attached to the *Hitler Jugend*—that is to say, they are to be a Party, and not a State concern, and there is to be one in each National Socialist province, or *Gau*—thus thirty-two in all. They are starting this year—some of them have already started—with only one form consisting entirely of boys of twelve. Next year these boys all move up into a second form, and a new lot will come and take their places below them, and so the schools will grow up systematically a form a year until in six years' time they will have reached their full strength with six forms of boys ranging from twelve to eighteen. I am told on good authority that the education in these schools will be very similar to that given now in the Napolas. The two types of school will presumably run on roughly parallel lines, for they are both training select bodies of boys, one to be leaders in the purely political field, and the other to be leaders in all branches of life, particularly in the fighting forces.

I think it is worth while now to consider this education somewhat more closely. I spent the whole of last year in one of these Napolas, and visited a large number of other boarding-schools in Germany; and I propose now briefly to describe the kind of life the boys live there. None of these fifteen schools contains more than four hundred boys, so that the competition to get in to them is tremendous. Money has nothing to do with it, and, as far as I could see, brains have not very much either. The qualifications are roughly threefold. Firstly, the boys must be racially sound—that is to say, they must be able to produce a pair of highly respectable Aryan parents, grandparents and great-grandparents, and the parents must have good records as loyal National Socialists. Secondly, they must be physically fit—the standard of physical fitness is extraordinarily high. And thirdly, they must look reasonably honest (though their honesty is sometimes taken for granted if they have fair hair and blue

eyes). They do have to have attained a certain standard in work, but that standard could hardly be called an exacting one. Each year from a vast number of applications a certain number are chosen provisionally and are summoned to the school, where they have to remain a week under observation, or on approval, or whatever you like to call it. At the end of the week the wheat is sifted from the chaff, the chaff is sent home, and the wheat is admitted to the official membership of the school. The parents pay according to their means and the State provides the rest, for these schools are a State concern, and are administered by a special department in the Board of Education. For the first two or three years the parents were somewhat hesitant about sending their sons to these schools. Nothing was really known about them. They were still in the experimental stage. But now that they are officially recognised as the best schools in the country, the consent of the parents is almost taken for granted if their son should be admitted: in fact, the parent is hardly consulted in the matter, for it is the headmasters of the primary schools who send in the names of candidates. This is another example of the way in which the parent to-day is being gradually forced into the background.

In conformity with the fashion prevalent in Germany to-day, both boys and masters wear a military uniform, and the schools are run on purely military lines. But they are not military academies like Sandhurst or Woolwich, for although the vast majority of the boys are going into the army, the schools claim to be training them for all branches of life. This love of militarism is really part of the national character, in the same way as we are apt to associate the Englishman with a love of sport. In England we constantly hear the sportsman held up as a model type and an example to follow. In Germany it is the soldier: the boys are taught to develop a soldierly attitude towards life. This ideal of the soldier is something far deeper than the mere desire to have a huge army; it includes aspirations to thoroughness, loyalty, courage and self-sacrifice. There is no technical military training in these schools such as we attempt in our O.T.C. to-day, for the boys all go later into the army to do their two years' service. But they do indulge in what one might call a pre-military training, which is a mixture of scouting and O.T.C. work. They carry out admirable schemes very similar to our Field Days, but without rifles. Instead, each boy has a white or red band tied round his arm, and he is allowed to go on fighting until the band is wrenched off him by an enemy.

The result is that the battle invariably ends in a hand-to-hand tussle, instead of having to be cut short by an umpire just when it is beginning to get exciting. I took part myself in one night scheme last summer. It was a form of rear-guard action, and I found myself confronted with having to swim across a very deep, cold, dirty river at two a.m. with all my clothes on. But it is significant, I think, that these military exercises should rank as games, and be every bit as popular with the boys as football or athletics.

Games take up a very large part of the day's programme. There is no specialising. They are not out to produce record-breakers, but boys who have reached a reasonable degree of efficiency in a large number of games. The Germans demand roughly two things of a game: firstly, it must develop the muscles efficiently; and secondly, it must be a form of *Kampfsport*—that is to say, it must give ample scope for the fighting spirit. So that games like tennis, squash, fives, are considered too tame a pastime, and are consequently not encouraged. The games in these schools are almost entirely organised by the masters. Moreover, in almost all the school activities there is much more concentration of power in the hands of the masters than in English schools. I thought this rather odd considering that one of their slogans is " Youth must be led by Youth," and I asked why, if the schools claimed to be training leaders, the boys were given so little responsibility and so few opportunities to lead. I was told that this would come gradually, but that until the schools really got under way it was safer to leave authority vested in the masters. But I am not quite sure about that. Giving boys responsibility means allowing them a considerable amount of freedom of action; and I think it is highly doubtful whether the authorities are prepared to grant them this freedom. For freedom of action inevitably leads to freedom of thought, and that is a thing they are out at all costs to prevent at present. The whole system, not only in education, but in every department of State, is so conceived that no matter how high a man may be in his profession, there is always someone immediately above him who directly controls him and to whom he has to submit his reports. The tendency is that after a revolution and under a dictatorship people are afraid to make decisions for themselves. They are afraid of losing their jobs, and they are constantly handing on all doubtful cases to the authority immediately above them: and this can hardly be said to be the best atmosphere for acquiring the qualities of leadership. The headmasters of these schools, for

example, are all exceedingly fine men, men of great personality, but their office of headmaster is little better than that of a clerk. Every single detail of organisation, every change of programme has to be referred to Berlin, and high officials of State may at any time descend upon the school and demand to inspect such and such a department without warning.

The National Socialist outlook imposes itself upon everything, and in these schools it is perhaps, if anything, more accentuated than elsewhere. Every single subject is taught with the sole idea of making the boys better Nazis. No subject, therefore, has for them any intrinsic value at all. Art for Art's sake is a decadent doctrine. The schools where classics are studied have been ruthlessly cut down in number; and recently all Latin words were abolished in the schools, and they are inventing new German words as substitutes. Latin, in fact, is of very little use to them except as a means of finding out what Tacitus or Cæsar thought about the Germans. History and Literature must be rewritten and reinterpreted in the light of the new ideas. Volumes are being produced on the subject, and as they have not yet all been finished, the official attitude is in doubt on many points. New problems are cropping up daily—How are we to interpret such and such a fact? Can we recognise so and so? Must we cut out this chapter?—and so on. It was, for instance, for long a matter of sharp dispute as to what the official attitude towards Goethe should be. Here was a man who made self-culture an end, who was a confirmed anti-patriot, who welcomed the arrival of Napoleon into Germany with outstretched arms, and whose life-long opinion it had been that Prussians were no better than barbarians. On the other hand, he was unquestionably the greatest name in German literature, and to disown him would be to offend countless millions. It was felt, therefore, that something must be done to save him. So the big men in the Wilhelm Strasse got out their Goethes and began ransacking his entire works in the hope that they might perhaps be able to find anyhow a few passages in which he was not wholly hostile to the new ideas. His saving grace was, of course, his Aryan extraction. Otherwise he would have gone the way of Heine and Mendlessohn and others. He was too essentially a man of many moods, and all these moods are reflected in his profuse works. So these unscrupulous pillagers succeeded in collecting a sufficient number of quotations, which, when cunningly strung together, made it appear that Goethe would perhaps have been sympathetic with at any rate a few aspects of the Movement. But this was not enough for them.

As you know, the German mind is incapable of compromise: a thing is either black or white. So finally Goethe was made the subject of a public oration in which Baldur von Schirach, the *Reichsjugendführer*, addressed a mass meeting at Weimar, in which he publicly hailed Goethe as the precursor of National Socialism. The great man must have turned in his grave; but the excitement in scholastic circles was tremendous. University professors, whose sole income derived from lectures on Goethe and who had seen themselves on the point of losing their jobs, now took on a new lease of life. Everyone, in fact, could breathe again. This is merely an example of what is going on in scholastic circles all over Germany to-day, and more particularly amongst historians. Professor Roberts in his book *The House that Hitler Built* feels very strongly on this subject. He writes these words:

"There is probably nothing more revolting in Germany, not even in the stories of physical atrocities, than the degradation of professional historians."

I think perhaps the word "tragic" might be substituted for "revolting," for one cannot help sympathising with them. If you talk to them, they will tell you quite frankly that their children must eat; that is the reason for a lot that is going on in Germany to-day.

The religious instruction given in these schools is, needless to say, based on a National Socialist faith. Until recently Catholic and Evangelical instruction was voluntary, and a priest used to come from the neighbouring town or village and take classes of any boys who wanted it. But the attitude of the masters was either indifferent or openly scornful. The boys were primed with embarrassing questions to ask the priest. The classes dwindled, and finally the priests were told that they were not to come any more, which incidentally is a breach of the 1933 Concordat. Now religion is taught by the masters as a school subject with the idea of providing a National Socialist background, based largely on the works and utterances of Alfred Rosenberg, whose *Myth of the Nineteenth Century* is regarded as a classic work on the subject. The boys are taught to take every opportunity they can to ridicule the Church. They are taught not so much to renounce Christianity as to interpret it in a new fashion. In the words of Herr Kerrl, the Minister for Church affairs:

"Christ must be taught according to the laws of our time and circumstances. The content of Christ's teaching must be altered. There has now arisen a new authority as to what Christ and Christianity really are. This new authority is Adolf Hitler."

"It is not Christianity," writes Rosenberg, "that has brought us civilisation. What lasting values there are in Christianity are owed to the German character." Well, in order, as it were, to add a little artistic versimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative, these schools have evolved new kinds of services. There is, for example, the *Morgenfeier*, which is equivalent to Morning Prayers. This takes place generally in the school hall, which is in some cases a converted chapel, now swathed in blood-red swastika banners. The service consists usually of a series of recitals of short patriotic poems or stirring events from the history of National Socialism, interspersed with music of a highly martial and patriotic flavour. Then again there is the *Sonnenwendfeier* which takes place at the winter and summer solstices. On this occasion the whole school assembles on a neighbouring hill round a huge bonfire. The whole thing has been carefully rehearsed beforehand. Out of the ranks of boys lined up in military formation single voices are raised intoning some article of the new faith or extracts from one of Adolf Hitler's speeches. Then at a given signal the whole school bursts out into one of their songs. Finally the headmaster gives an address in which he stresses the significance of the ceremony, a thanksgiving for God's eternal gift of the sun, and points out how they are acting in the same way that their forefathers did many centuries ago. It would be possible to go on quoting examples, but I hope I have made clear the main characteristics of this education. I have purposely devoted most time to this stage, firstly because I know most about it, and secondly because it is the longest and in many ways the most important stage of the education of these children—they stay there from ten to eighteen—and it is the stage one hears least about in England.

At the age of eighteen the boys leave and go to a Labour Camp where, by virtue of having been at a Napola, they are almost automatically promoted to the leadership in their particular group. These Labour Camps are probably too well known to need description. They are the show-piece to all visitors to Germany. The Germans are proud of them, and they have every right to be proud of them. They must not be looked upon merely as a device for solving the unemployment problem or as a disguised form of military service. They are now an essential part of the national scheme of education. The idea is to unite all classes throughout the country in a common task, and to make them realise that work is not merely a means of earning money, but the moral basis of national life. But, of course, these camps provide

another excellent opportunity for drilling a little more politics into the boys. Although they rise at six, work with hardly a break until two-thirty, play games vigorously during the afternoon, they are made to listen between five and six to a lecture on some aspect of the régime. I was told that the boys are usually so completely exhausted by the labours of the day that a row of hefty sergeants has to be imported with orders to prod anyone showing signs of falling asleep. The sergeants are kept very busy, I believe.

After the Labour Camp the boys do their two years' service with the army, and then they are free either to go to a university or join any trade or profession they choose. But that does not mean that they have finished with politics. Their political education still goes on. No student at the university is allowed to take his degree unless he has done his quota of political parades with the University Party organisation. Further, in every single town and village there is a branch of the S.A. or S.S., and nearly all professions and trades have their own organisations, in which politics figure largely. Everyone who wants to get on in his profession, and all those who are afraid of getting chucked out, feel they must join these organisations. So they have to spend their evenings listening to lectures, and their spare time in parading at some colossal demonstration. It would seem that the Government is afraid that if a man is allowed to drop his political education, he will at once fall back on evil ways and begin trying to think for himself.

Such, then, is the education for all except the select few who are to make politics their career. They, as I said, will from this year on go to an "Adolf Hitler School" at the age of twelve. Then at eighteen they will go through the Labour Camp and the army in the same way as everyone else. After this they are expected either to go to a university or to take up some profession until they are between twenty-four and twenty-five, at which point a voluntary muster is held of all those who left the "Adolf Hitler Schools" seven years earlier. A thousand of these (out of a possible four thousand) are chosen to undergo further education at a series of *Ordensburgen* or *Führerschulen*—leader schools, as they are called. These are coming into being this year. For the first year they will go to Burg Crössensee in Pomerania, where they will receive an extensive training in a large number of sports and will learn something about the new racial doctrines. The next year they spend at Burg Vogelsang in the Eifel where the training, both physical and mental, is somewhat more

specialised. Then for the next eighteen months they go to the Bavarian Alps, to Burg Sonthofen, where they learn the art of skiing and mountain sports. They spend half their time in the Burg and the other half in a series of mountain huts for periods of six weeks at a time. The last six months are devoted slightly more to the development of the intellect, at Marienburg in East Prussia. There they learn the secret of Germany's Eastern policy and the art of propaganda. For three months in each year they are let out from these Burgs and are given some administrative job in the provinces. This is firstly to give them a little practice in their future profession, and also to allow the people they relieve, the *Gauleiters*, *Ortsgruppenführers* and others, to go and have a refresher course themselves in one of the Burgs. Further, arrangements are being made for a huge " Kraft durch Freude " hotel of two thousand beds to be built in the neighbourhood of each of the Burgs. This is to keep the Junkers, as they are called, in touch with the outside world; for it is feared they would lead too monastic a life in the solitude of their Burgs. It also enables the people to come and view their heroes at close quarters and to see for themselves that they are really developing their muscles properly and not just idling their time away on the fat of the land. It will serve the additional purpose, too, of allowing the wives and families of the Junkers to come and spend some part of the year near them. For one of the reasons of the four-years interval between the time they leave the army and the time they join the first Burg is to give them an opportunity to find a wife. I am told there is very little hope of anyone being selected unless he has got a wife to his credit.

But even that is not the final stage of their education. There is to be yet one more school, one higher school still, which is to stand at the pinnacle of the Nazi education scheme. It is not yet decided how many are to be admitted within its portals, but it is to be directly under the control of Alfred Rosenberg, and is to consist of three parts: firstly a research institute for political philosophy, secondly an academy training the teaching staff of the Adolf Hitler Schools and the *Ordensburgen*, and thirdly a monthly camp in the form of a refresher course for the staffs of the *Ordensburgen*.

Well, such briefly is the scheme. One certainly cannot accuse it of lacking ambition. It is, I think, a typical product of modern Germany. A thing is not worth doing unless it is done on some colossal scale. It must beat all previous records. But the disadvantage of such a scheme seems to me to be that, though its good points may be more striking and impressive, its weaknesses

are also bound to be in proportion, and weaknesses on a large scale are often very difficult to eliminate. But what, one may ask, will be the final product of this education? Will he be a man, a super-man or a machine? It is an interesting speculation. Boys of twelve are entering the "Adolf Hitler Schools" this year for the first time. We have therefore seventeen years to wait before they will finally have finished their education. It is a long time, and much water will have flowed under the bridge by then.

It is easy to criticise, I know, and perhaps I may have been unduly critical in places. It is because the basic principles of this education are so utterly alien to British ways of thinking. But I hope I have not conveyed the impression that the boys are in any way subdued or tyrannised. On the contrary, I think it is true to say that the youth of Germany to-day are more buoyant with vital energy than perhaps ever before. They have such faith in their leader and in the régime that they genuinely believe that what they are ordered to do is exactly what they would want to do themselves if the choice were left in their hands. In fact, the theory is that the individual has for the first time been allowed to win a genuine freedom, in that he has been freed by the State from such shackles as Christianity, party politics, and class conventions which in the past have hampered him from developing along those lines which are decreed by biological laws, and which are therefore natural to him. How long it is possible to keep up this enthusiasm, whether in fact it is possible at all so to crush a person's individuality at birth that it will never again want to assert itself, are questions to which I can see no clear answer. But whichever way one looks at it, one is led to the conclusion that the permanency of National Socialism is likely to depend to a very large extent on the success or failure of the new education. "The foundation of every State is the education of its youth."

Summary of Discussion.

QUESTION: What provision was made for the women and girls in Nazi Germany? Was their education also strictly supervised?

MR. ROWAN-ROBINSON replied that their education continued roughly as before up till the age of eighteen, but they were organised into Youth formations. There was the *Bund Deutscher Mädel* and the *Jungmädel* corresponding to the *Hitler Jugend* and the *Jungvolk*. They had started Women's Labour Camps which they were always threatening to make compulsory, but they had not been brave enough to do so yet. Only the women who were to become leaders of these Camps received any special instruction, otherwise the three K's, Kinder, Küche, and Kirche were once again the order for women in

Nazi Germany. They were relegated to household duties and their place considered to be the home. They were not encouraged to study or to go to the Universities.

MR. A. G. DICKSON said that in 1933 he had visited the leaders' school at Potsdam and had arranged subsequently an exchange with boys from his own Public School, Rugby. As far as he could see the whole thing had been an unqualified failure. The English boys had not been specially selected. They had been told that those possessing the means might go to Germany after Christmas, and so quite the wrong type of boy had gone, the type who thought it would be a good idea to spend some of the Christmas holidays in Germany and get out of the first week of term's work. The Germans on their side chose boys who they thought would be completely impervious to any influence or impressions they might receive.

He had spent a lot of time during the last three years with the Hitler Youth, and he thought the possibilities of a breakdown of the system fairly certain. The German Youth movement had always been one of continuous revolt. Although Fichte had played a large rôle after Jena, the real movement of national revolt had come from the youth of Germany, organised in the *Burschenschaften*, which culminated in the historic meeting on the Wartburg, when a corporal's cane and a soldier's pigtail had been burned as being symbolic of political reaction and autocratic rule. The German Youth movement in the beginning had been wholly spontaneous, and organised by the boys themselves. The speaker did not consider that German Youth was entirely happy either in the new schools or in the Hitler Youth. The influence of the family to-day was stronger than it had ever been, and the family, as much as the Church, was going to stand out finally in opposition to the Government. He had talked with the boys, and was certain that they saw the emptiness of the slogan : Youth will be led by Youth. To use a metaphor, in the rucksack of every German boy was the Field Marshal's baton, certainly the baton of the German soldier, but it was also just as much the baton of the conductor, the German musician. Just because it was being repressed now and overridden, the musical and romantic strain in German youth would revolt as it had always done.

A MEMBER said that her experience had been somewhat different from that of the last speaker. She had been educated in a German school in Alsace before the War, and her feeling had been then and was to-day that the Germans did not know the meaning of freedom. Consequently the system of to-day was not so very different from the one she had known. Many details even were the same. They had always had to listen to an oration, for instance, on the Kaiser's birthday. The same principles had been there in a much milder form.

MR. RENNIE SMITH asked what was the actual religious teaching given to the boys? He understood that the teachings of Rosenberg were supposed to filter down to the Adolf Hitler Schools and so on.

The responsible leaders of Christianity in Great Britain had hinted between the lines of what they said on the subject that the actual religion which was being taught was in substance not to be reconciled with Christianity.

The second speaker had been optimistic that out of this education would come forth a revolt of German youth, and he had quoted the experience of a generation ago. The same argument had been applied by Lord Chelmsford with regard to the Bolshevik youth and their system of training. But the speaker felt a little sceptical in the present case. What did the lecturer think of the prospect of the emergence of independent free-thinking men under these totally new conditions?

MISS WARNER asked whether these new German schools had terms. Did the boys go home for the holidays as in Great Britain at present? During such holidays, if they existed, were the children quite free to be with their parents, or were they controlled by compulsory attendance at *Hitler Jugend* organisations or in any other way? Was there any system of rewards and badges in the schools? The lecturer had said that the prefectorial system was not being used very thoroughly. Were there any marks for progress and behaviour such as stripes or badges?

The speaker had come into occasional contact with the *Hitler Jugend* and with groups belonging to the corresponding organisation for girls. Each time she had noticed that it seemed to be the most unintelligent girl who had been chosen for a responsible position. She had also noticed this on the few occasions she had met leaders of the boys. Had the lecturer had a similar experience?

MR. ROWAN-ROBINSON replied that the boys all belonged automatically to the *Hitler Jugend*. When they went home for the holidays they joined their local branch of the organisation. In addition, they had to go on organised tours with the masters during some of the holidays. Then in the summer holidays all the fifteen schools had a huge camp in a different part of Germany every year, and they all met and did military exercises together for a fortnight. Therefore the time that was left for them to be with their families was cut very short indeed, and was being cut shorter every year.

With regard to promotion, the schools were run on military lines, and therefore the boys advanced through the various ranks as in the army. When a boy was officially admitted to the school he was given a small dirk, which was considered a great honour. There were medals for sport and military exercises. The boys had to pass certain tests to gain these. There was no competition, it was simply a matter of being up to a certain standard.

A GUEST said that she had visited the largest centre for the training of Hitler Girls, the leaders, and she had been absolutely astonished at the stupidity of the girls chosen to control no less than two thousand other girls. One of these future leaders had been asked why she had joined the organisation, and had replied : " Because the Leader wished

us to." She was then asked why the Leader wanted this, and was told that it was in order to build a better Germany. On being asked what kind of a better Germany she desired, the girl had answered : " What the Leader wishes." These were not children but girls who had been promoted to a very high rank, and one of their tasks later would be to see that the girls under them learnt the Nazi Weltanshauung.

Had the lecturer heard of the attempt of certain boys who had been forced to join the *Hitler Jugend* to re-form the old *Bündische Jugend*, another form of Youth Movement which had existed previously? The boys attempting this had been imprisoned.

QUESTIONS : Was there anything corresponding to a Parents' Council in the new German schools? Did they attempt to educate the parents too, or were they considered to be a generation about whom it was no longer necessary to bother?

What was the nature of the supreme authority in Berlin to which even the headmasters were subservient? Was there a kind of Supreme Educational Council? Was it on the other hand a one-man show?

MR. ROWAN-ROBINSON replied that there were still one or two schools in Germany in which the parents had a direct interest. One of the best-known boarding-schools in Germany was of this type. The parents had formed a kind of syndicate, and really partially owned the school, but this kind of thing was gradually dying out now, and the parents had less and less influence on their children when at school.

The new schools were directly under the Minister for Education, who had appointed a body of men under him to look after all the fifteen schools. These men formed part of the Civil Service. They had mostly been teachers in schools before they joined the Civil Service, and they chose the headmasters and staffs of the fifteen schools.

MR. R. BIRLEY said that the thing which had staggered him most in Germany had been when he had met a professor from Berlin University who had read two articles in an English Quarterly Review on the antiquity of London, discussing whether the City continued straight through from Roman times. The professor had said that any question which went back to the origin of the race was highly dangerous, and he was surprised that there was a country in which such articles were allowed. It was true that history went back to pre-history and so to anthropology and eventually to biology. The lecturer had stated that the Nazi knew there were certain things, such as Christianity, class conventions, etc., which prevented men from following their true biological end. Biology did seem to be the foundation of all Nazi philosophy. What, then, did the teaching of biology in these schools really come to?

QUESTION : What was the teaching programme in the present schools and in the new schools which had been described?

MR. ROWAN-ROBINSON quite agreed that a great many people in authority in Germany to-day had a very low degree of intelligence.

The two leaders in the school in which he had been teaching had been unquestionably the two stupidest boys in the school. People were not encouraged to think for themselves. If people thought, they might think differently, and the whole point to-day in Germany was—and this had been echoed by a member of the Board of Education visiting one of the schools—that it did not matter what people thought as long as they all thought the same.

Biology was undoubtedly the most important subject in all the schools. It was no longer studied objectively. It was the means by which the children learned about heredity and racial hygiene and other matters connected with politics.

The children learned all the ordinary subjects, but they were no longer taught objectively. The whole teaching was coloured politically, and its whole aim was to make the boys better National Socialists.

The second speaker had thought that music and the cultural strain would reassert themselves. That was the great problem of Germany to-day. Would culture forever remain at its present low ebb? It was a difficult problem. Looked at from the purely cultural point of view, it was true that the Germanic genius had lain always in individualism. German literature was pre-eminently a literature of individualism. On the other hand, from the purely political point of view, individualism had been very largely responsible for the failure of any attempt in the past to unite Germany as a nation. The Church had always been a great obstacle to national consolidation. Antagonism between State and Church was not new in Germany, nor was it surprising. It had been said that one of the problems of the Middle Ages was the reconciliation between the Germanic national spirit and Christianity. Throughout her history Germany had been immersed in religious struggles. In the nineteenth century Bismarck met with stern opposition from the Catholic Church and had to admit defeat in his 'Kulturkampf.' Hitler was trying to carry Bismarck's work of national consolidation one stage further. He realised that the two obstacles to national unity were, firstly, individualism, and secondly the power of the Church, and he was endeavouring to crush both these by his doctrine of the totalitarian State. This automatically led to gradual crushing of culture in its many forms. After a revolution this was a common enough sign. The only hope was that as the pendulum had swung so far in one direction it must, being a pendulum, swing in the other direction, but for the present there was no sign of this change.

It seemed that a combination of history and geography had rendered a spirit of nationalism, in the sense that Hitler conceived it, quite incompatible with a high level of culture.

MAJOR B. T. REYNOLDS (in the Chair) said that the tendency to anticipate a revolt of German youth against the present system all too often sprang from the hope that something of the kind would take place. It seemed fairly evident that, given time, there would be some reaction. But it was probably too early to expect this yet.

THE NUTRITION REPORT.[1]

By Dame JANET M. CAMPBELL.

THE Mixed Committee on the Problem of Nutrition was appointed, under the chairmanship of Lord Astor, by the Council of the League of Nations in 1935, following a resolution adopted by the Sixteenth Assembly requesting the nomination of a committee, including agricultural, economic and health experts, to submit a general report on the whole question of nutrition in its health and economic aspects. The same resolution also desired the Council to invite the Health Organisation of the League to continue its work on nutrition, and to instruct the technical organisations of the League, in consultation with the International Labour Office and the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome, to collect information on the same subject.

The appointment of the Mixed Committee, which was fully representative of the public health, economic, agricultural and scientific aspects of this many-sided problem, came at a time when the world had just experienced the evils of a long and severe economic depression. It not only made its own investigations, but it encouraged and centralised national and international inquiries on this subject which had been taking place for some years. The Mixed Committee was confronted with a vast field of work. Much knowledge was already available as to conditions in Europe and countries of Western civilisation, and there was sufficient similarity between these countries to enable a practical inquiry to be begun forthwith. It was obvious, on the other hand, that much preliminary work would be necessary in the Far East, in Asia and in Africa before actual investigations could be begun. Therefore it was decided to exclude inquiries in tropical regions and Far Eastern countries, but to draw the attention of the Assembly to the urgency of arranging for investigations there through other appropriate bodies. The Committee published an *Interim Report,* which was presented to the Assembly in 1936. This consisted of four volumes.[2]

Vol. I. The Interim Report on the Problem of Nutrition. This is the report proper, and deals primarily with the relation of nutrition to health.

Vol. II. Report on the Physiological Bases of Nutrition. This was drawn up by a Technical Commission of scientists appointed in 1935 by the Health Committee of the League, their reference being to define the nutritional needs of the human being in the course of development from conception to adult age.

Vol. III. Nutrition in Various Countries. Post-War problems are discussed, and accounts given of measures taken in different countries by the State, or national organisations, to improve nutrition.

Vol. IV. Statistics of Food Production, Consumption and Prices. This report was prepared by a Sub-Committee of the Mixed Committee on which the International Labour Office and the International Institute of Agriculture were represented. It sets out the statistical information which is available, stresses the incompleteness and doubtful accuracy of many of the figures, and formulates recommendations to be made by the League to governments and to municipal

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[1] Final Report of the Mixed Commission of the League of Nations on the relation of nutrition to health, agriculture and economic policy. [A. 13. 1937, IIA.] 1937. (Geneva: League of Nations; London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 327 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

[2] Vol. I, 2*s*.; Vol. II., 6*d*.; Vol. III, 5*s*. 6*d*.; Vol. IV, 3*s*.

authorities for the improvement and completion of statistics, particularly as regards the production and consumption of protective foods. The report also describes measures of financial assistance to agriculture, and gives examples of the nature and cost of a policy of government intervention. There is a series of Appendices giving tables of production, consumption, etc.

In 1937 the Mixed Committee presented its *Final Report* on the *Relation of Nutrition to Health, Agriculture and Economic Policy* to the Assembly. This report is divided into three parts, and sets out the views of the Committee on the nutrition problem as a whole, in its health as well as in its economic and agricultural aspects.

The bulk of the report deals with the economic and agricultural aspects of the nutrition problem. A study was made of recent tendencies in habits of food consumption, taking the principal articles of food in general use. There appears everywhere a tendency towards an increase in the use of dairy products, eggs, fruit and vegetables, and a reduction in the amount of energy-producing foods consumed, such as cereals and potatoes. There is a striking increase in sugar consumption in certain countries. The available data suggest that all classes have shared in the general improvement in dietary habits. This improvement is due partly to a better understanding of food values, but also to the modified physiological requirements which have followed mechanisation in industry (less expenditure of muscular energy); reduction of hours of work; and a rise in the proportion of persons engaged in quasi-sedentary occupations. A general expansion of national incomes has assisted workers to purchase more of the relatively costly protective foods, and many such foods have at the same time declined in price.

The way in which agriculture has adapted itself to changes in demand is then examined. The rôle of agriculture should clearly be positive, not merely adaptive. As the movement towards better nutrition grows, the demand for more and cheaper protective foods will need to be satisfied, though this should not necessarily involve a reduction in the energy-bearing foods. An interesting example of these newer tendencies is the development of horticulture, notably fruit- and vegetable-growing, in all parts of the world.

Food prices necessarily exercise great influence in determining consumption levels, and price elasticity is discussed at considerable length. In general, prices may be regarded as an " index of the degree to which the potential demand for a commodity can be satisfied by the available sources of supply." The supply of foodstuffs depends mainly on the commercial policy in operation, the production and price policy, and the cost of distribution. Conditions under which foreign food supplies are allowed to enter national markets exercise an important influence on food prices. Unfortunately, from the point of view of nutrition, import restrictions have tended to become more severe, especially since the economic depression in 1929, whether from a desire to defend national agricultural systems, or to secure a surplus, or to protect foreign exchange reserves, or even as retaliation against foreign tariffs. The effects of restriction are shown, first, in the volume of trade, in prices, and in consumption; and, secondly, in the volume and kind of production and the structure of domestic agricultural systems. Trade restrictions which raise food prices are likely to have an adverse effect on nutritional standards, and the report urges governments to take this into consideration in framing commercial and economic policy.

Family income has an obvious bearing on nutrition. Expenditure

on food is influenced not only by limitation of total income, but also by habits, tastes and conventional standards of living, which vary with occupation, urbanisation, etc. Improvement in the quality of the diet usually accompanies increased expenditure, consumption of bread, cereals and margarine tends to fall, and of protective foods to rise. When income is limited, the more numerous the family the less is the absolute food expenditure per consumption unit, and perhaps the most significant feature is the decline in the use of milk. Different measures have been applied for the purpose of supplementing incomes in the lower income groups—for example, through different methods of regulating wage incomes; through public works, unemployment subsidies, tax subsidies, tax remission, etc.; and through the provision of essential foods, such as milk, to mothers, infants and children.

Educational propaganda may exercise a profound and beneficial influence on national dietary habits, and in suitable form should be available for all sections of the population, urban and rural.

It is not easy to summarise in a short review the store of information contained in this comprehensive series of reports. There is, perhaps necessarily, a good deal of overlapping and repetition, and the reports themselves must be studied to gain an idea of the wealth of statistical and technical material given in the tables and in the descriptions of conditions in various countries. The exhaustive discussion of the whole subject, and the general principles submitted for the consideration of governments, have attracted attention all over the world. The extreme complexity of the problem is recognised, and the Committee does not attempt to offer ready-made solutions; but the keen interest aroused should make it impossible to neglect the practical recommendations put forward with such weight of authority for the continuation of the work both on an international basis under the guidance of the League of Nations, and in different countries through National Nutrition Committees.

For the first time it has been clearly stated, with international authority, that the nutrition of a people is a matter of grave public concern; that it is not sufficient for doctors and scientists to lay down the requirements of an adequate dietary, but that producers of food-stuffs must be able to provide the necessary constituents in sufficient quantity at reasonable prices, and that production depends not only on the competence of agriculturists, but also on the assistance given to them to overcome economic and political difficulties outside their own control. Throughout the reports the Committee emphasises the importance to health of protective food-stuffs; the provision of an adequate supply available for all classes may involve the reorganisation of agriculture, the modification of commercial policy, financial assistance to industries or to groups of persons, and educational propaganda to persuade both producers and consumers to make full use of the knowledge and facilities placed at their disposal. For most countries this would entail far-sighted schemes of research and reform, but few who have studied the question will disagree with the conclusion that such a policy would be fully justified by the resulting improvement in national health and efficiency. The Committee regards the malnutrition which exists in all countries as at once a challenge and an opportunity; a challenge, as it rightly thinks, to men's consciences, and an opportunity to eradicate a social evil by methods which will increase economic prosperity.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Any book reviewed in this Journal may be obtained through the Publications Department of the Institute. Members of the Institute wishing to cable an order may use, instead of the title of the book, the number which it bears, e.g., "Areopagus, London: Send Book Twenty May Journal: Smith."

Books marked with an asterisk (*) are in the Library of the Institute.

GENERAL

1*. SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1936. By Arnold J. Toynbee, assisted by V. M. Boulter. 1937. (Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Royal 8vo. xiv + 1006 pp. 38*s*. To members of the Institute, 23*s*.)

2*. DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1936. Edited by Stephen Heald, in conjunction with John W. Wheeler-Bennett. 1937. (Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Royal 8vo. xix + 717 pp. 35*s*. To members of the Institute, 22*s*.)

THESE indispensable annual aids to the student of International Relations have for 1936 assumed formidable dimensions. The problem of omission, yearly becoming more pressing, must have been peculiarly acute for 1936. In consequence the Spanish Civil War with its repercussions is held over for treatment in a subsequent volume. Even so the ground covered is very considerable, as the subject-titles show: the German reoccupation of the Rhineland, the relations of Germany with Italy and the U.S.S.R., the situation in Central and South-Eastern Europe, the re-militarisation of the Dardanelles, the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the Palestine Mandate, the situation in the Far East. These titles are sufficient indication of the scope and an adequate explanation of the size of the two volumes.

To assist them in their vast undertaking, Professor Toynbee and Miss Boulter have perforce increased their team of helpers to five. Three are old hands whose work is well known to readers of these Surveys. Mr. H. V. Hodson in his Economic Survey deals clearly and convincingly with the complicated problems of currencies and the end of the Gold Bloc, of the reaction of rearmament on commodity prices and industrial activity. His conclusion that rearmament has had little stimulating effect on commodity prices will be illuminating, if not comforting, to those who thought otherwise. Mr. G. E. Hubbard, in carrying on his authoritative account of events in the Far East, has among others two particularly interesting sections on the Economic and Strategic Relationship of Manchukuo to Japan and the genesis of the German–Japanese anti-Communist agreement. Miss Duff—the variety of whose contributions to these Surveys merits comment—describes the development of Pan-Americanism since 1933, and the liquidation of the Chaco dispute.

The new-comers, Mr. D. A. Routh and Mr. H. Beeley, have won their

spurs at their first appearance. The former's account of the Montreux Convention is a model of lucidity and conciseness, while Mr. Beeley's narrative of conditions in Palestine during 1935–36 is invaluable for an appreciation of the Palestine Commission's problem and solution.

The *pièce de résistance*, as usual, is Professor Toynbee's analysis of the year under review. Needless to say it is both penetrating and provocative. He finds 1936 not quite so heinous as 1935, though Great Britain and France still appear as the villains of the piece in not making a more determined stand against the forces of evil in the guise of a resurgent Germany and a still truculent Italy. Rearmament he admits to be an unfortunate necessity, though pregnant with trouble for the future. He sees in Germany and Russia the new rivals for hegemony in Europe, seeking through the appeal of their ideological propaganda to win the support of weaker States and divide Europe into two camps. In pursuit of this goal both countries find themselves in paradoxical situations, and Professor Toynbee's comparison of German support to Catholic Spain with Richelieu's policy of " Catholic at home, Protestant abroad " is peculiarly apt. He concludes with some account of the rival ideologies, and in so doing treads on delicate ground. It is as well, perhaps, to remind readers of the non-official character of the Survey and to draw attention to the notice printed on the frontispiece of both volumes.

One word of criticism. It is irritating to find so many " pearls " lurking in the copious footnotes. Exigencies of time, perhaps, account for their appearance, but it would add greatly to the ease and pleasure of reading if the extent of the footnotes could be curtailed.

The problem of omission is equally acute for the editor of the *Documents on International Affairs*, but the content of the 1936 volume is comprehensive and forms an essential complement to the Survey. Particularly valuable are the sections on the international status of Belgium, the German campaign against Communism, and Pan-America. It is interesting to note the increasing importance of broadcast speeches in these documents—a sign not only of the technical advances of our age, but also of the methods of modern diplomacy. K. C. BOSWELL.

3. A MIRROR TO GENEVA : Its Growth, Grandeur and Decay. By George Slocombe. Illustrated with drawings by Kelen. 1937. (London : Jonathan Cape. 8vo. 349 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

THIS is journalism at its best. It is the tale of the genesis, the growth, the glories and the decline of Woodrow Wilson's great project. Not only is it told with a fitting sense of the drama, but the *dramatis personæ* are brought singly on to the stage, portrayed, analysed, all but photographed, this omission being made good by Kelen's life-like sketches which illustrate the book. The peculiar charm of the process is the absence of any petty criticism or depreciation : Mr. Slocombe makes us see the best that was in the men who formed and shaped the League. And the scope of the portraiture is proportioned to the greatness of the actor. Briand, Stresemann, Austen Chamberlain, Albert Thomas are pictured in full and appreciative detail; but no injustice is done to the lesser figures, nor even to the failures. A special and deserved tribute is paid to the work of Sir Eric Drummond (now the Earl of Perth) in building up the Secretariat, although his original appointment, says Mr. Slocombe, was intended by Clemenceau as a sardonic joke; but there is a slip in describing his post as " a job worth £10,000 a year." In its general lay-out, and not less in its rich

asides, the book will be valuable material for future historians of the League.
MESTON.

4*. PEACEFUL CHANGE: A Study of International Procedures. By Frederick Sherwood Dunn. 1937. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 8vo vii + 156 pp. $1.50.)

5*. THE PROBLEM OF PEACEFUL CHANGE IN THE PACIFIC Area: A Study of the work of the Institute of Pacific Relations and its bearing on the problem of Peaceful Change. Issued under the auspices of the Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations for the Tenth International Studies Conference, June 1937. By Henry F. Angus. 1937. (London and New York: Oxford University Press. 8vo. vii + 193 pp. 6s.)

THESE two publications originated as data placed before the Tenth International Studies Conference held at Paris last June. The subject discussed by the Conference was "the Peaceful Solution of International Problems—Peaceful Change." Professor Dunn's contribution purports "to relate the material in other reports...to methods of procedure for relieving international tension." It does not in fact relate the one to the other, but it does contain generalisations (Chapters II, III and V) upon the material in other reports and an account of methods of procedure (Chapter IV), the two separately treated.

The generalisations are not very successful, for the author does not distinguish frankly enough between fact and mere diplomatic verbiage. The issues are really two: one is that Germany, Italy and Japan seek power for its own sake, the other that the collapse of international trade has put these and several other States in a very difficult economic position. The latter is a problem to be met by peaceful change, the former is not. Professor Dunn does show that the aggressor States use their economic grievances, true and false alike, to further their political aims, but he could have been more direct and incisive had he not felt impelled to be polite about bogus political–economic theory emanating from Central Europe.

Chapter IV, "The Procedures of Peaceful Change," is useful because it assembles and classifies together in the short space of 43 pages matter otherwise available only in separate places. Chapter I is likewise classification, this time of types of diplomatic motives. Both chapters are elementary, especially Chapter I (most of whose content is treated more penetratingly in Demiashkevich, *Shackled Diplomacy* [1]), but they give a reason for publishing the book—namely, as an aid to beginners in the study of international affairs. Those who attended the Paris Conference were presumably not beginners, and it is therefore difficult to understand the use to which Professor Dunn's book was put.

The opposite is the case with Professor Angus's book. It is a review of ten years' research by the Institute of Pacific Relations with special reference to Peaceful Change. It contains just the sort of excerpts and comments which would be likely to set a conference talking. Land Utilisation, Population Problems, Agrarian Problems and Industrialisation in Japan, China, Korea, the Philippines and Australia are of obvious practical importance. I very much doubt, however, the wisdom of publishing the book in the form in which it was presented at the Conference. The book serves in some sort as a bibliography of Pacific Relations, but it would have been far more usable and about

[1] New York, 1934.

one quarter the length if the sort of short comment usual in a classified bibliography had been substituted for the excerpts and comments which the author rightly thought appropriate for a conference.

RUSHTON COULBORN.

6*. THE PRICE OF EUROPEAN PEACE. By Frank Darvall. 1937. (London: Hodge. Sm. 8vo. 188 pp. 5*s*.)

THE author contends that "the things which all nations want to-day, and for which most of them would fight" include:

"control of all persons . . . belonging to their nationality; control over all economic resources, including markets, necessary to maintain the national group on a living standard not lower than its neighbours; control over means of communication, geographic and strategic points; military advantages sufficient to attain security; freedom from all limitations, *de jure* or *de facto*, from which other States are free, and equality in the possession of privileges."

He declares, further, that statesmanship could bridge the gap between the "Have" and "Have Not" Powers by promising the latter support in their "attempts to secure from others all that they require to give them a position of ethnographical, economic and strategic equality" *vis à vis* the other States of Europe provided that reasonable methods are adopted, and more than a "fair share" is not demanded.

Surely this is more than "statesmanship" could achieve, even were all men rational creatures who honestly wanted peace. Even a slight knowledge, for example, of the ethnographical complexity of Central Europe tends to show that national and economic ambitions frequently conflict. If Germany obtained satisfaction of her national ambitions in Europe, she might well at the same time increase her economic liabilities; to adjust these, again, would involve sacrifice of other minorities, or the security and economic prosperity of other nation States. While these considerations do not invalidate Mr. Darvall's general argument that it is time for statesmen and peoples to consider the price of European peace, nor detract from the value of his analysis of the present situation, they tend to confirm General Smuts' contention, in his critical foreword to the book, that the solution suggested is "not practical politics at present, and even as an ideal scheme will take many years to realise." H. G. LIDDELL.

7*. THE TORCH I WOULD HAND TO YOU. From Speeches and Addresses by Earl Baldwin. 1937. (University of London Press. Crown 8vo. viii + 160 pp. 2*s*. 6*d*.)

WHAT the world most admires in Lord Baldwin are his love of his country and his faith in its greatness; and these qualities pervade this little volume of extracts from his speeches. The torch he hands on is the lamp of duty, truth and patriotism; and his creed is simple. He dreads the mass mind and has no use for purely materialistic views of life; work for others; dogged does it; there is no corner of the world for an Englishman like his own birthplace; and the British Empire is "an instrument of Divine Providence for the promotion of the progress of mankind." It does one good to read those stout words; and not less refreshing, though in a somewhat different mood, is his advice to the budding politician: "Use your common-sense, avoid logic, love your fellow-men, have a profound faith in your own people and grow the hide of a rhinoceros." MESTON.

8*. THE CITIZEN'S CHOICE. By Ernest Barker. 1937. (London: Cambridge University Press. 8vo. ix + 185 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

PROFESSOR BARKER has brought together a number of papers (two of which he read at Chatham House) bearing generally on democracy and the present position of the political thinker. He gives a definition of Democracy which is particularly valuable at a time when there is so much fumbling over its implications :—

> " It is two things. It is a principle of the action of the human spirit—the principle that free spirits, in the area of social and political as well as of individual life, should freely guide themselves to freely determined issues. It is also a system of institutions, operative in a political community, which enables this principle to be realised and serves as the means of its realisation."

Its real danger is standing still : its strength is that it must, like all sound political philosophy, rest on moral foundations. The book is full of clear thinking. MESTON.

9*. THE IMMORTAL HERITAGE : An account of the Work and Policy of the Imperial War Graves Commission during twenty years, 1917–1937. By Fabian Ware. 1937. (Cambridge University Press. Crown 8vo. 81 pp. 2*s.* 6*d.*)

THIS beautiful little book embodies a report presented to the Imperial Conference on the work of the Imperial War Graves Commission by Sir Fabian Ware, who has been its Vice-Chairman since its start. It is a record of twenty years' remarkable achievement, and also a timely reminder of the hideous toll taken by the Great War of the generation which faced it. The dead of the British Empire numbered 1,104,890; if they could be formed in column of fours, the array would reach from Whitehall to Durham. Little more than half of the total lie identified in graves; but altogether the Commission has provided 767,978 graves, scattered in almost every land, those in France and Belgium being of course by far the most numerous. Bodies are still being found on the battlefields at the rate of twenty to thirty a week, and it is still possible to identify from 10 to 15 per cent. of them. The book is charmingly written, with a touching preface by Mr. Edmund Blunden, and it is illustrated by admirable photographs of different cemeteries. MESTON.

10*. LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS: CENTRE D'ÉTUDES ET SOURCES D'INFORMATION. Par A. C. de Breycha-Vauthier. Introduction de T. P. Sevensma. Préface de Joseph Avenol. 1937. (Paris: Pédane. 8vo. 105 pp. 25 *frs.*)

A brief classified list of the principal League documents with a short running commentary on each. It indicates where certain important series, such as the minutes of the Assembly and Council and treaties, may be found, and finally describes the material and system used in the Library of the League of which the author is in charge of the Legal Section. L. V. D.

11. INTERNATIONAL THOUGHTS. THE REFLECTIONS OF A CATHOLIC PACIFIST. By John Nibb. 1937. (London: Elliot Stock. 8vo. 118 pp. 2*s.*)

A very discursive consideration of nationalism and the conditions that make for war. In his extreme condemnation of all expressions of national feeling and patriotism, the writer does not reflect the views of his co-religionists, and does not even attack modern war as contrary to the conditions of Catholic Moral Theology, the method adopted by those Catholics who present a sounder argument for their pacifism. E. Q.

12*. THE FIGHT FOR PEACE. By R. B. Mowat. 1937. (London: Arrowsmith. 8vo. 155 pp. 3s. 6d.)

This book carries on the account of the diplomatic situation in Europe which Professor Mowat brought up to the summer of 1936 in his *Europe in Crisis*. The author believes that during 1937 Europe "turned the corner from war towards peace": his penultimate chapter is headed "The Passing of the War Scare." His aim has been to "see all sides of the international question" and to discuss them in a calm and dispassionate manner. The book should be useful to those who want a short guide to a complicated subject, though it is possible to criticise the arrangement of the material and to feel that Professor Mowat takes a rather rosy view of the aims and achievements of British foreign policy during the period under review. H. G. L.

13*. DÉMOCRATIES EN CRISE: Roosevelt—van Zeeland—Léon Blum. Par Louis R. Franck. 1937. (Paris: Editions Rieders. Sm. 8vo. 79 pp.)

A reprint of lectures given at the Geneva School of International Studies in August 1937. The material is presented in brief and subdivided form and provides a useful "note-book" of salient facts and figures. The author expressly disclaims any intention to offer solutions to the problems he indicates. H. G. L.

14*. DICTATORS AND DEMOCRACIES. By Calvin B. Hoover. 1937. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. 110 pp. 6s.)

Mr. Hoover compares the three dictatorships in order to discover their common points of origin, political technique, philosophy and psychology. As the result of several years' study of the totalitarian States, he is convinced that there is no hope for the survival of parliamentary government in Europe save in a general war—although he is also aware that such a war would "... shake with unprecedented violence the already weakened foundations of capitalist civilisation." Great Britain's foreign policy must in the near future decide "not only whether, but also when, to fight." It would be idle to complain that the "realism" of this book is excessive because it attempts to make the democracies appreciate their insecurity, but it is permissible to doubt all its premisses—for example, that the "existence of the Third Reich is due entirely to the world depression"—and therefore to hope that not all its prognostications will necessarily be fulfilled. H. G. L.

15*. THE INTERNATIONAL WHO'S WHO, 1938. 1937. (London: Europa Publications Ltd., in conjunction with Allen and Unwin. 4to. 1237 pp. £3 3s.)

Over 1000 additional biographies are included in the new edition of this invaluable reference book which has been brought up to date throughout.

16*. HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS (Associations, Bureaux, Committees, etc.) 1938. L. of N. Series, XII. B. International Bureaux. 1937. XII.B 4. (Geneva: League of Nations. London: Allen and Unwin. 4to. 489 pp. $3.00; 12s. 6d.)

Contains names, addresses, officers, finances, objects and activities of nearly 760 organisations, including international bureaux under the direction of the League, official central bureaux and private associations and federations in so far as they have international objects and are not run for profit. Three indexes are provided: a subject index, an alphabetical index, and a geographical index. This edition is a companion volume to the French edition published last year.

17*. RECUEIL DES ACCORDS INTELLECTUELS. 1938. (Paris: League of Nations International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation. 8vo. vi + 232 pp. $2.25; 9s.; subscription price to February 15th, 1938, $1.75; 7s.)

Includes the texts of thirty-six bilateral agreements concluded since 1919, and a few general conventions, such as the League Assembly's

Declaration of the Revision of School Text-Books, the Pan-American Convention on the teaching of history, etc. The results of the application of these agreements up to the beginning of 1938 are summarised in an appendix.

WAR AND SECURITY

18*. COLLECTIVE INSECURITY. By H. M. Swanwick. 1937. (London: Jonathan Cape. 8vo. 285 pp. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

19. COMMONWEALTH OR ANARCHY. By Sir John A. R. Marriott. 1937. (London: Philip Allen. 8vo. 225 pp. 5*s.*)

Place aux dames, though Mrs. Swanwick lays about her with more than masculine vigour. She believes that the League was begotten in wrath and cradled in duplicity; the Powers abound in "tedious protestations of loyalty at Geneva," but "have conspired to neglect and ignore it." There is no use in trying to patch up the Covenant: men must "start in real earnest to make peace by mutual help, the redressing of grievances and the abandonment of childish conceptions of national honour and prestige." The indictment of the Powers (Great Britain included) is scathing and precise; but when she comes to suggestions for a better plan of peace, Mrs. Swanwick is a little disappointing. Time after time she seems on the verge of some concrete proposal, only to swing off into such generalisations as "peace is a way of life," or frontiers are a perennial source of trouble. She would apparently replace Collective Security by Collective Neutrality; but would the fire be any improvement on the frying-pan? The book is passionately honest, and should be a useful irritant to all of us who ought to be thinking out the future of the League.

Sir John Marriott, as becomes a trained historian, approaches the subject with more balance and a kindlier tolerance of human weakness. "All the great wars that have been fought in Europe during the last four centuries," he reminds us, "have been immediately followed by the elaboration of projects to prevent the recurrence of war and to build on enduring foundations a structure of perpetual peace." He then describes in considerable detail the best-known of those projects, from the Great Design of Henri IV down to the Holy Alliance; and an impressive list it is. Had the architects of the League of Nations known all that Sir John Marriott could have taught them, their edifice would have been materially stronger than it is to-day. Yet, as he truly says, the peace-makers of Versailles would have earned the obloquy of the world if they had made no attempt to solve the problem that has baffled Europe for four centuries; and the failure of the League "lies on the war and the men who made it, much more than upon the well-meaning if fallible makers of the Peace." But failed it has, Sir John reluctantly admits, like all its predecessors; and if it is to be reconstructed, we must be "content to start on more modest lines and to aim at more limited objectives." MESTON.

20*. AIR DEFENCE AND THE CIVIL POPULATION. By H. Montgomery Hyde and G. R. Falkiner Nuttall. 1937. (London: Cresset Press. 8vo. xvi + 239 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

21*. WINGED WARFARE. By Squadron-Leader E. J. Kingston-McCloughry. 1937. (London: Cape. 8vo. 286 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

DR. MONTGOMERY HYDE and Mr. Falkiner Nuttall are to be congratulated upon an admirable book, which deals comprehensively

with the problem of the protection of the "man in the street" from the dangers of air attack. Its basis is to some extent the pamphlets issued by the Air Raids Precautions Department of the Home Office, but it supplements them by a mass of additional information. Chapter VII, on the precautions adopted in various European countries, is particularly interesting. The most complete systems seem to be those of Russia and Germany, where the organisation is in the hands of the semi-official associations known as the *Osoaviakim* and the *Reichsluftschutzbund*, with memberships of 13 and 12 millions, respectively.

Another interesting chapter deals with future town-planning in the light of the air menace. Various suggestions, such as the "Hundred New Towns" plan (which the authors favour), and that of the French architect Le Corbusier, whose plan advocates huge six-storey buildings each containing 30,000 people, are analysed. The latter plan is open to the objection that the occupants would probably not have time to reach the gas-proof shelter. It takes an hour to empty one of the newest American sky-scrapers, fitted with express lifts. The authors hold that buildings must be kept low if their occupants are to have a reasonable chance of safety.

Public gas-proof shelters and gas-proof rooms are the "first line of defence." The second is the respirator which the Government is providing (to the number of 30 million), and which should give protection for at least fifteen minutes (until safety can be reached) against the highest concentration of gas likely to be encountered. The authors hold that "gas attacks on the civil population of a country can be rendered of comparatively little effect if the community is properly organised and equipped to meet them." That "if" covers, however, a multitude of precautionary measures; this book shows in clear outline what they are.

From two *obiter dicta* (not essential points) of the authors the reviewer ventures to dissent. The first is their apparent endorsement of General Groves's severe strictures upon the Trenchard Memorandum of 1919, which cut down the Royal Air Force to a total strength of twenty-four and a half squadrons. Such strictures ignore the real difficulties in the way of retaining a large force in the immediate post-War atmosphere. They also credit Germany, Italy and France, in the table on page 33, with the possession of 3500, 2750 and 2700 *first-line* machines, respectively, in March 1937. These figures, in the reviewer's opinion, are considerably too high.

Squadron-Leader McCloughry, who is usually credited with having brought down about twenty enemy aircraft in the Great War, has collected in *Winged Warfare* nearly half that number of essays written by him between 1924 and 1935. One or two are now a little out of date. When that entitled "Whither?" was written in 1926, Germany had not rearmed in the air and our civil air lines had not been extended even to Karachi and the Cape. Possibly the conclusions reached in "The Mediterranean of To-day," while they tally in general with those of Mr. H. C. Bywater (in his address at Chatham House on February 2nd, 1937),[1] might have been a little different if the Abyssinian crisis had occurred before it was written, in 1934. Two papers, "Trenchard's Air Force" and "Aircraft in War," deal thoughtfully with the war aim of aircraft. In the first it is pointed out that, in November 1918, we

[1] Published in the May–June 1937 number of *International Affairs*, pp. 361–387.

were planning to bomb Berlin both from England and Prague, and that "the armistice came just in time to prevent unparalleled destruction and terrorisation." In the other paper it is shown that the defeat of the enemy's fighting force and the bringing of pressure to bear upon his population are for an army consecutive, but for an air force simultaneous processes; an air force wins or loses superiority in the course of its attacks on vital centres. Other papers deal with "Air Navigation," "Policing by Air," and "Wings over India," the last being a fascinating account of a flight from Simla to Quetta and back. J. M. SPAIGHT.

22. LOOK TO YOUR MOAT. By Admiral Sir Barry Domville. 1937. (London: Hutchinson. 8vo. 256 pp. 10s. 6*d*.)

23*. THE ART OF THE ADMIRAL. BY Commander Russell Grenfell. 1937. (London: Faber and Faber. 8vo. 255 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

EMERSON said that England's best admiral could not have anchored her in a more favourable position, and Gladstone's famous Silver Streak article (*Edinburgh Review*, Oct. 1870), was a lament on our "insensibility to the value" of sea-power. "We are," he said, "an essentially incurably maritime Power." Emerson's apothegm might be taken as the text of the Admiral's book, and Gladstone's regret at our backsliding as its justification. It will miss being a text-book, for the style is controversial, but it is of the bull's-eye type that will arouse interest as well as amuse, *e.g.* "It is no more inhuman to starve enemy subjects than for their countrymen to blow my grandmother into pieces." Service tradition has not hardened the Admiral's mental arteries, as can be seen in the chapter on "The Spirit of the Navy," and in his opposition to "specialism," though he rose from the ranks of the specialists. Both the Admiral's and the Commander's arguments show the need of broadening the minds of future admirals. When Parliament debated on the danger to the realm of the then newly formed United Service Club, they missed altogether the real risk of all professional clubs, which is the intensification of the groove. The sailor is far too much a race apart from the men who frequent the other clubs in Pall Mall, and we need to jumble them up together. The active list admirals need to come to Chatham House now and again. The *Daily Telegraph* record of Admiral Darlan's joke is a case when that admirable French sailor made truth and jest meet: "We have been seamen for generations, but my father was an exception. He went wrong and ended up as Minister for Justice." To the sailor our politicians are incomprehensible, and more cunning than foxes.

Both books deal with subjects that may be said to be outside the scope of studies at Chatham House, such as the unfortunate supremacy in the Navy, during the War, of the school that taught defensive and materialistic ideas, and attached more importance to the preservation of our battleships than to the destruction of the enemy. Yet things are so bound up one with another that, in considering international issues, we have to estimate such risks as whether a conflict with Italy might not so weaken the fleet as to leave all our interests in the Pacific at the mercy of Japan. This was true of 1935 and 1936, and remains true to-day, but the argument that the way we fought at Jutland had a similar justification, because the whole Allied cause depended on the preservation of the Grand Fleet, has always rung false. A fifty per cent. material superiority should always bring with it a far greater moral superiority through the confidence it engenders. Besides, Commander Grenfell has no difficulty in showing that we had beyond

the Grand Fleet a reserve battleship strength of thirty-six to four or nine to one, or, counting Dreadnoughts only, of six to nil. All this without counting on a single ship from our allies. There was, then, no call for patience while we built up our strength. In regard, however, to present-day anxieties, there is a measure of truth in Mr. Asquith's opinion, expressed when his responsibilities were greatest, that patience is the most important attribute of a statesman. CARLYON BELLAIRS.

24. DIE CHEMISCHE WAFFE UND DAS VÖLKERRECHT. By Dr. Adolf-Boelling Overweg. 1937. (Berlin: Verlag von E. S. Mittler & Sohn. 8vo. 130 pp. Bibl. *Rm.* 4.50.)

THERE is at present a scarcity of literature on the legal and military aspect of chemical warfare, and this monograph purports to fill up the gap by answering some of the technical questions arising out of the increasing development of this new instrument of war. The author enters into the examination of the various grounds on which the absolute prohibition of the military use of gases has been strenously urged, mainly on humanitarian principles. He does not consider, however, that this kind of warfare is any more inhuman, if confined to the fighting forces, than any other modern weapon. He is equally of the view that complete prohibition is, at any rate, for the present, impossible and he therefore advocates an international regulation of chemical warfare which will prohibit its use against the civil population, but allow it against the armed forces of the enemy. Recent events fully justify the author's conclusion that international action must be taken to put a stop to the dreadful abuses of poison gases against peaceful populations.

C. J. C.

25*. STATISTICAL YEAR-BOOK OF THE TRADE IN ARMS AND AMMUNITION. 1937. IX. 4. (Geneva: League of Nations; London: Allen & Unwin. 4to. 338 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*; $3.)

The 1937 edition of the Statistical Year-Book of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition contains information on the imports and exports of arms, ammunition and implements of war of sixty-two countries and, in addition, sixty-two colonies, protectorates and mandated territories. The aim of the Year-Book is to give all available information on the international trade in the various arms, ammunition and implements intended for use in war, or capable of being so used.

In the first part are given tables showing quantities and values of exports and imports of arms and ammunition. Values are expressed in the national currency of each country, and to assist comparison, the tables include data for the last five years. The second part consists of recapitulatory tables in which the exports and imports of all countries have been converted into a single currency—the former gold dollar. The purpose of this is to show the relation of the trade of each country to the world trade in arms as a whole. Statistics are also given of total world exports and imports for the last five years, showing the fluctuations in world trade in arms. The third part is devoted to detailed trade tables containing data from official publications.

26*. SEEHERRSCHAFT. By Josef März. [*Macht und Erde*, Heft 7.] 1937. (Leipzig: Teubner. 8vo. 60 pp. 90 *pf.*)

Gives a brief account of the position of the major sea Powers in 1937, as brought especially into prominence by events in the Mediterranean.

27. ARMAMENTS: THE RACE AND THE CRISIS. By Francis W. Hirst. 1937. (London: Cobden-Sanderson. 8vo. 171 pp. 5s.)

THIS book can be best described as a "*catalogue raisonné*," and very well *raisonné*, on the armaments problem. It touches in an easy and

amusing form most of the issues implied. In a short compass it does justice to the technical and financial aspect of the question. It groups a great many facts as well as arguments in support of the pacifist doctrine of the economic curse of armaments; but it does not deal equally thoroughly with those modern concepts which see in armaments a particularly attractive type of public work. M. J. BONN.

28*. WAR CAN BE AVERTED: The Achievability of Collective Security. By Eleanor F. Rathbone, M.P. 1938. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 221 pp. 5s.)

A plea for a "strong policy by a group of like-minded States within the League, willing and strong enough to resist aggression and willing also, if only as the price of peace, to make concession for the redress of reasonable grievances." The author examines and discusses alternative methods of averting war: for example, by "limited commitments and by non-resistance." She is trenchant in her criticisms of British policy since the War and as certain of the aims and objectives of what she is advocating as of the need for passionate and self-sacrificing service in its cause. Those who disagree with her will be compelled to justify afresh their "complacent isolationism" or their "woolly-minded idealism." H. G. L.

29*. ARMAMENTS YEAR-BOOK, 1937. Thirteenth Year. (L. of N. Series IX. Disarmament, 1937. IX 3.) 1937. (Geneva: League of Nations; London: Allen and Unwin. 4to. 1113 pp. $6.25; 25s.)

The new volume in this essential reference work contains detailed monographs on the organisation of the army, navy and air force of sixty-four countries, both Members and non-Members of the League, as well as for most colonies and colonial forces in the world. The monographs are divided as in past years into four chapters: (1) Land Army; (2) Air Force; (3) Navy; (4) Expenditure on National Defence.

The up-to-dateness of the volume is shown by the fact indicated in the Preface, that it has been possible in most cases, with the aid of publications appearing at frequent intervals, to follow the changes which have taken place in the miltary organisation of the different countries up to August 1937. As regards budgetary effectives and expenditure on national defence, it has been possible to give figures for 1937 (or 1937–38) for the majority of countries.

30. LUFTMACHT: Gegenwart und Zukunft im Urteil des Auslandes. By F. A. Fischer von Poturzyn. 1938. (Heidelberg: Kurt Vowinckel Verlag. 8vo. 176 pp. *Rm.* 5.80.)

In *Luftmacht* the author, one of the leaders of German civil aviation, contributes a valuable discussion of the possibilities afforded by air-power, destined primarily as an introduction for the general reader but of no small interest also to the expert. In particular the chapters upon Doorcet and his influence upon the development of the conception of independent air-power, and upon the lessons of the Abyssinian and Spanish Wars contain many stimulating observations. The concluding chapters contain summaries of the air-strategy of individual Powers and information on the development of civil aviation in general. H. R.

31. DRIFTING TO WAR: A warning and a prophecy. By Sir Malcolm Campbell, M.B.E. Foreword by the Right Hon. L. S. Amery. 1937. (London: Hutchinson. 8vo. 190 pp. 5s.)

LAW

32. LE MÉCANISME DES SANCTIONS DANS L'ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE DE TRAVAIL. Par A. Berenstein. (Extract de la *Revue Générale de Droit International Public*, Juillet–Août, 1937.) 1937. (Paris: Pedone. 8vo. pp. 446–464).

It is, perhaps, not generally realised that, under the terms of the Treaties of Peace, sanctions were devised, not merely in order to fortify the Covenant

of the League of Nations and combat military aggression, but also to ensure the observance of the Conventions concluded by the International Labour Organisation. Under the terms of Part XIII of the Treaty, the representatives of organised labour could invoke the application of an economic sanction in cases where they felt that they were suffering from the violation of an International Labour Convention. Although sanctions, in this sense, have never been applied, the threat of them has, in the opinion of M. Berenstein, exercised an important influence by securing the redress of grievances against which complaint had been made by the representatives of organised labour. H. P. S. MATTHEWS.

33*. THE DIVERSION OF WATER FROM THE MEUSE. Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series C., Pleadings, Oral Statements and Documents. No. 81. 1937. (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff. 8vo. 568 pp. Maps. Unbound. *Fl.* 9.50; bound *Fl.* 12.00.)

The case concerning the diversion of water from the Meuse which was submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice in August 1936 formed the subject of a judgment rendered by the Court on June 28th, 1937 (Publications of the Court, Series A/B, No. 70).

This volume includes all documents relating to the various stages of the written and oral proceedings before the Court, in particular the memorials filed by the Belgian and Netherlands Governments; the minutes of the public sittings held by the Court, and those of the inspection of the locality carried out by it; and the correspondence exchanged, which is placed in a special section enabling the reader to follow more or less day by day the course of the proceedings. Seven maps, most of them coloured, are inset at the end of the volume.

34. A HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW. By T. J. Lawrence. Eleventh edition, by Percy H. Winfield. 1938. (London: Macmillan. Sm. 8vo. xvi + 207 pp. 3*s.* 6*d.*)

A handy introduction to international legal principles and rulings with full bibliographical references to more complete sources of information on the subjects dealt with.

35*. ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT PUBLIC, 1937. 1937. (Paris: Sirey. 8vo. 606 pp.)

Gives the texts of the most important legislative enactments of the year 1936–37, in all parts of the world. Includes the new Russian, Indian and Irish Constitutions, decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on questions of constitutional law (1935–36), the proclamation of Italian sovereignty over Abyssinia, and the major constitutional changes in Latin-American countries. H. G. L.

36*. LA COMPÉTENCE DE L'ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE DU TRAVAIL. Examen de quatre avis consultatifs rendus par la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale. By C. Wilfred Jenks. 1937. Reprinted from the *Revue de Droit international et de Législation comparée.* Nos. 1 and 3, 1937. (Brussels: Bureau de la Revue, 22 rue des Paroissiens. 8vo. 66 pp.)

37*. ATTACHÉS MILITAIRES, ATTACHÉS NAVALS ET ATTACHÉS DE L'AIR. Par Capitaine Beauvais. 1937. (Paris: Pedone. 8vo. 212 pp. Bibliography.)

A study of the history and functions of the office of attaché, from both a military and a juridical standpoint.

37*a**. DIE GESCHICHTLICHE ENTWICKLUNG DES NEUZEITLICHEN NEUTRALITÄTSBEGRIFFES. By Dr. Martin Horn. 1937. (Würzburg: Verlag Konrad Triltsch. 8vo. 59 pp. Bibl. *Rm.* 2.80.)

A German view of the development of the idea of neutrality.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL

38. Les Cartels Internationaux. By M. Kypriotis, Docteur en Droit. 1936. (Paris : Librairie technique et économique. 8vo. 327 pp. 25 *frs.*)

This volume deals with a very important aspect of the international conditions which have come to be established in the post-War world. There has been a great change in the public attitude towards associations of producers for the regulation of their competitive relations. This country has followed Germany in actually imposing cartels on fundamental industries, such as mining and agriculture. And the United States found that the law against cartels had to be suspended as a part of a New Deal and an essential part of the technique of recovery. It may be assumed that cartels, trusts, and similar types of association will soon have become as much a matter of course as did joint-stock companies, once they had passed through their first decades and overcome the first prejudices and difficulties of what were then new methods.

But it will be necessary for the public to be informed on the manner in which these organisations deal with the interests of their nationals. They have entered the international sphere, often with the support of their governments, with power to make private bargains which may be even stronger in their influence than tariff conventions. Thus, an agreement to "respect the home markets" of the parties to an international cartel is evidently more effective than a customs duty, if it can be strictly carried out; and this is an ordinary clause of cartel agreements. In this way, a private organisation can go beyond what is the accepted policy of a nation as regards industrial protection, and this is a very important fact. It becomes all the more necessary that there should be access to the records of such proceedings. But proposals for the publicity of agreements have failed.

The importance of this volume is, that it supplies so comprehensive an account of what has been taking place in the great international cartels of recent times. Dr. Kypriotis has placed the student under a great debt by the labour with which he has assembled these facts. His book is sure to become a hand-book of reference. He has added discussions of the significance for the cartels of the capitalistic developments of the great industries, with the risks and uncertainties which became increasingly more pressing. Hence the cartel quota, the division of the market, and the regulation of price. Each of these aspects of cartel policy has raised a new set of considerations, which may be called the "Cartel Problems"; and particularly in the case of the foreign prices which are made by the home producers. It cannot be said that anything like stability of procedure has yet been reached; but the determination to have international regulation seems well established. D. H. MacGregor.

39. Will Gold Depreciate? By Paul Einzig. 1937. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. xiv + 178 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

Dr. Einzig answers his question with an unequivocal "No." The gold scare of the spring of 1937 was, in his opinion, due to superficial factors alone. In the long run, increasing indebtedness and higher commodity prices will call for an even larger credit base than that now available, while rising costs will discourage the mining of new gold.

The real danger is therefore one of scarcity rather than of superabundance and, over a period, gold is likely to appreciate still further in price. Meanwhile, the technique of sterilisation provides a simple and relatively inexpensive method of storing the metal.

The argument is pursued with enthusiasm and the book is both readable and provocative. There is, however, a tendency to oversimplification which may prove misleading to the lay reader for whom the book is intended. Dr. Einzig minimises the importance of the huge increase which has taken place in gold reserves and in gold output, and is inclined to resort to pure conjecture in order to stress and support his own view as to the probable course of future events. One might add that the restrictive effect of rising costs on the volume of gold production is by no means as certain as the author suggests, and that "sterilisation" (the technicalities of which are admirably dealt with in an appendix) creates new problems which makes its desirability questionable from the point of view of government finance. E. L.

40. INDUSTRIAL ASSURANCE: An historical and critical study. By Sir Arnold Wilson, M.P., and Professor Hermann Levy. 1937. (London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. xxxiii + 519 pp. 21s.)

THIS important and courageous book is primarily of domestic interest, dealing as it does with a deeply-entrenched vested interest employing some 71,000 agents and canvassers, more numerous than postmen—and far more formidable to politicians. But it is worth notice in these pages because of the useful account of foreign methods of dealing with the problem of funeral insurance (pp. 467–81). The criticism of the International Labour Organisation (p. 480) on the ground that the Sickness Insurance Recommendation of 1927 burked the question is, however, a little misplaced: it should really be directed against the British Government of that day, whose hand is very visible in the framing of the Recommendation. Nor is it quite fair to criticise the I.L.O. for not dealing with the British and American system of private insurance in its *International Survey of Social Services*, to which it cannot reasonably be held to belong. A. Z.

41. INTERNATIONAL LOANS AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A Comparative Survey of Recent Cases. By Dr. Martin Domke. 1937. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, for the Grotius Society. 8vo. 21 pp.)

It is undoubtedly true that it is of great importance that there should be as much uniformity as possible in the interpretation placed by municipal systems of law on gold clauses in international loans, and in the effect given by such systems to foreign currency legislation and restrictions. A comparative study of the results so far reached is therefore useful, but the present pamphlet is regrettably short for such an intricate subject and suffers from the author's lack of command of accurate English.

A. A. MOCATTA.

42*. ANNALES ÉCONOMIQUES. No. 1. Institut de Droit comparé de l'Université de Paris, Section Économique. 1937. (Paris: Recueil Sirey. 8vo. 156 pp.)

The first number of a review which is to contain the work of the economic section of the Institute of Comparative Law. The aim of that section is to study the collectivisation of agriculture in Soviet Russia, limitations to the creation and extension of enterprise, and the evolution of the idea of commercial enterprise in face of existing economic circumstances. This number deals almost entirely with different aspects of the second problem.

43*. FRAGEN DER UMVOLKUNG. [Sonderabdruck aus *Auslandsdeutsche Volksforschung*, Band 1, Heft 4.] 1937. (Stuttgart: Enke Verlag. 8vo. 62 pp.)

Essays on different aspects of the problem of "transfer of population," *in the sense of assimilation into another nationality*. The general psychological, political and economic questions involved are discussed, as well as particular aspects, such as the position of Evangelical Germans in Congress Poland and of the German minority in Hungary.

44*. *THE ECONOMIST'S HANDBOOK: A manual of Statistical Sources. Supplement. By Gerlof Verwey, with assistance of D. C.* Renooij. 1937. (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris. *8vo.* 79 pp. *Fl.* 1.)

Contains a most useful list of sources of economic and statistical information in addition to those published in the *Economist's Handbook* (1934), together with certain amendments to the sources included in that volume.

45*. L'OR ET LA GUERRE, ou le franc et les prix. By Dorax. 1937. (Paris: Alcan. Sm. 8vo. 72 pp. 8 *frs.*)

PRE-WAR HISTORY

46*. BRITAIN IN EUROPE, 1789–1914. By R. W. Seton-Watson. 1937. (Cambridge University Press. 8vo. vi + 716 pp. 30*s.*)

THIS remarkable survey of British foreign policy from Pitt to Grey is described, with great modesty, by the author as "essentially an experiment . . . laid before the public with some diffidence." Although in certain respects comparable to Mr. Algernon Cecil's *British Foreign Secretaries*, it may justly be claimed as the only attempt on this scale to present British foreign policy of the nineteenth century in its European aspects. As would be expected from Professor Seton-Watson, it is conspicuously distinguished by abundant use of foreign sources and foreign judgments on England and her statesmen, and it is marked by an attitude of mind which seeks to recognise the weaknesses and "dog-in-the-manger" elements in British foreign policy and, on the other hand, the strong points of those whose methods receive severe castigation. Only in the case of Stratford Canning does Professor Seton-Watson weaken his case by not fully meeting Professor Temperley's recent defence of Canning before (but not during, or after) the Crimean War. The book was originally planned to cover only the half-century between 1822 and 1874; but it has been expanded by two introductory chapters outlining eighteenth-century developments and the struggle against France and analysing Castlereagh and the Holy Alliance, and by three concluding chapters on Disraeli, Gladstone, and Salisbury and an epilogue summing up 1902–1914. In result over two-thirds of the text is devoted to the period 1822–1874, and inevitably Palmerston is the central figure.

Professor Seton-Watson has many hard things to say against Palmerston: he sees in him the apotheosis of the intransigent cocksureness of so much of British opinion in the mid-nineteenth century: his bullying of Greece in 1850 is rated as "even more scandalous than Mussolini's action at Corfu in 1924": with his "methods of hectoring interference . . . and downright menace" "he was a very real danger

to the peace of the world": his *idée fixe* of the reformability of the Turks was a fatal blunder, if not worse. And yet in his final estimate Professor Seton-Watson is prepared to allow that most of Palmerston's principles (though not in regard to Turkey or Austria) were sound, and that it is his methods and tactics (save in the case of Belgium) which condemn him. For Palmerston, as Professor Seton-Watson is at particular pains to emphasise, was always convinced of the paramount importance for England of her connections with Europe; this is the most important connecting thread running through the whole book. It might almost be summed up as a mighty tract on what are justly called those two "most equivocal" words—intervention and non-intervention. The British appetite for intervention has varied very considerably (as is notably shown during the years 1866–1874 in the reaction against "Palmerston the bully and Russell the busybody"), but Britain has never been able for long to pursue a policy of deliberate isolation. It is further emphasised that, not only in the time of the two Pitts, "colonial issues of the first magnitude have repeatedly been decided in Europe." Nearly all British foreign secretaries are shown to have been, in fact, interventionists, though the mode and degree of intervention have been strikingly different and have been usually conditioned by the smallness of the army.

Since the theme is British foreign policy as distinct from foreign relations attention is mainly concentrated upon the views and actions of the Crown, governments and foreign secretaries. But the reader is reminded at regular intervals of the main course of internal affairs both in these islands and on the continent, and the interconnections, *e.g.* in 1859, 1866, and 1885, are well brought out. The interrelations of public opinion and policy are not closely examined, except as regards the Crimean War: the main determinant plunging England into it is described as the excitability, ignorance, and irresponsibility of public opinion. Very little notice is taken of financial or economic factors, and naval problems, except for the Anglo-German rivalry of this century, are perhaps rather too much taken for granted. After all there was a fundamental difference between the position of Great Britain and that of the continental States in the nineteenth century: Great Britain usually felt that she was secure herself and could advance her empire as she pleased if she could maintain the great naval superiority with which she emerged from the Napoleonic wars. The Mediterranean was the main difficulty; but (except at certain brief moments) she did maintain naval superiority over *all* probable European foes combined: no other European State, and particularly Austria and Prussia, were in the same position on land, for any length of time. This, as I see it, is the main reason why Great Britain could, after 1815, indulge in the luxury of an aversion to alliances; and it is this which helps to explain the British outlook on the balance of power and the British tendency to play "that mediatory part which" Castlereagh "and all our greatest Foreign Secretaries have held to be Britain's true function in continental affairs." Now the twentieth century has brought air power, as well as a complete change in naval problems; and it is with this in mind that Professor Seton-Watson's closing words on the foreign policy of Britain should be read: "the lesson of the nineteenth century is her readiness to collaborate with any country irrespective of political creed or system, but not at the expense of her own free institutions, and only on a basis of international peace and co-operation."

B. H. SUMNER.

47*. A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE BALKAN CRISIS OF 1875–1878. THE FIRST YEAR. By David Harris. [Hoover War Library Publications, No. 11]. 1936. (California: Stanford University Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. 474 pp. 18s.)

THE insurrection in the Herzegovina in 1875 is a milestone in the history of the Eastern Question. Much has been written about it, and an eminent eyewitness is still with us, Sir Arthur Evans, whose *Illyrian Letters* are strangely omitted from the copious bibliography of this book. The present volume is a laborious compilation from official reports and numerous books, showing the slow and shifting working of diplomacy day by day during the period from the outbreak at Nevesinje to the Reichstadt meeting. The real facts underlying the usual diplomatic veneer were that the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, himself a Magyar, feared a solution which would increase the already large Slav element in the Dual Monarchy and might lead to Trialism, of which Franz Ferdinand, the victim of Serajevo, became the later exponent. On the other hand, Andrássy had to face the fact that the Dalmatian Slavs, especially after the Emperor's visit in 1875, were, from Rodich, their Governor, downwards, sympathetic to their insurgent neighbours, who even met in a Ragusan café, just as to-day veiled Herzegovinian Moslem women are seen among their Slav compatriots at Dubrovnik. Russia, while nominally co-operating with Austria-Hungary, had her special pet, Nicholas of Montenegro, whose action in the insurrection was dubious and who aspired to an outlet on the sea. British policy wavered between the Turkophil romanticism of Disraeli and the doubts and indecision of Derby. British agents on the spot had anti-Slav prejudices, though no one believed in the paper reforms of Turkey. France had not yet recovered from the war of 1870; Italy was scarcely a factor in Balkan politics; Bismarck did not think the question worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier. Serbia was in a difficult position. Milan Obrenovich, personally pacific, feared to be eclipsed by his rivals, Peter Karageorgevich, then leading a band of Bosniaks and destined to mount the Serbian throne twenty-eight years later, and Nicholas of Montenegro, the poetic but practical candidate for the leadership of the Yugoslavs. Belgrade regarded Austria much as she now regards Italy, which was "opposed to the creation of a Slav State independent of the Porte." Summaries help the reader to pick his way through the mass of confusing and contradictory details which compose this meticulous study. Perusal of these official reports confirms the opinion of students of the Eastern Question that to prophesy what will happen in the Balkans is to court disaster. A Yugoslav navy and mercantile marine in the Adriatic were then regarded by diplomatists as a Utopia, just as, in 1912, some of them foretold a Serbian defeat a few days before the crushing rout of the Turks at Kumanovo! There is an interesting account of the influence of Stillman, the *Times* correspondent, with the insurgents, to which the later parallel was that of his successor, Bourchier, in Bulgaria. Minutely accurate in details, the book gives the impression that its author knows the literature better than the psychology of the Balkan peoples. It is difficult to see the wood for the trees, and the inner nature of the trees is concealed by the moss.

WILLIAM MILLER.

48*. GLI ACCORDI DI SAN GIOVANNI DI MORIANA: storia diplomatica dell' intervento Italiano, II (1916–1917). By Mario Toscano. 1936. (Milan: Giuffrè. 8vo. 362 pp. *Lire* 35.)

THIS book is a sequel to *Il Patto di Londra*, and forms the second volume of a Diplomatic History of Italian Intervention, which is to be completed by four volumes on Italian problems at the Peace Conference. It contains a detailed and elaborately documented account of the Near Eastern Question during the War, but is written with the avowed object of showing with what injustice and ingratitude the Allied Powers treated Italy when the War was over. The arrangement of some of the facts and statistics may be questioned. For instance, when comparing the losses of Italy and her Allies in the War, the author demonstrates that Great Britain lost 0·2 of her population compared with 1·78 for Italy, this result being obtained by counting in the population of the whole British Empire, including India. L. K. D.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

49. GREAT BRITAIN AND PALESTINE. By Herbert Sidebotham. 1937. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. x + 310 pp. 10s. 6*d*.)

THE first and autobiographical part of this book is of considerable interest as a chapter in the history of Zionism. In November 1915 its author wrote a leading article, for the *Manchester Guardian*, advocating the establishment of a friendly State in Palestine as an addition to the defences of the Suez Canal. This article brought him into contact with a group of Zionists living in Manchester and including, besides Dr. Weizmann, Mr. Simon Marks and Mr. Israel Sieff. In 1917 these two, with Mr. Sidebotham and others, formed the British Palestine Committee, "to strengthen the liaison between British interests, both military and political, and the new Zionist movement."

The present volume has been written with the same purpose, but even so its indifference to other factors in the Palestinian situation is surprising. The Arab rising of 1936, for instance, is described in detail, but without the slightest attempt to account for it, the reader being apparently intended to attribute it to the inherent perversity of Arabs. The excuse given, that the Royal Commission "refrained from enquiring closely" into the origins of the rising, is a strange travesty of its Report.

It is more important, however, to consider the validity of Mr. Sidebotham's thesis that the establishment of the Jewish National Home in Palestine is, apart from any other justification, a vital British interest. It seems doubtful whether the advantage of this policy, from the point of view of imperial strategy, would outweigh the consequences of alienating the sympathy of Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. It was in the area now occupied by these countries that Mehemet Ali tried, a century ago, to found an Arab Empire. He asked for British support, and Palmerston's refusal to give it is condemned by Mr. Sidebotham himself. But now as then there is an evident basis of co-operation between Great Britain and the Arab peoples, who both live on the routes to India and require the friendship of a Great Power. H. BEELEY.

50. THE PEOPLE'S FRONT. By G. D. H. Cole. 1937. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 366 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS book is a plea for the formation in Great Britain of a Popular Front, on the analogy of the Popular Fronts in France and Spain, which

would unite all progressive democrats, from the Liberals to the Communists, in support of a short programme of immediate reforms. Mr. Cole believes that there are large sections of the electorate, particularly amongst the black-coated workers and the technicians of the new industries round London, who are both progressive in their outlook and discontented with the present Government, and whom the Labour Party has failed to attract owing to the narrowness of its appeal. He has some hard words to say about the present leaders of the Labour Party, and particularly about their hostile attitude towards the Communists—an attitude the justification of which in the past record of the Communist Party he seems to underrate as much as he overrates its practical importance. Moreover, in so far as Mr. Cole's complaints against Labour leadership have not already been met by the constitutional reforms enacted since the book was written, those leaders might well retort that effective leadership is not made easier by lack of confidence and discipline amongst Labour supporters. Indeed, the basic problem which Mr. Cole implicitly raises—though he nowhere discusses it explicitly—is precisely that of reconciling freedom with discipline and leadership in a democratic party.

In the matter of foreign policy, which is to be one of the principal items of the Popular Front programme, Mr. Cole advocates a close combination of the democratic Powers, and in particular Great Britain, France and Soviet Russia, to oppose Fascist aggression; but he does not explain away either the difficulties inherent in this policy or the dangers involved, in a rapidly changing international situation, in committing a prospective government to a fixed line of foreign policy in advance. In general this book does not reach the standard of forceful clarity and persuasiveness to which Mr. Cole's readers are accustomed; but it contains by the way much useful information and a number of penetrating comments on the nature and working of English democracy.

D. A. ROUTH.

51. IMMIGRATION INTO EASTERN AUSTRALIA, 1788–1851. By R. B. Madgwick. 1937. (London: Longmans, Green. 8vo. 270 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

THIS book is one of the best examples of its type. It is a very neat Record Office job on a subject small enough to be manageable, but not small enough to be insignificant. The job is finished; nobody will have to look into these records again; it will be sufficient to look into Dr. Madgwick's book. The book shows that, although the machinery of selecting migrants improved during the period, the quality of the men and women selected was always below the Australian demand. The assisted settlers were not very fit for the tasks awaiting them in Australia; but they were the best Great Britain could spare. And their children were fit.

W. K. H.

52*. THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE OF 1937. By John W. Dafoe. (Reprint from *University of Toronto Quarterly*. Vol. VII, No. 1, Oct. 1937. 17 pp.)

53*. MANITOBA'S CASE. A submission presented to the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations. By the Government of the Province of Manitoba. November 1937. (Winnipeg: King's Printer for Manitoba.)

Part I. Introduction. 6 pp.
Part II. The Constitutional Relations of the Dominion and the Provinces. 43 pp.

Part III. The Effects of Federal Monetary Policy on Western Canadian Economy. 47 pp.
Part IV. The Effects of Federal Tariff Policy on Western Canadian Economy. 40 pp.
Part V. The Effects of Declining Income. 32 pp.
Part VI. The Financial Problems of Municipalities and School Districts. 25 pp.
Part VII. Analysis of Manitoba's Treasury Problem. 95 pp.
Part VIII. Manitoba's Case—Summary and Recommendations.
Part IX. An Examination of Certain Proposals for the Readjustment of Dominion-Provincial Financial Relations. 29 pp.

54*. INDIA AND THE PACIFIC. By C. F. Andrews. 1937. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 224 pp. 6s.)

TWENTY years ago Mr. Andrews, with the help of friends in Australia, exposed the evils which indentured Indian labourers were suffering on the sugar plantations in Fiji. Last year he returned to a transformed island. Economically, the sugar industry is stronger through the substitution of the small tenant farm for the large plantation; morally and socially the transformation is even more striking. Mr. Andrews also believes that the progress of the Indian is helping the progress of the native Fijyan. At the same time he points out the existence of many unsolved problems, and is well aware that dependence on a single crop supported by imperial preference is too narrow a basis for progress.

In the latter chapters of the book Mr. Andrews reviews the position of the Indian dispersion in the Pacific, and reviews the relation of India herself to the Pacific countries, to Europe, and to Great Britain. These chapters contain matters of special interest to Australia, New Zealand and Canada. As for the British Empire, Mr. Andrews reports a big fall in its prestige. Japan is eclipsing it in power prestige, and the U.S.S.R. is eclipsing it in moral prestige as a champion of liberty, equality and fraternity. Mr. Andrews believes that "nothing but some outstanding deed will now persuade the East that Great Britain still holds fast to the freedom which made her moral greatness in the past."

W. K. H.

55*. WESTERN SAMOA: Mandate or German Colony? A Report by a Study Group of Members of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. 1937. (New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. 8vo. 15 pp. 6*d*.)

An examination of the political, economic and strategic advantages accruing to New Zealand in her capacity as mandatory for Western Samoa, and a discussion of the problems which would be raised by the return of that island as a colony to Germany. It is frankly stated that from the strategic point of view the only real danger would be "an alliance between Japan and Germany in peacetime with a view to war in the Pacific."

56*. THE WEST INDIES YEAR BOOK, including also the Bermudas, the Bahamas, British Guiana and British Honduras. 1937. (London: Gresham House, E.C. 2. 4to. Map. 382 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*. (post free inland 8*s*. 3*d*.; abroad 8*s*. 6*d*.).)

A guide to the position of banking, commerce and trade in general in the territories covered. Particulars of the rules and regulations governing the granting of British Preference Customs Tariff are given in full, together with information on the imports and exports passing between Canada and the various colonies to the close of the year 1936. Essential information concerning the non-British islands in the West Indies is also given, particular attention being devoted to the French colonies of Guadeloupe and Martinique.

EUROPE

57*. THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF FRANCE. By George Peel. 1937. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. viii + 242 pp. 8s. 6*d*.)

"THUS during thirty years, the economic policy of France has been under the stress of wars past, and present, and to come." With these words Mr. George Peel ends his book on the evolution of French finance since 1914. The book, despite its title, deals with the budgetary and financial aspects of French economic policy rather than with French economic policy as a whole. The author treats his subject in masterly fashion, for he has a profound knowledge not only of the facts, figures and documents involved, but also of the mentality of the French people and of the men in charge of its destinies. Some rapidly drawn portraits of statesmen bear witness to this knowledge. For example, this sketch of Poincaré:

> "The most weighty of journalists, the most overwhelming of lawyers, with a memory for facts equal to that of Macaulay, and with a will not inferior to that of Chatham. . . . When someone once asked me what it felt like to be introduced and to speak to him, I could only answer that it was like being introduced to an iceberg, and shaking hands with an Arctic floe."

Or again, of M. Caillaux:

> "In his novel *Coningsby* Lord Beaconsfield described the character of Sidonia—and, perhaps, also that of M. Caillaux. 'Sidonia was by hereditary talents prescient of the great financial future of Europe, confident in the fertility of his own genius, in his original views of fiscal subjects and in his knowledge of national resources.'"

These are the two men who have dominated the financial history of France during the last decades. To M. Caillaux is due the idea of taxation of income as a source of revenue and also that of absolute fiscal powers; to Raymond Poincaré must be attributed the almost miraculous recovery of 1926–8 and the Monetary Stabilisation Law of June 25th, 1928.

But individual initiative can do little against the traditions of centuries, unless it be momentarily to arrest the course of events when a catastrophe threatens. After which, the danger past, routine resumes its sway, and it is in disentangling the line of continuity behind the apparent variations that Mr. Peel has been so successful. His book not only gives an excellent account of the facts, but it also goes very fully and penetratingly into their underlying causes and effects.

In Mr. Peel's view, the elements of the present French financial situation can be traced a very long way back.

> "It is a disturbing reflection [he says] that, on the soil of France, two of the most stable and flourishing systems of Government which the West has ever witnessed have alike been brought to ruin by bad finance. That was why both the Caesars and the Capets fell."

France has never ceased to suffer from this original weakness. She has only succeeded in escaping from it spasmodically. She has had great statesmen, fine soldiers, but few eminent financiers. The great financiers of the Empire period, Mollien, Gaudin, the Comte Corvetto, Baron Louis, from whom Thiers received the torch which he in his turn handed on to Léon Say, all of them only succeeded with difficulty in maintaining a relative degree of order and equilibrium. Apart from these great administrators the conduct of the Budget has nearly always been marked by the confusion and multiplicity of documents

and accounts which Paul Leroy-Beaulieu denounced as early as 1898.

It would be unjust, however, to blame only methods and men. Public finance has never in fact figured in the forefront of French politics, but has always been subordinated to general political matters. The acquisition and organisation of a vast colonial empire, the arming and equipment of the army and navy with a view to an ever-threatening conflict all involved an increase of expenditure which, while inevitable, could not but add to the unjustifiable burden of an outmoded fiscal system that relied too much on indirect and too little on direct taxation. Colonial expansion and military preparations are thus responsible for the financial disequilibrium of the period before 1914.

The War accentuated this state of affairs. As much by reason of the invasion of the country as in the hope of keeping up the *morale* of the nation, taxation played only a very small part in the maintenance of the Treasury. It was not until 1917 that taxation on revenue came into force, though it had been adopted in principle in 1914; in 1917 too was introduced the tax on payments which was destined to become the Business Turnover Tax (*la taxe sur le chiffre d'affaires*). At the very moment when these fiscal measures were beginning to bear fruit, the end of hostilities aggravated the situation by raising in an acute form those problems which the War had postponed.

As long as the War and the Peace negotiations were in progress, France could still count on the results of victory, on reparation payments, and on the economic or financial solidarity of the Allies. None of these expectations was entirely fulfilled. Germany paid a part of her reparations in kind and very little in money. The Allies refused to establish any connection between what France owed them and what was owed to France by Germany. The French industrialists took the view that the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France was their own particular "plum." In short, France had to face alone the restoration of the devastated areas and the payment of pensions to war victims. And as she could not impose a heavier charge upon the taxpayers, she had to raise the necessary funds by means of a loan, simulated or avowed, masked under the cover of such mysterious nomenclatures as budgets of "extraordinary expenditure," budget annexes, independent budgets, "recoverable" budgets, and special or extra-budgetary expenditure.

The funds thus obtained were acquired by increasing the National Debt, and in particular the floating debt, and by inflation which brought up the issue of notes from 5 milliards before 1914 to 62 milliards in 1928. The malady was grave but not fatal, and itself gave birth to a remedy, if only a temporary and precarious one, the fiscal and monetary reforms of Poincaré. The benefits of these reforms were of short duration. The budgetary surplus they produced tended to make the Finance Ministers extravagant. Expenditure was increased, taxation reduced, optimism and confidence reigned. They did not last long. The economic crisis and political events interrupted their progress.

The reduced rate of taxation brought in less. The slowing down of business caused the drying-up of the funds produced by the schedule of commercial benefits and by the Business Turnover Tax. The policy of economy introduced by M. Doumergue and M. Laval annoyed those who were suffering from the deflation. Moreover it did not

succeed in assuring budgetary equilibrium. It did not do away with the need for a loan, and as, in addition, defence measures and the struggle against unemployment necessitated the putting in hand of big undertakings, the National Debt increased still further, aggravating the weight of the items with which it annually burdens the State Budget, until today the charges of the National Debt represent 51 per cent. of the annual expenditure.

The problem of the National Debt, fruit of wars past and to come, is thus, in effect, the chief problem of French finance and national economy. It is particularly fundamental and widespread in that it concerns, not only the *rentiers*, but also institutions whose assets must of necessity be invested in State funds and on whose revenues the functioning of the Savings Banks and Social Insurance systems depend. It also concerns the business world, for repeated public loans divert available capital from productive to static uses and cause a continual raising of the rate of interest. Now, as the taxation capacity of the French people has nearly reached its limit, France, as Mr. George Peel justly says, must seek her salvation in an alleviation of her overweighted national and local budget which today, taking all charges into consideration, approximates to close on 100 milliards. To reach this goal two possible methods are open: either deflation disguised under the form of a new devaluation; or an avowed deflation under the form of a reduction of interest on the National Debt. We agree with Mr. Peel in voting definitely for the second of these choices.

Such a policy would, however, be useless unless it were accompanied, as in the time of M. Poincaré, by measures calculated to guarantee a radical improvement in financial policy as a whole and a genuine budget equilibrium.

A warning of this kind, coming from the pen of an author who is so much at home in this subject and who is so sympathetic to France, takes on a gravity which should give cause for thought to statesmen on the French side of the Channel. WILLIAM OUALID.

58*. THE HOUSE THAT HITLER BUILT. By Stephen H. Roberts. 1937. (London: Methuen. 8vo. xii + 380 pp. *12s. 6d.*)

PROFESSOR ROBERTS has succeeded brilliantly in this book in giving a brief but comprehensive account of the Germany of Hitler. He has sketched the rise of the Nazi Party, its philosophy, its organisation, the personalities of its leaders, the process by which it acquired power and the use that it has made of it. The author has made admirable use of the wide contacts offered to him by the Nazi Party during the progress of his work in Germany and the reader's interest is constantly heightened by vivid personal touches. Professor Roberts is not afraid of the first person singular, nor need he be, since his very vigorous and sincere mind gives weight and point to the judgments he expresses.

It would be unfair to criticise his book merely for not being larger and more detailed, but it is perhaps worth saying that the first section—on origins—is one of the least satisfying, and that the account of the political organisation both of the Nazi Party and of the National Socialist State is at times so condensed as to make one wish that Dr. Roberts had given himself a little more elbow-room for his presentation of it. On the other hand in Part III, "The Economics of Hitlerism," we have a most illuminating account of the underlying realities and problems of the German State under its present guidance. The strain

imposed on the German economy by the pursuit of autarchy and of rearmament at the same time, and the "financial jugglery," to use Dr. Roberts' phrase, by which that strain is met and overcome are described with the utmost lucidity. It is, moreover, largely because of his firm grasp of these economic realities that the author is able to build up, in his last two sections, an assessment of the balance sheet of Hitlerism from the internal point of view and of the meaning of National Socialism to the outside world which carries conviction. Professor Roberts' conclusions are frankly pessimistic.

"The position reduces itself to this. Hitlerism cannot achieve its aims without war; its ideology is that of war. . . . That is what makes the German position so tragic. The nation has been duped in the sense that it has been launched along a road that can only lead to disaster. The nation may be reborn, it may be a 'new Germany,' but, unless it learns the habit of political and economic collaboration in international matters, it is a nation confronted by ultimate ruin and disillusionment."

One major point of interpretation may be criticised. In assessing the future of a dictatorship much must depend on one's judgment of the character of the dictator and Professor Roberts does not here seem to be wholly consistent. Hitler is presented to us, at the outset, as "the Romantic Ideal carried to the point of absurdity," or "his life . . . as an attempt at escaping from reality, and a more or less constant intoxication of his imagination by a free indulgence in fantasy" (p. 11). At the same time "he is transparently honest. . . ." "Nobody can doubt his utter sincerity" (p. 12). Yet the whole of Dr. Roberts' account of Hitler's foreign policy, with its calculated professions of peace and its acts of national egotism at the expense of treaty obligations and at the risk of war, would seem to contradict flatly this earlier interpretation. Again, Hitler's relations with possible rivals and the "liquidation" of most of them hardly seem to show him as either "the Romantic" or the "transparently honest" man. Dr. Roberts himself writes, in connection with the murders of June 30th, 1934:

"Hitler states that he came to his momentous decision only in the middle of the previous night at Godesberg; but Göring, as usual, bluntly gave the show away. He told the Pressmen on July 1st that 'Some days ago he ordered me to strike as soon as he gave the word, and he entrusted me with summary powers for the purpose'" (pp. 112–3).

In the body of the book Hitler appears as a quite ruthless realist with no compunction about elaborate lying, rather than as the "romantic" of its earlier pages.

The fact, if fact it be, that Hitler is a realist is, however, a reason to rejoice. The logic of events, the very nature of the doctrine and organisation of the Nazi régime, may seem to point to another war as inevitable. Yet to launch a nation so deficient in many of the raw materials necessary for armaments, as Dr. Roberts here shows Germany to be, and so hard-pressed for the necessities of life that it must choose between guns and butter, into a new life-and-death conflict would be an act of romantic despair rather than of realism. It is, indeed difficult to see how Germany can retrace the steps she has taken towards autarchy, especially in the economic sphere; nor are the difficulties in the way of her political co-operation with the victors of Versailles capable of any easy solution. But it remains possible that Hitler, the realist, may consider the chances of that short and over-

whelmingly successful war, which is the dream of some of his less realistic followers, altogether too slender to justify the attempt.

However this may be, we who live nearer the focus of events than the distinguished author of this book, and who may for that very reason be inclined to delude ourselves with vain hopes, can be glad that he had the opportunity of studying Nazi Germany at close quarters and that he has given us this penetrating study of what he has seen. E. J. P.

59*. GERMANY'S COLONIAL PROBLEM. By G. Kurt Johannsen and H. H. Kraft. 1937. (London: Thornton Butterworth. 8vo. 96 pp. 3s. 6d.)

THIS little volume gives a brief statement of the bases of Germany's claim for the return of her former colonies, with extracts from speeches by German statesmen and quotations from the British Press in support of the transfer. The arguments advanced are familiar. Two are unanswerable—that the Versailles Settlement violated the principles on which Germany agreed to make peace, and that if the present "age of economic war" is to become a permanent condition, the political control of oversea markets will become a necessity for every highly industrialised State. The argument that such control over sources of raw materials would solve the currency problem is more controversial. Figures showing the decline of Germany's trade with her former colonies need analysis and explanation before they can be taken to prove that this is due solely to the change in political control; and the statement that the African mandated areas have deliberately been developed on lines which would not bring their products into competition with the colonies of the mandatory Powers, besides being demonstrably false, suggests a somewhat sanguine view of the variety of commodities which can be profitably produced in tropical Africa.

The authors are on firm ground in exposing the unfairness of quoting figures from the pre-War period in order to minimise the economic importance to Germany of her colonies. But they do not realise that it is the very insistence of German apologists on the intensive development which they envisage for these areas that causes anxiety on behalf of native interests among those students of colonial problems who realise the nature of the demands on native society implied in such a programme. The indignation of Germans at the allegations made at Versailles is fully justified, but their refutation is no longer relevant to the question of native interests at the present day; not many of those who guided German colonial policy before 1914 can have any share in it now. The argument that native interests would not suffer by a transfer to the Germany of to-day would carry more conviction if its champions would leave the ground of generalities and give some indication of awareness of the actual problems of administration involved in the economic process on which their attention is concentrated, and of the criteria by which they would judge between the different solutions at present in operation. The statement that this rapid economic development, which must depend on the employment of native labour, will be accompanied by "no attempt at Europeanisation" seems to point to a future in which the African has the worst of both worlds; and the authors are not explicit as to the way in which under these conditions African society is going to exercise "the right to seek its development in accordance with its own ideas and ideals."

L. P. MAIR.

60. Der Deutsche Charakter in der Geschichte Europas. By Erich Kahler. 1937. (Zürich: Europa Verlag. Cr. 8vo. 695 pp. 18 *frcs. Swiss.*)

Before the War in Germany the younger school of literary historians regarded the traditional methods of treating literary problems as too much tied to fact and detail. Their method was to allude to a fact here and there *en passant* and bemuse their hearers and readers by a string of picturesque generalisations which the critical mind got no time to analyse for a factual basis. This they called *Geisteswissenschaft*. The present work also falls under the type of *Geisteswissenschaft.* It is based on the groundless assumption that there is a fixed entity, the German character, which is to be defined more positively in a last chapter of a future second and doubtless equally lengthy volume. Meanwhile the present volume lays down all that the German character is not as contrasted with the Italian, Spanish, French and English characters, likewise postulated as immutable. The comparison ranges through the centuries and touches on religion, feudalism, capitalism, trade and industry, army and navy, bureaucracy, social divisions and a multitude of other things. Neither the author nor his readers can be expected to have first-hand knowledge of a field which stretches ideologically from Socrates to Spengler and geographically from Scandinavia to Spain. The unending comparisons and contrasts drawn between Germany and other countries are a tissue of generalisations, not infrequently fallacious and tendencious, which were current coin in German university lectures and publications before and after the War.

The author is not a Nazi. His tragedy is that he does not realise how many of the assumptions in which he was reared and which he guilelessly sets down in the present work are also basic assumptions of Nazism. The one that underlies the whole work is that Germany has somehow failed to cut as good a figure in the world as other nations. What the author fails to note, probably because no German professor ever said or wrote it, is that Italy, with a similar history of late-won national unity, has also been haunted ever since Dante by a similar feeling that she, too, has been cheated of her due. And these feelings of frustration, these German and Italian inferiority complexes, from being national mortifications, have in our own times assumed the dimensions of a European disaster. I. M. Massey.

61*. Germany Puts the Clock Back. By Edgar Ansel Mowrer. New Edition with an additional chapter. 1938. (London: Penguin Books, Ltd. Sm. 8vo. 278 pp. 6*d.*)

Mr. Mowrer's lively book stands the test of time well. Events in Germany since 1933 have confirmed the substantial correctness of his analysis of the situation on the eve of the Nazi revolution, In the new chapter, in which he has to cover five years' crowded history in twenty pages, Mr. Mowrer is less penetrating—possibly owing to his enforced absence from the scene of his subject-matter. A. J. H.

62*. Krupp, or The Lords of Essen. By Bernhard Menne. 1938. London: Hodge. 8vo. 406 pp. Bibl. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

An English translation of " Krupp: Deutschlands Kanonenkönige," which was noted in *International Affairs*, July–August 1937, p. 635. H. G. L.

63*. NEW GOVERNMENTS IN EUROPE: the Trend towards Dictatorship. Edited by R. L. Buell. New edition. Revised and enlarged. 1937. (London: Nelson. 8vo. 520 pp. 10s. 6d.)

This is a new and revised edition of a work first published in 1934. The section on Germany has been expanded and an account of the causes and progress of the Spanish revolt has been included. On the whole the book provides, in concise form, a useful survey of the spirit and form of the governments with which it is concerned. It is a pity that the section on the political structure of the Soviet State has not been more radically revised; it reads as a statement of Soviet theory rather than of the system as it works to-day. The keynote of Mr. Buell's preface is qualified optimism. In his view there is no impassable gulf between the dictatorships and the democracies, given a rising standard of living and recognition of the legitimate nationalist aspirations of the dictatorships. H. G. L.

64*. DOVER-NÜRNBERG RETURN. By John Baker White. 1937. (London: Burrup, Mathieson and Co. 8vo. 108 pp. Illus. 5s.)

An account of the author's journey by car through Germany to be present, by invitation of the German Government, at the Party Rally at Nürnberg in September 1937. In this superficial but sincere and pleasantly written book, he claims to be unbiased, in the sense of having started without prejudices, and he succeeds in conveying an impression of the efficiency, enthusiasm and friendliness of the Germans with whom he came in contact. He is not concerned with the wider implications of his observations. H. G. L.

65*. CATALONIA INFELIX. By E. Allison Peers. 1937. (London: Methuen. 8vo. xxiv + 326 pp. 10s. 6d.)

Catalonia Infelix is an account of the rise, disappearance and gradual reappearance of Catalonia as a separate national entity in the Spanish Peninsula.

Her claims to this distinction are cultural, historical and linguistic. For many centuries, first under the Counts of Barcelona and then under the Kings of Aragon, she had formed as distinct a national unit as Portugal does to-day. But the fusion of Aragon and Castille in 1479 marked the end of her independence, and the first step towards her complete domination by Madrid. So thoroughly did she become Castillianised that it is only in very recent years that the Catalans have begun to consider themselves once again as something quite apart from the rest of Spain, and to claim recognition of the fact.

This rebirth of Catalonian nationalism has been a slow and painful process, and it was not until September 1932 that it achieved its first major success with the passing of the Statute of Autonomy by the Cortés at Madrid.

The events of July 1936 and onwards very naturally raise the question of the probable future of this separatist movement, and the answer involves all the other separatist movements that were making themselves felt prior to the Civil War. There are undoubtedly many who feel that the ultimate solution to the Spanish problem will be found in some form or other of federalism. But it is evident that the forces let loose by the present conflict must necessarily form a very definite barrier to any solution of this kind. Fascist-Nationalism, Communism, or Anarcho-Syndicalism are all hopelessly incompatible with any form of federalism. C. H. GUYATT.

66. SPANISH REHEARSAL. By Arnold Lunn. 1937. (London: Hutchinson. 8vo. 285 pp. 10s. 6d.)

THE author of *Spanish Rehearsal* is a sincere supporter of General Franco, and writes with deep conviction. His aim is to convince people

in England that what is happening in Spain may happen here " if we do not counteract Communism while it is weak by persuasion and social justice." But Mr. Lunn does not really make this appeal on purely rational grounds. Rather he tries to arouse our moral indignation against Communism, and makes no very concrete suggestion as to what we should do about it all.

The first part of the book is the most interesting, as it contains an account of Mr. Lunn's visit to " Nationalist " territory. Unfortunately he does not seem to have probed very far beneath the surface, and was hampered by not knowing the language. His habit of quoting pages and pages from other books is exasperating. Does it really strengthen Mr. Lunn's case that we have more to fear from Communism in Spain than from German and Italian intervention to quote a whole page of what Sir Francis Lindley said on the same subject?

It is only fair to say that the present reviewer is not politically sympathetic to the " Nationalist " cause, but a serious analysis of conditions in that part of Spain and the handling by General Franco of Spain's social problems would be a welcome addition to the volume of writing inspired by the present War. In his preface Mr. Lunn says, " I should not be a whole-hearted supporter of the Nationalists if I did not believe that they were more determined to redress the just grievances of the poor than their opponents," and it is therefore disappointing that there is no attempt in the book to throw light on such vital problems. We all know that General Franco believes in order and hates Communism, but neither anti-Fascism nor anti-Communism fills empty stomachs. Mr. Lunn has much to say about the religious crusade, but nothing about the handling of the low standard of living among peasants and workers. Is faith without public works enough? Mr. Lunn evidently thinks not, but while he recognises the need for tackling these questions he tells us nothing of what General Franco is doing in this direction, or what the people think and feel about the methods, Fascist or otherwise, employed in " Nationalist " Spain.

HELEN F. GRANT.

67. INVERTEBRATE SPAIN. By José Ortega y Gasset. 1937. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 212 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

A collection of essays from the pen of one of Spain's leading intellectuals. They were first published in 1921 with a fourth edition appearing in 1934, and form an analysis of the many ills from which the author sees his country to be suffering.

The conclusions he arrives at are as gloomy as the future which he sees to be inevitable. It is indeed remarkable how the events of 1936 have justified his fears of 1921. But one cannot help a feeling of surprise that the author, having shown that he possessed such a clear realisation of the dangers that beset his country, should have made no attempt to suggest a way out. C. H. G.

68. CONFLICT IN SPAIN. By G. M. Godden. 1937. (London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, Ltd. 8vo. vi + 112 pp. 1*s*. 6*d*.)

The author of *The Communist Attack on Great Britain* attempts in the 109 pages of *Conflict in Spain* to give a documented record of the progress and activities of Communism in Spain from 1869 to the present day. It is not a serious contribution to the subject, as the material is not very new or very original and is not handled objectively. H. F. G.

69. A CATHOLIC IN REPUBLICAN SPAIN. By Prince Hubertus Friedrich von Loewenstein. 1937. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 112 pp. 1*s*.)

A brief account of a visit to Republican Spain in 1937 by an anti-Fascist Catholic. Like many Catholics, the author is unwilling to believe

that it is his duty to support General Franco because the Nationalists claim to be fighting for the cause of religion. His visit convinced him that the Government is anxious to restore freedom of worship, and he quotes interviews with Ministers on the subject. Obviously a sincere pamphlet by a sensitive man, but there is no attempt to give more than personal reactions, and it adds little to what is already known. H. F. G.

70. EDUCATION AND REVOLUTION IN SPAIN. By José Castillejo. (*University of London Institute of Education, Studies and Reports No. XII.*) 1937. (Oxford University Press, for the Institute of Education. 8vo. 26 pp. 1s.)

Anything that Señor Castillejo has to say about Spanish education is worth reading, as no one was more closely connected with educational developments in Spain than he. As Permanent Secretary of the Junta para ampliación de Estudios (Central Commission for the Advancement of Studies) he sponsored most of the educational experiments that took place, and carried on the ideas of Giner and Cossío. This pamphlet gives in general lines an account of these innovations, and only a short section at the end is devoted to education since the War. He does not believe that the cause of liberal ideas in education is hopelessly lost, though he considers that passions will have to cool down before the freedom be believes essential to education will be possible in Spain. H. F. G.

71*. THE BASQUE CHILDREN IN ENGLAND : An account of their life at North Stoneham Camp. By Yvonne Cloud, with a chapter by Dr. Richard Ellis. 1937. (London : Gollancz. 8vo. 61 pp. illus. 1s.)

72. ECONOMIC PLANNING IN CORPORATIVE PORTUGAL. By Freppel Cotta. With a Preface by Dr. Marcello Caetano. 1937. (London: P. S. King. 8vo. xiv + 188 pp. 8s. 6d.)

IN this volume Mr. Cotta gives a most able survey of Dr. Salazar's economic planning in Portugal, and its results. In a country where all effective voluntary association was lacking, it was necessary at the outset to resort to compulsory co-operation by means of State control and legislation. Ultimately it is hoped the national economy will develop, not on bureaucratic lines, but by evolution of the autonomic activities of the respective corporations—State intervention being then reduced to the co-ordinating supervision of national and public interests.

Private enterprise in Portugal had broken down.

"The Portuguese wheat-growers were incompetent to market their produce to their own advantage. . . . The production of wine was excessive and of poor quality, and it could not make prices to cover its cost. The same might be said of fruits. Rice and codfish could not hold their own against imported products owing to their complete lack of organisation. The sardine industry was inefficient. Motor transport and insurance were engaged in a slow suicide. The State was, therefore, perfectly justified in intervening to help them to put their house in order and to save themselves."

Mr. Cotta examines the efficacy of the new régime in all the branches of economic production (agricultural, manufactures, social services), and his favourable conclusions are supported by statistics. As a text-book to the working of the Corporative system this study should be invaluable. FRANCES A. WELBY.

73. WATCH CZECHOSLOVAKIA ! By Richard Freund. 1937. (London : Nelson. 8vo. 112 pp. 2s. 6d.)

74*. GERMAN AND CZECH : A Threat to European Peace. By S. Grant Duff. With a Preface by Hugh Dalton, M.P. 1937. (London : New Fabian Research Bureau and Gollancz. 8vo 56 pp. 1s.)

OF these two brief expositions of the Czech-German antithesis Dr. Freund's is rather broader in scope, but both are conspicuous alike by

their freedom from prejudice and by the similarity of their conclu
They describe with some sympathy the still-unredressed grievan
the Sudeten Germans, though, as Dr. Freund emphasises, the:
mild when measured by present Central European standards. C
other hand, both acknowledge the fundamental difficulty of tr
generously a minority whose loyalty has always been open to susp
and they see little hope of a working arrangement with Herr H
which would not at the same time endanger the safety of the
Both, moreover, agree that the domestic antagonism between Czec
German, while it presents the Reich with a plausible excuse for hos
is nevertheless a symptom rather than the cause of the far-rea
diplomatic antagonism. Czechoslovakia, by her very existence,
offence to the Reich because she is a standing obstruction to the
ambition of Danubian expansion, and by the same token she
keystone of the European arch. As Miss Grant Duff well sums
the Czech-German tension is a struggle for power, and the intern
external victory will be won together. J. C

75. L'Opera dei Delegati Italiani nella Società delle Na
Edited by G. Bruccoleri 4 volumes, 1925–1936. 1(
(Rome: Società Editrice del "Foro Italiano." 8vo. *L*
each volume.)

The late Dr. G. Bruccoleri, an Italian official in the Press sect
the League of Nations Secretariat, compiled these four volumes co
ing the speeches and memoranda of Italian delegates at the C
and Assembly meetings of the League from 1920 to May 1936.
contexts are seldom given (and less in the later volumes than
first), which diminishes a good deal of the usefulness of such a
tion. However, the longer speeches and memoranda adeq
explain themselves. The first volume has already been noticed
it contains, above all, the Italian contentions against the Greek
to the League following the occupation of Corfu. Although a
time Signor Mussolini came into sharp collision with the Leagu
Italian chief delegates for many years collaborated construc
at Geneva.

Whatever the Head of the Italian Government and his pe
partisans may have thought about the League, men like V
Scialoja were at one and the same time expansionist patriot
advocates of international organisation through Geneva. S
emphasised repeatedly that the League must not be misled into
to suffocate wars (Art. 16 of the Covenant) without working to eli
the cause of wars by making a reality of the provision for re
treaties by agreement (Art. 19). The Italian apologist could d
strate from a fair number of passages in these volumes that It
along regarded promotion of peaceful change as the League's
vital function. As Scialoja said, at a given moment the system o
national engagements and treaties may correspond for a shorter or
period with the underlying strength of the nation bound by
during which time peace can be easily preserved, but as this chan
the system of engagements must be changed, if not by co-ope
then by conflict.

In the last of the four volumes Baron Aloisi is found trying to
the Italian action in Abyssinia by this "dynamic" principle
however true it may be that Italy was baulked in various atten
realise peaceful change by the League method (or to equip the]

for the task of bringing about a revision of the peace treaties and for tackling the problems of raw materials and emigration to which the disposition of frontiers gives rise), the Italian case in the specific Abyssinian affair was disingenuous. Italy has now left the League, and it can only be hoped that the intellectual contribution of men like Scialoja to the idea of a League of Nations will bear fruit some day again in a new collaboration with a renewed and more realistically constituted League. C. J. S. SPRIGGE.

76*. THE FASCIST GOVERNMENT OF ITALY. By Herbert W. Schneider. 1936. (New York: Van Nostrand. 8vo. 173 pp. $1·25.)

This book, intended for students, provides an outline of the present government of Italy. The author's aim has been to describe the actual way in which Italy is governed to-day, rather than to expound or decry Fascist theory. He devotes a chapter to Italy's political heritage and, against that background, describes the structure of the Fascist State, the corporative system, economic and foreign policy, etc. In his preface he warns his readers that the "totalitarian State" does not imply that the government rules everything; and he seems to suggest that Italy has, broadly speaking, the type of government suited to, and suiting, her present needs. It is a little surprising, in view of the general temper of the book, to read with regard to the Abyssinian crisis that "the serious attempt to stop Italy by sanctions" was really an "experiment" to test the value of the League of Nations for security in case the German threat materialised. H. G. L.

77. OESTERREICHS ERNEUERUNG: Die Reden des Bundeskanzlers Dr. Kurt Schuschnigg. II. 1937. (Wien: Oesterreichischer Bundespresseamt. 8vo. 223 pp.)

78. DAS WERK EINES STAATSMANNES: ZWEI JAHRE DR. SCHUSCHNIGG. By Julius Patzelt. 1937. (Wien: Oesterreichischer Bundespresseamt. 8vo. 47 pp.)

THESE two publications are issued by the Austrian Federal Press Service. The first is a collection of Dr. Schuschnigg's speeches, the second is an uncritical eulogy of the Austrian dictatorship since the death of Dolfuss.

As a study of Schuschnigg's personality the speeches are revealing. Here is a man trained in a Jesuit College to hide thoughts which he does not want to be known and to express others guardedly or in such a way as to make different and conflicting interpretation possible. The language he uses is naturally involved, is free from all genuinely poetic or rhetorical touches, and nowhere betrays any trace of enthusiasm for his policies. This lack of enthusiasm is partly explained by the hopelessness of his own vacillating outlook and by his loneliness both in political and private life. Schuschnigg hardly ever smiles, though the typical Austrian finds it hard to repress a smile whenever the slightest occasion allows.

To endeavour to elucidate an Austrian foreign policy from these pages is a hopeless task; contradictions abound, and in particular in the Chancellor's many attempts to demonstrate that there is no contradiction in the Italophil policy that he pursued up to the Venice meeting with Mussolini and the lip service he is willing to pay to the League of Nations and Anglo-Austrian friendship.

Perhaps the most important speech is that which is included in the final chapter, the Radio Speech on the German–Austrian Agreement of July 11th, 1936. It shows Schuschnigg at the height of his powers

as a juggler with words and as a diplomatic tight-rope walker of the first order.

Turning to the speeches on internal affairs we find an even more disappointing picture. Let three quotations speak for themselves :—

"Everybody (in Austria) can go his own way but he must not undertake anything which might injure the Fatherland, the State and therefore the common weal. If he behaves accordingly he will find Austria a country of freedom such as he could hardly find anywhere else in the world. . . .

"It is part of the fundamental principle of a State to watch that internal policy has nothing in common with external policy. . . .

"I know very well that not everybody who wears the badge of the Patriotic Front is a convinced compatriot and not an opportunist."

GEORGE W. CADBURY.

79. OTTO DE HABSBOURG ESPOIR DE L'AUTRICHE. By Philippe Amiguet. 1937. (Paris: Denoel et Steele. Sm. 8vo. 105 pp. 7.50 *fr.*)

THIS rather slight essay records in simple language and bare outline the main facts of the life of the Archduke Otto. More attention is necessarily given to the tragic circumstances of his boyhood and education than to any description of his personality. The main purpose of the book seems to be to state, rather than prove, the conclusion that in a Habsburg restoration lies Austria's only hope of survival. Otherwise she must be swallowed up by Nazi Germany. But the author does not attempt to show how this would be possible. He observes that the Little Entente is less implacably opposed to a Habsburg Restoration than it used to be, and that Austria has a right to control her own destiny, but the practical objection that she is very unlikely to be allowed to do so, is not considered. However, the work is not political but descriptive, and, though it does not contain much original material, it does at least succeed in giving a sympathetic picture of the Archduke and his surroundings. DAVID STEPHENS.

80*. HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS : The Treaty of Trianon and its Consequences, 1919–1937. By C. A. Macartney. 1937. (London : Humphrey Milford, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 8vo xxi + 504 pp. Maps, bibl. 25*s.*; to members of the R.I.I.A., 18*s.* 6*d.*)

MY first sight of Hungary was on one never-to-be-forgotten September's evening in 1896. I had been stopping in the Austrian Salzkammergut, on the Wolfgangsee, for a two months' holiday, and was persuaded to go to Budapest. It was the year of the Millennium Exhibition, the celebration of the existence of the Hungarian State which for a thousand years had remained within frontiers " which, if not entirely unchanged, had shown a very remarkable degree of stability." This was my introduction to the home of the Magyar, with its bitter-sweet gypsy music and songs and laughter. "Few if any nation in Europe," says Mr. Macartney "possesses the mysterious inherent attraction which is independent of material considerations in so large a measure as the Magyar." I agree. My intention had been to stay in Hungary for fifteen months. I remained on and off for fifteen years until within twelve months of the outbreak of war.

My next visit was immediately after the breakdown of the Bela Kun régime in the beginning of January 1920 on the eve of the setting out of the Hungarian Delegation for the Peace Treaty Conference at Trianon.

This time my visit was an official one, and during the following four years I was enabled to follow the workings of the dismembering provisions of the Trianon Treaty. Then to Bucharest and Roumania for twelve years, where I was given the opportunity of seeing the other point of view. Thus it happens I am one of those few foreigners who knew Royal Hungary in its old entirety when its Kingdom was the most important part of an Empire which extended from Salzburg in the west—a thousand miles across the Plains of Hungary and Transylvania to the ridge of Carpathians in the east, and from Fiume and the Adriatic in the south northwards across Croatia over the high Tatra mountains and thence to the Vistula in Poland. A territory where no customs barriers existed, where no visas or even passports were required, where no currency restrictions were known—a veritable land of "milk and honey."

Can it be wondered that each time I pass the new frontiers I ask myself—with Mr. Macartney—whether it was all worth it? For, despite the many faults of the Hungarians and their irritating efforts at Magyarising, they unquestionably possess a "something" which their successors lack. A Hungarian slaps his chest and says, "*En Magyar vagyok*," and is proud of it. A Roumanian nowadays also proclaims his nationality, but there is a difference; there is no *élan* about it.

However, all that is by the way. Mr. Macartney points out time and again that, had the motion of Eötvös in 1861, where it was laid down that all nationalities dwelling in the Hungarian State, whether Magyar, Slovak, Roumanian, German, Serb, Ruthene, or others, should be regarded as nationalities possessing equal rights, been accepted, then it is more than possible, nay certain, there would have been no Trianon Treaty to negotiate.

One other thing is perfectly certain—as Mr. Macartney observes—whatever may be arranged in the way of treaty revision at some future time, not even the most fervid Hungarian patriot in his heart believes that his country will ever gain the willing consent of *all* the inhabitants of the old Hungarian Kingdom to link their lot with Hungary under the same conditions as ruled before the War. Twenty years have gone by; a new generation has arisen in the Successor States—a modern generation with the advantages of wireless, picture-theatres in the remotest villages, and, curiously enough, silk stockings for the peasants.

What, then, is to become of Hungary and the Successor States? Will the solution lie in an economic union of the old parts of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire—"The transformation of the area into a true Eastern Switzerland"? Will it be possible to "adjust the relationships between the different nationalities in such manner that they will find it not merely possible to live together but impossible to do otherwise"? Or will Hungary hold to the "*Nem, nem soha*" attitude of never resting until every inch of pre-War territory is restored to her once more?

If the reader wishes to endeavour to reply to these questions for himself, I can only advise him to read and re-read Mr. Macartney's *Hungary and her Successors*, a work which, to my mind, is easily the most important contribution to the literature on this subject that has been published. It is objective, completely documented, brilliantly written, leaving no loose ends, a work which carries the conviction that Mr. Macartney has studied his subject profoundly, and I repeat that no one who wishes to be acquainted with this extremely difficult problem should be without this book. R. J. E. HUMPHREYS.

81*. THE HUNGARIAN MINORITIES IN THE SUCCESSION STATES. By Sir Robert Gower. 1937. (London: Grant Richards. 8vo. 123 pp. 2s. 6d.)

THIS little book, as the prefatory note announces, is "a recital, in a concise form, of those grievances under which the Hungarian Minorities in the Succession States are suffering." It is written, of course, from the Hungarian point of view and based, one suspects, on materials supplied from Budapest rather than on evidence collected on the spot. But as a presentation of the Hungarian case it is carefully and competently done. After a general introduction in which the author's sympathies are plainly visible, and the Little Entente is stigmatised as a constant danger to the peace of Europe, the unhappy lot of the Hungarian minority is successively examined in each of the Little Entente countries. Finally, the author pleads for more effective control of minorities by the League of Nations and the establishment of a permanent committee at Geneva. A useful appendix cites the relevant Minorities' Protection Treaties. For those who want to acquaint themselves rapidly with the Hungarian case against the Little Entente this book will have its uses, but it states the case for the plaintiff only.

DAVID STEPHENS.

82*. ANDRÉ M. ANDRÉADÈS, FONDATEUR DE LA SCIENCE DES FINANCES EN GRÈCE. By Athanase J. Sbarounis. 1936. (Paris: Sirey. 8vo. 294 pp.)

ANDREADES, whom the reviewer knew for many years, was a scholar combined with a man of the world. He lived a double life: he worked fourteen hours a day, in the evening he went into society or to the theatre as a dramatic critic, and the parties in Athens are late. His holidays he devoted to foreign travel from England to Japan and America, and wherever he went, he acted as the unofficial Ambassador of his country. He was more especially the bond of union between Greece and Great Britain, whose modern history and public men he knew as no other Greek. He wisely never entered politics, preserving a neutral attitude, and refused the Foreign Office when offered to him by Pangalos, as he had declined the London Legation. The present biography, however, gives no idea of these multifarious activities: it is confined to his works on finance, of which he was for twenty-eight years professor at Athens University and about which he wrote standard works, beginning with his *Histoire de la Banque d'Angleterre*, which has been translated into English and even Japanese. As often happens with scholars, who embrace too many subjects, his *magnum opus*, the *History of Greek Public Finance*, was unfinished, though a posthumous monograph on the two French occupations of the Ionian Islands and the intervening Septinsular Republic has been published since his biographer wrote (p. 194 *n*[4]).

The biography is marred by the abuse of footnotes, containing summaries in small print of the author's chief books and extending in some cases over 22, 31, 42 and even 46 pages respectively, through which a line or two of text meanders! This makes the perusal difficult. Throughout Andreades approached finance from the standpoint of history, of which he had a wide knowledge, and illustrated that of ancient Greece from his experience of modern times and the latter from the former. Thus, he thought that the ancient "tyrant" resembled the modern dictator, compared Xenophon, who provides the book with its motto, with Gladstone, and believed that the great

revolutions of England, France and America were caused by the financial factor. He showed how direct taxation, alien to the Greek character, was almost non-existent at Athens, Byzantium and in the Ionian Islands under Venice. He thought that "Byzantine finance exhibited more bad than good points," while the Turks neglected everything except the defence of their Empire. He considered that under Venetian rule, his native island, Corfu, was the most favoured part of Greece, though he saw the drawbacks of the system which forced Ionian goods to pass through Venice and allowed Venetian officials to make money out of their brief terms of Ionian office. His biography of Lord Snowden was an example of his particular interest in British questions: the reviewer heard him explain that statesman's Yorkshire origin to a Greek audience by remarking that "the Cephalonians were the Yorkshiremen of Greece." General Metaxâs is a Cephalonian.

Professor Varvaressos, ex-Minister of Finance and Governor of the Bank of Greece, contributes a preface in honour of his former master, whose indirect influence survives in his numerous pupils now holding important financial posts. Much of the book is filled with the reviews of Andreades' works published in foreign newspapers. It contains his portrait and two elaborate bibliographies of his writings, the former consisting of those on finance and economics, the latter comprising those on other miscellaneous subjects, such as his appreciations of Gladstone, Disraeli, Salisbury, Rosebery and Dilke, British policy in the Eastern question and the theatre. It concludes with a list of the obituary notices published on his death in 1935.

WILLIAM MILLER.

83*. L'ENTENTE BALKANIQUE DEVANT LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL. Par V. M. Radovanovitch. (Extrait de la *Revue de Droit international et de Législation comparée*, 1935, No 4.) 1937. (Bruxelles: Bureau de la Revue. 8vo. 52 pp.)

A study, from the legal standpoint, of the Balkan Pact of February 9th, 1934, which considers its historical background, constitution and organisation, and international significance.

84*. THE NORTHERN COUNTRIES IN WORLD ECONOMY: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden. (Published by the Delegations for the Promotion of Economic Co-operation between the Northern Countries.) 1937 (Finland: Otava Printing Office, for the Delegations. 8vo. 240 pp.)

POLITICAL and economic developments in the post-War world have brought the countries of Northern Europe much closer to each other. Active economic co-operation between the three purely Scandinavian States, which were concerned both about maintaining their neutrality and their standard of living, began actually during the period of hostilities. But it is in recent years that this "new Scandinavism"—as it is sometimes called for lack of a better word—has taken particularly extensive shape. These highly civilised trading communities, while maintaining their national interests and characteristics, have a great deal in common. Taken together, they represent, with a total population of only 16·5 million inhabitants, the world's fourth largest exporter (5·12 per cent of the total export trade in 1936), with only the United States, Great Britain and Germany ahead of them. Their share of the world's imports was in the same year 5·2 per cent, so that they occupy the fifth place, being exceeded only by Great Britain, the United States,

Germany and France. Taken together they are also Great Britain's largest customer and largest source of supply.

This and much other useful information will be found in a handsome volume recently published by their permanent joint economic organisation. But the book has the defects of its qualities: they have taken so much time and so much care over it, that it is somewhat overloaded with data, and many figures are already out of date.

GEORGE SOLOVEYTCHIK.

85*. ET ØKONOMISK FOLKE-FORBUND. By Bjarne Braatøy. 1937. (Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum. Sm. 8vo. 98 pp.)

U.S.S.R.

86*. SOVIET TEMPO. By Violet Conolly. 1937. (London: Sheed and Ward. 8vo. xv + 159 pp. 7s. 6*d*.)

MISS CONOLLY is not the only traveller who, returning to the Soviet Union after an interval of some years, has been shocked to discover the kind of progress which the revolution has made. Materially, the progress is there; and Miss Conolly does not perhaps do quite full justice to it. There *are* bigger and better hotels, and less bad plumbing. A good many Soviet trains *are* irreproachably punctual (Miss Conolly seems to have been less fortunate than I was in this respect, but I did not go to the South); and out of the rush hours, one can often sit quite comfortably in a Moscow tram. A lot of churches have been pulled down, and crooked ways made straight—and even paved. But from the æsthetic point of view, that perhaps is not progress.

What must, however, shock those nourished in the ideals of the revolution is the open flaunting of the privileges of a small, but relatively prosperous class, while squalor and hardship are still the lot of the vast majority of Russians. "Cash and comfort go together in the Soviet Union as everywhere else in the world. . . . Only there are lower degrees of discomfort in Soviet Russia than in countries like Norway, Sweden and Denmark, where capitalism has not been allowed to run amok." Nor is the disparity between privileged and unprivileged due merely to a quantitative difference in incomes. It seems to be deliberately emphasised. "The difference between first- and third-class travel in Russia is far more marked in comfort and expense than anywhere in my wide experience of third-class travelling, from Mexico to Ireland." As Miss Conolly acutely observes, it is the rare foreign worker visiting the Soviet Union who is impressed and distressed by all this display of inequality. The foreign *bourgeois* intellectual, not having himself experienced the struggle for existence, is content to swallow the Marxist patter and sees nothing of the hard reality.

Miss Conolly speaks fluent Russian, was determined to see things for herself, and writes in a pleasant style. These things taken together make her book both readable and convincing. She has collected and neatly pinned down specimens of several familiar Soviet types. There is the Party worker: "My work is agitation" (as Miss Conolly says, "agitation" nowadays does not mean something done by the masses from below, but something inflicted on them from above). There is the female teacher: "Now don't tell me that things are better abroad than here, because I *know* they are not." And there is the hotel manageress studying *Pickwick Papers* "so as to get colloquial English." One is also grateful to Miss Conolly for rescuing from oblivion the

following extract from an oration by M. Litvinov in Moscow: "If *bourgeois* widsom defines a diplomat as a person dissembling in the service of his country (it would be impossible to do justice in Russian to Sir Henry Wooton's original "lying abroad for the good of his country"), the Soviet diplomatist is distinguished by the fact that he always speaks the truth, for the good not only of his country, but of all workers and all mankind."

E. H. CARR.

87*. RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR: A Sketch for a History. By Alban Gordon. 1937. (London: Cassell. 8vo. viii + 280 pp. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS is an extremely well-written book, the result of much labour, much reading and a careful piecing together of dates and facts relating to the political and military events in Russia since the February Revolution and during the opposition against the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917. As its title suggests, it is only a sketch for a history; the author himself evidently realised that for a history book it is too biased. For him the Bolshevik Party was the legal government of Russia from the day it forcefully seized power, and all opponents are forthwith called "rebels" and "traitors"; they come in for many cheap gibes.

The book realistically describes the atmosphere of enthusiastic energy that obtained in the inner Soviet circles; it throws much light on the origin of the Trotsky–Stalin feud. But it entirely fails to picture the conditions either in the country where the peasantry encouraged by Lenin's notorious slogan "Rob what has been robbed" (*Grab nagrableni*), destroyed much national wealth, or in the towns with their gloomy atmosphere of cowering apathy and starvation.

To an unbiased outsider the "solemn farce" of Brest–Litovsk was not enacted by the Germans, as the author maintains, but rather by Trotsky, who by his "famous formula of neither peace nor war" brought ruination to Russia from which only the Allies' final victory could save her.

The nauseating murder of the Imperial family is more or less condoned because "it became clear that there was only one way of preventing (a rescue)" (p. 169).

The chapters on the civil war, although pieced together with great ability, constitute of necessity more an indication of the principal efforts of Denikin, Wrangel, Koltchak and Yudenitch. A detailed history of campaigns, battles and actual happenings can probably never be written.

The author apparently revels in lurid generalities on the doings of the Soviets' opponents. The Murmansk expedition, undertaken at the invitation of the Soviet Government, and when England was engaged in a life and death struggle, is called a "piratical enterprise."

Through the whole book runs the well-known Bolshevik accusation that all the Russian people's sufferings were exclusively due to foreign intervention. Those, however, who, like the reviewer, lived through those terrible times, blame the ruthless measures enforced by the Soviet Government to reach their millennium.

On the last page of the book the author says that Russia "from her ruin and desolation (has created) prosperity unbounding." Sir Walter Citrine, Mr. Smith in *I Was a Soviet Worker* and André Gide in *Return from U.S.S.R.*, on the contrary, give a picture of the present conditions in Russia as one of varying degrees of drab poverty.

W. J. OUDENDYK.

FAR EAST AND PACIFIC

88*. CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS. By General and Madame Chiang Kai-shek. 1937. (London: Faber and Faber. 8vo. 232 pp. 7s. 6d.)

IN December 1936 the world—or that section of it that takes an intelligent interest in Chinese affairs—learned with considerable astonishment that on December 12th Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had been kidnapped at Sian in Shensi Province by Chang Hsueh-liang, the Young Marshal, and Yang Hu-ch'êng the local Shensi commander. A fortnight later astonishment turned into bewilderment when it was announced that the Generalissimo had been released on Christmas Day, had flown to Nanking, and that his captor Chiang Hsueh-liang had followed him in another plane and had thrown himself on the mercy of the Nanking Government. These mysterious events not unnaturally let loose a flood of speculation and surmise that has not yet entirely subsided, for no one yet knows for certain what connection, if any, there is between the kidnapping and the great tragedy now being enacted in the Far East of which Chiang Kai-shek is the central figure. This book contains the story of the kidnapping told by those who alone have full knowledge of the facts, the Generalissimo himself and his wife—perhaps the most remarkable woman alive in the world to-day. It is a tale of such dramatic interest that even a bare outline of it—which is all that is possible within the modest compass of a review—may prove of interest.

When the Young Marshal succeeded his father, the redoubtable old ex-brigand Chief Chang Tso-lin, as ruler of Manchuria, his first act, to the intense annoyance of the Japanese, was to bring Manchuria into the Kuomintang fold and declare allegiance to the National Government just set up by Chiang Kai-shek at Nanking. He established further claims on Chiang Kai-shek's gratitude by intervening decisively in the civil war of 1930, with the result that when in 1932 he was ignominiously bundled out of Manchuria by the Japanese, with hardly a show of resistance, Chiang Kai-shek stood by him, and, in spite of popular criticism, found employment for him and his army.

In 1936 an anxious situation had developed in the North-West Provinces. The Communist armies who had for years maintained an independent state in Kiangsi had at last been driven from their stronghold, but had then executed an astonishing march of 7,000 miles, all round the map of China, and had settled down in Shensi within nodding distance of the Soviet influences in Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang. The Young Marshal and his army were sent to suppress them, but the Comintern in Moscow had just laid down their new political line of the popular front which in China was interpreted as a united front against Japan. The Young Marshal and his troops, exiles from their homes in Manchuria, were seduced by this propaganda, and disturbing reports reached Chiang Kai-shek's ears that they were fraternising and making common cause with the armies they had been sent to destroy. Following his usual practice, Chiang flew to the scene of action to restore the situation by the force of example and of personality. He was kidnapped by the Young Marshal (many of his bodyguard being killed), and held prisoner, while a vain attempt was made to force him to adopt the policy of the united front and head an immediate attack on the Japanese.

If there was one man in the world at whose hands the

Generalissimo was entitled to consider himself safe from such a cowardly outrage on his person it was the Young Marshal. His diary during his captivity, which forms the third and last sections of the book, bears witness to the fury that took possession of him. He resolutely refused to make the slightest bargain for life or freedom. His captors might kill him, as they came within an ace of doing, but they could not induce him to deviate by a hair's breadth from the policy that he had adopted because he thought it was in the best interests of the nation. His courage and resolution, backed by those of his wonderful wife, won the day, and he was eventually released without conditions.

When the capture of the Generalissimo was reported to the Nanking Government, their first reaction was to send an army to attack the rebels. Madame Chiang Kai-shek saw in a flash the fatal consequences of such a course. It would inevitably cause the troops of the Young Marshal to unite with the Shensi forces and the Communist army against the Central Government. The result would be the death of the Generalissimo, a large-scale civil war, Japanese intervention and the dismemberment of China. She therefore devoted all the considerable resources of her intellect and will-power to prevent these foolish plans being carried out, and eventually flew into the lion's den and returned in the same plane with her husband.

A curious feature of the story is that the Young Marshal and his fellow-ruffians when they captured the Generalissimo captured also his diary and correspondence for the previous twelve months, and it was a perusal of these that convinced them that the Generalissimo was just as bitter against Japan as they were, but that the long-term policy he was continuously pursuing was more likely to succeed in driving out the aggressor than the crude measures they had wanted to force him to adopt. It is just possible, though of course the book is silent upon this point, that the same knowledge also reached the Japanese and caused them to decide that it would not be safe to delay much longer their attack upon China and the destruction of Chiang Kai-shek. From Sian to Lukouchiao was seven months, and there are some grounds for believing that it was just about the time of the Sian incident that the decision to make war was taken. JOHN BRENT.

89*. PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC, 1936 : Aims and Results of Social and Economic Policies in Pacific Countries. Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 15–29 August 1936. Edited by W. L. Holland and Kate L. Mitchell, assisted by Harriet Moore and Richard Pyke. 1937. (London : Oxford University Press. 8vo. ix + 470 pp. 21*s.*; to members of the R.I.I.A., 16*s.*)

THE triennial conferences of the Institute of Pacific Relations have provided the nearest approach to a League of Nations for the Far East; and if any international initiative to avert the present struggle had been possible, it might have arisen in that atmosphere of "frankness, tolerance and mutual confidence" which distinguishes these conferences. When peace has again been reached, these conferences will again have an important part to play, for it is here if anywhere that the irreconcilable can be reconciled.

The present volume has a peculiarly dramatic interest, for it represents as it were the last pause before the zero hour. The chart of the coming struggle is here clearly laid out, though its course is not yet marked. There are, so a Japanese representative explained, three

road geographical divisions in Japan's foreign policy, and Japanese liplomacy observes these divisions whatever the political party in power at the time.

1. The world at large, where Japanese interests are almost entirely commercial and war is unthinkable.

2. China, where it is essential to have not only a stable government but one that is not hostile to Japan; but if Japan were to use force in China " it did not mean that she had become a militaristic nation."

3. The U.S.S.R., with whom Japan's relations were " more complicated " than with Great Britain or the United States, since Japan feared " revolutionary tactics," though not the Soviet system of planned economy, " to which many Japanese were sympathetic."

This definition of policy by " a Japanese representative," especially when read with the " document " on " Recent Developments in the Chinese Communist Movement " by Mr. Otsuka, an official of the South Manchurian Railway Company, sheds a light on the situation which deserves to be considered by those who think that the simple word " aggression " accounts for the whole of the tragedy. Japan believes that she is engaged in a life-and-death struggle, and that she is the victim of attack. To us, who know so little about the undercurrents of the East, and even about public events, when they happen a hundred miles from a Treaty port, this excuse seems to be impertinent foolishness. But, then, we do not know much about the power and policy of the Communists, although this is a very important factor in the present situation, as we may learn to our surprise if the Japanese policy fails. This at any rate was Mr. Otsuka's conclusion in the summer of 1936:

" The anti-imperialism movement under the ' New Strategy ' of the Chinese Communist Party is being steadily continued. As has been mentioned previously, the present anti-Japanese movement is not only the concentrated expression of the anti-imperialism movement, but also part of the drive against the Kuomintang, and it must be admitted that the situation brought about by such a state of affairs is extremely grave. In view of its ignominious failure to check the red forces, Japan proposed to the Nanking Government a co-operative plan for defence against the sovietisation of the north-west, and emphasised the vital fact that if swift measures were not executed it would be extremely difficult for the inhabitants of North China to be guaranteed safety. In truth, Japan's proposal was not merely for the sake of protecting the boundary of Manchukuo and the safety of its people, but also for the preservation of the security of the eighty million inhabitants of North China. For the prevention of the sovietisation of the north-west, the subjugation of the Red Army is essential from the military point of view, while, as a political measure, a policy for the rehabilitation of the rural communities is a vital necessity."

The idea of a threefold division of Japanese policy did not pass unchallenged at Yosemite. This Japanese claim was, of course, the crux of the political situation that confronted the Conference, as it now confronts the world with what is at the present moment its most serious political problem. The approach at Yosemite, however, was mainly along the economic road. There must have been an immense amount of material available; and the editors are to be congratulated on their choice and arrangement. After a brief introduction, they give an analysis of the politico-economic situation in the four principal countries—the United States, Japan, the Soviet Union and China; and conclude this section with a review of the Changing Balance of Political

Forces in the Pacific, as a result of "the failure of the treaty structur established by the Washington Conference." The political adjust ments proposed were of three types: (1) bilateral agreements for th adjustment of specific international disputes—which was the form o treaty most urgently advocated by Japanese members; (2) a genera Consultative Pact and periodic conferences of the Pacific Powers; (3) some form of Collective Security Pact, enforced by sanctions. The difficulties were regarded as being almost insuperable.

After this general review of the proceedings, the second half of the volume is given up to a most valuable selection of documents, being full-length expert memoranda on the following subjects:—

1. Trade and trade rivalry between the United States and Japan, by Wm. W. Lockwood, Jr.
2. Factors affecting the recent industrial development of Japan, by Kamekichi Takahashi.
3. The Resources and Economic Development of the Soviet Far East, by E. Raikhman, B. Vvedensky, and others.
4. Recent Developments in the Chinese Communist Movement, by Reizo Otsuka.
5. The Reconstruction Movement in China, by George E. Taylor.
6. The working of diplomatic machinery in the Pacific, by Quincy Wright.

These are monographs of the most useful kind on subjects of vital importance and containing information, as has already been indicated above, which is not easily available elsewhere. They cover a wide range of outstanding questions—the principal omissions being agriculture, which was dealt with in the preceding volume on the Banff Conference of 1933, and the programme (political, economic and social) of the Japanese Army, with an estimate of its success and failure up to date. This is an extremely important factor in the situation in Manchuria, Mongolia, China and even Japan itself, and one of the few upon which the Institute of Pacific Relations has not yet turned the searchlight of its attention. P. J.

90. MY RUSSIAN JAILERS IN CHINA. By George Vasel. Translated from the German by Gerald Griffin. 1937. (London: Hurst and Blackett. 8vo. 288 pp. 18*s*.)

91. JOURNEY TO TURKISTAN. By Sir Eric Teichman. 1937. (London: Hodder and Stoughton. 8vo. 221 pp. Map, illus. 15*s*.)

92*. CRISIS IN CHINA. By James M. Bertram. 1937. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. xxii + 318 pp. 10*s*. 6*d*.)

HERE are three books which tell vividly of strange events in some of the strangest, least-known parts of the world, the first two dealing with much the same parts of it, the third with an area closely adjoining. To add to the interest of vigorous narrative they are all illustrated with many fine photographs, those in Sir Eric Teichman's book being particularly lavish and good.

Mr. Vasel is a German employed in 1933 by the Eurasia Company, the German-Chinese aviation corporation, to map out sites for aerodromes across the Gobi Desert and Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan) for the service of aeroplanes which it was hoped to establish between Nanking and Berlin. Descriptions of the Gobi, its sudden horrible storms, fierce heat by day, bitter cold by night, and utter desolation, yet somehow always tinged with memories of the romantic caravans that carried the wealth of Asia and Europe, are always thrilling. Mr. Vasel writes admirably of his lonely life, where his only companions were a Chinese

servant and a devoted Tibetan dog named Kara. But his business brought him into contact with many interesting characters, most striking of all, General Ma Chung-ying, the "Great Horse," leader of the Mohammedan revolt against the Chinese, who would probably have conquered all Turkestan if the Russians had not come in on the Chinese side. Ma was a man of tremendous physique, a matchless horseman, a deadly shot, a fanatic, yet with noble characteristics. What war meant under him is shown by an appalling account of one village full from end to end of slaughtered men, women and children. Ma's defeat meant that Mr. Vasel fell into Russian hands, and languished in an Ogpu gaol at Urumchi for over a year. As a foreigner and a German of Nazi sympathies he was doubly suspect. How he survived his miseries and why he was eventually let go are equal mysteries. Altogether a most exciting book. But, with the author, one nearly weeps over the fate of poor Kara.

Sir Eric Teichman travelled in comparative state, with two motor lorries (one of which, after giving endless trouble, collapsed and had to be deserted, a forlorn object in a desert village), and as a Government envoy. Since the Russians took a hand in Sinkiang's affairs, the trade from British India has been suffering—and not only from competition. Part of Sir Eric's purpose was to endeavour to negotiate better conditions in the capital Urumchi, where he was joined by Colonel Thomson Glover, the British Resident at Kashgar, and where argument with the Chinese "would tend to develop into iteration, on the principle of the drop of water wearing away the sandstone rock, and final victory was likely to accrue to the side that went on repeating the same thing long enough." We are not told the result, but in a final chapter Sir Eric shows that Turkestan cannot stand alone; either Russia, China, or Japan must have her; the present war would seem to make it pretty clear which.

In spite of official backing, which carried him over the last lap from Gilgit to Delhi in an Indian Government aeroplane, Sir Eric had to "go through it" like anyone else. His crossing of the Pamirs at altitudes of 12,000 and 14,000 ft. in the depth of winter makes one gasp. It was a great feat. One can well understand Sir Eric's regret as he "sings his swan song" of travel in the wild parts of Asia.

Mr. Bertram takes us to Sianfu, capital of Shensi, still but little known to foreigners, whither he went in hot haste in December, 1936, when the world was electrified by the news that General Chiang Kai-shek had been kidnapped by the "Young Marshal," Chang Hsueh-liang, formerly of Manchuria. By cruel ill-luck Mr. Bertram was delayed, and reached Sianfu just after the Generalissimo's release. He does not seem quite to have fathomed the significance of the kidnapping, which caused a complete *volte-face* in the temporising policy towards Japan hitherto followed by Nanking, and thus contributed directly to the present war; but he tells us a great deal of the highest interest. Mr. Bertram has a vivid touch in description; the pages in which he describes his waiting for the Yellow River to freeze and the crossing of it are brilliant. Among the many people with whom he was associated in Sianfu was Miss Agnes Smedley: her standing in the Communist creed rather reminds one of the old Scotch lady who said there were "only twa in the village that wad be savit, herself and the meenister, and she wasna just sure about the meenister." There is also an excellent

account of the Young Marshal, treating that unhappy man more fairly than history has usually done. O. M. GREEN.

93*. JAPAN'S FEET OF CLAY. By Freda Utley. New and cheaper edition, revised and enlarged. 1937. (London: Faber and Faber. 8vo. viii + 408 pp. *7s. 6d.*)

THE second edition of Miss Utley's well-known book includes, as additional matter, a long preface and a new chapter, both of which contain comments upon the present Sino-Japanese War. The author reiterates her belief in Japan's economic weakness. "Japan herself is obviously in no condition to face a long war. If China can hold out for a few months, if she is prepared, as there is every reason to think she is, to continue fighting the Japanese in the interior if the defence near Shanghai fails, there is little doubt that Japan will collapse." One would have more faith in Miss Utley's judgement if she had shown herself in the course of her book to possess the temper of a detached and scientific student of Japanese affairs. But unfortunately, well-informed and interesting as her book undoubtedly is, she has contented herself with propaganda, and the judgments of a propagandist can seldom be relied on. That the Japanese standard of life will decline under the burdens of the war, and that Japan's competitive strength will be weakened because of the wastage of resources and the diversion of productive effort to war-time industries, there can be little doubt. The Japanese, indeed, are prepared for these results. But conditions in Japan and the experience of countries faced with similar difficulties suggest that economic troubles alone will not prevent the war from being carried through to a successful conclusion.

Miss Utley is inclined to base her view about Japan's economic weakness, especially her inferiority in industrial technique, upon inadequate evidence. The predominance of small workshops, and the system by which the production of engineering-components is divided among numerous small producers, are not in themselves a demonstration of industrial inferiority, as she suggests. In Japan capital is relatively scarce and labour plentiful; consequently, the industrial organisation which suits that country is one which is appropriate to these conditions of relative scarcity. This does not mean, however, that industry is necessarily inefficient. Small machinists supplied with dies, tools and metal by the larger factories or merchants can turn out components of satisfactory quality. Small "backyard" foundries, which obtain their metal from a co-operatively worked cupola, can produce small, good-quality castings at prices with which large foundries equipped with moulding machines cannot compete. Miss Utley certainly under-estimates the substantial advance in quality and industrial capacity that has occurred in the Japanese metallurgical trades during the last five or six years, an advance to which many competent foreign technicians in Japan can testify.

If Miss Utley had tried to understand the causes of the peculiarities of Japan's economic structure, about which she gathered much valuable evidence, instead of regarding them with scorn, she would have written a more valuable book. As it is, she provides as distorted a picture of the country as are those drawn by the sentimentalists whom she rightly condemns. It is a pity that she did not correct in her new edition some of her original errors. For instance, on page 195 she is guilty of the quite untrue statement that there are no public hospitals in Japan.

G. C. ALLEN.

94*. La Mongolie : Historique, Géographique, Politique. By J. Lévine. 1937. (Paris : Payot. 8vo. 252 pp. 24 *frs.*)

M. Lévine has produced a semi-popular review of Mongolian affairs which should be of considerable value to the general reader wishing to acquaint himself with the chief features and relevant background of the contemporary political scene. The comprehensiveness of the title is, however, misleading in several respects. Only one-sixth of the book is devoted to historical events before the nineteenth century, and the geographical description of the country, based on Maisky (1921) and Reclus (1882), is confined to ten pages.

The main body of the book deals with political developments during the last thirty years, the author's account of which is unusually complete and well-documented for this type of work. Ample use has been made of I. J. Korostovets' *Von Cinggis Khan zur Sowjetrepublik* (Berlin, 1926), with due acknowledgement, for the period which it covers, but there is also much supplementary material from other sources, including Russian publications and periodicals such as *Krasny Arkhiv*, *Novy Vostok*, *Pravda*, which yield still more of interest for the last decade. Both Soviet and *émigré* literature has been scanned.

While Inner Mongolia is referred to in various connections, and there is a chapter on Uriankhai, M. Lévine is concerned primarily with Outer Mongolia. He sums up the nature of the relations between that country and Soviet Russia at the time he was writing, which he gives as December 1936 (p. 222), in the following terms :

" L'U.R.S.S. ne lui impose pas un régime intérieur déterminé, elle lui laisse une certaine liberté de mouvement, pourvu toutefois que les anciennes couches régnantes ne reviennent pas au pouvoir. Mais dans les domaines militaires et économiques la dépendance de la Mongolie est complète. On peut comparer les rapports mongolo-russes à ceux qui existent entre les princes des Indes Britanniques et le gouvernement de Londres. Mais une définition de l'État bien connue dit que l'État est un être social qui dispose de moyens de coercition et peut s'en servir à son gré. Dans ce sens la Mongolie Extérieure actuelle n'est pas évidemment un État indépendant " (p. 234).

The book is marred here and there by sweeping generalisations, *e.g.* on the alleged submissiveness, indifference and passivity of all Mongols of to-day (pp. 7–9), which the reports later given by the author of insurrections against Chinese and Russians scarcely confirm, or on the effective autonomy of Hsingan Province (p. 240), which has been belied by the execution of four leading officials (*The Times*, April 14th and 21st, 1936), the Kwantung (Japanese) Army itself announcing the reasons for their disgrace.

The one map is clear, but on too small a scale, several places and regions, *e.g.* Kiachta and Barga, which play an important part in the narrative, not being shown. The spelling and transliteration of foreign words and names are also sometimes erratic and inconsistent, and an index should have been provided. In spite of its limitations and defects, however, this concise and eminently readable summary of the main political tendencies in northern Central Asia may be welcomed as an introduction to a subject concerning which far too little is generally known.

E. J. L.

95. I Speak for the Chinese. By Carl Crow. 1938. (London : Hamish Hamilton. Sm. 8vo. 136 pp. 3*s.* 6*d.*)

Carl Crow has written a handbook which should be of value to anyone who wishes to speak in the interests of his 400 million customers ; he well understands how to interpret Oriental psychology to the West.

But is it surprising that the motives of Powers other than Japan should be suspect when we are told that such treaties as the Briand-Kellogg Pact "were designed in a comprehensive way to guarantee the peace of the world," but "were all privately designed to protect China against the aggression of Japan" and by implication to protect the American interests in China? EDWARD AINGER.

96. GEOPOLITIK DES PAZIFISCHEN OZEANS. 3rd revised edition. By Karl Haushofer. 1937. (Heidelberg: Kurt Vowinckel Verlag. 8vo. 338 pp. Maps and charts. *Rm.* 15.)

This new edition of General Haushofer's standard treatise is substantially an integral reprint of the original version published in 1924, the additions being confined to occasional paragraphs in the text and a continuation of the additional chapter summing up events since 1924, which appeared in the second edition. The bulk of facts, data and statistics remain at the 1922–3 level, interspersed by occasional reference to later events. A decided improvement in the new edition is, however, the addition of a map showing the development of the area controlled by the respective Central Governments in China (Table III) and a most useful chart of air lines in the Far East (Table VII). H. R.

97*. BULLETIN OF THE COLONIAL INSTITUTE OF AMSTERDAM. Published in collaboration with the Netherlands Pacific Institute. Vol. I. No 1. November 1937.

The first number of this periodical contains interesting and useful articles on financial and social problems of the Netherlands Indies, and on air transport in the Pacific Area. A special feature is the publication of long summaries of important books which have appeared recently.

THE UNITED STATES

98. A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. By Samuel Flagg Bemis. 1936. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 8vo. xii + 881 pp. $5.00.)

To those who cherish the hope that the United States might yet play a leading part in world politics, this will be a cheerless book. For, written by one of the most noted authorities on American diplomacy, it is a patent sign of that flight from responsibility in which expert and plain man are now so much at one. What earns the author's approval is a purely continental policy. With overseas expansion which merely consolidated the defensive security of the mainland, such as the annexation of Hawaii, he finds no fault; but commitments which went beyond that, especially the acquisition of the Philippines, are deemed the gravest folly. For some purposes, indeed, Professor Bemis is as much an imperialist as were those expansionists of 1898, whom he so unsparingly condemns; for others, now that the United States is a satiated or satisfied Power, he is anti-imperialist in a classical American tradition.

By a narrow and short-sighted calculation of "vital interests," Professor Bemis is no doubt right; a continental policy may be "a safe ground on which to watch and wait for a better world." What he refuses to understand about John Hay and Theodore Roosevelt—his study of Woodrow Wilson being fairer in that respect—is that they perceived that the United States must do her share (and not depend entirely upon the exertions of others), a share commensurate with her wealth, importance and capacity, to support the kind of international

order she needs or desires. Even from the testing experience of the recent past he derives for the future no constructive moral:

> " What the United States really gained from the war was the overthrow for a generation of the military German Empire, which, victorious, would have been in a position for an inevitable Japanese alliance that would have caught the nations of the New World in the jaws of a crushing vice of occidental and oriental military and naval power. *The price of temporary immunity from this was excessive.*" [1]

Professor Bemis's comment upon the guarantee treaty of 1919 between the United States, France and Great Britain cannot fail to give pause. For he contends that Wilson probably knew, and Clemenceau must have suspected, that this tripartite alliance would never pass the isolationist Senate. " It was a way the diplomatists had to get around a difficult corner." The dire effect of that rejection upon the subsequent attitude of France, the international relations of Europe and the peace of the world seems to have eluded Professor Bemis's notice. He is nevertheless at pains to deny that American abstention has had anything to do with the breakdown of the League. For him to have admitted that would have been for him to have abandoned one of the central theses of his work. Lulled into his dogmatic slumbers by the " sage and perfect counsel of Washington's Farewell Address," Professor Bemis deals with these matters in a manner hardly befitting the high standard he otherwise sets himself.

Upon other major topics as well his interpretation may perhaps be questioned. Although towards Great Britain and Canada alike he manifests in general an admirably judicious temper, neither the settlement of the Alaskan boundary nor the adjustment at the turn of the present century of the isthmian canal problem receive adequate treatment. Of Theodore Roosevelt's intervention at Algeciras in 1906 he accepts the conventional American view. In point of fact the Moroccan conference reached agreement not when the President's final solution was put forward but when it was withdrawn.

In a volume so large and comprehensive no historian, however eminent, can avoid furnishing critics with an array of targets at which to shoot. Its merits, none the less, far outweigh its defects. In this distinguished narrative the mainsprings of contemporary American thought on foreign affairs stand revealed. LIONEL M. GELBER.

99. THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT: A history of our Constitutional Theory. By Edward S. Corwin. 1934. (New Haven: Yale University Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. xxvii + 237 pp. 11s. 6d.)

" IN constituting the Supreme Court, the Convention endowed it with attributes which, while removing that body from contaminating touch with the daily aberrations of public opinion, were ingeniously calculated to foster among its members a corporate spirit, a sense of calling, *an instinct for power* . . . . Its deliberations are in private—one might well say, in secret; and its determinations were commonly thought, in an age when the doctrine of natural law was a universal tenet, to be invested with the impersonality of fate." Thus does the learned author of this valuable study of judicial processes describe the Supreme Court of the United States. But, whatever may have been the attitude of lawyers and laymen towards judicial decisions in the

[1] Reviewer's italics.

past, legal fatalism does not go unchallenged to-day, and while the author declares that "the work purports to be chiefly historical" (p. xxvii), nevertheless his analysis of the judicial process in the interpretation of the constitution merits a high place in the general literature of jurisprudence, for Professor Corwin has done for constitutional law what a previous lecturer in this series has done for other fields (*cf.* Mr Justice Cardozo's *Nature of the Judicial Process*).

It would be presumptuous for a foreigner to discuss the adequacy of the author's treatment of the various doctrines which are analysed in this volume—a task which has been fully discharged by American writers. We can only add that the clarity of analysis, and the scientific treatment contributed greatly to the reviewer's appreciation of the lectures. We should like, however, to draw attention to several points which have impressed themselves on our mind. The author's thesis throughout the study is that "the Court, as heir to the accumulated doctrines of its predecessors, now finds itself in possession of such a variety of instruments of constitutional exegesis that it is able to achieve almost any result in the field of constitutional interpretation which it considers desirable, and that without flagrant departure from judicial good form" (p. 181). Since it has usurped the ultimate power of declaring what laws are within the competence of the various law-making bodies in the United States—a power which is now unquestioned —it has made itself morally if not legally answerable for the common weal. But its position in this respect is anomalous, because, in theory, it is incapable of providing solutions of its own, and, in practice, congress has proved a better prophet than the court of what the law has become. The continual frustration by the court of administration schemes for improving the lot of "the people" has led to dangerous expedients, and Professor Corwin intimates that the development may lead to a social upheaval which may very well destroy those elements of the constitution which the court has struggled to preserve.

One of the expedients which has been adapted to circumvent the pronouncements of the court has been the expansion of the "spending power," and the author suggests that "the success of the spending power in eluding all constitutional snares goes far to envelop the entire institution of judicial review, as well as its product, constitutional law, in an atmosphere of unreality, even of futility."

It cannot be denied that the outlook presented in this way is bleak, but one may perhaps be permitted to wonder whether Professor Corwin has not laid undue stress on the dark side of the picture. His clear-cut analysis of the constitutional development discloses, as he admits (p. 89), that a great deal of the responsibility for the court's attitude must be shouldered by the citizens, without whose "complicity" the court could never have achieved its present status. In addition, we may infer with reason from the past history that if public opinion supports social change, the court will ultimately yield; indeed, the way has been prepared and made easy for such yielding without loss of prestige. Ultimately, therefore, the public advantage will prevail, and a developed public opinion coupled with a less deferential attitude to the court will hasten social advancement. A Canadian lawyer may well be envious of the freedom enjoyed by the Supreme Court of the United States, where at least some loophole is left for progressive constitutional interpretation; for us even the "spending power" has been taken away by the recent decisions of the Privy Council.

J. FINKELMAN.

100. The ABC of the Federal Reserve System. By E. W. Kemmerer. Tenth Edition Revised. 1936. (Princeton University Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. xiii + 286 pp. $2.50, 11s. 6*d*.)

This new edition of Professor Kemmerer's well-known standard work will be welcomed by all who require an up-to-date account of American financial organisation. The banking legislation of the New Deal, embodied in the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 and in the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, has brought about revolutionary changes in the organisation and structure of the Federal Reserve System. The bulk of banking deposits are now insured; gold has been nationalised; the volume and direction of credit are now more or less regulated by the needs of the Treasury rather than by the needs of industry and agriculture. Professor Kemmerer does not welcome these changes. He remains a strong supporter of free central banking independent of government interference, and maintains that recent legislation has seriously impaired the Federal Reserve System's control over the credit structure of the country. Yet it is well to remember that even before the depression the Federal Reserve System never had complete control over credit conditions, because of its inability to regulate the financial operations of the big corporations and the dealings in securities on the Stock Exchange. In actual fact the powers now exercised by the Federal Reserve System, the Treasury, and other Federal bodies make possible a far stricter degree of credit control than was ever exercised by the Federal Reserve System alone.

The really crucial question in all countries at the present time is not whether or not government control of credit is desirable, since it has come to stay, but rather, what is the wisest policy for the authorities to adopt. Professor Kemmerer's preference for the old system of privately controlled finance leads him to adopt a pessimistic attitude about the future of American banking, and to overlook some important benefits which may result from more centralised control, free from the pressure of vested financial interests. However, it must be agreed that such centralised power requires wise and impartial direction. This, after all, is the real financial problem in every country.

Whatever may be thought of Professor Kemmerer's views on general policy, his account of the Federal Reserve System itself is a scholarly piece of work, based on wide experience and detailed knowledge. It can be strongly recommended to specialists and non-specialists alike. A. E. Radice.

101. Citizenship of the United States of America. By Sidney Kansas. 1937. (New York: Washington Publishing Co. 8vo. 222 pp.)

At the present time, when for so many people citizenship of certain great States carries with it penalties so heavy as easily to outweigh its advantages, the conditions governing admission to citizenship of the democratic countries take on a new and rather tragic significance. Although the basis of American citizenship law is the constitution, a study of the constitution alone does not give a complete picture of the modern law on the subject. Judicial interpretation, rules and regulations, and opinions by the law officers have all played their part, and are incorporated in the book under review, either in the text or in appendices.

It is a matter of common knowledge that confusion and hardship are often caused by the difference between the citizenship laws of

various States; and this confusion, which is well illustrated by the following example, has been the subject of much agitation. By the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1914, a British woman who married (*e.g.*) an American, *ipso facto* ceased to be a British subject; but under American law she could not become an American citizen until she had acquired a qualification by residence. She thus found herself without a nationality for at least three years. It is not difficult to think of circumstances in which an individual might, on the other hand, be claimed as a citizen by more than one State, with resulting difficulty and embarrassment. No kind of international co-operation is altogether simple, but it is gratifying to know that it has not proved beyond the ingenuity of the governments of the world to arrive at a satisfactory solution of this problem.

I do not know whether it is usual for the index of American books of this kind to be arranged otherwise than in alphabetical order. In this case the result is materially to decrease the usefulness of an otherwise excellent work of reference. E. M. PRICE HOLMES.

102. CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES, 1900–1935. By Russell H. Fitzgibbon. 1935. (Wisconsin: George Banter Publishing Co. 8vo. xii + 311 pp.)

THE struggles towards national strength and unity of any country newly liberated from vassalage form a fascinating study and perhaps the history of the Cuban Republic, whose emergence is contemporaneous with the birth of this troubled century, is not the least varied or interesting. Dr. Fitzgibbon has added to the several fine books on the subject a painstaking and dispassionate review of that aspect of the story for which there is documentary evidence. Perhaps it is in the long run a contribution of great value, in that it has stripped the subject of the colour and rhetoric which are so much a part of Cuban life. His chapter analysing Cuban–American relations in perspective and in prospect will commend itself especially for its understanding and vision. F. H. BROWN.

103. THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA. By William D. McCain. 1937. (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press; Cambridge University Press. 8vo. xiii + 278 pp. 13*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS book provides the most complete survey yet existing of the relations between the United States and Panama from the establishment of Panamanian independence to the signing of the treaty of March 2nd, 1936. A rapid summary of Panamanian history up to the revolution of 1903, and a brief account of that interesting episode, preface this survey.

By reasons both of strategy and of commerce, the Republic of Panama occupies a position of immense importance to the United States. She has, in consequence, become, in a phrase which Dr. McCain quotes, "a sovereign nation only in so far as her sovereignty does not clash with the ideas of the elder statesmen of the State, War, and Navy Buildings at Washington." Dr. McCain discusses the pervasive influence of those ideas, and the peculiar position of the Canal Zone, in relation to internal conditions in Panama, foreign relations, finance and trade. His discussion is sometimes a little hurried, but it is always fair. His book is a useful and valuable contribution to an interesting chapter in the history of imperialism.

R. A. HUMPHREYS.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor,
International Affairs.

The Colonial Problem

Sir,

In public speaking and writing, Mr. Harold Nicolson has arrived at the conclusion that a solution must be " conceived, not in terms of the old nationalities or frontiers, but in terms of economic planning and co-operation on a scale which until now has not been dreamt of in our philosophy."

Long before anything was heard of the clamour of colonial claims, there was a crying need for a Federal Economic Council for tropical colonial Africa. Once the four or five tropical colonial Powers can agree to merge the British, ex-German and other tropical African colonies into European-cultural areas under a federated economic direction, a laborious, scientific and colonially experienced Germany may reasonably be invited to participate and collaborate on terms of complete equality.

Neutralised, issuing its own currency and insulated from European disputes, such a co-operative Africa may germinate the seed of Europeanism which lies frozen in Europe itself. The Conventional Basin of the Congo is, in everyday practice, exceedingly shallow. It is, however, capable of serving as a nucleus of negotiations.

And what of invested capital? When the Helvetian States of differing French, Italian and German culture were merged under a Federal Council, capital invested in, for instance, the Republic of Geneva did not *suffer* from the abatement of suicidal economic exclusiveness nor from the widening of opportunity and of Customs boundaries. Nor has the right of local legislation ever been withdrawn.

It is in the interests of Europe, and especially of highly populated Italy and Germany, that there should be European solidarity overseas to retain for Europe the market of one hundred million African consumers in whom European-type education is just awakening desire for European-type goods. In return, the African would benefit by the *combined* effort of European medical and technical science. The African needs *European* education more than the present jealously national or nationalist instruction in locked compartments.

It is impossible in this space to set out the facts and foundations, or other than the merest outline, of any comprehensive scheme. But in such a constructive project sleeps the seed of an effective European Society of Nations. By such a plan, no colonial peoples would be betrayed.

I am, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
Tracy Philipps.

46, *Pall Mall, S.W.*1.
January, 1938.

To the Editor,
International Affairs.

Sir,

I find it difficult to reconcile the opening sentence of Miss Currey's review of Marshal de Bono's book on the war in Abyssinia with the text. She says, " Marshal de Bono's book is a reply to those who

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

DR. ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE is Research Professor of International History in the University of London and Director of Studies at Chatham House. Author of the annual *Survey of International Affairs, A Study of History*, and other works.

THE VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD was Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1915–16, and Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 1918; he was Lord Privy Seal, 1923–24, and has been United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations Assembly on many occasions; he is a President of the League of Nations Union, President of the International Peace Campaign and a Nobel Peace Prize-winner, also Chancellor of the University of Birmingham.

THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN is Secretary of the Rhodes Trust. He was Secretary to Mr. Lloyd George, 1916–1921, Parliamentary Under-Secretary in the India Office, 1931–32, and Chairman of the Indian Franchise Committee, 1932.

MR. R. A. BUTLER is M.P. for Saffron Walden and Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He was Parliamentary Under-Secretary for India, 1932–37, and Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry of Labour, 1937–38.

H. N. FIELDHOUSE is an Englishman now in Canada as Professor and Head of the Department of History in the University of Manitoba.

THE ISSUES IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY[1]

I. DR. ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, Hon.D.Litt., F.B.A.

Is There a Crisis?

I SUPPOSE the first question that we have to ask ourselves is: Is there a crisis? Because the very subject of our discussions during these meetings is in dispute. Mr. Eden has felt that there has been a big enough crisis to compel him to resign; the Cabinet say it was a question, not of principle, but of time and tactics and degree. The truth may be that a particular question of expediency here and now has brought to a head issues that have been forcing themselves upon us for a long time past, perhaps ever since the War of 1914–18.

What I have been asked to do is to try to put before you these underlying issues as far as one can grasp them; and I have therefore tried to get as many lights as possible from authorities with different standpoints—different from one another as well as from my own standpoint. In trying to put these results together I can hardly help giving a personal presentation; but, anyway, the points that I am going to put before you—necessarily in my own way—do include a number of views which are, in the first place, more authoritative than any that I could have given you just out of my own head, and, secondly, cover a far wider range than what I had in my head before I discussed these questions with other people with a view to this meeting.

I think all concerned in this—whatever it is, crisis or non-crisis—however much they may disagree on other points, appear to be of one mind in being grateful to the Prime Minister for his frankness about what he does not mean to do and does not think it possible to do. Frankness is perhaps not a very common

[1] Address given at Chatham House on March 10th, 1938; Mr. Clement Jones, C.B., in the Chair. It will be seen that the paper was prepared and delivered before Germany's occupation and annexation of Austria between the 11th and the 13th of March, while the other three papers in the series were read after that event. The present paper has since been brought up to date with the three succeeding ones by Lord Cecil, Lord Lothian, and Mr. R. A. Butler, and these four papers, together with that by Professor H. N. Fieldhouse, constitute an attempt to present some of the principal points of view on this vital question.

British virtue. Foreigners think we misrepresent our motives only to them. Really, of course, we often conceal our motives from ourselves as well. That is what is called British hypocrisy. The degree of it is greater than foreigners realise; and in this superlative form it may sometimes be a valuable asset, because it may help us to do what we know that we want to do with great moral assurance; but if what we want should happen to be open to question in our own minds, then it might be better to look into our minds in order to try to find out for certain what is there.

If There is a Crisis, Why Has it Come Just Now?

Well, if there is a crisis, why has it come at this moment? We have not much authentic information, but an outsider may perhaps guess that the reason why Mr. Eden parted company from his colleagues in the Cabinet on a question of action was that he took a different view of the best way to deal with an urgent fact; and I suppose this fact is the imminent and extreme danger of another European war. I seem to remember that Mr. Eden once, in the House of Commons not long ago, defined British policy as "peace at *almost any* price." [1] It will probably be agreed that this is the aim not only of Mr. Eden and Mr. Chamberlain and the Government as a whole, but also of the overwhelming majority of the electorate of this country. It looks from outside as though Mr. Chamberlain had come to the conclusion that the only way to grapple with the now imminent danger of war was for this country immediately to take the initiative—without insisting on any preliminary conditions—in an attempt to come to an understanding with the Powers, or anyway one of the Powers, whose unsatisfied grievances, or unfulfilled ambitions, are the immediate cause of the present severe strain in international relations. On the other side it looks as though Mr. Eden had come to the conclusion that Mr. Chamberlain's policy of unconditional negotiations, so far from diminishing the danger of war, might be likely to increase it by whetting the appetites and raising the hopes of the so-called "Axis" Powers to a point at which those Powers might be tempted sooner or later to present demands which would be higher than the highest price that Mr. Chamberlain himself would be prepared to pay for peace. To put it in another and perhaps simpler way, Mr. Eden may have felt that Mr. Chamber-

[1] "It is a true saying that to keep this country at peace is a great contribution to the peace of Europe, and, whatever may be said about 'peace at any price,' if the Rt. Hon. Gentleman [Mr. Lloyd George] puts it 'peace at almost any price,' I shall scarcely quarrel with him."—Mr. Eden in the House of Commons on June 25th, 1937.

lain's approach to Rome (and through Rome perhaps Berlin as well) would only be likely to succeed if the policy of this country were not " peace at *almost any* price " but " peace at *any* price."

Now at present we, outside, have no indication of the price which the Government are prepared to pay. It looks as though they contemplate abandoning their support of at least one third party, Abyssinia. One does not know whether they intend to abandon the support of others, for instance, Czechoslovakia—as they have in fact abandoned Austria[1]—if and when they find themselves faced with a choice between making that concession and going to war. And, of course, one could carry these conjectures further. Do the Government intend to make larger concessions than that? Are they prepared, for instance, to abandon indirect, though not necessarily on that account unimportant, British interests? A very vital British interest of this kind is the League of Nations. Then there are direct British interests as well: for instance, the lives and business and property of British nationals abroad in such places as China. Will they give up these? And, after that, will they give up territory under British rule? And if it comes to giving up territory, will it be only a question of giving up some or all of the territories that we acquired under mandates in the Peace Settlement, or might it also come, in the last resort, to an offer to give up portions of the pre-War British Empire as well? These are all questions that may arise, and indeed seem likely to arise, in the near future under the double pressure of a growing danger of war and an undiminishing British will to peace. Yet, while these are thus already practical questions, it is difficult to discuss them until we know something of the Government's views about them; and of these we are really quite in ignorance at present. What we can perhaps profitably discuss at once is an underlying general fact which these particular questions seem to bring to light. The fact to which I refer is that to-day both the Government and the country seem to be at one in their readiness, for the sake of preserving peace, to make sacrifices which would not have been practical politics perhaps even a few months ago. The issues that I am going to raise this evening all arise out of this apparently very deep change in the British attitude on foreign affairs.

Great Britain's Extraordinary Good Fortune in the Modern Age.

Having started out like this, let us stand back for a moment in order to look at the picture from a distance. Let us remind our-

[1] See footnote on p. 308.

selves of the extraordinary good fortune that Great Britain has enjoyed in the modern age of history which now seems to be coming to an end. This coming autumn it will be just two hundred and fifty years since this country assumed the status of a Great Power, if that event is to be dated, as I think it ought to be, from the Revolution of 1688. In the course of this period of two hundred and fifty years we have acquired, and have so far kept, the greatest empire in the modern world, and we have done this at an astonishingly low cost to ourselves. I will illustrate what I mean in quite a crude way: We have had to impose universal compulsory military service on ourselves for less than four years out of the two hundred and fifty. It is an astonishing fact. By contrast, our continental neighbours have had to submit to this burden continuously for the past hundred years or more in order to defend, not an immense Empire containing the riches which made Blücher's mouth water in London, but just their own homes. Switzerland is an extreme case. She has just her mountains to defend. Nobody much wants those mountains, but nevertheless she has to have at least a mild form of universal military service in order to defend just that. Now, obviously, we in this country have come to the end of the term—it has been a long term—during which we could enjoy this immensely privileged position; and it now looks as though we shall have to renounce some part of our possessions or else make much greater sacrifices—moral, material, or both—than we have had to make in the past in order to enjoy all this. That is obviously one issue before us now.

In that connection it may be worth recalling the circumstances in which we took up the position of a Great Power in 1688. The decisive fact was a decision to take up the challenge of another Great Power, Louis XIV's France, which was then aspiring to world dominion. In the Revolution we rejected Charles II's policy of keeping on the right side of Louis and letting the Dutch go to the wall, and we deliberately embraced a policy of resistance to French ambitions which led, as it was bound to lead, into a first-class conflict in which we played a principal part. Now, supposing that we substitute contemporary Germany for seventeenth-century France and contemporary France for seventeenth-century Holland, I think the present equivalent to the Revolution of 1688 would be if we turned out our present Government and invited Monsieur Daladier and General Gamelin to come over to London, like William and his military advisers, and take the unified command of French and British resources for opposing Herr Hitler's ambitions. The point that I am trying to make

is that being a Great Power has always—even on the unusually easy terms on which we have enjoyed the status so far—meant taking risks and making sacrifices to some extent, and that this is the essence of being a Great Power. Of course, even since we have become a Great Power, we in this country have never aimed at world dominion for ourselves; and I expect everybody here will agree that we shall certainly never aim at that now or in the future. Our temperament, our tradition and the nature of our power, the structure of our Empire—which has been determined for us by the combined operation of temperament and tradition and geography—all these things make the Napoleonic ambition quite uninviting to us. We have aspired, as a Great Power, not to emulate the ambitions of the Napoleons, but to frustrate them, which is quite a serious enough undertaking. Since 1688 our constant policy has been to refuse to compound, for our own peace and quiet, with aggressive strong Powers and to be active in supporting weak unaggressive Powers against the aggressors' attack. I believe that this was the policy that we deliberately adopted in 1688, and I do not think that we have ever deliberately departed from it yet. Are we going to depart from it now? That, I believe, is one of the issues before us. Perhaps it is the greatest of them all. Anyway, if there were to be a change of British policy on this issue, it would mean a complete break-away from what by this time is a very old British tradition: the practice of a quarter of a millennium, and that is quite a long time.

The Bases of Our Late Exceptional Position.

Then let us consider for a moment the bases of our exceptional position during the past two hundred and fifty years. I suppose we were able, by a combination of sea-power and money-power, gradually to establish a world-wide *Pax Britannica* which was effective and yet not irksome. First, thanks to sea-power, we kept all the other Great Powers corralled on the European continent, and yet in Europe we always had a majority on our side because we stood for maintaining a balance of power, which meant championing the liberties of the many against the ambitions of the few. Then, outside our naval cordon round Europe, we had all the rest of the world for our field, and yet we incurred little envy because we left trade open for all. Then, thirdly, we held the power of the purse in the world, but we used it for the constructive development of all countries inside as well as outside our naval ring. We not only built the first railway in Mexico; we built the first gas-works in Berlin, which continued to

be managed by a British Company down to the outbreak of the War of 1914–18. We invested our riches for the benefit of the people who were ringed round by our naval power, besides investing them in our playground in the rest of the world.

The British political world-order that was based on these almost invisible yet rather powerful naval and financial sanctions was just sufficient, during the century ending in 1914, to provide a framework for the economic unification of the world which took place in the course of the nineteenth century. But of course the Great War broke those gossamer threads and compelled us to stake the whole of our resources of life and wealth and happiness in order to defend our system. I say deliberately "in order to defend our system," because I think we were fighting for our way of running the world, and not just for the territorial integrity of our Empire, which was a much smaller thing. In the nineteenth century the British territory marked on the map was less than it is now. It did not represent anything like the whole of our position in the world: our world-wide trade, our activity as the workshop and as the financial heart of the world, our *Pax Britannica.* The Great War, however, brought to the surface a change which had been in progress underneath it for some time, and which was already undermining the *Pax Britannica's* foundations. I propose that what we should do mainly to-night is to discuss the possible alternative policies which Great Britain might adopt in face of this change in the international situation which is now obviously coming to a head.

Can We Maintain the Pax Britannica?

First let us ask ourselves: Can we maintain the nineteenth-century *Pax Britannica* in these twentieth-century circumstances?

I think there will probably be general agreement that this is impossible for several reasons: first, because two great Powers, the United States and Japan, are now outside our British naval ring round Europe; secondly, because the narrow seas round Europe —the Mediterranean, the Channel, the North Sea and the Baltic —can now no longer be controlled by sea-power, or anyway not exclusively. They have passed, at least in part, under the control of land-power using the air-arm. In the Great War, for instance, the Baltic was controlled by Germany, and from the air England was attacked directly by an enemy for the first time since the Dutch fleet sailed up the Medway. It was the first direct hostile attack on our country since then! But under present post-War conditions London is said to be one of the most vulnerable cities

in the world. If, in these changed circumstances, any Great Power were to set itself to undertake the task of maintaining a political world order—even of so rudimentary a kind as the nineteenth-century *Pax Britannica*—out of its own unaided strength, it would have to be a Power of the continental scale and structure which the United States and the Soviet Union possess already, and which Japan and Germany would come to possess if they were to achieve the great ambitions with which they are credited in the Far East and in Central Europe respectively. To mention one small point, I believe it is a fact that there were more White men yesterday in Germany, even within its reduced Versailles frontiers and without counting in the six-and-a-half million new citizens whom the Reich has just acquired through the annexation of Austria, than there are in the whole British Commonwealth of Nations; and of course our British White men are scattered all over the globe under half-a-dozen separate governments, while the heart of the Empire in Great Britain itself is dangerously exposed to attack by contrast with America's citadel in the Mississippi basin or with Russia's in the Urals.

Can We Put the Pax Britannica *into Commission?*

Well, if we cannot go on keeping our nineteenth-century *Pax Britannica* single-handed, can we put our British system into commission? That is one meaning, though, of course, not the only one, from the British point of view, of the collective security policy which we have been trying to work out since the War through the League of Nations. The ill-success of this policy on an eighteen-years' trial has brought us up against the present crisis.

If one looks into that ill-success, one can see that the serious thing is *not* that the League has been challenged by the so-called "Triangle" group: Germany, Italy and Japan. After all, if we had not expected such challenges there would have been little point in creating the League, and it was obvious that, if and when the challenge did come, it would come from a group, and not from an isolated Power. I think the seriousness of the situation lies perhaps rather in facts like the following. First, the United States has been unwilling to co-operate in contributing the necessary quota of force. Then France has been unwilling to co-operate in contributing the necessary quota of conciliation towards Germany. Here, parenthetically, one may say that if France has been the greatest sinner in this respect, she has not been the only one. For instance, if one looks into the causes of Italy's conquest of Abyssinia, one sees that one cause can be

found in the action of the Canadian delegate at the first Assembly of the League of Nations. At that Assembly the Italian delegate brought up the question of the distribution of raw materials. The Canadian delegate moved that this Italian plea should be ruled out of order; and Canada's will prevailed. Well, Canada has something to answer for over what happened in Africa fifteen years afterwards. Again, the action of the Senate at Washington, in substituting the Exclusion Act of 1924 for the previous Gentleman's Agreement with Japan on the immigration question, is not irrelevant to the present Japanese outbreak of militarism. And, of course, our own country has also had her share in bringing about the present situation—though this mostly, I suppose, by way of *refraining* from taking action on critical occasions. For instance, Great Britain took advantage of her legal right not to ratify the Guarantee Treaty of the 28th June, 1919, to France when America declined to ratify her parallel treaty. We have made the same commitment to France since, but much too late. It is true that Mr. Lloyd George did renew the offer to Monsieur Briand in 1921, but by that time M. Poincaré was in the ascendant, and he preferred to keep a free hand in order to invade the Ruhr. And, of course, we did not effectively oppose the French invasion of the Ruhr. I think Mr. Bonar Law's last words to the French before they marched were: "I hope you're right"—by which he meant, no doubt: "I know you're wrong, but I am not going to do anything about it."

Then another serious impediment in the way of executing the Covenant to-day is, of course, the enigma of Russia. I suppose that what we see going on in Russia to-day is hateful to all of us, and to most of us it would be no pleasure to be closely associated with Russia. But still we might swallow that, because, as far as we know, there is nothing in Stalin's policy that is incompatible with his genuinely co-operating in resistance to aggression. Unlike pre-War Russia, the Soviet Union, I think, very evidently has no aggressive intentions against other people's territory, so that in this matter the vital point for our present purpose is that the Soviet Union seems to stand in the same position to-day as Czechoslovakia and France and the British Empire. Like us, the Soviet Union has no intention of committing territorial aggression, but has a lively fear of becoming the victim of it. Therefore, there is nothing in Soviet policy which is incompatible *a priori* with co-operation with us in support of collective security. The trouble is, of course, that at the present time Stalin's policy is as obscure as—I was going to say: Mr. Chamberlain's!

We do not know whether it is a League of Nations policy or a policy of alliances or a policy of isolation. We cannot gauge the Soviet Union's material power, either. We do not know the degree of her technical efficiency, and we do not know how far she has been weakened politically by the purges. We imagine that she must have been weakened appreciably, but we do not know the extent of the damage.

Now, if Great Britain and France are to pursue a League policy with any chance of success in face of the "Triangle" group of Powers who have expressly repudiated the principle of international law and order, it may well be argued that we must know that we can count upon the active co-operation of *either* Russia *or* America. Well, as it is, we cannot at present, I fear, count upon either of them.

Finally, if one were making a list of the weaknesses of the League, its local weakness at the point where it has just been challenged and is most likely to be challenged again next must be considered, and that point, of course, is Central Europe. The League's weakness in Central Europe is, I think, partly strategical and partly moral—the moral weakness being the more serious. To take the strategic point first, suppose Germany attacked Czechoslovakia, and the Russians could not or would not move. Then the only way in which Great Britain and France could come to the help of Germany's victim would be by attacking Germany herself on the west. But, apparently, as between Powers of approximately equal strength—for instance, as between the Western Powers and a Germany-cum-Austria who has re-occupied and probably re-fortified the Rhineland—the defensive to-day has an advantage of about three to one. Then there is the moral point that, in setting himself to win political unity for Germans outside and inside the frontiers of the Reich, Herr Hitler is appealing to the very principle of self-determination on which the Allies professed to have fought the War of 1914–18 and to have made the Peace Settlement. In Czechoslovakia, as in Austria, the advent of the German army would be welcomed by a large minority. The Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia would be as glad to hail Hitler as the Austrian Nazis were. Of course I do not mean to suggest that German grievances against Czechoslovakia would justify aggression on Germany's part; for what we mean by the crime of aggression is resorting to force instead of peaceful means even for remedying genuine grievances. But you cannot castigate the crime with complete moral assurance if there has been anything which the person who wishes to commit aggression can

present as being an invincible refusal to give reasonable satisfaction to him. I expect most people here have read President Beneš' offer in the *Sunday Times* of the 6th March to discuss with the Western Powers some solution of the minorities problem in Czechoslovakia. I profoundly hope that the Western Powers will at once respond to Dr. Beneš' very important overture.

Considering the present situation—that is, an apparently invincible non-co-operativeness in the United States, an almost invincible unwillingness for war in Great Britain and France, the unreliability of Russia, the strategic and moral weakness of the present régime in Czechoslovakia, and a certain will to war in the "Triangle" countries—the Prime Minister was clearly uttering a simple truth when he said that the Covenant was now not working. That raises some immediate issues. Ought we, then, to make efforts and take risks for the sake of trying to make the Covenant work again even now? And, if so, how far would it be right and reasonable for us to go along that line?

One trouble is that the risks involved are peculiarly difficult to estimate, because one of the main ingredients in them is the psychological reaction of the dictators. Which of two alternative gambles is more likely to save us from war? A policy of making clear to the dictators that there are limits to the price that we are prepared to pay for peace? Or a policy of negotiating unconditionally in the pious hope that the dictators will not then demand more than the utmost that we are privately prepared to concede? Would firmness on our part, open firmness, daunt the dictators, or would it madden them? Would an offer of unconditional negotiations win their hearts, or would it swell their ambitions to outrageous dimensions?

On this point I would like to quote two very telling observations from a colleague of mine in Chatham House who has been kind enough to look at my notes for this evening. Here is the first observation:

> "One has to consider what the possible consequences of a League policy may be. It is at least arguable that dictators cannot afford to be intimidated, so that standing up to them will then precipitate a general war."

His second point is this:

> "Supposing that the policy in question did precipitate war, and supposing that the League forces succeeded in winning that war, how much further should we be towards making the League work? With passions roused, as they could not fail to be, by the conflict, is there any guarantee that we should not make much the same mistakes as were

made last time? I am prepared to argue that we should be even further away from the League, because the waste and dislocation of the war would undermine the economic security of life in most nations, and that is the kind of situation which breeds dictatorships. The League, if it works at all, will only work with Democracy, and Democracy is a fair-weather form of government."

Now, these arguments against persisting, at any rate at the present, in an attempt to carry out a League policy are obviously very formidable; but, then, so are the arguments against abandoning a League policy. I think there is a very strong case for arguing that, in a post-War world in which a *Pax Britannica* is no longer practical politics, the League system is the first *and last* line of defence both for the principles for which the British Empire stands at home and abroad and also for the integrity of British territory.

Let me try to explain what I mean by that. If we fail to make a success of collective security, then I think the world is going to be unified politically, not by peaceful agreement, but by the ancient method of force in the shape of military conquest by some Power or group of Powers. The "Triangle" group of Powers are already trying out in Spain and in China a method of securing world dominion for themselves. They denounce as Communist any Government that they wish to attack, and then they, as they say in America, proceed to "put it on the spot." Czechoslovakia, one of the most *bourgeois* countries in Europe, has been called Communist by them already on account of her alliance with the Soviet Union. It is as if we had been called Czarist before the War because of our alliance with Imperial Russia—an alliance that was dictated by the same reasons which have now moved Czechoslovakia to make an alliance with Soviet Russia. The same measure may be meted out in turn to any country which does not adopt a régime agreeable to the Fascist Powers, or which refuses to enter their orbit.

The game of the Triangle Powers is perhaps unlikely to succeed. If they do force the world into a competition for military supremacy, leaving no choice except conquest or downfall, then I believe that the victory in that awful struggle will go, not to those Powers, but to some Great Power that combines a continental structure with a command of modern technique (and corresponding material resources) and with democratic institutions to give its people staying power. This combination of winning points is only to be found in English-speaking North America, by which I mean the United States reinforced by the English-speaking

parts of Canada. But we may be certain that a British Empire pivoting—as any British Empire must—on the United Kingdom will *not* be in the running in that competition for world supremacy. Just look at the post-War *British* Empire on the map; I think one can see from that map alone that it could not possibly survive even one round of a struggle of all against all in an anarchic world. Its only chance of survival lies in establishing some sort of world-wide system of law and order for its framework.

Another point to be considered is that a League war is the only kind of war in support of which you would now get a united nation in the United Kingdom. That is a point which Mr. Churchill has often made in various forms, and I think with special force since Mr. Eden's resignation. The reason, of course, is that the League policy is an example of our " British hypocrisy " at its best. One feature of this " British hypocrisy " is the knack of making British interests and ideals harmonise with each other and also with the interests and ideals of a majority of the rest of the world. Now, in present circumstances a British foreign policy based on the Covenant is, I believe, the only British foreign policy that can fulfil these conditions. This policy—and this alone—can unite those of us who are mainly concerned with upholding British principles with those of us who are mainly concerned with preserving British property. That is a point of really crucial importance, for on any other basis we shall go to war, if it comes to war, as a deeply divided nation, and that may mean a nation which has been defeated before the war starts. Then, again, it is only by taking our stand on the Covenant that we can hope to rally to us the support of all those forces in the world outside our really rather narrow British frontiers which are of the same way of thinking and feeling as ourselves. Of course, much of this support may be moral only and not material, at any rate to begin with; but do not let us under-estimate these imponderable forces. Germany's blindness to the power of these moral factors was perhaps the principal cause of her defeat in the War of 1914.

Well, I have tried to put before you the pros and cons of a League policy in present conditions. On this question whether we should still try to uphold or restore a system of collective security we may perhaps reserve our judgment until we have considered the possibility of alternative policies.

Can We Isolate Ourselves?

Let me turn to another suggestion. Can we retain our great possessions without maintaining *either* the nineteenth-century

Pax Britannica or the League? We should not be human if we did not wish to answer this question in the affirmative; and therefore here, perhaps (I would like to suggest to you), lies the greatest danger both for our honour and for our material interests in the present situation. One sometimes sees the following policy suggested. First that we should make it clear to the three Powers now on the war-path that we have no intention of interfering in any attacks which they may make on the territory, independence or interests of third parties. This might be taken to be implied in an official recognition of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia; and that, of course, is one of the reasons why the question of this recognition is a crucial one. The second point in this policy of isolation is that we should re-arm to the full extent of our material and psychological power. I suggest that, in re-arming under those conditions and with that policy, it would be the psychological factor which would be the limiting factor. The third point in the policy that I am describing now is that we should make it clear that we shall fight for nothing but an attack on British (or French or Belgian) territory. For instance, we should not fight for British lives or property in China, and *a fortiori* not for the sake of any third party other than Belgium or France. We should fight if British or French or Belgian *territory* were attacked.

Can we hope to keep our Empire intact on these lines? I think the suggested policy runs on certain very sharp rocks.

The first rock is that the overwhelming majority of the people of this country have no heart, as far as I can judge, for playing this game. The assumption is that we should be playing it because we had not the spirit to pursue a League policy. But if we are not bold enough to fight for the League, then, *a fortiori*, we are not likely to be bold and bad enough to fight just for the British Empire. You cannot extinguish in a great nation the will to fight for a cause without at the same time extinguishing still more thoroughly the will to fight for property. No doubt, a people on the war-path will sometimes have the zest to run quite considerable international risks for the fun of acquiring new property on a large scale—as witness our Elizabethan ancestors when they bearded the King of Spain and risked the Armada and got away with it; but the mere defence of acquired property is not an inspiring cause for which to give one's life. Nor is it common sense. On a hedonistic calculus, leaving all ideal considerations out of account, what London householder would be prepared to have his wife and children bombed at home

for the sake of keeping, say, Tanganyika, that pink colour which British Mandated territory is painted on the map? If you are asking people to get themselves and their families bombed, then you must appeal to them, I feel certain, not for the preservation of property but for crusading in causes that can deeply move their hearts. Look at the dictators, who know how to play upon hearts. They appeal to their peoples to sacrifice themselves either to save the world from, or to win the world for, such causes as Communism. My point is that the limits of psychological rearmament are very narrow if the purpose is merely to cling to property.

Then, further, a policy of defending British property while letting British ideals go by the board would lose us all sympathy abroad. In particular it would lose us the sympathy of the English-speaking people of North America, who are, I believe, going to have the last word in any struggle for world dominion that may be let loose by a collapse of the League system of collective security.

Here is an extract from a letter, dated the 23rd February, 1938, from an able student of politics who is a citizen of the United States:

"The new Chamberlain policy has produced the most profound depression in the United States among persons of every shade of opinion. During the past year there has been a growing conviction among Americans that everything which we hold dear in life is being menaced by the Fascist Powers. And, regardless of differences of opinion on method, it was being resolved in most minds that whatever weight the United States might have in world affairs must be thrown on the side of the so-called democratic Powers. This was as true of the isolationists as of the advocates of collective security. The single doubt remaining was whether the democratic Powers were in fact democratic. There was a suspicion, which I must confess I shared, that the present Government of Great Britain was promoting reaction in the guise of appeasement. As I wrote you months ago, there is so deep-rooted a hatred of Fascism in America that there seems to most of us no basis for compromise. This is the more so as no one here has the slightest faith in any agreement which Hitler and Mussolini may sign; look at the record. The American naval-building program was largely predicated upon the proposition that ultimately the power of the United States would have to be thrown into the balance on the side of England. And now what? I am sure this is all as bewildering to you as to some of us here."

That is how my American correspondent concludes. And here is an extract from a letter of the 19th February written by

an Englishman, well known to everybody in this room, who has been overtaken by the crisis in Europe while he is on tour through Canada :

" It is rather difficult to judge what is the really prevalent judgment of British foreign policy, because naturally the critics are the most vocal. I think, however, that there is a large element everywhere which wants to be sympathetic but has been puzzled how to meet the criticisms which it hears. On the whole I should say the prevalent criticism is that we do not stand firm enough : that we seem determined to avoid war at all costs, and thus play into the hands of the Nazi-Fascist blackmailing combination. This is, of course, as they admit an easier attitude for those at a safe distance than for us on the spot Except for (and probably because of) French Canada, which is violently anti-Communist and pro-Fascist in its sympathies, the prevailing opinion seems very *anti*-Hitler and Mussolini. There is, I should say practically no support for the attitude of one present school in England which seeks, and thinks possible, a peaceful understanding with thei régimes. All would agree with the attitude of Eyre Crowe in 1907 as to the inadvisability of conceding to blackmail."

Now we may feel this North American criticism—which is the same, you see, in Canada as in the United States—rather hard on us, because no doubt the impossibility of our counting on the support of the United States and the Dominions (other than New Zealand) for a bold League policy in the Old World is one reason that has moved Mr. Chamberlain now to give up the League policy, at any rate for the time being, as a bad job. There is, o course, a time lag between our European island and the North American continent. You remember how in the War of 1914-18 the Americans were just beginning to get into their stride when we were utterly war-weary here. Now, in that very tight place we did realise the urgency of our holding out until the Americans brought their weight to bear. Does not the same consideration hold good to-day? My own belief is that the English-speaking North Americans are old-fashioned enough and naïve enough to be going to fight for democracy in their own good time. Doe not this make it very important that we, in the meantime, should avoid doing anything to disillusion them too much and so perhap irrevocably alienate them from us?

Then the policy of defending British property while throwing overboard British ideals will not only weaken this country by losing us the support of our friends and fellow-subjects in America it will also put us at the mercy of our rivals in the Old World. We cannot, you see, buy off the Triangle Powers by giving them a free hand, so far as we are concerned, to do as they like with th

property, liberty and existence of third parties, because the British Empire can be conquered in the territories of third parties without the conqueror having to touch, directly, one spot of territory that is painted red on the map. For instance, Shanghai could be turned into a Chandernagore and Hongkong into a Goa by a Japanese conquest of the Chinese hinterland. We have played that trick ourselves on the French and Portuguese in India in the last chapter of the present story. Then Singapore could be enveloped by a Japanese seizure of the Dutch East Indies combined with a Japanese alliance with Siam, who has old scores to pay off against France. Aden, again, could be enveloped by Italy from East Africa and the Yaman. Malta has perhaps already been enveloped between Sicily and Libya. Gibraltar may soon be enveloped between a Spain and a Spanish Morocco united under a Spanish Government belonging to the Triangle camp. Scapa Flow could perhaps be outbid by a German naval base in the Faroe Islands, which Hitler might extort from a defenceless Denmark as a ransom for Copenhagen; he has only to make a military, naval and air concentration at Kiel; and he knows that the United Kingdom is not pledged to fight on Denmark's behalf. Most formidable of all, if Germany were to build up a Mitteleuropa and convert its resources into air power, then South-East England, where we are sitting at this moment, would be directly commanded from the air by a Great Power of the geographical and economic calibre of the United States—a Power with which we could not attempt to compete in air strength.

Now, supposing that Germany did achieve her reputed ambitions in Central and Eastern Europe, is it conceivable that she would then leave Great Britain and France and Belgium to enjoy undisturbed their great possessions in Africa, or that she would not beat us into surrendering them by blows struck at the metropolitan countries in Western Europe (even if we discount the possibility of Germany's gaining direct access to Africa over an Italian bridge)? So, on consideration, one might judge that if we did pursue the policy of isolation we should be condemning ourselves to having to fight for our possessions in the long run after all, but this time at a stage where we should no longer be able to defend them.

If you want to see what is apt to happen to a democracy that tries to play this game against a dictatorship, I recommend you to re-read the history of the poker-match between Demosthenes' Athens and Philip's Macedon which opened with Philip's seizure of Amphipolis in 358 B.C. The series of Athenian reverses which

thus began, far away from Athens, in Thrace, ended twenty years later on the stricken field of Chaeronea.

Can We Abdicate?

Yet another possible policy might present itself if we were willing to give up a substantial part of our present possessions. Could we retire with honour and security from the status of a Great Power which we have held for the past two hundred and fifty years? I mean, could we, at a price, pass from our present status to that of Holland, Belgium, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries, or, in other terms, revert to our own status in and before the reign of Charles II? Before I go into the question whether abdication is in itself a possible policy for us to adopt—possible materially and also possible psychologically—I want to make the point that we cannot even begin to think about abdication without having first made up our minds to sacrifices which might have to be very considerable. We had better, anyway, get used to this idea of sacrifices, because probably we shall have to resign ourselves to making substantial sacrifices whatever policy we pursue. On this point let me read an extract from a paper sent me in anticipation of our meeting this evening by a Member of Parliament who is an able and distinguished representative of what I might call the Defeatist-Die-Hard point of view. He writes to me:

"The War, historically viewed, merely delayed a change in the relative strength of Great Powers which was bound to be to our disadvantage and could only have been countered, if at all, by the means they have used, viz. national service, national concentration and a strengthening of every material and sentimental bond. We in this country, led by the 'intellectuals' and the churches, took the opposite line; we disarmed ourselves regardless of what others were doing, in the moral as well as the material sense. . . . We must now pay the price, and it will be heavy.

"We cannot hold all we have. We must give up something: it will cost us more to do so now than if we had done it from a sense of justice even a few years ago. We must recognise this and give what we must give 'with an air' on sound moral grounds, as usual, and peacefully. Whatever is living is subject to change. We are not exempt from natural laws.

"I have urged concessions to Germany, as part of a general agreement, for the past three years. Two years ago a token payment Cameroons, would have sufficed. National honour, not economic need, is behind the demands" [that, I am sure, is true] "and always has been. The longer we defer the day the higher the price, as Tarquin the Proud found in his dealings with the Sibyl."

Now, how much should we have to give up in order to purchase the option of abdicating from the status of a Great Power and reverting to neutrality? Another British commentator, whose own political outlook is very different from that of the Member of Parliament whom I have just quoted, estimates the bill as follows:

To Japan: All British and French and Dutch territorial possessions and business interests north-east of Singapore.

To Italy: Everything that we now have in the Red Sea and the Mediterranean: islands, naval bases, the command of the narrow seas, the control over Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the protectorate over other Arab countries—in fact, the naval and political supremacy in all these waters and their hinterlands.

To Germany: To balance her Mitteleuropa, a Mittelafrika, which would have to include not only all the former German colonies (an integral restitution of these is a matter of principle for the Germans), but also probably the Belgian Congo and those places in West Africa which produce vegetable fats: *i.e.*, large slices of French and British and Portuguese West Africa.

That would be a very large bill. But let us assume for the sake of argument that John Bull has written out a blank cheque to cover the Triangle Powers' bill, whatever this may amount to. Assuming this, let us ask ourselves whether neutrality is a commodity of which, when we have paid the price for it, we can take delivery?

Given the willingness and ability to pay the price, the case that can be made out for our reverting to neutrality is rather an impressive one. Supposing that one genuinely believes that it is beyond one's strength to be one's brother's keeper, we might agree that it is not dishonourable in itself to renounce that rôle; it is only dishonourable to throw one's brother to the wolves in the hope of saving one's own property. If one gives up the property first, one cannot reasonably be expected then to defend the brother. Moreover, the danger of assuming the position of neutrality in an anarchic world where might is right is likely to be diminished in proportion to the extent of one's renunciation of great possessions. Norway, for instance, has obviously very much less to tempt an aggressor than the present British Empire. But here I must enter a caveat: there is one possession of which we cannot divest ourselves, and that is our geographical position. It is this inalienable asset which keeps Switzerland armed and alarmed and that caused Belgium to be invaded in 1914. Belgium

was invaded then because she lay between Germany on one side and France and Great Britain on the other. If England and France were now to go neutral in their turn, they would find themselves in a geographical position not unlike that of Belgium in 1914, for they would lie in the no-man's-land between a Mitteleuropa under German domination and a North America led by the United States. Their position then between those two immense Powers would also be not unlike Czechoslovakia's position now between Germany and Russia.

I believe that if France and Great Britain abdicated, a Central European Confederacy under German domination might come into existence very rapidly, and later on I shall suggest some grounds for our having to fear that this new German Empire on the scale of the United States would still be an aggressive Power.

There is, however, one recent historical example of successful abdication that looks encouraging at first sight, and that is the abdication of Holland, who in the early modern age was in a position very like our own to-day. The histories of Holland and England have run so nearly parallel in modern times that one might almost say that, if we had not each had our respective histories, England might have had Holland's history and Holland England's. Now in 1713 Holland emerged from a victorious war against a Great Power, Louis XIV, as the financial and even military protagonist in the coalition which had defeated him. And then in the course of the eighteenth century Holland dropped out of the ranks of the Great Powers by almost imperceptibly gradual stages. Step by step her naval and military and money power was liquidated; and, in the process, some unpleasant things happened to her. There was the failure of the Bank of Amsterdam; the capture of the Dutch grand fleet by French hussars; and the seizure of the Cape and Ceylon by Great Britain on the excuse that Holland herself had been conquered by Napoleon. The last was the unkindest cut of all. Yet, all the same, the Dutch at present are very comfortable. They have managed to retain a considerable empire; they are less heavily taxed than we are; and they are now perhaps not more insecure. So is not Holland's experience perhaps an encouraging precedent for us? Does not eighteenth-century Holland's example show twentieth-century England the best course for her to take? And if we want a warning example of what not to do, we may perhaps profitably study the contrast between the policy of eighteenth-century Holland and that of eighteenth-century Sweden. In that

century the Swedes found themselves up against Russia, much as we find ourselves now up against Germany. The sequel proved that it was really beyond Sweden's strength to maintain the rôle of a Great Power against so gigantic a rival, but for a hundred years—from the disaster at Poltava in 1709 down to the loss of Finland in 1809—Sweden kicked against the pricks before resigning herself to the inevitable. It is only during the last century, when she has accepted the status of a neutral, that Sweden has recovered her prosperity and happiness. Well, would not Great Britain to-day do well to take warning from Sweden and to walk in Holland's footsteps?

Furthermore, Hitler and Mussolini are no doubt eager to induce Great Britain and France to withdraw into neutrality and are therefore perhaps ready to build golden bridges for us. That, I suppose, is the meaning of their project for a Four-Power Pact. If we were to resign ourselves to neutrality, then the Rome-Berlin Axis would almost certainly offer us some mitigation of our lot. I do not think that the Axis would in that case immediately demand of us intolerable concessions at our own expense. The first instalments of their demands might be moderate, and in return they would probably be ready to grant all four West-European neutrals—Belgium, Holland, France, Great Britain—a West-European non-aggression pact coupled with a West-European air pact (not, of course, an agreement to accept parity in air strength—the superiority of the Axis Powers in this would be overwhelming—but a "gentleman's agreement" not to bomb each other). These arguments in favour of reverting to neutrality are rather attractive, but before we accept them let us look again at the Dutch parallel. There are differences as well as likenesses between our position now and that of Holland in the eighteenth century; and at least two of these differences seem to me to be vital.

First there is a vital economic difference. When Holland abdicated in the eighteenth century, she was in the fortunate position of having given no hostages to fortune. She was a great commercial country, but not a great industrial country with a population which could only be maintained by a world-wide trade. Holland's abdication was completed just before the Industrial Revolution. Eighteenth-century Holland had not industrialised herself, as Great Britain has done since. So we have to consider whether we, who have given those hostages to fortune by increasing our population to its present size in the course of the nineteenth century, can materially afford to do what

Holland did in the eighteenth century. On this point let me quote my colleague whom I have quoted once before :

" In discussing whether we could give up our Empire and turn into a second-rate neutral Power, you seem to me to overlook the economic aspect. The British Isles could not support their present population without our foreign trade, and that trade is surely due in large measure to our position as a World Power. If we lost the Empire, and with it the trade, would not an economic depression ensue, which would call forth, if not Fascism, at least a demand for vigorous policies incompatible with neutrality? "

Then there is a political difference between our position to-day and that of Holland and Sweden a century ago. When Holland and Sweden both finally sank into neutrality after the Napoleonic Wars, they went neutral in a world in which the *Pax Britannica*, as I have described it, had just become a going concern : the nineteenth-century world in which Great Britain had both the will and the strength to maintain a balance of power in which the existence of the small neutral European countries was reasonably secure against aggression. Great Britain did pocket one or two Dutch colonies in the peace settlement of 1814–15. On the other hand the British world-order which was then established provided a guarantee for the survival of the rest of the Dutch Empire, and, above all, for the independence of the Netherlands themselves. But if Great Britain and France go neutral now, who is going to provide for us the *Pax* which British sea-power and money-power provided for Holland and Sweden and other small neutrals during the last century? Can we count on a *Pax Americana*? I hardly think so. North America may ultimately be driven by German aggression to fight for the dominion of the world; but in the meantime I do not think she is going to take on the nineteenth-century functions of the British Empire.

There is also a French factor : the French, who love clarity as much as we love obscurity, have already been facing this issue of abdication. It was the subject of the debate in the Chamber in Paris on the 26th of February, and the sense of that debate was unmistakable. France has declared that she, for her part, is *not* going to abdicate from the status of a Great Power, and that she is going to honour her engagements in Central and Eastern Europe—if necessary, at the cost of war. Now, if France does insist on taking up the challenge of the Rome–Berlin Axis, can we stand out? In my belief : No. It is just conceivable that Great Britain and France might go neutral together. But for Great Britain to go neutral alone and leave France to be crushed

by Germany and Italy is not really practical politics. We could never risk putting ourselves so much at the mercy of the Axis Powers as that.

Do We Want to Abdicate?

Assuming that the possibility of going neutral were open to us, should we want to embrace it? I believe that at first thoughts the majority of people in France and Great Britain would welcome the idea in the secret places of their hearts, though they might not confess this openly. Their second thoughts, however, might be: Can we count on being able to go on cultivating our own garden in our own way whatever the social climate of the rest of the world? Can Liberalism in the broadest sense of the word expect to survive in a world in which the totalitarian ideology is given free play outside the democratic countries' own borders to propagate itself by force?

Let us first look at the arguments in favour of opting for abdication. There is an impressive historical argument in the experience of the Catholic Church. In the sixteenth century Catholicism found itself in much the same position as Liberalism to-day. It had been challenged by the sudden violent eruption of a militantly hostile movement. Could Catholicism and Protestantism live together? At first Catholicism answered the question in the negative, fought the Wars of Religion, failed to suppress Protestantism and had to resign itself to living in the same world with it permanently. Yet at the present day, two-and-a-half centuries after the Wars of Religion ended in a draw, Catholicism is certainly not less favourably situated than Protestantism in the world. Cannot Liberalism profit by this experience without repeating the mistake—as the precedent seems to prove it to be—of fighting a destructive yet indecisive ideological war? Then, turning from the past to the present, one might question the staying power of the totalitarian régimes. Where there are so many unknown quantities, why not gamble on the possibility of Chance falling out in our favour? Dictators are not immortal. The movements that they lead have been evoked by particular grievances or ambitions. They might subside if these were removed or satisfied. Again, so far as the dictators do succeed in achieving their war-aims they may be creating difficulties for themselves by arousing opposition. In present conditions it may be easier to conquer countries than to digest such conquests.

But we cannot overlook the arguments on the other side. The lessons of history are, after all, conflicting. The experience

of the Catholic Church, for example, seems to be contradicted by that of the United States. The constitutional history of the United States appears to show that people cannot live together without a modicum of moral and intellectual common ground. The makers of the Constitution perceived that all the constituent states of the Union must be republican if they were to work together. They could not have some of them republican and some monarchical. They shirked the graver conclusion that you could not have some of the states slave states and others free states. This conclusion, however, forced itself upon their grandchildren, and the states had to be made all free at the cost of a fearful civil war. Was Lincoln wrong? Could the issue have been avoided? And does not the same issue really confront us to-day? Down to the War of 1914–18, and even after it, it looked as though a new common ideology for a Liberal world order were being provided by the steady spread of Liberalism itself. President Wilson said that this was a war to make the world safe for Democracy, and after the armistice most people everywhere, except perhaps in Russia, believed that this end had been achieved. The subsequent rise and spread of the anti-democratic ideologies has completely upset this expectation. And these ideologies—or " ideals," to call them by a more courteous and less tendencious name—have to be taken very seriously.

If the world cannot be made safe for Democracy unless these anti-democratic movements are defeated, the democratic peoples certainly cannot afford to leave it to Chance to do their work for them. What ground is there for the assumption—that seems to be made to-day by almost every member of the so-called English governing class whom one meets—that Chance is going to fall in our favour? Chance only favours people who are prepared to " take a chance." Mussolini took a most hazardous chance when he committed aggression on the wrong side of the Suez Canal, and, conversely, we had the chance of a life-time in our hands when the weakest of the Great Powers committed a flagrant act of aggression and did this in an area where strategically we were in a position to strike. But we flinched from taking our chance, so Mussolini got away with his. Chance, then, is on the side of the dictatorships, not of the democracies. And this play of Chance is not checkmated by the fact of Mortality. Cæsar was removed at the age of fifty-eight, which is young for a politician. Yet Cæsar changed the course of history. The Gauls whom he had conquered never recovered their freedom; the Roman Republic which he had overthrown was never restored. Our living

Cæsars may live long enough to make history likewise. Though they are not immortal themselves they have been making provision for a kind of vicarious immortality by founding monopolist political parties and establishing an intensive system of education in their own ideas and ideals. Moreover, the totalitarian ideal is not just a melodramatic expression of temporary strong feelings about particular material questions. It is something much deeper than that. It is a real religion, and this a very ancient religion to which mankind has always taken readily. It is nothing less than the primitive self-worship of the tribe, into which we now see civilised peoples relapsing from the higher religions which have been in the ascendant in the world for the past thousand to two thousand years.

Again, are we so sure that the dictator's conquests—for instance, Hitler's conquests in Central Europe—will prove indigestible? Could not this skilful player upon passions create among all the peoples of Central Europe a common political feeling of an aggressive kind? Think of one or two feelings that are common to at least a majority of the Central European peoples. There is the common anti-semitism of the lower-middle class, which is as strong in Poland, Roumania and Hungary as it is in Germany. There is the common land-hunger of the peasantry, which might be tempted by the prospect of common conquests of at least partly colonisable lands that now lie within the frontiers of the Soviet Union. There is a common hunger for colonies, partly out of *amour propre*, partly out of desire for unfettered command over tropical raw materials. The Poles have feelings on the colonial question. After all, is it not intolerable for the Poles, as well as for the Germans, that four small West European countries—Holland, Belgium, France and Great Britain—should, between them, now hold a virtual monopoly of Europe's vast colonial Empire? If Hitler wants to work up a common Central European patriotism in order to make Central Europe forget its parochial feuds, is it not his best policy to lead all these peoples on a common crusade against either the Soviet Union or the Western Powers? That, after all, was Bismarck's policy. How did Bismarck reconcile to a Prussian hegemony the small German states whom Prussia had beaten in the fratricidal war of 1866? Bismarck wiped out rankling memories and achieved a union of hearts by giving them all a common mead of military glory. The Hanoverians were reconciled to Prussian rule by being used as Prussian *Kanonenfutter* in a victorious war against France four years after the independence of Hanover had been extinguished.

Finally, we have to ask ourselves whether international relations can be conducted on a non-moral footing. This question is raised by the last, because of the tenets of the totalitarian Powers. They all agree in teaching that their adherents have an unlimited obligation to their own section of mankind, be it nation or class, and that this obligation may be incompatible with having any towards the rest of mankind. For them, as for Muslims, the world is divided into Dar-al-Islam and Dar-al-Harb. War is regarded not only as inevitable or as a bad means to a desirable end, but as a positive good in itself. I need not bore you with apposite quotations from the sayings of Mussolini and Hitler: these are familiar to you. I would only suggest that you take those sayings seriously. These men mean what they say, and do what they mean to do. The question for us is to consider whether it is possible to conduct international relations on this basis. If we believe that the attempt to "de-moralise" any department of human affairs is a grave moral and intellectual error, can we, after all, expect to be able to settle down and live cheek by jowl with people with whom we disagree on this fundamental issue? Will they, on their side, consistently with their own principles —in which they believe at least as sincerely as we believe in ours— be able permanently to respect the neutrality that at this stage they are probably willing to grant us at a certain price? And do we ourselves want to retire into neutrality if that would mean leaving the destiny of the world to be decided by people who hold the totalitarian doctrine? What seems to be at stake is not just political and social liberalism but Religion itself.

So, to conclude, if we are to rule out of consideration first any attempt to maintain the nineteenth-century *Pax Britannica*, and, second, any attempt to retain our own great possessions without trying to maintain some collective kind of world order, and third, as I think we must, any attempt to keep neutral in an anarchic world where the whip-hand will be with neighbours of ours who perhaps believe in anarchy on principle, we seem to be thrown back on our post-War attempt to make a success of the League idea.

In suggesting this conclusion I do not want to pretend that it is easy or agreeable or one that can be accepted light-heartedly. One formidable weakness of it is that, if you compete with the dictators, you have to play their own game; and if you can defeat them at all, you can perhaps only do it at the cost of converting the democracies themselves into Fascist States. That is the most formidable argument against standing up to the dictators. I

shall leave you to consider it, and shall simply suggest three very general conclusions. First, if one is thinking of taking a new road which is also a tempting road, it is perhaps wise, before one commits oneself to that road irrevocably, to try to look ahead right down the whole length of it and consider whether this is a road that one is able and willing to follow to the end. The fatal *impasse* would be to discover suddenly, after one had travelled too far down the road to be able to turn back, that one had come to a point where one could not go farther along that road any longer. I mean that I think we are going to fall into mortal danger in our present situation if we indulge once more in our British bad habit—which we have glorified almost into a fetish since the War of 1914–18—of refusing to look more than one step ahead.

My second conclusion is that it is impossible for us to abdicate, however much, in our weaker moments, we may long to do so. We are the prisoners, I suggest, of our own past greatness; and I will suggest to you, further, that this is as honourable a captivity as Pastor Niemöller's. My third and last conclusion may be, I fear, the most unwelcome of all. It looks as though our greatness is likely to demand sacrifices from us in the future—perhaps the near future—which will be heavier than any in our past experience, even in the War of 1914–18.

Summary of Discussion.

MR. WICKHAM STEED said that the lecturer's brilliant and penetrating analysis had seemed in the last resort to be a paraphrase of Kipling's poem:

> We sailed wherever a ship could sail.
> We founded many a mighty State.
> God grant our greatness may not fail
> For craven fear of being great.

There had been lately a tendency on the part of the Press and certain public men to keep as much information as possible from the public so that they might not be able to think with the information which the Government had at its disposal. This was a very dangerous method when a Government wished to rule by democracy, because some crisis might occur where whole-hearted public support was needed which could not be given if the public was ignorant of what was taking place.

He had attended meetings in country villages where representatives of the Home Office were instructing the people in anti-air raid precautions and how to wear gas masks. In not one case had there been any attempt to instruct the people as to the reason why these precautions were necessary. At one meeting, on being asked to say a few words, the speaker had said that the reason was the terrible danger to Great Britiain coming from Holland, Belgium and France.

There had been slight bewilderment, and then some laughter. It was now necessary to face the fact that a " no " from Great Britain would cause a very violent outbreak of propaganda and perhaps something worse—or the collapse of Nazi-ism in Germany, a fact which filled some good people with horror. The speaker's own view had long been that the interests of Great Britain had been betrayed when she had helped to save repeatedly systems which were ultimately incompatible with the existence of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Such attempts had begun in 1925. He considered that the country was becoming sick of running away from threats actual or implied. It wanted to see a stand made on some principle which it could understand. He thought that the people of Great Britain would back, up to 90 per cent. of the population, a firm stand made by that country as the head and heart of the British Commonwealth, of which in the words of the Balfour report " free institutions " were the life-blood and free co-operation was the method. Such a declaration of policy would bring at once the whole-hearted support of the Dominions and also of the United States of America, and would encourage opponents of the dictatorship countries everywhere.

MR. NIGEL LAW said that he agreed very substantially with the last speaker. The first step in retreat had been the Halifax mission to Germany, a most dangerous and unwise step. This had culminated in the decision to negotiate with Italy which every day was growing weaker while Great Britain, it was to be hoped, was growing stronger. The lecturer had stated very clearly the successive steps of retreat which would have to be followed if Great Britain continued in this course. She could not stop, once having begun, because wherever she stopped she would have to stand and fight.

Was it right to assume that there was an unlimited desire for peace in Great Britain or that there was an unlimited desire for war in either Germany or Italy? The speaker had found that in the City opinion had been strongly, 75 per cent., pro-Eden during the recent crisis. Now certainly there was a change and people were saying that, Eden having gone, they would wait to see what Mr. Chamberlain would do, but this had been after the newspapers had done their work. Should the Prime Minister trip up, there would be a terrific outburst of public opinion which would sweep the present Government out of office, or at least sweep out the old men in it who wished to have peace in their very short time, and also those others rather irreverently referred to as the " shiver sisters." What Great Britain needed was a lead. Making a distinction between the peoples and the Governments, the speaker did not believe that the people in Germany and Italy did want war. They wanted peace; but they wanted to reap the benefits of warlike gestures on the part of their leaders. They had been told that if they armed enough and drilled enough and suffered enough privation the Bolsheviks would not invade them. Should it come to asking them to take part in an obviously aggressive war there would soon be a grumb-

ling at home. When those grumblings began it should be remembered that there was not the efficient Germany of before the War to deal with, for the old Prussian Civil Service had been practically liquidated. It was amazing how inefficient the German departments were to-day. This was shown by the fact that all the big German industrial concerns had moved their head offices to Berlin in order to be closer to the Government offices which controlled their activities. They were busy pulling strings which snapped as sôon as they were pulled. There was no doubt that Germany was not as formidable as she was believed to be. The speaker did not know a great deal about Italy, but he felt certain that her people were tired of fighting both in Abyssinia and Spain. Italy was short of raw materials and of money. Germany too was short of raw materials, and although she was making great quantities of substitute articles, she could not, except in the case of nitrates, make substitutes of air. They had to be made of other raw materials.

The time had come for a lead, and one had only to see how many of the smaller Powers followed any British lead to realise that Great Britain would not be left alone. At the same time it was necessary for her not to be upset by the Franco–Soviet Pact. It should be remembered how Herr Hitler was to-day trying to promote German–Russian trade and making large loans to Russia for that purpose, how there had been mention of intrigues between the German and Russian General Staffs. All the Russians would need to do would be to have a first-class pogrom of Jews, and Hitler would fall into Stalin's arms. Germany would then have enormous supplies of raw materials and great man-power at her disposal.

DR. SETON-WATSON said that concerning the avoidance of war it was not sufficiently realised that to-day the initiative lay with the dictators, and there was nothing to restrain them except fear, or calculations of possible reprisals. To tell them that Great Britain would not fight was simply to encourage them to a great gamble.

A great deal of talk which was heard about helping this or that country was all entirely beside the point; the fact was that without allies Great Britain was in a far more dangerous position than she had been in in the days of Napoleon. The French alliance which was vital to France was also vital to Great Britain. It cut both ways. This fact was not always appreciated. British abandonment of France would leave her no option but to come to terms with the dictators. She on her side could not break her alliances in the East, either with the Soviet or Poland or the Little Entente, without putting herself in a most dangerously isolated position. So East and West were hopelessly interlocked.

The speaker agreed with the previous speaker concerning Russia. The whole of British policy as formulated by every statesman since Canning up to Mr. Chamberlain was based on a refusal to mingle domestic with foreign policy in the case of foreign countries. That, presumably, was the reason for the negotiations with Rome and Berlin

at the present moment. Why should not the same attitude be taken with regard to Moscow? Russia needed peace as much as the British Commonwealth of Nations. The fact that Russia was out of the picture owing to her present domestic horrors was the reason why the West was having so much trouble with Hitler at the moment. German abuse of Russia was simply a blind. The German–Russian alliance had been within an ace of success last summer. Mussolini had been the first to treat with the Soviet Union, and had used Russian methods in Italy and boasted about them. A German–Russian alliance was always a possibility, and in this connection a remark of Bismarck's should be remembered. He had said that in a combination of five Powers it was always necessary to be three against the two. To try now to drive one of the five out of Europe and so leave two and two was so stupid that anyone who could contemplate it was not fit to discuss foreign policy at all. The speaker was not suggesting that the new Foreign Secretary should sell his principles, but that strategic, fundamental facts should not be ignored and thrown away.

One of the most interesting sections of the address had been the one dealing with abdication. There was no doubt that in following this course it would be necessary to give up the Mediterranean to Italy, Shanghai and Hong-Kong to Japan, and drawing a line through Singapore to New Zealand we might be able to safeguard the two Dominions. Then there would be the Central African Empire for Germany from Nigeria to South-West Africa. This demand put forward by Herr Hitler to-day was not very different from the plan put forward in 1918 for the German colonial Empire in Africa. This might sound fantastic, but it was not so, because Mussolini was really and seriously beginning to believe that Great Britain had feet of clay which he could easily smash. What else had Great Britain to offer Italy? An estimate of money had been given at about eighty million sterling. The exact figure really did not matter very much, the whole thing being quite impossible. Such a sum of money would not and could not be found. The real obstacle to Mussolini's ambitions was Great Britain. He had made it quite clear, saying: "Their Empire or our Empire." It was not true that Fascism was not an article for export. On the contrary, it was going to dominate Europe. Liberalism would become a thing of the past. British international ideals were to the Fascist leader the false gods of Europe, and they were pitted against such slogans as: Live Dangerously. High Tension. Extreme Militarism.

MR. W. J. ROSE said that if we went on "running away" there would very soon be substituted for British power and policy—the *Pax Britannica*, great spheres of political influence, which were economic and cultural as well; and everywhere there would be signs up: Trespassers Prosecuted! Possibly there might be room for France in the Western Mediterranean and in Africa, though this was doubtful. There would, however, be nothing for Great Britain. She lay on the

edge of Europe, caught between two worlds, as the lecturer had pointed out. It would be said that she had her Empire. The speaker did not know whether this would still be true or not. If Britain went on running away from issues, she would certainly not be able to count on keeping the Empire in the future.

MR. J. SILKIN said that he would like to state the case for neutrality or, as some had called it, the policy of running away. It had been said that Great Britain owed her possessions to the part she had played in various wars, but she maintained her strength equally on account of knowing when to remain neutral. The present situation might be compared with the time when great statesmen had wanted Queen Elizabeth to take sides in the ideological struggle between the Catholic and Protestant Powers, but she had steadfastly refused to so so, and rightly as we now see. Another great English statesman who had followed a policy of peace was Sir Robert Walpole, who once, in answer to Queen Caroline, had said: "Madam, there were thirty thousand men killed in Europe this year, and not a single Englishman." It seemed that the argument in favour of making a stand, which meant a declaration of war to the dictators, was based on the assumption that the situation was going to persist unchanged: in fact nothing in the world stood still. As regards the inevitability of war, a parallel could be taken from the last war. Had the Serbian crisis been successfully overcome in 1914 quite possibly the ever-threatened world war would never have taken place. Francis Joseph, whose personal prestige was the sole link binding the Austrian Empire together, would no doubt have died in any case in 1916 and that would have meant the end of the Balkan Problem. Great Britain had been on the best of terms with Germany in 1914. It had simply been a case of managing the Serbian crisis. Again it was often said that the dictators were on the verge of bankruptcy. If this happened a change in the direction of events would soon follow. If so many things could happen and the chances were more or less equal, why should we risk ruining our country by the danger of air attacks in a purely defensive war when there was a real chance that war might in the long run not be necessary.

A MEMBER said that he would like to stress a point raised by the second speaker on the importance of distinguishing between peoples and governments. He, personally, knew Germany very well, and this was very true. It was still most vital that Great Britain should not forget the repercussions of her policy upon opinion in Germany. When the speaker went to Germany he was always asked what Great Britain was going to do, in the hope that she might do something which would weaken Herr Hitler and his régime. He had heard the speech announcing the reoccupation of the Rhineland while lunching in a café in Germany, and it had spoiled his luncheon as he was alone in the middle of Germany, an Englishman, and he had not known what Great Britain would do about it. But he had noticed that there was the

same anxiety in Germany, and when he had discussed the question of a possible war with his friends, they had looked up at the air, because if London was only an hour's flight in a fast aeroplane from Germany, they were only half an hour's flight from France. The policy of Mr. Eden would have support in Germany. The support would be unexpressed, but it would be strengthening those forces in Germany which must prevail if civilisation were to be saved.

MR. J. C. FRENCH said that the gist of the whole problem was: What was the bill to be paid to Italy? The bill could be paid not in territories, or mandates, or money, but simply in friendship. In 1934 Italy had sent two divisions to the Brenner Pass and frustrated Herr Hitler's designs on Austria. This year she had done nothing of the kind, and it had been called blackmail. It had not been in the power of Italy, with an unfriendly England, to do anything. Now Italy was friendly with Germany, but did anyone want a friend, even a great friend, always sitting on their doorstep?

The speaker had heard that Herr Hitler welcomed the agreement between Italy and England. This was because Herr Hitler was subjected to pressure. This might sound strange, but it was a fact. There was such a thing as being more royalist than the King. For instance, in German internal affairs, if Herr Hitler was anti-Jew, he was not nearly so anti-Jew as Herr Julius Streicher. And, to take an example from external affairs, the Austrian Nazis were a party of violent methods. The Nazis in Germany would strongly support their colleagues in Austria, and would certainly try to induce Herr Hitler to support their activities, which he might be prevailed upon to do unless he could say that both Italy and Great Britain disapproved. The German Army did not want a repetition of 1914. But if Great Britain drifted on in the way she had been going for the last few years, the end of the matter would be like a Greek tragedy, a gradual drifting to an inevitable doom of war. The way out of the impasse was to support Mr. Neville Chamberlain.

PROFESSOR TOYNBEE said that he thought that it was important for the British—while all the time looking abroad, as, of course, they must do—at the same time to look into their own hearts. The greatest danger was that they might enter upon a path which they would find themselves unable to follow the whole way. To embark upon a policy of neutrality and then to find that it would be impossible to pursue it to the end would lead to certain and deadly disaster. On the same showing, if it were decided that we should pursue a League policy, the decision should not be carried out unless the country was prepared to face trouble, and grievous trouble, if this came our way. Whatever policy was adopted, it ought first to be looked in the face. Wisdom, as well as courage, required us to look right to the end of the road down which it would be necessary to travel.

THE ISSUES IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY[1]

II. The Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, P.C., K.C.

I think the first thing that strikes everyone who considers the present situation in Europe is the enormous change that has taken place in the last six and a half years. In the autumn of 1931 the situation really did look very good. For the first time there seemed to be a real decline in the level of armaments. Ours, of course, had always been low, but those of others seemed inclined to be going down, and they were, compared to present figures, very low indeed.

Certainly the position was, politically speaking, a fair position. In Germany, Hitler had not come. Even in the autumn of 1931, certainly a little later, Doctor Brüning was the Chancellor, at any rate the most important figure in Germany at the time. Doctor Brüning was, and I hope still is, a very convinced advocate of peace, and while he was there, there was no question of anything like an aggressive policy on the part of Germany.

At the same time, Signor Grandi was the Foreign Minister of Italy, and at that time he was a very powerful and effective advocate of the League of Nations; it is not too much to say that Italy had never taken a greater or a more useful part in the affairs of the League than at that period. France was ruled by a Cabinet of the Right, more or less, that was moving towards the Left. Japan was a loyal member of the League and a permanent member of the Council of the League. The United States did not, indeed, suggest that she was going to join the League, but was every year drawing nearer and nearer to the actual work of the League. She was taking more and more part, as I am glad to say she has gone on doing, in the work of the League. She sat on many if not all the Permanent Committees of the League, and she was in every way exceedingly friendly. Russia was outside the League and had been very hostile, but she too was showing some signs, which developed rather rapidly a few years later, of coming towards the League. In England there had been up till the crisis of 1931 a Ministry in power which was very keenly supporting the

[1] Address given at Chatham House on March 22nd, 1938; Mr. Clement Jones, C.B., in the Chair.

League, and though the crisis had made a great difference in the situation in England, there was, as far as anyone knew, no change in the general attitude of England, or I should say of the British Empire, towards peace and the League.

In every respect, then, the situation seemed to be exceedingly peaceful, and likely to remain peaceful. The League itself was at the zenith of its power and authority. It had, as you will remember, started a great number of efforts towards improving the community life of the nations, and set up committees for dealing with all sorts of humanitarian questions—questions of transport, of economics and so on, a regular network, so that you could not go to Geneva without finding one or more of these Committees sitting to discuss questions of great importance and value to the nations of the world. On the political side it had dealt with a certain number of disputes, and almost without exception its efforts had been successful. The threat of war which existed in some cases had been arrested, and, what was more satisfactory, after the settlement there did not appear to remain any bad blood. The nations that had been disputing came together in a friendly relationship and in almost every case they have remained friendly ever since. It appeared to be very much easier for a nation to make concessions which were advocated at Geneva than to make concessions in a bilateral negotiation with a country with which up till then it had been in rather strained relations. There was also the fact that the League had set up an International Court of Justice which up till now has had unbroken success. Certainly in 1931 it would have been no exaggeration to say that the progress and prosperity of the League were remarkable, if not phenomenal.

And then came the first great difficulty, the Manchurian dispute between China and Japan. It so happened that owing to the political confusion going on in Great Britain in connection with the great slump, which affected every phase and department of English life and the whole of the Government, I was left practically in charge of the British delegation at Geneva. I was not a member of the Government during the session of the Assembly in 1931, and it was in that condition—rather a bad condition because I had very little authority to speak for the British Government—that the crisis arose. I remember very well indeed my own sentiments at the time. I thought it was a matter of very little importance. I thought it was just a minor international dispute. The Japanese rather represented it as such, and the Chinese did not seem to disagree. There had been at that time, I believed, a genuine railway outrage (it turned out

afterwards that no such outrage ever took place), that the Japanese had taken rather a stern view of it, but that it was a thing which would be settled in a very short time. We passed a number of resolutions of the ordinary type. There had developed almost a fixed scheme for dealing with international disputes. So we passed the ordinary resolutions, all of which were assented to by the representative of Japan. But we were not quite satisfied because we decided not to part altogether, but to adjourn for a fortnight. That was the first sign that things were not going quite as well as they might. We met in the following fortnight, and things had certainly got worse. The invasion of Manchuria had more or less begun, though it had not gone any great distance. It became quite clear that the situation might become serious. Meanwhile the new Foreign Secretary, Lord Reading, had become settled in his office, and he came out and took charge.

The financial position in Great Britain was extremely difficult. We had just gone off gold at the time when this particular event took place, and nobody had realised then that it was going to be, as I understand it has been, a blessing in disguise. They thought it might be a very serious matter. I remember a little earlier a French Minister coming to me and explaining (just before we went off gold) that it was very serious for England. It was quite evident she would never have the same position in financial matters which she used to have, and that she must be content to take the place of a second-rate financial Power with no prospect of raising herself from that position. I remember that I was a little annoyed with the observation. I have always been delighted to think how entirely wrong he was.

Then came a further change of Foreign Minister when Sir John Simon took up that position. He took a very severe view against any action of any kind. The result was that the British Government decided not to make any attempt to coerce Japan, but they agreed to the nomination, as indeed the Japanese agreed, of the Lytton Commission, which, as you know, went out to Manchuria, made a very elaborate inquiry into the matter, and came back in the summer of 1932 quite convinced that there never had been any outrage on the railway and that this was a purely aggressive move on the part of Japan. Nothing was done on that report. We all remember the speeches which were then made on behalf of this country that seemed to some of us to be pure apologies, defences for the action of Japan; and they no doubt convinced the Japanese that they might go on and do anything they liked, we should certainly never interfere with them.

The purpose of my raising these things is just to point out to you that what has happened, as far as the League is concerned, is that there has been a perfectly definite policy on the part of Great Britain based on this: that we are not prepared to undertake any fresh responsibilities; that we believe that the best that we can do is to get round each difficulty as it arises, and we are to have no fixed and determined policy as to how peace is to be kept in the world. I mention that because otherwise this may seem to you rather irrelevant, but it becomes essential for the final argument that I wish to submit.

Then came the next great international event, the Disarmament Conference. There the same policy was pursued. I do not propose to go at all into the detail of what happened there, but there was the same conception. We were not to do anything or to have any definite policy. I can speak on this subject with absolute knowledge. The British Government unquestionably went to Geneva to take part in the Disarmament Conference without any policy as to what should be done to promote disarmament. The conception was that we had done a great deal for naval disarmament at Washington, and that it was now for France and other countries to do the same on the side of land armaments, that all that we needed to do and all that we had better do was to stand aside and see what was proposed. If it seemed to us a desirable proposal, we should support it, but we should take no initiative in any way at all. That really is, literally, and without any exaggeration, an accurate description of the attitude taken up, and you will observe the same note running through the earlier proceedings. The whole issue has been, from that time and ever since, no commitments. This has taken different forms, and recently a definite advocacy of the policy that we must keep out of war at all costs.

As a consequence of this attitude, which is quite understandable, you may fairly say that the system of the League has never been properly worked or even tried during the last six years. One result of our inaction was that it became impossible to make any serious concessions to the German point of view or the Italian point of view; and you will remember that at the end of the summer of 1932 Germany and Italy both, for the first time, left the Disarmament Conference on the grounds that no attempt was being made to deal with their particular grievances, which, particularly Germany's, were undoubtedly very serious. I think, myself, that it is not accurate to say that this was mainly due to French policy. I do not mean to say that the French were very

helpful. They were not. But I do say that on the whole, with the exception of M. Barthou, who so far was not on the scene, the French Ministers were not too bad. The French Minister in charge at the time of the opening of the Disarmament Conference, M. Tardieu, was a leader of the Right, and very decidedly to the Right. But I also remember that when, on behalf of the League of Nations Unions, we put forward a scheme of disarmament which consisted of forbidding to other nations the arms that were by the Treaty of Versailles forbidden to Germany, M. Tardieu appeared by his demeanour, so I was told, to welcome this suggestion as an admirable proposal. What he would have done with it later I cannot tell, but that seemed to be his attitude, and he was shortly succeeded by M. Herriot, who, though not a revolutionary, was more inclined to be progressive than M. Tardieu.

The result of this attitude of the Governments of Great Britain and France was that the authority of the League began to diminish. Its highest point was unquestionably in the summer and autumn of 1931, and it descended continually after that time. It became the fashion in authoritative quarters to sneer at it more or less openly, to say that it was an intolerable nuisance having to go to Geneva, and how useless it was, and all that kind of thing. As part of the same movement, at any rate coinciding with it, the whole technique of the League was gradually, if not totally abandoned, very much weakened. One of the great features of the earlier proceedings of the League was the appeal to publicity. That was done on many grounds, but on one particular ground it has always seemed to me to be unassailable. The conception of the League was that it was a League of Nations. The nations no doubt spoke, because they had to speak, by their Governments. But the idea was not the old conception of all-powerful Ministers meeting in a room and deciding what they thought right and then calling upon nations, if necessary, to carry out what they had decided was right to be done, as, for instance, at the Congress of Vienna. It was rightly felt that that procedure was out of date, and that if you were to get international agreement you must persuade not only the Governments, but also the nations behind the Governments, and if you were to do that you must have publicity, so that the nations would have an opportunity not only of knowing the results, but also of seeing the process by which those results were reached. Personally I attached enormous importance, and I still attach enormous importance, to publicity. I believe that without it you cannot get the nations to support you or, to put it in another way, you cannot get that public opinion,

international public opinion, in action without which any form of international organisation becomes almost impossible. Its abandonment seems to me a matter for very grave regret.

Then came the series of disasters. First there was the withdrawal of Japan. That was followed in the first place by the advent of Hitler, and it became increasingly obvious that he did not intend really to work the League; then came his withdrawal, and his withdrawal not only from the League but also from all forms of international co-operation. I want to stress that in one sentence, because very often people think that it is because he objects to the League in itself, that he dislikes sanctions or this, that or the other provision of the League. It is not so. The objection is to the international idea. If you consider the totalitarian idea, it is very natural that the totalitarian States, having raised the conception of the State almost to divine honour, should regard it as intolerable that any outside body, any international body, should attempt to control or influence the State. Hitler's advent to power inevitably involved Germany's withdrawal first from the Disarmament Conference, then from the League, then from the International Labour Office, and so on through all international activities. Then (I forget the exact chronology, but it does not matter very much) came the series of events beginning with the reoccupation of the Rhineland and the abolition of the treaties concerned, then the pressure upon, and ultimately the invasion and occupation of, Austria. At the same time we have had the still more serious disasters of Abyssinia and Spain. Unquestionably the sequence of the original stand taken by the British Government in September 1935, followed by their complete retreat from that stand at the time of the Hoare–Laval agreement, did produce the most disastrous impression all over the world. I was in the United States only the other day, in November, and talking as I usually am about the League I always found that that was one of the great things they set up against me. They said that up till that moment their people were coming along. They thought there really might be something in it, that we were really going to use the League, quite apart from national interests, as a great instrument for restoring peace. They were greatly struck by the celebrated speech of September 1935. They thought that this was a new departure, something really worth watching, and they were prepared, as their Administration showed, to do whatever was possible under their rather difficult Constitution in order to help the work of the League. Then came this terrible crash of their hopes and the

hopes of so many of us, and the League received, I will not say a fatal, but a very serious setback.

I need not mention Spain now; it is all too recent for me to recount even in the very brief way in which I have tried to recount the earlier items. What has been the result? This is what is very much worth your attention. As the League goes down and loses influence, the unrest and difficulties in the world increase. You may say *post hoc*, not *propter hoc*. Possibly. Still it is remarkable how the two have followed one another, how the decline of the League has been followed by the increase of the difficulties of the world. If it were true, as some would have you believe, that the League is in fact the source of the difficulties, then it is at any rate a remarkable fact that, as it has become weaker, and less a feature of international life, the disorders have increased. With them has occurred this gigantic growth in the armaments of the world. I know people say that armaments do not necessarily mean war. I agree. But, for various reasons into which I do not propose to go to-night, I think that, though they may be necessary as an emergency measure—I think they are —they increase the general danger of war. That is to say, if one nation arms, another nation must arm, but I am quite satisfied that, so far from ultimately being a remedy for war or the inclination to war, they operate in exactly the opposite direction. Whether that be true or not, this at any rate no one will dispute, that the growth of armaments is an excellent barometer as to the state of feeling in the world. If people are peaceable and calm, the tendency will be to avoid spending money on arms. Money is always spent on armaments because some nation fears that it is going to be attacked by another nation. If therefore you see expenditure going up, as you have seen it going up during the last few years, that is because the fear of being attacked has grown, and grown enormously. There is no doubt that that is the truth. The growth of this expenditure is something colossal. The nations are spending between two and three thousand million pounds a year on armaments; we in this country are spending three or four hundred million. In 1903 Mr. Gladstone resigned because he thought the estimates were too much; they were about thirty million, I think, for defence, about one tenth of what they are now. That is the measure. It is prodigious. It is terrific. Until you can stop that, you cannot pretend that you are getting anywhere nearer a peaceful condition in the world.

All this time the deterioration of the League went on. There was one very nasty symptom: that whenever a serious matter

came up it was thought better that it should not be referred to the League. It should be dealt with outside the League. There were very plausible reasons, but, of course, the effect was to diminish the authority and position of the League. That went on, and has gone on until quite lately. Perhaps it is still going on, I do not know. And to all the remonstrances which were made (and the League of Nations Union made many remonstrances) we were always told that the sufficient answer is : We have kept out of war.

Yes, that is the great business of any system of foreign affairs that is worth having, but it does not mean that you are only to avoid the immediate danger of war. It means that you avoid it altogether, or at any rate diminish its probability altogether, and if by your policy you would avoid war at the moment, and do so at the price of increasing the danger of war a little later, you are not really working for peace but for war.

There was another feature I disliked very much during those years. There was a tendency to regard the League as just an effort in altruism by this country, that we were being very kind and good and had entered into a great undertaking, the object of which was to defend other countries from war and it was very noble of us to do it because it did not matter to us (that I imagine was the assumption) what happened to other nations as far as we were concerned. It was always to me astounding that people in very great positions would constantly refer to the operations of the League, and particularly sanctions, as if we were the only persons involved, the only country to carry out the sanctions or to enforce them, and we were to do it entirely for the benefit of other nations. That has turned out to be a profound mistake.

Then came the Spanish question. There again you had the same features. The efforts that were to be made to reduce the danger from the Spanish war were to be carried out by a body outside the League, avowedly because two of the main countries, Germany and Italy, Italy practically and Germany altogether, were outside the League. It was thought that if you had your Non-Intervention Committee as a Committee of the League, these two countries would not take any part, and since you wanted their assent, you thought it better to form the Committee outside the League. This was very plausible. It may have been inevitable. I, myself, should very much like to have tried the other plan and made non-intervention a part of the League policy and seen whether the other nations would not have come into it as they came into the Nyon Agreement. Whatever the reason for it,

this was another blow to the authority and prestige of the League.

I will not say anything about Austria, because everybody will admit that the position there was one of immense difficulty, though, personally, I could have wished more had been done even there.

Here, then, is the policy which has been pursued of avoiding immediate risk and keeping the aggressive Powers quiet by concessions, and at the same time increasing your armaments. I think it is a perfectly intelligible policy, but I cannot help thinking that it is altogether mistaken. It is very defensible from a mercantile point of view. The conception of small profits and quick returns is a laudable conception in mercantile matters. I do not think it is good in political matters. You must be content frequently that your policy produces no immediate profit, but ultimately lays the foundation of a much sounder and a safer state of things.

And now we are faced with a very serious situation. It is becoming clear that it is not true that the League is a mere altruistic exercise of a rather visionary conception. It is perfectly clear that the safety of Great Britain is being threatened. The Spanish War is now recognised to be a great danger to us. How great I do not know. I do not pretend to be a military expert, but it is to me most striking that I meet military expert after military expert now who says that the victory of the Insurgents in Spain would be a most serious danger to this country, because it would set up a Fascist Spain, the policy of which would be inspired by the Fascist Powers; an immense danger thus for France and a considerable danger for Great Britain. That is one of the things which we have got to realise. It only brings us back to the old proposition, as old as anything that I can remember, that our interest is peace, and that to suggest that a particular war that occurs in Europe of any importance is a matter of indifference to us is simply to misunderstand the very foundations on which British policy should be built. Peace is essential. Not peace here or peace there, but peace everywhere. The Spanish example is an admirable one. It is something which at first sight appears to have nothing to do with us, it is an internal matter of Spain, but it has gradually grown to be a very serious matter for our safety and our prosperity;—and a very serious matter for France.

As to Central Europe, the broad facts are worth recalling. I have no doubt that with regard to the international position in this direction the extent to which the interests of Great Britain

are affected has a very considerable resemblance to 1914. It looked certainly in 1914 as if we need not bother about something that was happening down in the south-eastern corner of Europe. But in the course of a very few days it became quite clear that our interests were immensely involved, and it is the same in Central Europe at this moment. I hear Ministers (I am bound to say Ministers in junior positions) saying in so many words that we have no interest in Czechoslovakia. Well, I should have thought that anybody who gave five minutes' thought to the subject would see that was a very superficial way of looking at it. It is the same case in that respect, I do not mean to say in other respects, as in 1914. If you could isolate these things completely, you might say that we have no particular interest in Czechoslovakia, but you cannot. You must take the existing situation in Europe, and what is it? We know perfectly well that France has a Treaty with Czechoslovakia, which binds her to go to the defence of Czechoslovakia if she is attacked. No one has ever raised the slightest objection in Great Britain to that Treaty. It is part of the general system which France has erected in order to make her position secure. It may be a wrong system, but it is not an unreasonable system. France is a country of some forty of fifty million inhabitants. She has on her north-eastern borders a country which now contains about seventy-three million inhabitants, at least as vigorous and as prosperous as the French, with a great history behind it of hostility and rivalry with France. Nobody who has ever talked to French people for five minutes can fail to be aware that this fact has burned into the consciousness of every single Frenchman and Frenchwoman. They *know* that this is the great fact about their national position, and they say: "We have twice been overrun in the last century, once unsuccessfully and once successfully. We have suffered terrible losses and injury. We do not know what would happen if a similar event occurred again. It is not by any means certain that we should ever recover at all." That is, indeed, my own opinion. "Therefore we must take all the precautions we can." As long as the League existed and was vigorous, we had a complete answer to it. We could say: "What do you want with private alliances? Trust to the League. The League exists to protect you against unprovoked aggression and attack." But now that we are told on the highest authority that it would be foolish to rely, at any rate exclusively, on the League, we cannot say that. And so France says: "I have got this alliance with ten or twelve million people, very able, energetic, war-like people, and I must protect them,

for I may want their assistance." And then beyond this is the great Russian Empire. Nobody, I suppose, much likes being in alliance with Russia, but still, this particular alliance may be of some value, because Russia is likely to see that it is her interest in the end to prevent Germany having an overwhelming power in Europe. That is the position. And no one can doubt in that situation that if Germany is so ill-advised as to make an attack on Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovakia, moved by its intense patriotism, will decide, even at the terrific risk which such an action would mean, that she must defend her own country. After all, she sees what is going on in Austria, and she may well say that it were better to be killed in war than become the victim of Nazi government!! Certainly I think she will fight. You cannot deny that an immensely probable event is that if Germany attacks Czechoslovakia, France will become involved, and if France becomes involved, then the reason that drove us into war, *against our will*, in 1914 will operate again. No doubt there was then a good deal of feeling that Belgium was entitled to our protection, but fundamentally, and I say this really without fear of contradiction, the real essential motive was that we were not prepared to allow France to be crushed at the price of our afterwards having to meet Germany without any assistance. That was the vital and essential situation in the West of Europe. And that is what it remains. And as long as that is so, it is foolish, if I may say so with all due respect, to say that we need not bother about what happens in Czechoslovakia.

Everyone now is asking all over Europe, and the United States too, as far as I can learn, What are we going to do? What is Britain, or, as they say, what is England going to do? That is what I have really come to ask you. There are, as I see it, the proverbial three courses. There is isolation. So far as I can perceive, isolation must mean and can only mean an immense loss of power, prestige, authority and strength to this country and to the Empire. I believe that the present Lord Russell is perfectly right, who, advocating isolation in its most extreme form, says in so many words that if that happened we could not defend ourselves. Of course he was advising, I am bound to say, unarmed isolation. Personally I think it comes to very much the same thing whether you are armed or unarmed, because you certainly will not be strong enough to resist other nations by yourself. Unarmed or armed, it comes in the end to the proposition that you will have to give in to any great military Empire on the continent and do whatever they think it desirable from their point of view

that you should do. I must say, looking at their policy, that if it remains it means the destruction of the British Empire, which would not only be disastrous from a sentimental point of view, but, as I think, disastrous from the point of view of this country and of the world.

There seem to me to be only two ways in which you could face the danger by which we are threatened at this moment. Firstly, I am quite sure you cannot do it by your own strength alone without the assistance of anybody else. To go along and to trust to being able to pick up an ally at the last minute is too dangerous and reckless and gambling a policy to be recommended. Well, then, what *are* you going to do? One policy which has a great many advocates is that we should form an alliance in effect with France and Russia and with whatever other countries are ready to join us. That has one merit. It is the old plan. Therefore everyone knows what you are talking about, and they are not shocked and disgusted because you recommend something which has never been tried before. But I think it is a bad plan myself. And I believe it would be found, if you really put it forward, to be profoundly unpopular in this country. When we were starting the Peace Ballot they had a little ballot of their own at Ilford. This was before we thought of taking it up. They asked substantially the same questions as we afterwards did, except for this, that instead of asking whether the balloters were in favour of collective security, they asked whether they were in favour of the Locarno Treaty. On that question, and on that question only, there was a majority against—that is, against the Locarno Treaty. When we put the question in the more general form, there was a considerable majority in favour of collective security. I went down to Ilford to attend a meeting at which the results of the little local ballot were announced, and there was a great deal of congratulation and so on, and then I said: "How is it you voted against the Locarno Treaty? It is a shocking thing to have done. Why did you do it?" And they said: "We were prepared to vote for any general scheme of peace, but we were against the idea of a special arrangement in favour of or arranged by one country or one group of countries." I was very much struck with that answer, because I believe it was an example of the extraordinary power our people have of, apparently with very little material, arriving at a very sound conclusion. I think they were probably right in saying that as a general policy it was wrong, though I was in favour of Locarno at the time, and still remain of the opinion that it was right at the time. Yet as a general policy it was

wrong—wrong for the reasons, broadly, that were given. It is one thing to have a general scheme of peace. That is worth considerable risk and considerable danger. But to try to single out a particular district of the world and say, "We will have peace there, and we will not bother about the rest," that is unsound and is likely to lead to trouble. And it is for that kind of reason and others that I do not believe that the policy of an alliance would really succeed.

Therefore, you are left with the other policy—the policy of the League. And I am satisfied myself, in spite of all that has happened, and in spite of all that has been said, that that is the right policy for us to pursue. I quite admit that the League has sunk to a position very different from what it was six years ago. And if we are to get it back into anything like its old position of authority, we shall have to make a great effort, and we have got to say we are going to make a great effort. But I believe it could be done if Great Britain and the Government of Great Britain were really determined to do it and really recognised that it was the only path of safety for this country and for the world.

I wish I had the gift to do it properly, but let me try to sketch the kind of procedure that I seem to see. I can conceive of a great movement with a Pitt or a Fox at the head of it, saying, "We must do something (as Pitt said) to save Europe by our example and ourselves by our exertions." We would go down to Geneva. We would have a special meeting of the Assembly called. We would go down and our spokesman would say, "The situation in the world is extremely bad and extremely dangerous. The respect for treaties appears to have almost disappeared. We see reviving the old system that violence is the only thing that counts, that any country that wants some change has now nothing to restrain it provided it is strong enough to get what it wants. If that goes on it must become a danger to the whole world, to every country represented in this Assembly, particularly to my own. We must do something to stop that. We propose in the first place that Members of the League should solemnly reaffirm their adherence to the Covenant and to all of its provisions. And for our part (I am speaking, or trying to speak, as I would wish our representative to speak to the General Special Assembly), we are prepared to throw in the whole of our strength in support of this movement. We are prepared to do everything that is necessary, that can be done, provided we get others to assist us in this great effort. We are prepared now to go to the Council and to draw up a detailed scheme for the protection of any country that is in

danger of attack. We are prepared to tell you what we can do to help to carry out that scheme, what in our view and the view of our experts is necessary for the success of that scheme, and we ask you, the representatives of the other countries, to come in and help us to re-establish the law and good faith amongst nations. We do not mean that that is the only thing that has got to be done. Of course we know that as a necessary accompaniment of any scheme for keeping the peace we must be ready to do full justice to any legitimate grievance that any country has. That has always been our view. That is still our view, but that must be done as a matter of justice, not as a matter of concession. It must be done because it is right and proper, and in our view it is in the interests of all that it should be done, and not in order to conciliate the fury of a particular ruler or anything of that kind." I have sketched it—I know, very badly—but that is the policy I would like to see adopted. And I am profoundly and utterly convinced that if that could be done, without any reserve, without looking over our shoulders, if that were done as the great effort to secure the peace of the world, we should have the most enormous support from every part of the world. We should have support all over Europe. We should have it all over the greater part of Asia. We should have it over the greater part, if not the whole, of America. And I believe that the current of opinion would develop under such leadership to such a strength that no ruler, however powerful and however determined, would venture to stand against it. And then you might re-establish, and more than re-establish, the situation that we had in Europe six years ago, and so lay the foundations of a lasting peace.

Summary of Discussion.

ADMIRAL SIR SYDNEY FREMANTLE said that although he profoundly disagreed with a great part of the lecturer's argument, he wished to pay a tribute to the magnificent and enthusiastic eloquence with which he had argued his case, which, however, he had made rather as the advocate of a particular cause than as a judge.

The speaker wished to concern himself with the address given on the same subject on March 10th and the discussion which had followed it, in which he had not been able to speak owing to lack of time. Both in the speech and in the discussion the speaker had been astounded at the lack of national self-confidence which had been shown. Every element of military strength, strategic position, every advantage and piece of good fortune possessed by foreign Powers had been seen through a magnifying-glass. They were all to be good friends bonded together in amity and strength for the downfall of England. Whereas British

strength, British industrial power, the unity of the Empire had been looked at through the wrong end of the microscope. She was to have no friends, no allies. The principal element in the defence of the United Kingdom, the English Channel, would be controlled by land and air forces. The British Empire could not survive. A German Central African Empire was inevitable. The country had no confidence in the Prime Minister, and City opinion was entirely on the side of Mr. Eden. The speaker could find no justification at all for all these gloomy views.

From the point of view of military strength, although rearmament had been so long delayed, and was now by no means completed, Great Britain had the greatest navy in the world. Her Air Force was rapidly approaching a position of equality with any other Air Force in the world. She had military force adequate for her defensive needs. For the security of the United Kingdom and of her lines of communication with the constituent parts of the Empire, even if she had no allies at all, she had little or nothing to fear in essentials. It was certainly true that in certain areas such as the Mediterranean, the Baltic Sea, the China seas, the West Indies, she could not maintain the command of the seas against certain possible enemies or groups of enemies, but she could seriously dispute the command of the seas even in those cases, and make it extremely unpleasant for any possible enemy.

Concerning allies, France was a potential ally with whom it would be found difficult to quarrel. A hostile Russia seemed most improbable. The lesser Powers of Europe would have no cause to oppose Great Britain, and nothing to gain by doing so.

There remained the German–Italian axis. What harm could Germany possibly do Great Britain? She could interfere with our sea-borne trade in the same way as she had done during the last War. But Great Britain was now in a far better position to deal with such interference, both effectively and rapidly. Air raids could be met with retaliatory measures, and in any case would not affect the vital issues of a war. The idea of a German Central African Empire was fantastic and not worth arguing about, as it would entail command of the seas. Italy could make things very unpleasant for Great Britain in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, she was far more vulnerable in that sea than was Great Britain. The speaker omitted all reference to the friendship of the United States and to the collective system, as he placed no confidence in either.

It was very difficult to understand the supposed lack of confidence in the Prime Minister and the Government. Surely he had been wise in accepting the resignation of a Foreign Secretary who admittedly had a different outlook on foreign affairs from his own. Bad mistakes had been made in the near past by acting on idealistic principles, or impractical principles. The great Lord Fisher had said that "everyone made mistakes, but only a damned fool made the same mistake twice." Surely if the realistic principle were to be accepted, in what

quarter besides Italy could the Prime Minister begin his policy of appeasement? Could he have done so with any hope of success as long as Mr. Eden remained Foreign Minister? Most people had been profoundly impressed by the Prime Minister's conduct of affairs during the last few days in refusing entirely to be stampeded by unforeseen events into rash measures of retaliation and statements of policy.

The speaker considered that as a nation the British Empire had every reason for self-confidence. The present Government could be trusted not to embroil her in continental affairs, to substantiate her friendships with her many friends, to maintain her military strength, because whether it was pleasant or not power politics would inevitably be the controlling factor in the world situation.

The question had been asked when the British Empire would curb the aggressors. The answer was obvious: the very first moment a hand was laid on British territory or at which, after all possible economic and diplomatic measures had failed, a vital British interest was seriously and unreasonably interfered with.

SIR NORMAN ANGELL said that, unlike the last speaker, he agreed with everything which the lecturer had said, adding something, however, to the distinction he had made between an "alliance policy" and the League policy. The League was simply a great alliance to carry out certain principles; a code of behaviour, a rule of international life which was also offered to the other fellow. Alliances were the instrument by which League policy could be carried out. It was fidelity to an alliance at this moment which would finally determine the issues of peace for Great Britain.

The speaker wished to bring the discussion back to the decision which would have to be taken by the public opinion of the country within perhaps the next few days. Her statesmen and members of the Government had said that they would fight for France. They had discovered in 1914 that they could not tolerate the subjugation of France when the fact had been pushed beneath their noses. But they had said that Great Britain would not fight for Czechoslovakia. Could she then fight for France? France's engagements to Czechoslovakia had not been made out of philanthropy or love for Czechoslovaks or out of pure mischief. If that series of alliances had been made by France, it was because she felt that she could not defend herself without them. She realised that if she waited for France to be invaded, it would then be too late to do anything at all. That conclusion might be wrong, but it was one deeply rooted in the French conviction (and the speaker had passed fifteen years of his life there). If the Spanish Peninsula were virtually occupied by an Italo-German Power, a Peninsula whose independence of foreign domination had for three hundred years been regarded as indispensable to the safety of the British line of communications, a policy dating back to the War of the Spanish Succession and to the Peninsular War; if Great Britain were content for France to be threatened on the Pyrenees, threatened on the

Rhine, threatened on the Alps, threatened in her Mediterranean communications; if she were content to see Spanish Morocco, as well as the ports of Spain commanding Gibraltar, occupied by German and Italian forces—if the strategic position were rendered thus impossible, would it then be any good to say that Great Britain would defend France?

Many of those who had reviewed the history of 1914 had come to one main conclusion. It had been drawn by Mr. Lloyd George at the end of his memoirs, when he had said, in answer to a question as to whether the Great War could have been averted (and the answer was tragic) that the Great War might have been averted if it had been possible to make clear to the Central Empires that the line of policy which they were following would cause them to meet the degree of resistance which ultimately they had had to meet. Had Great Britain been in a position to say at the beginning that she would do what, at long last, she had been forced to do, she would not have had to do it. In other words, the real cause of the War had been a too-long-delayed decision as to what Great Britain would regard as indispensable to her own security. The delay had been a matter of days with Great Britain, months with others and years with the United States. It was a challenge to the intelligence of the present generation to profit by that experience. It was being said in the columns of *The Times* and elsewhere that the decision as to whether they were ready to go to war or to threaten war should be left to the Government. But they had threatened war now if France were attacked, and on behalf of the fulfilment of that pledge they had taken certain measures in the nature of military rearmament. But there was a strategic rearmament without which military rearmament was perfectly futile.

When statesmen of the 1914 period were asked why the Government had been so late in coming to its decision at that moment, they usually replied that in the years 1910, 1911, 1912 before 1914 public opinion would not have stood for such a policy. They did not understand that an alliance of this nature with France was necessary to ensure European peace. This meant that the War had been caused because the Government had not had a public opinion intelligent enough to see what policy was necessary if peace were to be preserved. The speaker suggested, therefore, that those who had taken it upon themselves to awaken the public to a realisation of what the obligation to defend France really meant, were not urging war by the Government, but were only trying to arouse public opinion to a degree of realisation which would permit of the pursuit by the Government of the only policy which would save peace.

MR. WICKHAM STEED said that he wished to express conditional agreement with the lecturer and mitigated agreement with the first speaker.

Although he recognised the lecturer's description of the Disarmament Conference and the position of the League as it had appeared to

be in 1931, there had been one fundamental weakness in that position, the steadfast refusal of every British Government to answer the question which had been put constantly: "If we disarm and are attacked, will you help us?" The British answer had always been: "Wait and see." On such a basis no Disarmament Conference could succeed. The speaker remembered the late Mr. Arthur Henderson saying that as the nations had renounced war, they should renounce the means of war. They should disarm. And he had asked him, publicly, the question to which he had never received any answer: "Could it be said that as the individual citizen had renounced the right to carry a pistol or a sword in order to settle disputes, this involved the renunciation of the use of force by Scotland Yard?" This was the whole point. Apart from this matter, the speaker was in agreement with the lecturer's admirably temperate speech.

But he also agreed with the first speaker that Great Britain should fight, or show her willingness to fight, whenever any fundamental British interest was attacked. What was the most fundamental British interest? The preservation of the freedom and independence of Great Britain, of the freedom and independence of the British Commonwealth and British individual liberties, all of which were now threatened. If the speaker were asked whether he would fight for Czechoslovakia he would say "No." But if he were asked if he thought that the position of Great Britain and the British Commonwealth would be safe if she abandoned the defence of those democracies and representative institutions upon which the whole Commonwealth was based, and in so doing incurred even more fully the contempt of the world than she had done hitherto, he would reply again "No." The one fundamental British interest was to say that Great Britain would defend those things which ultimately she would be forced to defend. She would be dragged into war by the tail if she refused to go in with her head high on the basis of principles which would command the support of the British peoples and eventually of the United States. The dictators would not begin another Great War yet, they were not ready. There was still time.

The first speaker had said that surely it was right for the Prime Minister to get rid of a Foreign Secretary who held a different view on foreign affairs from his own. Last Wednesday the Foreign Office had sent Lord Perth in Rome the precise instructions for which Mr. Eden had been removed for wishing to send. It had not been found possible to stay away from the Eden basis, though this had been done after the moral advantage of maintaining that basis had been thrown away. It would be poor policy to get involved in a great war after the moral advantage of fighting to uphold certain principles held by Great Britain had also been thrown away.

Great Britain was in a very dangerous plight; and though the public in London might be bewildered, the public in the rest of the country was not. During the past ten days the speaker had addressed a large meeting at Oldham, a meeting at Manchester and, last night, a group

of labourers in an Oxfordshire pub. There had been no dissent when he had said that Great Britain must be prepared to fight for British interests. He had told them to find out from their Member of Parliament against whom they were arming and preparing themselves against air raids. Only in London and certain other districts had the people been unconsciously doped with German propaganda. Who, among our people, eighteen months ago, had ever heard of the Sudeten Deutsch? To-day on every side people were saying that these poor people were being oppressed and must receive their rights. Their position was infinitely better than that of the Germans in Polish Silesia or in the Southern Tyrol. The principal British interest was to find a basis upon which the whole Commonwealth would come together, because this might not happen on a question on Gibraltar and Malta. When this basis had been found, it should be defined clearly and stated to those other Powers concerned, so that they might know where they stood.

MISS HOLLINGWORTH said that she agreed with the lecturer, particularly with the latter part of his address, when he had described what he would like a Pitt or a Fox to do were they in Geneva now. She was afraid that if there were a Pitt or a Fox in Great Britain now, they would be put carefully on the retired list.

What did the lecturer think of a policy of buying up the Balkan countries by trading agreements and so wooing them away from the influence of Germany? Ottawa would be a stumbling block. In the Balkans there was an army potentially the size of, or a little larger than, our own. The population of those countries was about the same as that of Great Britain. The area was immense and its strategic importance considerable. Germany at present took half Bulgaria's exports, two-fifths of Hungary's and a third of Roumania's. Germany was buying up the trade of these countries and returning frozen marks or photographic apparatus, armaments—whatever she had for sale. By spending five hundred thousand pounds per country per year, Great Britain might gain the support of these Balkan countries. This was a very materialistic point of view, but from her own humble experience the speaker had found the people of these countries ready and willing to co-operate with the League. They realised what the people of Great Britain seemed rather reluctant to realise, that its members stood to gain as well as to lose by the use of the Covenant. If Bulgaria were attacked she might need the League. If Great Britain were attacked she might also need the League. This, at times, she was apt to forget.

MR. FRANCIS DEVERELL said that the lecturer had considered that Great Britain should have intervened on three or four occasions during the last few years. He (Lord Cecil) had rather overlooked the fact that Great Britain had not been strong enough to intervene with any certainty that such intervention would be effective. The best thing to do was what was now being done: to get as strong as possible so

that future defence of British rights would be effective instead of ineffective, as it might have been in the past.

The fact had also been overlooked that the League had been temporarily destroyed by the incubus attached to it in the form of the Versailles Treaty, to which all the present troubles could be traced. Hardly anyone seemed to remember the promises made to Germany before her surrender. On October 5th, 1918, the German Government had addressed a Note to President Wilson accepting the Fourteen Points and asking for peace negotiations. On October 8th the President replied asking whether the German Government accepted the terms laid down in the Fourteen Points and the President's subsequent address, so that the object of entering into discussion would be to agree upon certain details of their application. On October 12th the German Government had returned an unconditional affirmative to these questions. On November 5th the President sent to Germany the reply he had received from the Governments associated with him and Marshal Foch was asked to communicate terms. In this reply the Allied Governments had agreed to make peace, subject to certain qualifications, on the terms laid down in President Wilson's address to Congress on January 8th (the Fourteen Points). One of those Points read as follows: "A free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, regard being had to the interests of the populations concerned." The address of February 11th, 1918, also had included these words: "There shall be no annexation, no contributions, and no punitive damages." Then people had the audacity to blame Mussolini and Hitler for breaches of faith and the breaking of treaties.

The League had made no attempt to remedy this state of affairs. In 1919 Members of Parliament, business men and bankers had proposed that Germany should pay indemnities of twenty-five thousand million pounds, and the blockade had been allowed to go on for nine months after the cessation of war, while the British Tommy in Germany had been giving starving women and children his own rations. It was now necessary to make a real attempt to redress grievances and to make the Czechoslovakians act up to their promises before Great Britain guaranteed their freedom.

MISS RATHBONE said that she thought the question as to whether the whole responsibility implied in the Covenant should be undertaken, or only more and definitely limited commitments, was important. The lecturer had seemed against the policy of a limited alliance and had quoted his experience at Ilford. The speaker ventured to think that there had been a change of feeling on the subject since the Peace Ballot, and that there was reaction in the public mind from too wide and indefinite commitments, and that there would be a great rallying of public opinion to support definite and limited commitments. She thought that for the States members of the League simply to come together and reaffirm their loyalty to the Covenant would have little result.

A great change had taken place in public opinion lately. The prevailing opinion in the country was: We must make a stand somewhere. The London Press did not represent the opinion of the country. The great question was: how was it possible to crystallise and make articulate the mass of opinion in the electorate in general so that it would really compel the Government to obey the will of the people? It was necessary to bring home to the people that it was not a question of taking a League path which meant danger or a Chamberlain path which meant safety, but of taking a League path which meant taking great risks and acting in a situation which had terribly deteriorated, in the hopes that war might be averted by taking a strong stand against it, or of taking the Chamberlain path, which was not one of risks but one of certainty, or retreat step by step because each step did not seem worth fighting for until Great Britain was in the position of a second-rate Power, or if a stand were taken at some point, a completely disastrous war, because then she would be standing alone because of her previous selfishness. If this could be brought home to the public then it might be possible to get the uprising of public opinion which was needed.

LORD CECIL said that he thought the question of limited commitments could be met by a firm agreement as to what should be done when the crisis arose. The Covenant contained the provision that when a crisis arose the Members of the League should meet to decide what exactly should be done.

He did not think that the idea of going to the present Government and getting them to give up their Ottawa Agreements would be easy to carry out. He quite agreed, however, that something in the nature of economic appeasement was essential to any policy of general peace.

He thought that to unite what President Roosevelt so rightly called the peace-loving Powers the best instrument, and the least liable to misunderstanding, would be the League. It was certainly true that a common effort should be made either through the League or through an alliance.

The lecturer considered that to say that the League had been destroyed by the Versailles Treaty frightfully exaggerated the situation. It would certainly have been better to have had the League quite separate from the Versailles Treaty. He had always disliked that treaty, had protested against it at the time, and particularly against the money clauses, which he had always found unreal and oppressive. But certainly they had had nothing to do with the present situation. It would be more true to say that the Germans could never forgive the fact that they had been defeated. Most Powers who had been defeated had felt the same, and little could be said against them on this score. What could be said against them was that they were taking steps to re-establish their position in the world which might very well lead to an outbreak of another general war. The lecturer complained most bitterly of the Germans that, even though they had suffered

injustices, they had not used the League to redress their grievances when they became members. On the contrary, when, at the Disarmament Conference, they had not got their way in just the manner in which they desired it, they had left the Conference.

Finally, the first speaker believed in power politics. In one sense everybody believed in power, because if one wished to make a cause prevail one must have the necessary power behind it; but what the first speaker had meant by power was guns and ships and aeroplanes. He should study the views of Napoleon I, who had said with great confidence that in his view four-fifths of victory depended not on those things, but on the moral considerations, the imponderables. Unless this was realised, it would never be possible for anyone to understand the first thing about international politics. The people who disregarded such considerations were not realists, they were a very curious type of idealist, a type of idealist who believed in the ideal of material force and nothing else.

THE ISSUES IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY[1]

III. The Most Hon. The Marquess of Lothian, C.H.

There is an old saying, which is worth remembering in difficult times like these, that there are two very bad counsellors for man : one is fear and the other is hatred. We very soon lose our perspective and our judgment if we begin to listen to the whisperings of either of those enemies of mankind.

This is the third discussion, and Professor Toynbee and Lord Cecil have made the addresses which preceded this. I have had an opportunity of looking at them. I think that Professor Toynbee's paper was rather pessimistic, and I thought Lord Cecil's paper, although very interesting, did not really probe down to the ultimate facts which have got to be taken into account if we are to understand why it is we find ourselves in our present position and what is really the way forward.

I am going to begin with a little history. I always feel that my opinions have got some solid foundation when they are grounded in history and are less liable to be swayed by the emotions, passions and prejudices of the contemporary world. Moreover, I do not think you can see the present position fairly without just weighing for a moment the origins and outcome of the last war, because what is going on now is in great measure a corrective of some of the things that were done at the end of it.

The Treaty of Versailles, as you all remember, was based on the thesis of the sole guilt of Germany. There was a clause in that Treaty which compelled Germany to admit her guilt, and it was from that admission of guilt that the legalistic French mind justified a great many of the decisions which have since been operating in Europe. I am not going to argue the War-guilt case here and now, except to express my own conviction, having read a great many books about the origins of the War, that the doctrine of the sole guilt will not hold water at all. If anyone wants to study that question in the briefest possible compass I commend them to an extraordinarily interesting report published in the *American Historical Review*, of January last, which is to be

[1] Address given at Chatham House on March 24th, 1938; Mr. Clement Jones, C.B., in the Chair.

found in this Institute. The report was compiled by a committee of four German historians and four French historians, who for some years have been engaged, partly by correspondence and partly by direct meetings, in trying to reach as many agreed conclusions as possible as to the diplomatic quarrels which have divided France and Germany for the last hundred years, with the object of getting the history books of both countries freed from the grosser perversions of fact and nearer to something like a common view of what actually happened. You may have very different opinions as to the degree of responsibility, but if you read this report you will see that the simple view upon which the Versailles Treaty was juridically founded, and which most people still believe, does not now hold water.

Of course the War was just an episode, a very important episode, in the collision of forces which go to make up human history. It was partly the result of a conflict which has reappeared since the War, the conflict between what are called the late comers and the early comers, the Haves and the Have-Nots. Germany then, as now, was a late comer. It was partly the outcome of the historic conflict between Slav and Teuton for control over or predominant influence in the Balkans. It was partly the result of anarchy in Europe, the division of Europe into seventeen sovereign States, a division which the League of Nations was intended to overcome, because the fundamental thesis underlying the League of Nations is that it is impossible to end war unless we begin to get unity and some collective reign of law in the world. Finally, the most immediately decisive cause of the War was the military time-table. The reason why, following the ultimatum which Austria sent to Serbia after the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, to the surprise of everybody and without anybody deliberately pressing the button for it, the whole world was plunged into war in less than fourteen days is to be found in the military time-table which anarchy imposed on Europe in the unsettled conditions of that time. There is no option, therefore, but to dismiss the doctrine of the sole guilt of Germany for the War.

Coming now to the Versailles period, you will find that what happened at Paris was two fundamentally contradictory things. On the one hand, there was the peace settlement made by the victorious democracies, and believe me democracies can get as wrong-headed about foreign affairs as anybody else, especially after having been influenced for four years by war-time propaganda. As a result of the beliefs we all had at that time about the

origins of the War there was a very stiff Peace Treaty. I do not think anybody disputes that now. Germany lost all her colonies and all her foreign investments, one seventh of her European territory was taken away, she was unilaterally disarmed, the Rhineland was demilitarised and quite fantastic reparations were placed upon her back. There are few people who to-day think the Treaty was a perfectly fair and balanced interpretation of the Fourteen Wilsonian Points upon which the Armistice was signed. That was one side of what happened in 1919, a stiff treaty of peace. The other was the aspect of the settlement which has mostly filled the mind of Great Britain, the attempt to bring into being a new international order represented by the League of Nations, whereby we were to substitute pacific means for the solution of international disputes for warlike means, to create a system of orderly investigation before nations would be justified in resorting to war, and to create a system of economic sanctions to compel use of these pacific methods for investigating and settling international disputes, before there was resort to war.

Those were the two main results of the War. But what is not, I think, generally realised is that what followed the War was far more fatal, at any rate in its consequences for Europe, than what was actually done at Versailles. Because, whatever you may say about the Big Three, Lloyd George, Wilson and Clemenceau, they were wiser men than perhaps most people would now admit, and they knew quite well that they were imposing upon Germany terms of peace which would have to be revised. It was impossible in their view to be more moderate at that time because the Peace Conference consisted of some twenty nations excited by four years of fighting and bitter losses, misled, if you like, by war-time propaganda, and there was no possibility of re-educating the democracies in the six months which lay between the Armistice and the signing of the Peace Treaties. But they did provide means which they believed would bring about a revision of the Versailles terms in our time. Indeed, in recommending the Covenant to the plenary session of the Peace Conference, Woodrow Wilson made it quite clear that in his view one of the first duties of the League would be to undertake the revision of the work then being done at Paris.

There were three instruments for bringing about revision, and every one of these was, in fact, wrecked by the subsequent withdrawal of the United States from Europe. The first was the League of Nations itself. The United States, the most powerful single nation in the world and fundamentally the most neutral-

minded, was expected to be a leader in the new system represented by the League. Yet her influence both for security and for revison disappeared with her rejection of membership of the League. The second was the Treaty of Guarantee to France by England and the United States. I remember very well the discussion which preceded that agreement. Clemenceau came to Lloyd George and Wilson and said : " You Anglo-Saxons believe in allowing Germany to recover. You believe in this new-fangled institution the League of Nations which we Frenchmen have not much confidence in as security. We believe that the Germans are much safer people dead than alive, and that the best way of securing the peace of the world against a renewal of war by Prussia is to divide it up, at any rate to separate the Rhineland from the rest of Prussia." That was the thesis put to the Anglo-Saxon Powers by M. Tardieu at the beginning of the Conference when he was acting for M. Clemenceau. When the British and the American delegates said that such a solution would only make a renewal of war eventually inevitable and that the line of equality was the only possible foundation on which to build peace, Clemenceau said : " You may be right." " But," he added, " look at the risks you are asking us to take. You say allow Germany after a certain period back into the comity of nations. We, France, are a nation of forty million people. The Germans even with the new frontiers are sixty-five millions, and they have a far greater industrial equipment. Unless all history is wrong, they will have a feeling of *révanche* against those who conquered them in this war. It is only fair, if you want us to take the risk of allowing them to recover, that you should share that risk. You ought to give, both of you, a guarantee to France that you will come to our assistance in the event of unprovoked aggression by a recovered Germany." Lloyd George and Wilson both said that they thought that was a perfectly fair proposal, and they said they would invite their countries to give a joint guarantee to that effect. If the joint guarantee had been given it would have meant, on the one hand that France would have been given security and that it would have been possible for her to look more tolerantly on Germany, and, on the other, that the United States and Great Britain would have been able to say to France : " You must treat the German Republic fairly and justly because unless you do we will not continue our guarantee." But, as you know, that guarantee fell to the ground. The third instrument of revision was the Reparations Commission, which was to be so constituted that it had two nations in favour of low reparations and two for

high reparations with an American as the chairman with the casting vote. One of the duties imposed on the Reparations Commission was to inform the Governments, after two years, what they estimated Germany's capacity to pay to be. Lloyd George and Wilson at any rate believed that as the war temper died down the facts would gradually penetrate the consciousness of the nations and that the Reparations Commission, because it had to consider what Germany's capacity to pay really was, would be able to bring about in the first place a reduction of reparations to a reasonable figure and secondly to establish a relationship between reparations and War Debts. It may interest you to remember that Mr. Keynes estimated, just after the end of the War, that the maximum Germany could pay was two thousand million pounds. That was the official Treasury estimate.

When the United States withdrew the whole of the machinery for revision collapsed. This to my mind is the most dynamic and tragic fact in the whole history, and hardly a citizen of the United States, then or now, understands the consequences of the events which culminated in the decision of the Senate in 1920. For this I do not wish, especially considering the responsibility other nations also bear for present conditions, to blame the United States, for the reason that Woodrow Wilson expected the United States to do something greater than any nation had ever done in its history, namely, that a nation secure, educated for more than a century in the theory of isolation and non-commitment, living three thousand miles away, should remain permanently committed to taking part in the quarrels of Europe and to protecting the frontiers of Europe. I do not think it was surprising that the United States, for that and other reasons, rejected the obligation. But nobody can understand why we are in our present position unless they realise how catastrophic was the result of the withdrawal of what was really the fundamental foundation upon which the whole Peace Settlement was based, namely the co-operation of the United States in the rehabilitation of Europe and the creation of a new system of international relations in the League of Nations. As soon as the United States withdrew from participation in the League, as soon as the Treaty of Guarantee to France lapsed, because when America withdrew we most unfortunately withdrew also, until we offered it again at the end of 1921, when it was too late, as soon as the Reparations Commission failed to get its American chairman, France fell back upon her original policy and said: "The essential basis upon which I

accepted the Peace Settlement with its provision for the recove
of Germany, namely the guarantee of my security by the Unit
States and Great Britain, has disappeared. I therefore have
option but to fall back on my original intention of trying to ke
Germany down until I get my guarantee given back to me
So she built up her system of alliances in Eastern Europe, t
main purpose of which was to enforce the Treaty of Versaill
especially by the unilateral disarmament of Germany and t
demilitarisation of the Rhineland, which left Germany militar
at her mercy and was the real basis of European peace during
the years when the League was at its zenith.

Now again I do not blame France for that. I think she v
faced with the most terrible decision when the United States a
Great Britain withdrew. The responsibility lies rather on us a
America, who did not fulfil the promises we had made to her. I
the result was fatal. First came the alliances. Then Poinc
overthrew Briand and rejected the unilateral guarantee tard
offered by Lloyd George, in order to go into the Ruhr to enfo
payment of reparations, and to try to bring about the separat
of the Rhineland from the rest of Germany, and in order to try
prove to Germany that she could never escape from the Versai
system. Then the Reparations Commission, with the control n
in French hands, so far from being an instrument which could
used to revise reparations, became an instrument for collecting
maximum reparations, until finally events at the time of the gr
depression of 1931 ended reparations altogether. You then l
Sir Austen Chamberlain's great effort to bring about an appea
ment which culminated in the Locarno Treaty. But the Loca
Treaty was never followed up. And it could never have bee
lasting basis of peace because it rested on the assumption tl
Germany would be willing indefinitely to accept a position in wh
she was disarmed while her neighbours were armed and l
frontier was to be left open so that at any moment she mi
have to endure, without being able to resist it, a new invas
of the Ruhr. Whatever you may think about subsequ
events, no sensible people can believe that such an arrangem
was voluntarily accepted by Germany as part of a perman
and normal international system. You can imagine what
would have said had we been put in that position. Finally, wl
really killed the Disarmament Conference was the unwillingn
of France to agree to disarmament or to agree to any rearmam
by Germany unless she was given in an effective form the gu
antee of security originally represented by the Anglo-Ameri

guarantee. The British guarantee in the Locarno Treaty she treated as inadequate because we were at that time disarmed. Finally, you had the disastrous action, as I think it, of Sir John Simon in revising the preliminary agreement about disarmament made in the spring of 1933 between Germany and the allies, when he went to Geneva in October and proposed that effective movement towards disarmament should be postponed for four years in order to give Germany a period of what was then called trial, and M. Paul-Boncour jumped up and said: "Yes, and at the end of four years what we do must depend on the political circumstances of the time." This it was which precipitated the final withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations and gave her an excuse for rearmament contrary to the Treaty. So that the withdrawal of the United States was really a far more serious thing for Europe than the Treaty of Versailles itself, because instead of the terms of the Treaty being revised, it meant that their effect was immensely intensified and prolonged. The outcome was far worse than anything contemplated by the Big Four at Paris.

We ought to face honestly the main result of all that history. I do not think there is any doubt that its main outcome was the triumph of Herr Hitler and the National Socialist régime. Nobody who had contacts with Stresemann during those years, still more with Brüning, will forget the way in which they came and said: "Unless you make some concession to the Republic now, nothing can prevent Germany yielding to those who say that you can get nothing from the Allies by appeals to justice. You can only get your freedom by strength and violence." Brüning came over and over again, but for various reasons, quite easy to understand, nothing was done. And therefore there eventually came into being a régime which believes that the method of attaining not only internal unity and strength, but also all international ends, is force. Yet the hideous internal persecution and repression of all who will not bow to the régime is, in great measure, only the outcome of the persecution and repression which were inflicted on Germany for fifteen years from outside. That is the psychological explanation of recent events. Nothing will convince me that what is going on in Germany represents the normal attitude of the normal German. Germany is in an unnatural pathological state as a result of the history of the last twenty years. It convinced Germans, or the mass of them, that the Hitler thesis was right, that what counted in international affairs was not the

sincerity or the rightness of your claims, but your power to secure what you wanted by your own discipline, strength and force.

In my view the fundamental things which have undermined the authority of the League have been two. First, that its principles, such as respect for treaties and the reign of law, came to mean in practice respect for the Treaty of Versailles. You could not get people who were suffering from the Treaty of Versailles to feel very much respect for an international system which rested upon that kind of law. Again, the recent advocacy of the League as a system of collective security, the thesis that no nation has the right to alter the *status quo* by force but only by consent, has meant, inasmuch as up to the present none of the main elements in the *status quo* have ever been altered by consent and there is really no adequate machinery for bringing it about, that collective security implied collective action to maintain the *status quo*, including the Treaty of Versailles.

The second theory has been that when collective security was put to the test most of the League nations were not really armed and were not willing to face the risk of war. Let me give you some examples. I remember very well both at the time when Hitler rearmed in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and when he went into the Rhineland, the French, remembering the vanished Treaty of Guarantee, came over here and quite naturally said: "This is the last chance for freedom. You have got to act now. Will you act?" And in both cases the British Government, as its habit is, discussed the matter with its own supporters, who went back to their constituencies for the week-end and sounded public opinion. The following Monday morning they came back and said: "Well, it is no use expecting Great Britain to go to war about this. Most of our constituents simply say: 'Why should not the Germans defend their own frontier?'" It was the natural instinct of the Englishman. There was nothing particularly heinous fifteen years after a war in advancing to the edge of your own frontier in order to defend it. It meant that the Germans did not accept the thesis of the sanctity of treaties if those treaties meant that they must accept permanent liability to invasion from outside. Then I think you have got to admit that the fundamental reason for the failure in Abyssinia was that most of the League Powers were more concerned to deny to Germany the right to equality in armaments or to defend her Rhineland frontier than to save Abyssinia. That was why the French were opposed to resolute action against Italy. They were more concerned with keeping Germany down with their left hand than

with giving security to Abyssinia with their right. If it had not been for that German question, I think Mussolini would never have started and that, if he had, the League would have been able to deal with him, and if we are honest we have to admit that this country, while anxious to support the League, was both not prepared to risk war and was unprepared for war. Finally I think that what I may call the Versailles-League structure made negotiations with Germany practically impossible. I will tell you why. I have felt for the last three years that the most imperative thing was to go and to have a real talk with the Germans as to what the basis of a lasting peace should be. Perhaps it was because I felt that they had legitimate grievances which had to be removed before there could be peace. But I felt also that the time to negotiate with Germany was when Hitler was offering to be content with an army of two hundred or three hundred thousand men or an Air Force half that of France or one third of the neighbouring Air Forces, whichever was the smaller. That was the time to negotiate. But what stood in the way? That Great Britain was committed to the support of the reign of law and the sanctity of the Paris system of treaties through the League of Nations. It was therefore quite impossible for any British Government to go to Hitler and to say: "We are prepared to agree to this fundamental change, in rearmament or the Rhineland or Austria, or to stand aside if you force the issue," because they were committed to defend the *status quo* under Article XVI of the Covenant of the League of Nations and because to agree to such changes would have involved them in quarrels with the other members of the League. If you consider it you will see that that is what made any discussion so difficult.

Then there is another aspect of the present situation which we have got to recognise. The whole post-War attitude of the Allies, of the small nations and France and the Great Powers, has been an attempt to stem one of the vital forces of history. Nationalism is probably the most potent political force of the modern world. It has been immensely stimulated in recent years by the challenge of Communism. It is proving itself much more powerful than class. I think that if you put the two in rivalry, nationalism will always defeat class, which is one of the reasons, though not the only reason, why Fascism, I think, does in practice beat Communism. Fascism is not, as the Marxists say, merely the final incarnation of capitalism. It is something far more dynamic. It is nationalism protesting against an inadequate *status quo*. Germany, for the last three hundred years, has been thinking and working for her own

racial and national unity. Because the Germans were drawn away by the will-o'-the-wisp of the Holy Roman Empire, and the Holy Roman Emperors did not, like the Kings of France and England, coerce their feudal lords into subordination to themselves, and so lay the foundations for a united nation, but gave more and more power to their feudal lords in order to get money with which to prosecute their imperial ambitions in Italy and elsewhere, Germany remained until the Napoleonic wars divided into three hundred sovereignties, German but separate. The Napoleonic wars reduced them to thirty-three. Bismarck used his famous phrase about blood and iron when he said of the ineffectiveness and divisions of the German Confederation, " This division of Germany will only be ended by blood and iron. There is no other way of doing it." In the end he fought three wars, one of which threw the Habsburgs out of Germany, in order to create a German nation. But with the Magyars the Austrian Germans were also the dominant force in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

And now Hitler, by methods which we cannot help deploring because of the shock they give elsewhere, has at last realised the dream of the German people—the dream they have dreamed for three hundred years, to be a united people, as Italy is a united people, and France is a united people and England is a united people and every other race in Europe is a united people except the Germans. Thus the whole Versailles Settlement was not only " stiff," but was turned against what is, I think, the most powerful political movement of the time, the urge towards racial and national unity. You saw evidence of this underlying tendency in 1921, when a plebiscite was held in the Tyrol in which a hundred and forty-four thousand voted for union with Germany and seventeen hundred against it. In another plebiscite in Salzburg a hundred and three thousand voted for union with Germany and eight hundred against it. Almost the last act of Chancellor Brüning was to say: " Give me the *Anschluss* and I may be able to save my country from yielding to the National Socialists." And that was denied because of a manœuvred political decision by the International Court at the Hague. So that I cannot help feeling that we (by we I mean the dominant Allied Powers) are largely responsible for the situation that confronts us to-day. If another war comes and the history of it is ever written, the dispassionate historian a hundred years hence will say not that Germany alone was responsible for it, even if she strikes the first blow, but that those who mismanaged the world between 1918 and 1937 had a large share of responsibility for it.

I say this unpalatable thing because I think it is necessary to a balanced view and is a corrective to the natural instinct of hatred and indignation which springs up when we see what is going on.

Now I come to what really interests everybody to-day: What are we going to do now? Personally I think that a fundamentally new situation has been created by the incorporation of Austria in National Socialist Germany. I have long thought it was inevitable, especially as the only alternative, a Danubian federation, was blocked, though I did not think it was inevitable that it should be done in the violent way in which it has been done. I do not think it is worth discussing who was responsible for recent events. There is no doubt that Hitler and his party were determined sooner or later to absorb the Germans of Austria and whether, if Schuschnigg had played his cards better, it might have been possible to arrive at a slower and gentler method I will leave the historian to decide. But you can now say that the fundamentals of the German case, the unity of the German people in a strong independent state, fundamentals which it was extraordinarily difficult to get recognised by consent, have now been won by rapid and unilateral action. The remaining questions, the small German minorities, the colonial question, the economic problem, are, I think, matters which can be and ought to be settled by negotiation. Moreover I think that the rest of the world is now quite willing to negotiate about these matters provided it is able to feel that an agreed settlement of them will mean a lasting peace. Of course the corporation of Austria in Germany by this totalitarian method, with its instant transformation of Austria into part of the German military system, makes a fundamental strategic change in the strategic position in Europe. It gives to Germany a strategic and economic dominance in Central Europe which she did not have before and which nothing that anybody can do now can alter. But the question which I ask myself, and which I know a lot of you are asking yourselves, is this: Hitler has adopted the method of altering the *status quo* by the unilateral use of his strength. Up to the present his objective has been justifiable. It has concerned only Germans, except for the miserable minorities in Germany and Austria. Other nations have done so also, Japan in the Far East, Italy in Abyssinia and Spain, with far less justification. Is it possible to stop that method with the momentum behind it which the success it has gained has given it, unless the rest of the world is ready to say that there is a limit beyond which they are willing and equipped to accept the challenge of war? That is what we have to face now. Can

you convince those who have practised this violent method of bringing about perhaps overdue changes that the day has come when they must abandon that method and return to the method of negotiation on the understanding that negotiation will be honest and fair, unless you can convince them that the democracies of the world are prepared to face war rather than see the world transformed bit by bit, inch by inch, by the method of power politics. The difficulty is that that card is the card which every democracy in the world is most reluctant to play. It is the card which every democratic government finds it most difficult to play because it knows that it cannot enter a war unless it has got a united country behind it. Yet the issue is bound to arise for the reason that so long as nations insist on maintaining their sovereignity and are unwilling to federate, the ultimate instruments for dealing with international affairs will remain power politics and war, and it is quite clear nobody is prepared to federate to-day.

I think it is true that the only argument which will induce the dynamic totalitarian régimes to return to what you might call constitutional methods of international intercourse is the conviction that if they attempt to get what is unjust by power politics they will find themselves confronted by what every one of them is most afraid of, world war. There is not a government in the world which would dream of starting a world war, for the reason that nobody can tell what its outcome would be, except that any régime which enters the next world war will certainly not be in power at the end of it. Therefore the question we have to answer is whether there is any way in which the method of altering the *status quo* by power politics or war—a method for the return to which we must bear some measure of responsibility—can be stopped in any other way than by being willing to accept the challenge of resisting it, if need be, by war, while providing a just and alternative method of revision by pacific means.

We are in a much more difficult position to-day than we were a few years ago, for the reasons which I have given. I think we have squandered the authority of the League by trying to use collective security for purposes which were fundamentally unjust, for denying its natural rights to Germany. While we were doing this five of the Great Powers have gone outside the League, and a good many more members, while still members of it, are clearly going to remain neutral if they can if war comes. Therefore if there is going to be any collective resistance to

further attempts at what is called aggression, it can only be if the nations, members of the League and otherwise, concerned to resist aggression, enter into quite specific military obligations and get the General Staffs to advise them as to the points at which their action will be effective and the points at which their common action cannot be effective. The first step will estimate accurately what our real military strength is and that of our associates as opposed to potential aggressors. The second is to use it for purposes which have a universal appeal. If Great Britain pursues a policy purely concerned with its own national interest every other nation in the world will tend to do the same, and the way will be open for alterations in the *status quo* by the methods of power politics, because there will be no collective action against them. I do not think you will get the Dominions, you certainly will not get much friendly support from the United States, unless you can convince public opinion (and you have got to get the support of the Left as well as the Right at home to get a united country) that your policy will not only protect the British Commonwealth, but does lead towards a new and better international order. And it is much more difficult to do that to-day than it was a few years ago, because the League has squandered so much of its authority, partly in refusing the just claims of Germany and partly in offering ineffective resistance to aggression elsewhere.

There are two questions which are in the forefront of people's minds to-day : Czechoslovakia and Spain. I do not think I need discuss the practical difficulties of the Czechoslovakian problem. They have been discussed at length in the newspapers and I think in this hall. The fundamental difficulty is that while Czechoslovakia geographically has a good natural frontier it is now almost the only racially heterogeneous State left in Europe to-day. Switzerland is the only other case. It has, therefore, elements of disintegration within itself unless its minority problems are handled both justly and firmly. If Czechoslovakia had only set itself up at the beginning on Swiss lines, as was suggested at Paris, things would be very different now. I have not had time, this afternoon, to study the Prime Minister's declaration,[1] but, as far as I can understand, what he says is that while Great Britain will honour the so-called " Leamington obligations," that is the guarantee to France and Belgium against unprovoked aggression, the defence of the British Commonwealth, and its alliances with Portugal, Iraq and Egypt, it must keep a free hand

[1] Of March 24th, 1938.

as to the extent to which it can live up to what may be called general League principles in the rest of Europe, because the test in each case is the circumstances and the degree of effective power the League can exert. As regards Czechoslovakia, he says that he will not accept any new commitments, but that he cannot say that in the event of unprovoked aggression Great Britain will not go to war. That is, I think, in substance what he has said. And I confess I do not see that he could have said anything else to-day.

Spain is much more difficult. I had three days not very long ago in Rome. Therefore you will not class me among the experts, though there are many people who go three days to a place and then come and talk as if they were experts. But the impressions that I formed were these. Italy wants peace—that is, the mass of the Italian people. They are tired of adventure. I think that to-day they are profoundly worried about the appearance of the Germans on the Brenner. And there is nothing that most of them would like more than to get back to the old healthy friendly relationship with Great Britain. But the policy of Italy is not determined by the people, but by one man, a very remarkable man, but a man of Napoleonic mind and a man who, since he successfully played poker with fifty-two nations and defeated them about Abyssinia, has been unable to rid his mind of the Napoleonic dream of Empire. He is pursuing to-day in Italy two quite contradictory policies. What Italy, on the domestic side, really needs is twenty years of " living poor " in order to make up its reserves and get the corporative State going and gradually raise the standard of living of its people. But its foreign policy in Abyssinia, Spain, Libya and so on is using up the resources which are really needed for internal reconstruction. My own belief is that if you are going to deal with Mussolini you have got to convince him that he cannot get Egypt in his lifetime. If you convince him of that he may go back to the policy of developing Italy and its present possessions and of having real friendship with us. But as long as the dream that we can be thrown out of the Mediterranean so that Italy becomes our heir in the Eastern Mediterranean seems a possibility I do not believe he will abandon it voluntarily. Can you convince him that he has no chance of getting Egypt in his lifetime? He cannot get it in a single combat with ourselves—that is certain. But so long as the democracies are weak and divided, and so long as the anti-Comintern Powers might intervene, as a whole, in a general international adventure, I do not think he will abandon his dream.

The future depends also very largely on Spain. In Spain I

think the policy of non-intervention was fundamentally right—that is to say, it was the right policy for the democracies to say that the Spanish people must be left to settle their own affairs, and that at the end of the war Spain must be a truly independent country, free to choose her own policy for herself. The root of the trouble in Spain has been the attempt of both Communists and Fascists to settle things in their own favour by violence, violence applied both internally and from outside. We were quite right not to become engaged in this conflict of violent political philosophies; but can you be sure that in the event of Franco winning, or in the event of the Government winning, though that is at the moment much less probable, you will have an independent Spanish Government to deal with at the end of the war? I think it is a vital British interest, I think it important from the point of view of peace, that whoever governs Spain at the end of the war should be a genuinely independent government. Such a government will pursue a policy which will be in the interests of Spain, and not in the interests of anybody else, and it will seek peace and good relations with its neighbours. But if it pursues a policy in the interests of a group hostile to ourselves, it will have a motive for mounting guns near Algeciras, which will make Gibraltar untenable in the event of a war in which Spain was a belligerent on the other side. If that happened, then the possibility of defending Egypt effectively would become by so much the less, and the possibility of coming to real terms with Mussolini would also become so much the less. The Government statement reaffirms its belief in the doctrine of non-intervention and expresses its belief that the Italian conversations will lead to satisfactory results. I hope they are right.

There are two other points which I think are worth mentioning about the general thesis that now that Germany has at last taken back her fundamental rights, we may be able to get the world back to the principle of negotiation on League lines, as opposed to the methods of power politics. As I have said, I think the fundamental basis for doing that is that we can convince the totalitarian Powers and others that Great Britain is in the last resort prepared to fight and is equipped to fight and is prepared to stand air warfare, without quailing, for the sake of this principle. Personally I think that the adoption of some form of national service for the emergency—if possible national service voluntarily undertaken; if that is not possible, on the basis of a national register—would have as much effect as anything else in convincing the world that the era

when everybody has got to go back to negotiation has arrived. The Achilles' heel of this country is doubt as to what would happen if you got really effective modern bombing on London. Modern bombing means hundreds of bombers making say three journeys every twenty-four hours indefinitely on a specified objective. You cannot deal with that only by counter-attacks. The essential thing is to have your civilian population really disciplined and organised, so that you can deal with fire and casualties and prevent the roads being blocked by cars and foot passengers, and so keep them open for food supplies, fire engines, ambulances, road and sewage and cable-mending parties, and so on. If you can do that I don't think air bombing is very effective. It will probably, therefore, not be treated as an important element in war. But, because of the speed of modern war, you cannot improvise these arrangements after the war has begun. What frightens everybody is the possibility of London waking up and finding that it is unable to feed itself because of the destruction of its communications. When this doubt disappears, then you will be able to face threats fearlessly.

Secondly, I think it is very important to encourage and fortify the other democracies, and especially France It has been suggested that if we were willing to make a loan to France on condition that she took the drastic steps necessary to put her own finances and economic system in order, the capital which has now left France would instantly come back, because confidence would have been restored. The loan could then be immediately repaid, and the influence of France as a stabilising factor in Europe would be immensely increased.

Now one final word about pacifism. I think Mr. Gandhi has said the best thing about pacifism. He has said that if you are a pacifist because you are frightened of the suffering involved in fighting for your country, it is far better you should get into uniform and fight for its freedom. But he also thinks that the only thing which in the long run is going to end war is non-violent resistance, and that is a more painful and more difficult, even if more effective, method than war. It is not non-resistance. It is resisting non-violently. He gave me the illustration of Abyssinia, if the Abyssinians had reached the point, which no nation has yet reached, that they had been able to go to the frontier when the Italians were about to cross it and say: " You have no right in this country. You are committing a wrong. We are not going to resist you violently because we do not believe that in the long run peace comes from violence. Violence breeds

violence. But we are going to resist you to the end non-violently. No Abyssinian man, woman or child will render you any assistance, will do labour for you or sell or give you food or render you any co-operation in the wrong you are committing. Though you may flay us alive, beat us, machine-gun us and destroy us, none of us will co-operate with you in your crime. We will resist you to the end. The only service we will render you is to nurse you when you are sick, because we must prove to you and to ourselves that we love you and do not hate you." Now, that is a very high gospel. There is no nation in the world which is near practising it. But Mr. Gandhi thinks that when nations reach that point war will end upon earth, and not before.

I do not want to end these considerations of what has happened during the last few weeks on a pessimistic note. I feel a good deal more cheerful than I have for the last year or two, for the reason that I believe Great Britain is at last beginning to find its purpose and its soul. It is coming to realise that collective security and collective justice are inseparable, and that if you do not have the one you cannot have the other. I think, personally, that if you can convince the world on the one hand that there is a practical way of getting collective justice, without war, as there has not been for the last fifteen or twenty years, and, on the other, that resort to war or power politics for unjust purposes, or without having exhausted the alternative methods, will be prevented by nations who are ready to face war for the purpose, it will be possible once more to put substance behind the League ideal. In a revived League the most important members of the Council would obviously be the seven big Powers. In an armed world it is the Great Powers who are equipped to wage modern war, who are going to be the leaders. They are the United States, Germany, Russia, Japan, Italy, France and Great Britain. With them would be associated a proper sprinkling of the smaller Powers to prevent dictatorship by the big Powers. If such a Council could be brought into being, even with no automatic obligation to take sanctions, there would be no risk of world war. But, if it is to come into being, it is essential to create confidence that justice can be done as well as security given. That is only possible if you establish as the basis of a revived League the principle that in every international issue, the first requirement must be impartial third-party advice as to what the solution should be. I do not think that arbitration can be final, because execution depends upon the sovereign States, until they are willing to federate. But, as in the case of a Royal

Commission, the nations must be given the results of impartial investigation and practical proposals before they come to conclusions. So, on the whole, despite the undeniable risks and dangers of the present time, despite the fact that a serious crisis may be necessary before we can make a fresh start to apply League principles, I am not pessimistic about the future, because the fundamental obstruction to the League in the past, its inability or refusal to do justice to Germany, has at last been removed by Germany herself. The danger to-day is that because the rest of the world has forced her into getting her rights by the method of violence, and because she is now under a constitution admirably adapted for the use of violence, the momentum of her past will carry her farther, and also her associates, and make her issue a challenge which can only be stopped by a general war. Whether that tragedy can be averted depends, I believe, very largely on whether we make the moral and material preparations necessary to convince everybody that we are, in the last resort, prepared to face it. But if on our own chosen ground we do face it, I think we shall bring into being the foundations of the new world order we have all dreamed of, without war, because the farther the dictatorships go in repressing opinion and minorities in their own countries, and in attempting to dominate or restrict the freedom of others, the greater will their own inner weakness become, and the more formidable will be the external opposition they will create.

Summary of Discussion.

PROFESSOR TOYNBEE said that he agreed with everything which the lecturer had said. Perhaps the most important question to consider was that of "momentum," which had been mentioned by Lord Lothian in connection both with Hitler in Central Europe and with Mussolini in Spain. This "momentum" on the German and Italian side had certainly been in part, and indirectly, created by the other Great Powers. The Powers suffering from a sense of inferiority had reached the belief that nothing would avail them but forceful methods, and towards this end they had organised themselves in a way which the democratic nations had not yet dreamed of following. Certainly the *Anschluss* of Austria would give to Germany almost that national unity which Italy, France and Great Britain had long since taken for granted as their own natural right. On the other hand, it would be seen from a glance at the map that a momentum which had now given Germany the unity of seventy or eighty millions of Germans would swing her on, quite probably, to building up an immense Central European Empire based on a German ascendancy over non-German peoples. During the last few weeks Europe had seen a German *Mittleleuropa* visibly growing under

its eyes. She had seen Poland drawn towards it; Hungary and Yugoslavia were likely to follow; and even Italy was now nailed on the Brenner. In spite of all the efforts of the British Government to detach Italy from the Axis at the thirteenth hour and bring her back to the Stresa policy, the speaker believed that she was now Germany's prisoner. Then Italian policy in Spain had also come within sight of its goal in the last weeks. Could Great Britain afford not to try to arrest that momentum? The speaker believed that she could not without ceasing to play the rôle which she had played in Europe for so many centuries—the rôle of a Great Power. It would be seen that really the origin and basis of the British Empire was that this was the payment which Great Britain had received from the nations of Europe for taking very heavy responsibilities for maintaining their liberties. The very enviable position which she had enjoyed, in this respect, at the end of the Great War had been thrown away by the injustices which she had allowed to happen during the twenty years since the War. Now she would have to decide whether or not to retire from business as an incompetent trustee; and, if she did retire, the liberties of Europe would quickly disappear. Already some of the small nations whom she had kept free through holding the balance of power in Europe might be seen gravitating in fear towards the stronger Powers. Instead of these small nations rewarding Great Britain by allowing her to hold the British Empire, as a gratuity for her guardianship of the liberties of Europe, these smaller nations would, probably, if Hitler's intended system gathered such momentum that it came true, be compensated by Hitler, for the forfeiture of their liberties to Germany, by the gift of some part of Europe's vast colonial Empire, which was now held by four little nations (as they would then be) in the West of Europe. It was desperately important for Great Britain to maintain, not so much her territory and Empire (for in a sense these were a small thing) as that social and moral climate which her policy as a Great Power had hitherto produced and maintained all over the world. If she meant to preserve this, she could not afford to renounce her responsibility for the liberties of Europe.

Germany was now approaching the point where justice would have been done and where injustice on her part might begin. To arrest Germany's momentum at this point would mean taking enormous risks; but this was the penalty, the heavy penalty, to be paid for our having made so many mistakes during the past twenty years; and it was a penalty from which Great Britain could not escape.

General Aspinall-Oglander said that it had been a great pleasure to hear the lecturer speak not only about what Great Britain ought to do, but what she was at this moment equipped and able to do, before attempting to cry " Halt " to the dictators and bring them back from forceful methods to negotiation. During previous debates a great deal had been said about what should be done without any reference to what could be done. It was dangerous to talk about what should be

done without considering the utter unreadiness of Great Britain for war to-day. In time of war, or even of crisis, it had been proved many times that diplomacy without adequate strength behind it was bankrupt, that bluff was most unsafe, and that policy must never be allowed to outstrip one's military preparations. In other words in time of crisis it was necessary to cut one's coat according to one's cloth.

How much cloth had Great Britain to-day? Only a short time ago she had been pursuing a policy of unilateral disarmament, and the Empire had been going in for the most outrageous exhibition of strip-tease ever seen. Lord Hailsham had said that it looked as though the only defence for chastity was complete nudity. In those days anyone who asked for rearmament had been called a war-monger or a war-profiteer. A little later, after the disastrous humiliations which had been the result of this policy, the whole procedure had been reversed, and it had been decided, not without opposition, that rearmament was necessary. The country had been told it would take us four or five years and would cost fifteen hundred million pounds. Last week it had been stated that that sum would not suffice, but that a great deal more would have to be spent. To-day only one fifth of the original estimate had been spent. The start had been made from scratch. The time so far had been principally spent in building and equipping factories, manufacturing machinery, supplying machine tools and training skilled workers. The actual supply of machines for the Air Force and armaments for the Army was only just beginning. Great Britain was still lamentably unready for war, yet those who had most criticised the policy of rearmament and its supporters had now turned themselves into war-martyrs, and were attacking those who had foreseen some of the dangers which now face us by calling them Do-Nothings or " the Shiver Sisters."

Fortunately the Navy was, as ever, beyond reproach, but the days had passed when the Navy alone could keep Great Britain inviolate. Unfortunately it was common knowledge that our preparations against air attack were incomplete, and London, the heart of the Empire, the home of a quarter of the population of Great Britain, was the most vulnerable point in the whole world. Concerning British offensive power in the air, an eminent authority on flying matters, himself a supporter of the Government, had said in the House of Commons last week that Germany already had twice as many aeroplanes as Great Britain, and that her monthly output of 'planes was three hundred and fifty, while Great Britain's had not yet reached a hundred. Also the latter did not possess a single bomber capable of flying to Berlin and back. The best that the Government spokesman had been able to say in reply was that the Government hoped that in twelve months time Britain's machines would be " up to a comparative standard with those of other countries." Only so much; and only after twelve months! The Army, comparatively speaking, was not ready for war. It was still twenty thousand below its small normal peace-time establishment. The last week had been one of acute crisis, which one might have

hoped would bring thousands of young unemployed men of goodwill to the colours. Mr. Hore-Belisha had said that it had been a record recruiting week, the biggest number of recruits in one week since 1918. The figures had been put in the front page of *The Times* for all the dictators to see. The number of recruits was 137 and the figures were quoted in detail, including 72 for the Infantry, 10 for the Cavalry, 3 for the Tanks, 3 for the Foot Guards and 1 for the Army Ordnance. When one thought of all the young men waiting outside the Unemployment Exchanges, to whom, because Great Britain was a free country, the Labour Exchange officers were not even allowed to suggest that they would be more happily and usefully employed in serving their country than in living on the dole, it made one wonder whether Great Britain still deserved to be a great country. In 1914 she had had an Expeditionary Force of six divisions ready in every respect for foreign service. To-day she might be able to equip two divisions.

That being the size of our cloth, were we to cut it up at once and go out into the rain with a coat only reaching to our waists, or should we wait till we had got more cloth, in the belief that we could better survive an even heavier storm in a coat that reached to our feet?

There were three possible courses; one had been suggested by the first speaker in the debate following Lord Cecil's address; this was, in effect, to wait until there was a definite attack on or threat to British soil, and then to send the Navy after the aggressors and sink the whole damn lot of them! The second course had been greatly advocated. It was to throw down the gauntlet to the dictators, to hope that they would not have the courage to pick it up, and to trust that if they did by any chance pick it up, Great Britain's good friends the French, who had always gone in for national service, and their rather questionable friends the Russians, who were supposed to have a big army though they had no generals, would be kind enough to pull the chestnuts out of the fire and make Great Britain safe for a democracy which she would not take the trouble to make safe for herself. The third course which the speaker recommended was for the British to keep their heads, to go on arming with watchful care and great energy, and to strive to make public opinion realise that every man and woman in the country must be ready to do something, not only after war had broken out, but now, while there was still time, for the defence of their great heritage. There was a great deal, including time, on their side. The dictators had their own problems. Even they were mortal. The storm, when it came, might be heavier, but there was just a chance that the clouds might disperse without interference from outside. Collective security, if it could be obtained, was most desirable, but it must be real collective security, not collective security on the cheap for Great Britain. She must play her full part, and before war began. If liberty and democracy were worth fighting for, surely they were worth the sacrifice entailed by preparing in time of peace to defend them. In 1914 the ring had been kept for months and months while Great Britain prepared. In 1938 Hitler had entered Austria in three days. London might get seven

minutes. The lesson of the last fortnight was that if Great Britain wanted security, she must bring in some form of national service. It would do more than anything to make the dictators realise that the country was in earnest, and to rally friends to Great Britain's side. It would give new life to the League of Nations. Then not only would Great Britain be able to choose the foreign policy which she desired, but to support it with the force necessary to ensure that it would prevail.

A MEMBER said that he had been visiting Central Europe on business between 5th and 16th March and had been in Prague on the Friday and Saturday of the Austrian move, in Berlin before that and had returned to Germany afterwards. He felt that the present crisis was not a short-term matter but that Great Britain and other countries were in the grip of long-term forces which were at work. The Germans had asked the speaker quite plainly what Great Britain was prepared to fight for. She claimed to believe in certain things, to hold certain principles and ideals, but the only criterion of faith was success. For the past seven years she had not had a single success. Germany also had her ideals and principles in which she believed and she had had such astounding success that, imperceptibly, she had passed from what was reasonable to what might be very unreasonable. This was because, first, the German authorities could not now risk a single failure. They must get bigger and better results with at least 95 per cent. of apparent support. Secondly, they were now so intoxicated with success that cases which had seemed border-line and fit for negotiation even a few weeks ago might now be outside such negotiations. Europe was now at the stage of a military time-table. Every move Germany made was now made with the collaboration of the Army, Navy and Air Force chiefs. Austria had been a brilliant demonstration, but the circumstances leading up to it were, in a sense, fortuitous. Mr. Chamberlain had made a speech saying that the smaller nations could not rely on the League—this the Germans interpreted as meaning that Great Britain had said she would not fight for either Czechoslovakia or Austria. France immediately said she would fight for the former. Thus, the next German move had to be Austria, as there was no choice. Schuschnigg had certainly created the opportunity necessary for Hitler by announcing his plebiscite : the speaker had been in Berlin at the time and even official opinion there had been that to allow it would be disastrous, because Schuschnigg would get something like seventy per cent. of success and such a blow to prestige might endanger the Nazi system in Germany. Therefore Hitler had acted in a few hours and with complete success. The reason why Germany had mustered such overwhelming force had not been because of possible trouble in Austria but because it had been necessary to "put it over big" as the Americans would say.

The difficulty now was that the next coup or coups would have to be " put over big " too or there would be reaction at home. In this

connection Spain became a very important factor. It came into the long-term plan of the German General Staff. The present attack in Aragon and the Austrian affair were connected. It might be true to say that Franco would remove the foreigners from Spain when he had won but for a few months they would be there and that would keep France still. Thus as soon as Franco won, certain interesting developments in Europe would almost certainly take place, which would all be part of the German plan. In two years' time Germany (when she had consolidated her position) would considerably increase her demands to Great Britain. Already the colonies were not considered to be a matter for bargaining. Germany demanded all her colonies back. Later the demands very likely would grow. For the past seven years the British Government had tried to isolate every event and deal with it on its merits. This was no longer possible. It was impracticable to say that a particular case could not be envisaged in advance and then when it happened later to muddle through or remain silent. The speaker was certain that if the public were told beforehand what the future policy would be, and why, they would support it unanimously. He was sure the nation would answer a call to national service, but charity began at home: the country would want to know what form of national service was needed and for what it was required, *i.e.* against whom and why. The country would not wish to fight an election on the mere issue: "We kept you out of war." A long preparation would be necessary, but if that preparation was started now and properly carried out then certainly the country would respond.

Sir Frederick Sykes said that to the latter part of the address he could not quite assent.

He agreed with the second speaker that foreign policy could not be effective without strength to back it up. The present situation had been brought about not through the fault of any one particular nation but by a *mélange* of forces and during a period in which Great Britain had tried consistently to do the right thing, usually in the wrong way. Now she had come to the point where she could not unaided exercise the predominating influence on affairs which she did during the whole of the last century, when with her Navy she had been able to maintain the peace of the world. That peace had been challenged, with the result which everyone knew. Now, owing to the geographical alterations which had recently taken place, the lecturer had indicated that it had become necessary to come to an arrangement with Germany. But did the lecturer really think that any arrangement made with Germany by any of the Powers could be relied upon?

At the end of his address the lecturer had stated that he was not pessimistic, and for two reasons: first, because Great Britain was at last conscious of the real position, and secondly, because Germany, having expanded to the utmost of her state, would now be willing to come to some arrangement. Both of these arguments seemed very weak. Even yet it was doubtful whether Great Britain did realise

the exact position. It would take time and even greater difficulties than those already experienced to bring the country to a full knowledge of the true state of affairs. Secondly, the speaker did not think that, with the best will in the world, Germany could remain where she now was. She would be forced by the momentum which had recently carried her forward to a greater momentum which she would not be able to control.

Great Britain had made the unfortunate mistake of disarming entirely, instead of maintaining parity strength in order to tide matters over into a state of peace. After all it was becoming a duel between two forms of civilisation: we believed that our form of civilisation was the best in the world. It had given more benefits in the last hundred years than any other form. We should try to maintain it. Unfortunately the only way of doing this now would be by being exceedingly strong throughout the whole Empire. To do this, the Government was at last straining every nerve. Some form of national service was absolutely vital, if Great Britain were to be really strong enough to deal with the present situation.

MISS FREDA WHITE said that she was concerned with the objects, not the subjects, of foreign policy—the people. The most important factor in a situation like the present was the single people or groups of people who ruled nations and their reactions to and upon the people whom they ruled.

It was a very serious matter to-day that among the ruling class in Great Britain there was a struggle between sectional interest, which admired material success and class domination, a characteristic of the totalitarian States, and national interest. This meant that large numbers of the ruling class sympathised, for example, with Franco in Spain, a policy which was opposed to British interests. Failing the ruling class, it was necessary to fall back on the people, where at the moment sectional interest, class interest and national interest coincided. The people believed in democracy and in the rule of law, and they could be relied upon to defend those principles against aggression.

COLONEL WALEY COHEN did not think that it was very useful to discuss or consider the causes of the Great War. Whatever might have been the long-term causes, it was true that in 1914 Germany, by the turn of a finger, could have prevented it.

The real issue which had been mentioned by the lecturer was: Was it time to put the brake on? The speaker believed that it was. Last year he had made a survey of Czechoslovakia. He had been impressed by three things: first, the capacity of that country for producing munitions, which was very little less than that of Great Britain; secondly, that if the food production in Czechoslovakia were controlled by Germany the latter would be completely independent of imports; and thirdly, that, therefore, it was now or never. If Czechoslovakia went, then Germany would become too powerful for Great Britain and France to resist her. Not only would the British and

French think this, but Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Roumania would also think the same.

A good deal had been said about the population of Great Britain. The speaker agreed that the people only needed to have the situation explained to them to follow any lead which was given. He had been speaking during the last ten days with British working men, and they had all asked him what the situation was, whether it was necessary to fight, and if so why? The speaker suggested that the lecturer should go one step farther than his admirable letter written the other day advocating national service, and organise some form of propaganda throughout the country, stating the position clearly, and also what effort it was necessary for the people to make.

MR. JULIAN PIGGOTT said that subsequent speeches had tended to ignore the admirable statement made by the second speaker.

One important point was the exact nature of the next crisis. Did people expect that Herr Hitler would declare war upon Czechoslovakia? Was it not far more likely that some sort of internal commotion such as civil war would start? There were three and a half million Germans in that country and a million Hungarians, two large minorities. There was the example of Spain. Surely the technique employed might be local risings, and then a German concentration on the frontier without, necessarily, a declaration of war—in other words, the danger of outside intervention in a civil war, on the one side from the Germans, on the other from the allies of the Czechs. It was conceivable that in such circumstances France might not run the risk of involving civilisation again in a completely final catastrophe. It was even more conceivable that Great Britain would find it difficult to say in advance what she would do in such a situation. Therefore, perhaps Mr. Chamberlain was right in entering into no formal commitment at this stage.

MAJOR JOURDAIN said that he also had been at the House of Commons during the afternoon and had been there some ten or eleven hours in all during the past few weeks. During that time he had heard only one lucid and impressive speech, that delivered by the hon. and learned Member for Bristol East. One read English newspapers of the right, the centre and the left, but one was not greatly enlightened in the matter of foreign affairs. The ordinary British citizen could get no clear lead. The lecturer had said that he was not feeling so pessimistic now because Great Britain was at last finding her soul. The speaker wished that he would go to the B.B.C. within the next forty-eight hours and repeat the substance of the address which he had just delivered. England might then wake up.

LORD LOTHIAN said the problems facing Germany would increase in proportion as they started to move towards countries where there were no German minorities. The problem of the totalitarian States always became greater as they expanded. Germany's great strength hitherto had been that it had had a moral case, if not a legal case,

behind each step. It still had grievances to be remedied, but th
could probably be remedied by negotiation, especially if the pı
ciple of third party arbitration were invoked.

The central question had really been raised by the second spea
when he had asked whether it would be better to go out into a sho
in a short coat or to wait for a long coat to arrive even if it meant go
out when it was pouring cats and dogs. Assuming that at sc
time it would be necessary to face the momentum of the totalitar
Powers, at what point would it be necessary and best to do so? T
really depended on three factors: they were very difficult to foı
ulate and estimate without the information which was only at
disposal of the Government.

First, there was the question of armaments, the relative power
the country to defend itself and to counter-attack. No one was i
position to estimate the constantly varying position about this exc
the General Staff and the Government whom it advised.

The second varying factor was the strategic position. Gı
Britain had started in the post-War era in a very fine strategic positi
She had owned and controlled all the major strategic points in the wo
the Channel, Gibraltar, Cape Town, Suez, Singapore, the Falkl
Islands. Napoleon had said that all war was a struggle for positı
If you had position you did not have to fight wars. Many speak
had pointed out that the strategic position might begin to go agai
Britain, partly because past allies were being detached either forci
or otherwise, and partly because at the moment an approach was be
made by rival Powers to certain strategic positions vital to Gı
Britain, the most important of which were Spain and Egypt. There
in considering which was the time to act it was necessary to consi
whether the strategic position was changing against you more rap
than rearmament could progress.

Finally, and parallel to this, it was necessary to consider what ot
nations would co-operate not only by passing resolutions, but
contributing effective military and economic strength to the comı
cause. By waiting too long more might be lost on the strategic
allied side than might be gained on the armaments side. On
other hand by going forward ahead of your armaments and resolut
you might find that people were relying upon you, as had the Empero
Abyssinia, only to find that when the time came it was necessary to g
the order to retire instead of to fight because of lack of arms
unreadiness to fight. These questions could only be finally resolved
Government in full possession of the facts and it placed upon ther
great responsibility to give the country the right lead at the right ti

Great Britain was approaching the point where she would have
say " No " if she were ever to get back to the position of negotiat
instead of yielding to pressure. On the other hand the pract
question as to when exactly that point would be reached me
striking a balance in armaments, strategic position, and allies on e
side and this could only be done effectively by the Government.

THE ISSUES IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY [1]

IV. R. A. Butler, M.P.

I understand that this is the fourth of a series of talks on the issues in British foreign policy. I have been allowed the privilege of scanning the talks which have been given to you on this subject, and I should like to say here that I envy their erudition, and I envy also their liberty of expression, which is, alas, denied in its full extent to an Under-Secretary at the present time. But I am at least aided by your generous title, "The Issues in British Foreign Policy." This aids a member of the Government in treating this subject in the wide manner in which my predecessors have done in their talks, and it means that I need not be quite so literal here among my old friends of Chatham House as one must necessarily be in a declaration of immediate steps to be taken, that is if I were making a declaration of policy.

When I glanced at the lectures that have gone before, I was reminded of the phrase of a very wise Minister, the Swedish Oxenstierna, himself counsellor to a great leader of history, who said: "I marvel at the unwisdom with which the world is governed." This seems to me to be the burden of many of the remarks which have been addressed to you previously in this series, and I certainly am ready to accept the criticism, or implied criticism, of policy which has preceded my remarks, although not in every case. I prefer to look at this quotation in a more positive way. I prefer to look at it like this, and I believe that was the intention of the great statesman: "With how little wisdom so many human troubles could be avoided." That is very true of the task of statesmanship which lies before us to-day. One of those who has already spoken to you referred to an example of the great effect which British policy could have had if we had been able to give more help at an early stage to Dr. Brüning in Germany, and claimed that this might have avoided the rise of the present movement in Germany. I do not wish to develop that, but it just gives me an opportunity of making my first generalisation.

[1] Address given at Chatham House on April 7th, 1938; Mr. Clement Jones, C.B., in the Chair.

I want to ask whether we can in fact avoid human forces such as we see arising in Germany and other parts of the world to-day, and whether we can, as a Government or as a nation, avoid human fallibility. I think there is a great danger in attributing to British foreign policy the growth of any particular foreign situation which may have deep roots in the past, deeper than we imagine. Such an urge as that of Germany to make herself united and great, for instance, has been present throughout history. We have seen recent manifestations of it in the nineteenth century, but history goes deeper than that, and to illustrate my point may I just refer you to a classical work, Bryce's *Holy Roman Empire*. This will show how far back the roots of the troubles which we are considering go, and you will, I am sure, enjoy as I do the rather colourful language of this great work :

> "To the south-west of the green plain that girdles-in the rock of Salzburg the gigantic mass of the Untersberg frowns over the road which winds up a long defile to the glen and lake of Berchtesgaden. There the peasants of the valley point out to the traveller the black mouth of a cavern, and tell him that within Barbarossa lies amid his knights in an enchanted sleep, waiting the hour when the raven shall cease to hover around the peak, and the pear-tree blossom in the valley, to descend with his crusaders and bring back to Germany the Golden Age of peace and strength and unity."

That language, I think, illustrates to you that the word Berchtesgaden, which has featured so prominently in our discussions recently, is a word and a place which has been known for long to the students of European history. My object in reading to you this quotation is not to make your blood boil or curdle, not to raise bogeys, but simply to show the deep roots of our historical problems with which we are now faced, and the danger of ephemeral judgments in dealing with them. And I hope this may illustrate at the outset of my remarks the realistic attitude towards helping to understand the causes of foreign movements and the rise of foreign powers which has always been a preoccupation of British foreign policy.

We are nowhere more encouraged in developing this sense of realism than in our Empire. Perhaps I was fortunate that my experience in India of human realities gives my attitude towards foreign policy an imperial tinge, and I am convinced that the distribution of our Empire, its growth and its nature, determines our conduct in foreign affairs. The distribution of our Empire warns us that our interests may involve us at any time in any part of the world. Our trade routes remind us of the dependence of our industrial population on the Empire for our standard

of living. And I was very interested to read in Professor Toynbee's address that he referred to the importance of remembering in our foreign policy the industrial population which forms so large a part of the citizens of this country, and the fact that that population does depend for its standard of living, with all that that means to the British working family in the great cities, on this modern imperialism, which, as I have just tried to show, does so much affect our foreign policy.

The growth and nature of our Empire, to which I have referred, remind us of our responsibilities, which cover one quarter of the human race. In its gradually-built-up Constitution we find the system in which we believe, or, in the words of Professor Toynbee, "our system of running the world." And what does that Constitution consist in? Free speech, democratic institutions, and government for the people, of the people, by the people, a sense of toleration, fairness and justice. In fact, if you look at the Empire from any point of view, you find our own Society of Nations. I remember coming here about twelve years ago and seeing Mr. Lionel Curtis in his room upstairs, and I remember him pacing up and down the room, as those who know him know he does when he is full of thought, as indeed he usually is. He said to me: "Some of us are getting rather long in the tooth, and it is up to you to study the Empire, and to make the best of Chatham House." And he presented me with a volume that I still have, a copy of one of his diaries, kept in Australia and New Zealand, interleaved with white sheets of paper, upon which he told me to make my own notes. This still remains one of my treasured possessions. When I travelled round the Empire at that date, I remember learning one very important lesson. It was taught me, I remember, one evening in Wellington, when a delegate of New Zealand to the League of Nations told me that the Empire has gained enormously by consulting together prior to the meetings of the League. In that way the League of Nations has contributed to the solidarity of the Empire. I want to ask you whether it is too much to hope that eventually the League of Nations will profit by the Empire fostering the League idea, and trying eventually to achieve all that that idea means by the same method of gradual, slow progress by experiment that we have made in our own imperial system. This, I think, is the realistic attitude towards the League of Nations so well defined by the late Foreign Secretary at the hundredth meeting of the Council of the League of Nations last January. You remember the words used by Mr. Anthony Eden on that occasion.

"By the defection [he said] of some of its most important members, the League is now faced with the fact that the area of co-operation is restricted, and that its ability to fulfil all the functions originally contemplated for it is thereby reduced."

And he went on, after facing these facts, to outline the principles on which the League was founded. They were, he said, the promotion of international co-operation, and the achievement of international peace and security. And he added: "It seems to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom essential in these difficult times to retain what still exists." (He meant "of the League.") And he continued:

"And they do not regard their membership of the League as preventing or hindering friendly relations with non-Members, since they [that is, the Government] see no reason why such relations should involve them in any departure from the principles to which I have referred."

That was, and remains, our attitude towards the present position of the League. This statement was, I think, very excellently followed by the Dominions Secretary, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, in his speech in the House of Commons on April 4th, 1938, when he said: "We have to extend the circle of co-operation much wider than the membership of the League of Nations to-day."

This seems to me to be a positive peace policy, that of gaining the co-operation of as many nations as we possibly can, and, like the Dominions Secretary on the occasion to which I have referred, I now want to stress the importance of widening the area of co-operation, and the importance therefore of an understanding and settlement with Italy.

This is important to our imperial idea, and it is important for widening the area of co-operation to which I have just referred. It is important to the imperial idea, because the interests of Italy and this country intertwine in the most remarkable degree, throughout the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Near East. To use some words which were used at Palermo by Signor Mussolini, I think it is possible to arrive at a lasting and definite reconciliation between the highroad, which is what the Mediterranean is to us, and the life, which the Duce claimed the Mediterranean was to Italy. You will remember he used those words, "*la via e la vita*," the highroad and the life. We do sincerely believe that it is possible to come to that understanding, and we do not underrate its importance to the Empire and to British foreign policy.

I have referred to the need for realism, and the fact that our British foreign policy is guided by the fact that we are a great Empire. This Imperial conception of our policy carries

with it the need of strength. This need was best outlined by Sir Eyre Crowe in his well-known minute of January 28th, 1908, where he said, "Policy and strategical preparedness must go hand-in-hand. Failure of such harmony must lead either to military disaster or to political retreat." This interlinking of strength with policy is fully realised by His Majesty's Government; that is what prompts us in our determination to proceed with every aspect of rearmament, so that our policy may in fact be a strong one, through being based on strength. And in our policy, is it necessary to stress again the special importance of preparation in the air, and of developing the passive resistance of our population? I am convinced that our policy will be the more respected the more the undoubted determination of our people is shown.

Up till now I hope that I have shown that that realism which our Imperial history has taught us to adapt to circumstances will enable us to preserve peace, and with it the ideas to which we attach such importance. To do this I hope I have shown that it is necessary to preserve our strength. Hitherto, as one of the previous talks suggested, the power of the purse and the power of the British Navy have sufficed to maintain our position throughout our history. The problems now before us are surely these: first, the wide front of our interests, from which we see the wisdom of the Italian talks which I hope will help to regulate peace on one of our many fronts, for it is dangerous—and I cannot stress this too much—to be unsettled on all our fronts. The second problem that I see is that the Navy and the power of the purse do not, particularly in view of modern developments in aircraft, so fully ensure our position and security as in the past. I remember reading that excellent history of England by M. André Maurois, in which he refers to the development of the projectile as having a most marked effect on the development of history. He reminds us that when the short bow was invented, the Churches attempted to ban its use owing to its terrible nature. He reminds us how, shortly afterwards, the long bow was invented, which, at a distance of a hundred and sixty yards, could pin a man's leg to his horse. And he stresses this conception of the development of the projectile on history through the pages of history. The modern projectile is undoubtedly the modern military aeroplane. We may console ourselves with the old adage that the power of defence catches up with that of offence, but this is only true provided we have the material background and the determination necessary to make good any defects there

may be in our defences in this respect. We must therefore press ahead with the development of our aircraft, and use those particular industrial opportunities which we have in this country for doing so. It seems to me that the significance of these considerations, the wide front of our interests and the fact that there are modern projectiles in the world, lead us to the consideration that we must be able to honour all that we undertake in the way of commitments. The Prime Minister, in his statement on foreign affairs,[1] upon which I cannot improve, and do not wish to improve to-night, outlined those commitments. It really comes to this. We have always had interests in the Low Countries and the Channel Ports, and we have an old alliance with Portugal. These interests are very old, and are bound up with the whole of our history. The alliance with Portugal dates, for instance, from the fourteenth century. These old commitments, these old understandings, these old interests show the wisdom of our ancestors in the methods which they chose to protect our Imperial trade routes. We have since made treaties with other countries whose seaboard does not abut on ours, but which have vital geographical positions in the lay-out of our Empire. These are, for example, Egypt and Iraq. The importance of their independence and the importance of these countries to our air communications in the modern world cannot be denied. Besides those, to use the words of the Prime Minister, are other considerations:

> "Where peace and war are concerned legal obligations are not alone involved and if war broke out it would be unlikely to be confined to those who have assumed such obligations. It would be quite impossible to say where it would end and what Governments might become involved." [2]

In view of all these considerations we must supplement our old methods for assuring our security, including the use of the purse. Now, I should like to develop that aspect a little further.

Besides the ideals which I have outlined, we must try to extend economic co-operation as well as political co-operation. The commercial and financial power of the United Kingdom is such an obvious asset of national strength that we may well inquire what use we are making of this power in present circumstances. Has our financial supremacy been affected by new developments and by new inventions in the world of finance? What are we doing to maintain and to apply our power? I think I can describe it best like this. The system which prevailed

[1] *The Times*, March 25th, 1938.
[2] *loc. cit.*

up till the War was one of free imports into the world's greatest import market. It was a profitable system for traders and bankers, and the profits that resulted therefrom were invested in development at home and abroad and in the financing of current trade. This system presupposed a maximum degree of peace and confidence, and these suppositions have been absent since 1914. The attempt to reconstruct that pre-War system since 1918 has succeeded best in those parts of the world where the factors of peace and confidence prevailed between the United Kingdom and her customers, and where the United Kingdom's import market has been kept really open, as with the Dominions, or partly open to important products, as with the Scandinavian and Baltic countries. This has been the main line of our commercial policy since 1931, a modification but not a reversal of our free trade system. Owing to the growth of national systems of economics such as we see, for example, in Germany and in Russia, we no longer stand in the supreme position which we held in the end of the last century, but our import market is still the largest in the world, and therefore our influence on world commerce is still greater than that of other nations. This circle of Ottawa and the Trade Agreements countries does therefore represent a large area in which relatively free conditions of trade prevail, and where special relations with the United Kingdom are maintained by special preferences or by obligations of mutual consideration. This has both commercial and political importance. If there be any possible way of enlarging this circle, it would surely be to our political advantage to do so. And at this present time there seems good reason to hope that our negotiations with the United States will bring a most important addition to the freer trade movement. The signature of such an agreement will bring not only commercial advantages, but will also show that both the United States tariff and the British Ottawa system are capable of considerable modification in the interests of world trade. We believe that the signature of this agreement is the greatest practical contribution which the two greatest trading nations can at present make to the cause of economic appeasement. I have referred to systems of internal productivity, stressing the importance of the internal market, which exist to-day in Europe. It is not an ideal arrangement that the whole world should not be under a system of freer trade, and for every reason we would welcome a restoration of the whole European international economy, for this is what economic appeasement really means—a return to a condition where goods, money and

people can easily pass from one country to another, where their presence will be welcome and useful. These are the aims towards which the economic efforts of the League of Nations have been directed, and they are the aims of M. Van Zeeland in the report [1] which he submitted last January to the French and British Governments. This report contained the outline of a plan for the reconstruction of European economy and a suggestion that a meeting of five Powers, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Germany and Italy, should discuss the possibility of adopting it. Our Government would gladly associate themselves with such an endeavour and would contribute towards its success so far as we could without weakening our own position.

The concluding portion of my remarks will be devoted to the theme upon which I started, that we are to-day faced with new and great human forces and with what are known as ideological movements of unprecedented depth and strength. We have on our side at this critical time all the advantages and resources of our own character and of our own not inconsiderable political experience gained in the building of that imperial system to which I referred at the opening of my remarks. It is surely wiser, instead of hurling ourselves blindly against these forces, to marshal our own characteristics and to exploit and use those characteristics, particularly of toleration and balance of character, to the full. Just as we have decided, by our decision to open talks with Italy, to widen the basis of co-operation and prevent the danger of the League Powers being lined up against the dictatorship countries or, as is sometimes said, the Democracies against the Dictatorships, in a vast sort of trench warfare, just as we have refused to accept that position by our recent action, so we refuse to intervene on behalf of either ideology in Spain at the present time. We do that not only because of the practical considerations, but also because we believe that by our policy of Non-Intervention we are avoiding a really serious danger of world war in present circumstances. But we have come to that decision because it is against our own character and against the real interests of the world that we should take sides in this war of ideologies which is going on in any part of the world. I should say here that nobody realises perhaps better than I do, who have experienced some of the feeling on the other side of the House in the present controversy, how deep and sincere that feeling is. And in taking the course we do I sincerely hope that our opponents in this important matter will credit us with the same patriotic

[1] Published as a White Paper, *Cmd.* 5648 of 1938.

and sincere motives that actuate our decisions and which I propose now in general terms to defend.

It must be, I believe, our cardinal principle that our great strength and character should be used rather as a bridge between conflicting ideologies than that it should be thrown exclusively on one side. I know that this has been said both in the talks to which you have listened and in the House of Commons, and it has been said throughout our history in the words which let me borrow from Charles James Fox, " It should be the policy of this country to allow no one Power to become a danger to the liberties of Europe." Equally important is the advice of another Victorian statesman who used these words in the middle of the last century. " It is our particular interest with regard to Europe that freedom should be extended. It is a great advantage that we take part with neither of the extreme Parties that divide Europe." This attitude towards the great movements of our time carves out for us a position of unexampled importance, and should fire the imagination and command the wide support of many sections of opinion in this country. It is, as Burke said in his remarks on the policy of the Allies, the energy of foreign dictators that is so remarkable, and if our balanced view is to prevail, if we are to satisfy the legitimate demands of these strong new movements by understanding their root causes, if we are to preserve the peace, we must, in his words, " Summon to our aid a manly and a rational vigour and, as virtue is limited in its resources, we must widen the area of co-operation and feel ourselves deeply bound to use all that, in the circle thrown about us by our morals, we are able to command."

Summary of Discussion.

LORD ASTOR said that he wished to thank the lecturer as the first Minister to have taken part in a discussion of the Institute. He had also paid the audience the compliment of not addressing them as though they were his colleagues in the House of Commons, but had tried to enunciate the principles upon which the foreign policy of His Majesty's Government was based.

The speaker had read the preceding speeches and discussions on the same subject. One speaker had seemed to imply that much of the present trouble was due to happenings since 1931. The speaker's reading of history was that the present trouble had arisen from many mistakes, made first of all at Versailles and again subsequently both before 1931 as well as after 1931. He supported entirely the policy which the lecturer had enunciated, the policy of limited commitments and of only undertaking that which could be carried through in the event of necessity. In giving pledges His Majesty's Government

were determined to see what their resources were, which must surely mean not only their own defensive forces, but also consultation with the other great self-governing nations which made up the British Empire. It was also in the interests of His Majesty's Government to maintain good relations with the democracies on the North Sea and the Baltic. The importance of maintaining, through commercial policies, the benevolent neutrality through prosperity of these small democracies had not always been realised in recent years.

The speaker had recently visited the United States of America. He had found that the conscience of people in the United States was disturbed. They realised the part played by Great Britain during the past two hundred years in maintaining the peace of the world. They realised that the days of the two-Power naval standard had gone never to be re-established. They realised that although Great Britain would be a powerful contributory factor for maintaining peace, she could never again be able, single-handed, by her influence to ensure peace as she had been able to do in the past. And so he had found people asking themselves whether, and if so to what extent, and how and when, the United States should take some part. That was the reason why conflicting reports were constantly coming concerning what the United States would do or would not do to preserve order. She did not know herself. American opinion was being moulded. There was an increasing appreciation that she was suffering from a slump not because she had been implicated in the War, but because there had been a World War in 1914, and that therefore it was in American interests, as well as other interests, to prevent another World War. The speaker had said in a debate in the House of Lords that support would be found in the United States for the policy of Lord Halifax and the Government. Someone had disagreed, saying that he had received a cable from someone lecturing in that country expressing their complete contempt for the Government's policy. The speaker thought that anyone who felt deeply for or against the policy of the present Government and went to speak in the United States would receive some support for his speech because public opinion was uninstructed—but it was deeply interested in what was happening. Personally he had found a great deal of support for his explanation of what the present Prime Minister and Government were trying to do.

The next big issue to be decided was whether it was possible for democracies to live in harmony with dictatorships. The speaker had purposely not used the words peace-loving nations, he preferred to divide them into democracies and dictatorships. He did not believe that any country wanted war. The invention of the air arm and the long-range bomber would make Germany far more reluctant than she had been in 1870 or 1914 to start another Great War, when she had been able to contemplate the possibility of fighting the war on enemy territory. It could now be seen by looking at the map that the only European country which would be very difficult to bomb would be Russia, because of the creation of new munition works in Siberia.

Since the end of the War there had been two groups of people in Germany and in Great Britain. One group thought that war between the two countries was inevitable, while the other thought that it was possible for them to live in harmony. The situation to-day was more difficult than it had been even six months ago, and much more difficult than one or two years ago, but that should not make Great Britain mould her foreign policy in the belief that war between herself and Germany was inevitable. The speaker did not believe that a war between Great Britain and Germany was inevitable every fifteen or twenty years, because, if so, sooner or later one would have to be annihilated. Great Britain had been a little inconsistent in the way in which she had received offers of peaceful co-operation during the last few years. Herr Hitler on more than one occasion had held out the hand of peace, but Great Britain had said that she did not believe he meant peace, whatever he said. On the other hand, when England had been assured that the old Communist policy of world revolution still existed, she said that she did not accept this, but believed that the Soviet influence was for peace, though this was not borne out by their diplomacy. It was necessary to see whether some way could not be found whereby democracies could live harmoniously with dictatorships, whether Fascist or Communist. In the past Great Britain had been apt to treat Germany as if she were inferior and must be kept inferior. The time for this was over. The difficulty now might be to make Germany realise that Great Britain was at least her equal, so that negotiations between the two countries might be negotiations on a basis of strength and not weakness.

Concerning the League of Nations, it was to be hoped that all in the room were in favour of the principle of international co-operation, but it was also to be hoped that they would agree that the only chance of maintaining alive the organisation which had been set up was not to over-tax it at this moment. Periodically Great Britain was faced with industrial strife. This danger was often removed by consultation and without coercion. The speaker refused to believe that if, for a time, the League became an instrument for consultation, and not coercion, it would not in effect be a powerful force for peace. Personally, when other nations were ready to do so, he would be quite prepared to contemplate a reconstruction of the constitution of the League whereby it might become more of a Federation; but until that day arrived he did hope that the risk would not be run of breaking down the League machinery by expecting it, with its present unsatisfactory constitution and composition, to solve all the hitherto insoluble problems of the world.

The speaker thanked the lecturer not only for creating a precedent by addressing the meeting as a Minister, but also for the quality of his address.

MR. BERNARD SHAW said that he was taking the platform rather because this seemed to be expected of him than because he had anything of any great importance to say.

The lecturer had mentioned ideological movements. To the speaker a policy was necessarily an ideological movement. If it were not an ideological movement, then it was not a policy. The course which the lecturer had outlined for Great Britain to take in the face of these movements, which so far as he had any feeling about them he seemed to regret, was the characteristically British course of not joining in. We were to watch these movements and make bridges between them. This phrase, making bridges, was new to the speaker, and would probably be very useful to political speakers in the future. He did not know what it meant. But if Great Britain was not going to represent an ideological movement of any kind, there was nothing for her to fall back upon except stupidity, which was the mightiest and perhaps the safest of all the Powers.

It had been pointed out by Lord Astor that British diplomacy since the Treaty of Versailles had been a series of mistakes. (Hear, hear.) Was the gentleman who had said, hear, hear, exulting in that fact? Great Britain had not, however, been alone in this matter. The policy of France had not been one of unmixed wisdom. This being so, it was a very fortunate thing that the League of Nations had never attempted to carry out the objects for which it had been created, because if it had, there would have been a condition of continual war throughout Europe. This was the most cheerful view to take of the inactivity of the League of Nations.

Of course, the lecturer had spoken of democracy, freedom, etc., with the conventional assumption that they existed in Great Britain but not in the dictatorship countries. The speaker was over eighty, and had been taking part in politics to some extent for the last sixty or seventy years; and he had yet to meet with actual democracy. People spoke of the energy of dictators. They were probably no more energetic than many specimens which Great Britain could produce; but the secret of their effectiveness was that they had power. They therefore had responsibility, and could do their work because they were not prevented by the British Parliamentary system. This system we always spoke of as if it really gave public opinion supreme power, and vested that power in the Cabinet. Its real power was one of almost unlimited obstruction and delay. For that long period of life to which the speaker had already referred there had been a general demand in the West of England for building another bridge over the Severn. A dictator would satisfy this demand in six months. We had waited sixty years, only to discover that we must either do without our bridge or do without Parliament. It was necessary to look facts in the face; but democratic Cabinets never looked anything in the face. And it was remarkable that as far as they had different opinions, they never seemed to communicate them to one another. From Charles Dickens to Oswald Mosley there was a long string of close observers of Parliament warning us that the Parliamentary system was the most complete system for preventing anything from being done until in the course of nature it absolutely had to be done; and even then it was only half done after a very long delay. Only the other day the supremely absurd step had

been taken of allowing Parliamentary opposition and obstruction to be officially organised, even to the length of making the leader of the Opposition a factor in the Constitution. There was Mr. Chamberlain, whose business it was to govern the country. Lest he should do anything, which was the one thing of which everybody was afraid, Mr. Attlee was to receive two thousand pounds a year to prevent him from doing it.

Mr. Attlee represented the Labour Party in Great Britain. The speaker knew a good deal about the Labour Party; and the one thing which had always characterised it was that whereas you could get it to voice its immediate interests, and even formulate a programme on internal affairs, it could never be induced to pay the slightest attention to foreign policy, except when as a party of Peace it was clamouring for three or four wars. And even in the Socialist change-over in domestic policy it was being outwitted. At the beginning of the Socialist movement the great capitalists and financiers had been in favour of the *laissez-faire* Governments who never meddled with industry. The Fabian Society and other similar bodies had demonstrated the necessity for Government control. The Labour Party, however, had gained only incidental advantages from this; whilst the capitalists, financiers and great industrialists soon discovered that it was a splendid thing for themselves! Whereas previously they had only had their own resources, they now found that through the doctrines of the Fabian Society they could make a merit of exploiting the taxpayer as well as the employee. To-day they did not dream of building a liner without Government help, nor of excavating a seam of coal except as a Public Utility enterprise. The big capitalists were exploiting Socialism, and developing it into a thing called Fascism. There was no longer the old Liberal opposition to Government interference: on the contrary, the whole power which had always been on the side of private property and private enterprise in Great Britain was now for extensive State interference which so far the Labour Party had been unable to handle. All this made things exceedingly difficult in the Labour Party. There were deep divisions of opinion between Trade Unionism and Socialism. There were, however, also divisions of opinion in the governing classes. There was a strong leaning towards Fascism in some directions and on the other hand a great dislike and dread of Fascism. Meanwhile events were on the march. The dictators were outdoing us in all directions. We needed a parliamentary system in which, when after whatever discussion might be necessary it had been decided to do something, the Opposition must step down and out, and the job be given to some personally responsible Minister without any party nonsense. Otherwise we should never keep up with foreign Fascism and Communism.

The speaker hoped that he had made his position clear. At least it was as clear as the position of the British Government.

LORD ALLEN OF HURTWOOD said that he did not know whether to be more sorry for himself or for his audience in having to speak after

Mr. Bernard Shaw. He would, however, make some attempt to return to the subject of international affairs.

It was difficult to say anything of importance within the necessary limitation of time imposed upon all speakers. But there was also another difficulty which he felt had characterised the whole of the recent discussions on this subject. It was far easier for critics of His Majesty's Government to state their case in public discussion than for those who supported the Government to make use without restraint of the arguments which were relevant to proving their case. He would, however, do his best.

There had been one outstanding defect characterising all the previous three discussions on the present and future of British foreign policy. There had been too much concentration of attention upon the doctrine and theory of the League, and upon proving intellectually that collective defence was the best—indeed the only—defence left in the modern world, particularly for the British Empire. Too much attention had been given to historical surveys, demonstrating that British policy since the time of Queen Elizabeth had been this, that or the other. Too much time had been spent in prophesying an inevitable series of events leading to war which must follow, if certain steps were either taken or not taken. He suggested that, however much anyone might be an adherent of the League of Nations, as he was himself, there were to-day three overriding considerations which must be faced and answered before any decision upon theory or policy could be made. First there was the problem of British military power, a very difficult question to discuss in public, but a very vital subject for consideration when either the theory or practice of the League of Nations was under review. Secondly, there was the question of the military power of other nations. To what extent could Great Britain rely, either upon the military support or the diplomatic *bona fides* of such a country as Russia at this critical moment? And what was the bearing of this problem of military power upon any particular geographical area where disputes or dangers might arise?

Next, unhappily, the law of Europe had developed inadequate moral foundation during the last eighteen years. From the time of Versailles and in subsequent events the League had been founded upon a law the quality of whose justice was not satisfactory. This had led not only to the new outbursts of immorality which were now occurring, but had caused France to enter into commitments which were a result of unfortunate policy on her part and on the part of Great Britain during the last ten years.

Thirdly, the present League of Nations was not the League, so far as its membership and authority were concerned, which they had desired. The condition of the League to-day was partly due to the policy of His Majesty's Government. However blame might be apportioned, the fact remained that the League, to-day, was not able in certain geographical areas to carry the responsibilities which theoretically it was desirable to place upon it. Therefore these three factors—the problem of military power, the degree of morality of the

law, and the state of the League—were the three over-riding considerations which must be taken into account before speaking of doctrine, theory, history or prophecy.

With these factors in mind, ought Great Britain to go beyond the statement of the Prime Minister in clarifying her commitments in advance of a possible crisis? Without hesitation he, personally, thought not. Sometimes it was argued by distinguished authorities that there was an analogy between to-day and 1914. It was said that if Great Britain had made her intentions absolutely clear in 1914 she would have averted the Great War, and that the position was the same in 1938. He suggested it was not. In 1914 there had been no grave question mark overhanging the problem of military power. Aviation had not become a terrific major uncertainty. It had to-day. Therefore, if now British commitments were to be clarified, in view of the truth about the military situation, far from deterring the aggressor, he might be provoked. The speaker believed it possible for the democracies of the modern world to win a war, but he was not so sure that by clarifying the situation they could deter the aggressor and thereby prevent a war.

The speaker believed that the Italian negotiations were a vital necessity at the present moment. They might produce tangible results, but even if they produced only intangible results, these might be of immense importance by bringing a new psychology into the relationship first of Great Britain and the dictatorship Powers, and secondly in the relationship of the dictatorship Powers to each other. It should always be remembered that there was a far more permanent and rational tradition binding the democracies to each other than could ever exist between dictatorships, based as they were upon the chances of personal power politics; and this was true whether the régime in question were that of Stalin, Hitler or Mussolini. The Italian negotiations at the moment represented the desire of Great Britain to be friendly with all nations, if that were possible. But should that prove impossible benefit might accrue so far as Europe was concerned in a new orientation of policy between the dictator countries, while the attempt to reach a new peace settlement for Europe would commend Britain in the eyes of the United States of America.

The present crisis could not be discussed as though it were an academic problem of what to do or what not to do with an institution called the League. The present immediate critical situation could only be considered in terms of the very difficult military and political background to which he had referred. It was necessary to see how a transitional policy might be developed in order to meet a transitional position.

Finally, it was vitally necessary for new attempts to be made, in spite of all the difficulties in the way, to ascertain how the United States could be brought nearer to Europe in the organisation of the peace of the world. If the speaker had to pay a certain price concerning the constitution of the League in order to achieve that notable object,

he would now pay it. Indeed, he would prefer a membership of the League which would enable action to be taken even without obligations, rather than see action prevented by the retention of obligations.

Meantime the inevitability of war should not be prophesied so frequently and with such emphasis, lest in assuming an inevitable war in the future an immediate war in the present should be precipitated.

THE RT. HON. A. V. ALEXANDER said that concerning the remarks of the second speaker, as he came from the very, very working class, having worked since he was thirteen years of age, and having had no education but that of the elementary school, he had a much more profound faith in the power of the British Parliamentary system than had that speaker. He had seen in the course of fifty years such a change in the social conditions of his people that he believed that in this direction more progress had been made in Great Britain than in any country in the world in which he had travelled. This, to him, was a fairly good measure of the success of any governmental system.

As a member of the Opposition, the speaker felt obliged to the lecturer for his very careful and very true presentation of the Government's point of view concerning the issues in British Foreign Policy at the present time, although he had listened to those arguments frequently lately, and had become very used to them. But he regarded the views presented as entirely false in the present terribly serious and grave situation. So desperate was the danger of Great Britain being involved in the struggles now taking place elsewhere that something should be done immediately to try to stem the tide. Probably at this very moment the future of one's children was being decided on the battlefields of Spain. Although some people might imagine that a possible deal with Mussolini at present might avert further danger of new threats to Great Britain's Empire communications, it was necessary to consider that though Mussolini might be willing to come to some agreement because he felt nervous about the presence of the German Army on the Brenner Pass and the necessity for Hitler to collect a "dividend" for his people, the very fact of the agreement with Mussolini might precipitate the danger which would have to be met from Central Europe.

When the speaker thought of the way in which Great Britain had drifted for the last six years until she had arrived at the present situation, he felt almost broken-hearted. For he did believe, and he was not theorising, that if the nation had so instructed its leaders that they had been impelled to adopt and support the policy of collective security, it would not now be facing the immediate danger existing in Europe. The lecturer had said that it was necessary to be friendly with nations who were not necessarily Members of the League, but this should not lead to the adoption of such a policy that the friendship of those nations already in the League would be lost. When it was said that Britain must be strong, and that therefore she must rearm, the speaker felt, not without experience and responsibility and after naval negotia-

tion with Mussolini, that even though Great Britain continued with her rearmament programme intensively for the next three years, relatively, compared with the strength of the rest of the world, she would be then in no better position to maintain her national and imperial security than she had been in 1931, when she had first begun to shirk her responsibilities under the Covenant of the League.

Now that it was necessary to rearm, how was this to be done? The lecturer had referred to "the power" of the purse and the British Navy. Was it to be *merely* the power of the purse and of the British Navy? The question to-day was: could the country, in her rearmament, rely upon the millions of really intelligent and educated working men and women? Nothing had been said on this side by the lecturer. Great attempts had been made during the last weeks by the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence to secure industrial unity. When those who held the same views as the speaker had been appealed to for national unity during the last few weeks, they had replied that the unity and support would be forthcoming if the Government would adopt a foreign policy based upon collective security, and involving if necessary economic and military sanctions as well as legal action to ensure peace. But they had been calmly put on one side by the Government, and the consequence was that with the absence of any policy of collective security to-day, they were not getting the united and enthusiastic support from the working class for the very creation of the strength for which the lecturer had pleaded. It was doubtful whether it would be forthcoming.

The second speaker had spoken as if the solution must be one or other of the ideologies, either Communism or Fascism. The speaker had always hoped, as had his colleagues, that in internal affairs and social questions there would be the same opportunities for peaceful change as had been hoped for in the international field. He believed that the class from which he came and of which he was so proud, loved their country and loved peace. They wanted a constructive peace, but they were not prepared to lend themselves to a policy which they believed would not save them from war, but would lead them to recurrent struggles such as had been going on now for the last two or three hundred years.

If the Government to-day wanted a really united people to work for the construction of peace, they could have it if they would adopt the policy of collective security, would advocate it at Geneva and as a first step towards it would pool all the military, naval, air and economic resources of those nations who were prepared to stand vigorously together and face the consequences.

MR. VICTOR RAIKES said that as a back bencher in the House of Commons he could say exactly what he liked.

The fourth speaker had said that Great Britain might lose the friendship and co-operation of present League Members through the policy pursued by the present Government. Could he substantiate this

statement? The Prime Minister had defined his policy on the previous Thursday evening. On the Friday morning every newspaper in the land had had the headlines: Premier Speaks. Hailed by the Whole of Europe.

The second speaker had said that he did not know what a democracy was. He had also said that for sixty or seventy years he had taken part in public life. Had he not been living in a democracy he would not have been permitted to do so, but would have eked out his life in a concentration camp or spent his time making a beautiful confession in the Courts of Moscow. The real difference between dictatorship and democracy was that dictators, through being what they were, had no sense of humour and did not like those who had.

Then the second speaker had said that there could be no policy unless it were based on one ideology or other. Therefore, the only thing to fall back upon was stupidity. The Party to which the speaker belonged considered that to take any part in any of the rival ideologies now so popular on the continent was to fall into the very pit of stupidity itself.

Concerning the policy of the Government, there were only three possible policies. Firstly there was the policy of a formal alliance of the democratic League Powers. Down in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe there were a good many League Powers who were not democracies, so an alliance between the democratic League Powers must mean an alliance between Great Britain, France, though she was a strange kind of democracy at the moment, Czechoslovakia, the Scandinavian Powers, who were little fitted to fight at present, and perhaps Russia! The only possible result of such a combination would be to fight a triple alliance of the totalitarian States on their ground and in their own time. In that case there would certainly be war before the year was out. The second policy would be to drift along allowing France and Russia on the one hand and Germany and Italy on the other to drift gradually further and further apart, and the explosion would come at some future time. The third policy, and the one being pursued at the moment, was to try to avoid driving the nations of Europe into two opposite camps, to try to make friends with the Powers inside the League, democracies or otherwise, to try to make friends with those outside the League, showing them that peace was in their own interests because peace was in the interest of nearly every nation in the world, first of all Great Britain and France, then Great Britain and Italy, Italy and France if possible, and then, and then only, from strength, would it be possible to treat with Germany. In these circumstances it was very possible that Germany would be willing to come into a peace front and give up the idea of dominating Europe, but the only way to show her that she was not strong enough to dominate that continent was to concentrate on weakening her potential allies, instead of throwing down the glove now and making it a straight fight between Democracy and Fascism in Europe. This might fail, but was it not worth trying to get the nations of Europe to follow Great Britain in a peaceful settlement, rather than to insist upon a preventive war every

fifteen or twenty years and start having a war with the dictators, above all at a time when Great Britain was not fully rearmed? If it should be necessary to fight, it would be better to fight when Great Britain was strong and had as many allies as possible. But another Great War would mean the end of Western civilisation. For this reason the speaker supported the policy of the lecturer, and considered that the Prime Minister, criticised as he was to-day, might yet go down to history as the greatest peace-maker of his time.

SIR FRANCIS LINDLEY said that the fourth speaker had mentioned collective security as if it were a thing which had been abandoned in 1931. He had been abroad continuously since the War until 1934, and could say from his conversations with many foreigners of experience that collective security had never existed, and there had never been the slightest sign even of its beginning to exist. The people of Great Britain had great experience in internal affairs. They had more political sense concerning their own affairs than the people of any country in which the speaker had lived; and it was, therefore, only natural that they should judge foreign affairs as they judged their own internal affairs. But the two were as the Poles apart. The Opposition invariably spoke as if the League of Nations were a British institution. It was not, and it never had been. It was an international institution; and Great Britain was only one of many countries which belonged to it. It was ridiculous to think that the others would follow any lead given by Great Britain to defend her Empire and what foreigners considered to be her own interests. On the contrary, her proposals were usually received with scepticism. Far from the League of Nations being considered as the symbol of a new world order, the speaker had never met a foreigner, except two or three who had never had anything to do with foreign affairs, who believed anything of the kind. Such an idea had been entirely confined to Great Britain, and the speaker blamed every Government since 1919 for not informing the people as to the true feeling about the League abroad. The present situation was the result of the fact that for eighteen years the people of Great Britain had believed in a state of affairs which had never existed. If the League was a real safeguard, why should France have concluded the alliances which she had in order to guard herself from attack? The French had not shared our illusion for a moment.

The speaker wished to associate himself with the third speaker in saying how difficult it was for supporters of the Government to state the case fully. Those who criticised the Government's policy at such a time or who threw out extraordinary suggestions for some action were taking upon themselves a very heavy responsibility. As the third speaker had said, at such a time the first considerations must be military. It was always necessary to see that diplomacy did not go ahead of military strength, which maxim had been consistently disregarded since 1918. Now the situation was critical and no good would be done by exciting the active animosity of those stronger than oneself.

PROFESSOR SIR ALFRED ZIMMERN said that the course of the discussion had made him even more anxious than he had been before: for it had revealed how deep was the division in public opinion at a moment when unity was essential in the face of danger. It would be impertinent to praise the literary quality of the speaker's address: nor could they expect him, as a Minister, to signalise his acceptance of their invitation by making a breach with long-established custom in conveying information on matters which the Prime Minister had left in obscurity. Before coming to the meeting the speaker had put himself two questions: first, was time working for Great Britain or against her? Secondly, was it the view of the Government that Great Britain and the British Empire had still a vital interest in preventing the hegemony of any one Power over the continent of Europe? This had been considered a vital interest over many centuries, but it might be that the balance of forces had changed and that other considerations were now more important.

The speech of Mr. Alexander had made it clear what a powerful current of feeling existed in the country against the policy of the Government. Whether this included 60 per cent. or only 40 per cent. of the voters, it was a very serious phenomenon at such a time as the present. If an emergency occurred it might be a catastrophe if it found us divided. What should be done? It had been said by Lord Allen and others that the military issues were so grave that nothing must be said about them. But democracy could not survive in the world of to-day unless their Governments developed habits of greater frankness with the mass of the people. Why should they not be told the details concerning the military strength to which the third speaker had referred? In other countries, such as France and Switzerland, arguments on such matters were current coin. A Government which shirked discussion on such issues prevented itself from receiving adequate criticism. In the United States it was customary for the President himself to receive newspaper correspondents to give them official information. The old prejudices about publicity which existed in Great Britain must be swept away if the kind of national effort required and essential was to be obtained. Whenever the crisis came it would have to be faced by the whole population of the United Kingdom, and they had a right to know very much more than they did at present. They would never get the degree of national effort necessary and essential unless the people were told a great deal more, as could be done, for instance, through the use of the wireless, about the strategic and other factors which were important considerations in foreign policy.

MR. A. V. BURBURY said that he had listened with admiration, in every sense of that word, to the distinguished visitor's skilled, able and pernicious exposition. Pernicious, because red herrings had been drawn over every vital point. It was as though the lecturer were embodying the post-Eden policy and endeavouring to defend it against the previous policy, against the ghost of Lord Cecil who had demanded

that His Majesty's Government should place all their armed forces at the League's disposal and concert lightning plans with other States against any aggressor. It seemed hopelessly late to propose this.

This was the day of new so-called ideologies and of the emergence of the State as God. An early revolutionary idea, that all men's souls were equal before God and that inequalities would be compensated in heaven, had brought down the world's greatest empire, although it was held only by despised Christian aliens in the slums of Rome. The World War had spread the new revolutionary idea that all men had a right to equal opportunities and comforts here and now, irrespective of their birth, wealth or privileges : heaven would not do, when they had seen God in all his cults divided against himself in the War. And this idea threatened to bring down this civilisation and cast us into new Dark Ages, aided by gas bombs and starvation. The State was the new God that was to give to all alike equal opportunities and comforts.

The speaker did not advocate a Hitler–Mosley England, but just as Great Britain must arm amid armed States, so she must adjust and rationalise her system to compete with the nationalised foreign trade of totalitarian States. The need was for a solid long-term policy at last. Lord Cecil had shown clearly how His Majesty's Government had for years progressively abandoned its lip-serve League policy at every crisis. It was not too late to redeem our broken pledges, but Great Britain's form of concession to the totalitarian spirit had been a one-party government for the last twenty years, with what lamentable results the whole debate showed.

But all Great Britain's kind of liberty and success had been obtained through the alternating government of the two-party system, with the weight in policy-making allowed to the Opposition—despite Mr. Bernard Shaw's scorn this was a most important factor, as Mr. Alexander had confirmed. It was time that we got away from our present one-party government, which dismissed a Foreign Secretary without consulting the people, and had a strong, intelligent and experienced Left Government. With that it would be possible at last to establish a really agreed policy with socialistic France, without which agreement neither country could survive. The Left swing of the electorate in Fulham on the previous day seemed to show that the country felt sick of the autocratic drift of the present Government.

MR. BUTLER said that whatever criticism there might have been, he had at least provided the opportunity for a first-class discussion. There had been strong criticism and strong support, and it could hardly have been possible to obtain more diverse and definite opinions.

He had realised that he was coming to a forum of discussion and criticism, but he had wished to show that an Under-Secretary, with all the limitations imposed upon him, was able, desirous and willing to come to discuss these matters openly and in a friendly manner. He would certainly take back all the impressions which he had been able

to gain, one of the most important of which would be the statement of the seventh speaker, which he would discuss with his friends.

The lecturer was pleased to find that he had not been misinterpreted at all. He had been called stupid, but that was not a misinterpretation when applied to an Englishman. It was difficult to be anything but complimented when one was bowled over by the second speaker in company with the British Constitution, the Labour Party, the Parliamentary Opposition and the whole Parliamentary system. The lecturer said that he would note the different arguments raised in the debate, when he could read them again, as carefully as he hoped the audience would read his statement again. On a second reading he thought it would be possible to distinguish those inner guiding principles of our foreign policy upon which he had been invited to lecture.

The fourth speaker had raised a point to which the lecturer attached a great deal of importance: the need at the present moment for remembering the vast industrial population of Great Britain. In his speech he had mentioned this, and in connection with it the new imperialism which was so vital to its life. Before coming to the Foreign Office he had had the privilege of being at the Ministry of Labour, where he had gained a small knowledge of industrial conditions in the country. The Government attached the greatest importance to the co-operation of industry, and they sincerely believed that by widening by practical steps the basis of co-operation a real and deep significance for collective security would be attained which would be appreciated by the practical sense of the work people of industry. The lecturer was sure that when they had seen the new policy working, gradually a faith in the Government's policy would come to many of the audience and if given a chance he was sure that policy would achieve something real and lasting for the peace of Europe and of the world.

THE FUTURE OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY[1]

By PROFESSOR H. N. FIELDHOUSE

A DISCUSSION of the future of British Foreign Policy may very well begin from two recent dicta by Sir Norman Angell and Sir Alfred Zimmern.

In discussing Mr. J. L. Garvin's suggestion that Britain should acquiesce in the reconstruction of Danubian Europe under German leadership, Sir Norman pointed out that " those who previously [before 1914] described so luridly the dangers of German power, now tell us that an enormously strong German Mitteleuropa, dominating the Continent . . . does not constitute a menace to our defence " ; and he went on to add : " Capacity to change one's opinions in the light of new facts is proof of wisdom far too rare in our changing world. But conscious and deliberate change of policy and opinion is very different from an unnoticed slipping from one policy to an entirely opposed one, without thinking why the change is made. . . ."

Professor Zimmern's dictum was as follows : " It seems that there are two sets of people in the room [at Chatham House] : those who can think American and those who cannot. The latter are irritated by American policy. They also, for no particular reason, write off France and they forget the British Dominions. Thus they see this country isolated in the world. . . . "

The purpose of this paper is to suggest that the reasons which move some of us to believe that Britain can no longer take the attitude towards the possibility of a German Mitteleuropa which she took in 1914, are entirely " conscious and deliberate " and have been reached " in the light of new facts," and that among those facts is the realisation that Britain is virtually " isolated in the world," since " thinking American " is unlikely to win her American support, and since she really has " particular reasons to forget (at least one of) the Dominions."

It is, of course, true that at any time between 1688 and 1918 Britain would have resisted the domination of the Continent by

[1] Summary of paper read by Professor H. N. Fieldhouse before the Winnipeg Branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in February 1938.

any Power which might, of its own will, occupy the Channel ports or make the Mediterranean impracticable for British shipping. We can go farther, and say that on those occasions on which Britain has intervened to avert the domination of such a Power, her intervention in support of the balance has been decisive. What made her intervention decisive, however, was her naval power, and what enabled her to use her naval power so decisively in Europe was the fact that her naval rivals were themselves in Europe. For three hundred years before 1914 the only considerable naval Powers were all to be found in Europe, and, in consequence, so long as Britain held the seas round Europe, she could bottle up her opponent in his home ports, deny him access to the overseas world, and herself draw freely upon the resources of that world. Under these conditions, the adhesion of Britain to a European coalition meant, in practice, the adhesion of the whole world outside Europe.

Since 1918 this situation has completely changed. The great naval Powers are no longer confined to Europe. They have, so to speak, escaped from Europe, and therefore from British control, and, in the shape of the United States and Japan, lie strategically on flank and rear of British trade routes and empire. The far-reaching implications of this change will probably make themselves felt increasingly as time goes on, but we have already had a foretaste of them in the last two years, when we have seen British diplomacy largely immobilised by being distracted between Europe and the Far East. It is too much to hope that in any future European struggle Britain will be able to reckon on the friendship of both the great extra-European naval Powers, and it is only too likely that she will be faced with the hostility of one and be the object of, shall we say, the benevolent distrust of the other. The hostility of either or both Japan and the United States would paralyse historic British strategy, for it would make it impossible for Britain to bring the whole pressure of her naval power to bear upon her European enemy. In short, Britain has hitherto been a decisive element in the continental balance of power because her overseas empire has been safe behind the naval cordon which she could draw around Europe. Henceforth she may have to choose between the maintenance of a continental balance, and that of a world balance, and a Britain distracted by the independent action of Japan or of the United States may have to permit developments in Europe which the older Britain could safely have opposed.

We must remember, secondly, that in modern times Continental

Europe has not been able, of itself, to resist the hegemony of its strongest Power. The Europe of 1814 could not have broken Napoleon had it not had the support of non-continental Britain, and the Europe of 1914 could not have broken Germany had it not had the support of the overseas British Commonwealth and of the United States. Germany could not have been beaten, the present balance of power on the Continent could not have been set up, and the present frontiers on the Continent could not have been drawn, save for the decisive intervention of the Commonwealth and the United States. How far can the overseas members of the Commonwealth or the United States be counted upon to maintain a continental balance and continental frontiers which could not have been established without their aid?

No intelligent man will dogmatise about the future of American policy. This, however, can be said with certainty : that although the United States is immeasurably bigger, immeasurably more populous and powerful, and immeasurably less exposed to danger, than Britain, practically all Americans expect Britain to take the lead in the direction of their common purposes, and, if that lead is not forthcoming, regard themselves as being absolved from doing anything at all. Professor Zimmern invites us to " think American." Life lived in Canada gives one assiduous practice in this art, but what kind of American are we to think? For in this matter America is not one. Liberal Americans are apt to call on Britain to devote herself to the cause of collective security under the ægis of the League, which means, in effect, that they call on her to run the risk of war with Germany, Italy and Japan. Englishmen reply that they cannot run this appalling risk unless they have the certainty of American support; whereupon isolationist Americans complain that they are being asked to pull British chestnuts out of the fire.

In this question of support for the League there are, roughly, four American attitudes. The first is that of those Americans who inherit a sour suspicion of Britain as such, and more Americans are infected by this temper than the English visitor to the United States may be allowed to suspect. How little support a British lead towards collective security would receive from Americans of this type was shown in the Abyssinian affair, when they simultaneously denounced Britain for not doing enough in support of the League, and decried what Britain did do for the League as being dictated purely by her imperialist designs.

The second attitude is that of the isolationists, who insist that never again, and in no circumstances whatsoever, should the

United States become involved in Europe's wars. Clearly there is no support for a British lead at Geneva here.

The third attitude, that of many American liberals, is simply the reflection, in this particular field, of the unfortunate North American habit of urging someone else to take risks which you have no intention of running yourself. It can be very fairly summed up in the question put to me by a prominent American in Chicago some fourteen months ago. "Why does not Britain take the lead," he said, "in an anti-Fascist bloc in Europe? You would be certain of our moral support."

The fourth attitude is that of those informed Americans who realise that Britain has long been America's first line of defence, and that a world from which she had disappeared as a first-class Power would become an increasingly unpleasant place for the United States. Americans who hold this view believe that if Britain were on the brink of serious defeat, the United States would be compelled by self-interest to come to her rescue; and there are Canadians who argue that this possibility of an ultimate American intervention should be a sufficient assurance to encourage Britain to lead a League crusade in Europe.

Let us examine this argument. Britain is to follow a policy which will lead her into another Anglo-German war, and, this time, with Italy and Japan very probably on Germany's side. When Britain is at the point of destruction—and not before—the United States will intervene. Now, the only certainty about a war so waged would be that Britain would be the loser. The intervention of the United States at the eleventh hour might give military victory to the British side, but it would be a victory even more pyrrhic than that of 1918. It would leave Europe, and with Europe the economic life of Britain, shattered for the second time in thirty years, and it would reproduce, intensified to a degree, all the phenomena of 1918: the sale of British securities to the United States, the incurring of British debt to the United States, the transference of naval and financial and commercial power from London to Washington, the mounting of unemployment and the dislocation of our whole economic structure. The only kind of American intervention which could save Europe would be an intervention so immediate as to ensure that the war should be short. An intervention delayed until Britain was on the verge of defeat would not avert Europe's economic collapse, and if such a collapse took place, it would matter little who was proclaimed the military victor. It would be better for Britain to suffer a military defeat which would bring home to our population the very real

decline in our power, and so prepare the way for an adjustment of our policies to that decline, rather than that the decline should be concealed and the adjustment postponed by an illusion of victory created by a belated intervention by America.

Thinking American, then, is apt to mean thinking in a circle. Britain is to be told that she can only win American sympathy if she pursues certain policies in Europe, but those policies are precisely the ones upon which she dare not embark unless she has the certainty of American support. If she consents to pursue them, the hostility of Germany, Italy and Japan is certain: the support of the United States will admittedly either not be given at all, or be given only at the eleventh hour.

Professor Zimmern's second complaint was that some of us forget the Dominions. Whether British policy should "forget" the other Dominions, is a question upon which I am not qualified to speak, but there are certain good grounds why it should "forget" Canada. For Anglo-Canadian relations are running in much the same circle as Anglo-American relations. Canadian supporters of collective security tell us that Britain can only expect Canadian support if she devotes herself to Geneva, but they are quite unable to promise that if Britain does devote herself to Geneva, Canada will support her with anything more effective than applause. As Senator Dandurand once told Geneva, "In this association of mutual insurance against fire, the risks assumed by the different States are not equal. We Canadians live in a fire-proof house, far from inflammable materials. A vast ocean separates us from Europe."

It should always have been clear that, in the long run, Dominion Nationalism must make a common Commonwealth foreign policy impossible; but instead of admitting this fact, our supporters of collective security tried to retain the advantages of Dominion independence and yet keep a finger in the British pie, by dragging in the League as a *deus ex machina*, and producing the formula that Canada and Britain could only have a common policy if they both subordinated their policies to the League. Now, some of us in Canada have always felt that this formula dodged the question.

In the first place, the Canadians who used it had never thought out what devotion to League policies meant in terms of Canada's liability to go to war. Devotion to the League, between 1920 and 1930, cost nothing. What was to happen if the League should ever have to be defended in arms? In Canada, even more than in Britain, our supporters of the League had never really considered what their obligations under the Covenant involved.

They regarded their adherence to the League simply as an act of moral affirmation, a declaration in favour of peace and against war. When asked what they would do if a Great Power should defy the League, they invariably evaded the issue by asserting that economic sanctions would suffice to deter an aggressor. I had myself a striking example of the extent to which the mental reservation involved in the device of economic sanctions could be used to enable men to make the best of both the isolationist and Covenant worlds. At the height of the Abyssinian crisis, a prominent member of the Winnipeg League of Nations Society was urging that Britain should go to all lengths against Italy. I asked him whether he was prepared to see Canada do likewise. After some hesitation, he replied, " Why cannot Britain and France apply military sanctions, and we apply economic sanctions? " An even more striking attempt to rationalise his instinctive pacifism while masquerading as a supporter of the League was made by a gentleman who enjoyed a special reputation in Western Canada as a champion of the League. He began a letter to the public press by insisting that Ottawa should use all its influence in London to press Great Britain to support the League to the uttermost in its attempt to restrain Italy; he continued by denouncing, as an armament ramp, the British Government's proposal to strengthen the Mediterranean fleet; and he concluded by saying that if unhappily the policy which he was urging upon Britain should end in war, Canada must at all costs keep out of it. His final sentence was a classic of unconscious political immorality. " Canada," he wrote, " must co-operate in the council, but not in the trenches."

It followed, therefore, that the League formula was never the all-sufficient unifying factor which it seemed to be. It was a façade concealing the fact that we could no more be certain that Canada would take the same risks as Britain for the League, than we could be certain that she would take the same risks as Britain for any other purpose. For Canadian opinion in this matter has been hopelessly divided.

There have been, first, those who hold that Canada is a part of the Commonwealth, that she has enjoyed its benefits and should accept its liabilities, and that she is, or should be, involved in war whenever Britain is at war. At the other extreme from this group there have been those whom we may label nationalists. Members of this group do not necessarily give themselves airs because they are on the lucky side of the Atlantic. They do not, as do so many North Americans, count that fact unto themselves

for virtue: but they do say that Canada is in an extremely fortunate geographic position, that she is safe under the lee of the United States, and that she should stay at home and follow the example of other nations by taking the fullest possible selfish advantage of her position. Each of these two groups is honest and consistent. Each of them realises that those who assist to call tunes should be prepared to pay pipers. The imperialists propose to have a voice in determining British policy, but are prepared to help in making that policy effective. The nationalists do not propose to assume any responsibility for supporting British policies, and would therefore claim no share in determining them. Neither of these groups, then, makes its attitude to Britain dependent upon whether its members approve or disapprove of the particular policy which Britain is pursuing at any moment.

Who, then, are the Canadians whose willingness to co-operate with Britain might be expected to be affected by the kind of policy being pursued in London? They are, first, those whose affection for the League makes them wish to see Britain give a strong lead at Geneva, and secondly, those whose dislike of Fascism makes them wish to see Britain call a halt to Germany and Italy. If Britain gives a strong lead at Geneva against Germany and Italy, can she, then, expect effective support from Canadians of this school of thought? Unfortunately, no. For it is not unfair to say that most of them preach co-operation with the League to Britain in time of peace, but in time of trial will practise isolation with the United States. It is Canadians of this group who are wont to say that a common foreign policy is only possible for Britain and Canada if both countries base their policy upon the Covenant of the League. When, however, they are pressed to say what Canada will do if, in discharging her liabilities under the Covenant, Great Britain has to go to war, they divide into two very different sections. A few—a very few—of their number remain perfectly consistent and reply that if Britain becomes involved in war in support of the decision of the League, then Canada, as a member of the League, must in honour support her, or stultify herself and her own signature upon the Covenant. The great majority, however, will, if pressed, admit that they both think and hope that if war should come—even a League war—the forces of geography will assert themselves, and that Canada, with the United States, will form a North American neutral bloc. Now, it is the contradiction inherent in the position of the members of this third group which has so thoroughly confused Canadian

thinking upon the whole question. All of them have called themselves supporters of the League, and have been anxious that Canada should use her influence to press the British Government to honour its obligations under the Covenant, but only a very small minority among them is prepared to do anything to share the risks in which such a course would involve Great Britain. The great majority among them will admit that no matter how a war may arise, they intend that Canada shall keep out of it. In other words, they are urging upon Great Britain a devotion to the service of the League which they have no intention of practising themselves, and while helping to call the British tune in Geneva, decline any responsibility for paying the piper.

Finally, we have to realise that Dominion Nationalism, by shattering the unity of Commonwealth foreign policy, is itself one of the factors which has weakened Britain, and so makes it dangerous for her to take a strong line at Geneva. For it should be noticed that the Canadians who insist that Britain can only expect Canadian support if she pursues League policies, are also the Canadians who insist most strongly upon Canada's independence. Thus, the achievements of the Imperial Conference of 1937 have recently been reviewed in Canada by Dr. J. W. Dafoe and Professor F. H. Soward. Both these gentlemen are able and ardent supporters of collective security and yet each approaches the Imperial Conference in a spirit more appropriate to 1897 than to 1938. Professor Soward repaints the time-honoured picture of the overseas statesmen being subjected "to the strain of being wined and dined by royalty, aristocracy and plutocracy, and subjected to the talk of 'empire, empire, empire' which Sir Wilfrid Laurier came to know so well"; and Dr. Dafoe records with quiet satisfaction that if, in the long series of conferences, pressure for a common policy of defence has failed, "it was mainly due to the delaying and blocking technique developed by Canada."

This is all perfectly legitimate, and no one to-day would wish to abate one iota of Dominion national independence, but Canadians who rejoice that the Commonwealth nations have no common defence policy can hardly expect it to have a common foreign policy, at Geneva, or elsewhere. A Commonwealth in which Dominion independence makes a common defence impossible cannot embark on common crusades in foreign policy, whether in the cause of Geneva or of any other cause; and it is useless for Canadians to press Britain to take the lead in creating a "democratic front," when the same Canadians see in every

move for co-operation from London a sinister threat to Dominion autonomy. Professor Soward virtually admits this when he writes: "Despite the dangers that confront democratic States to-day, a generation which has been educated in the Dominions to take pride in its advance in autonomy cannot be easily persuaded to reverse its policy." Even Dr. Dafoe confessed that at the 1937 Conference Canada "ignored the League and as well rejected outright all propositions looking towards a common defence policy and all understandings that might carry with them implications of commitments."

In short, there can be no certainty whatever that fidelity to the League would ensure for Britain that she will have Canada's support. Canada is so divided that, as Professor F. R. Scott pointed out, her real difficulty is "not how to co-operate with other members of the Commonwealth, but how to secure co-operation within herself." There are thoughtful Canadians to-day whose considered opinion is that a war would disrupt Confederation.

British foreign policy in the future, then, seems likely to have to take account of two fundamental changes. First, that now that two great naval Powers lie outside Europe and in flank and rear of her overseas possessions, Britain will never again be able to bring her concentrated power to bear in Europe, save upon the almost impossible condition of conducting her policy so as to be always sure of the friendship both of the United States and of Japan. Secondly, that for the execution of her policies she can rely upon her own resources only, and not upon those of the Dominions. This being the case, her policy must be shaped accordingly. If Britain alone is to pay the piper, Britain alone must call the tune, and the tune will have to be correspondingly subdued. Policies which would have been possible to a united empire, supported by the United States, would be suicidal for an empire in which Dominion nationalism has had its way, and which can expect nothing more concrete from North America than exhortation and applause.

It seems probable, therefore, that we must look forward to a steady diminution in the power of Britain, and should shape our policies accordingly. The conditions of our unique industrial and commercial supremacy are already gone. The basis of our naval supremacy has equally disappeared. Our population is probably on the brink of a sharp decline. The Dominions are determined to be independent, and may have to be reminded that the corollary of a Dominion policy looking solely to Dominion

interests is a British policy looking solely to British interests. Britain will remain for some time, of course, an important factor in the European balance, but she seems unlikely any longer to be the determining factor. This does not mean any catastrophic abdication. It does mean an adjustment of our policies to suit our decreasing power, a progressive limitation of the things or causes which we can feel free to defend in arms, and a steady contraction of commitments. Above all, there will have to be caution in "giving British leads." Britain will pull her weight, but her weight is likely steadily to decline, and leadership will have to be left to those who are weightier.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Any book reviewed in this Journal may be obtained through the Publications Department of the Institute. Members of the Institute wishing to cable an order may use, instead of the title of the book, the number which it bears, e.g., "Areopagus, London: Send Book Twenty May Journal: Smith."

Books marked with an asterisk (*) are in the Library of the Institute.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

1. KINGDOMS IN PARTNERSHIP. By C. J. M. Alport. 1937. (London: Lovat Dickson. 8vo. 290 pp. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

MR. ALPORT sets himself two tasks in this book. The first is to give a clear and readable study of the growth of the British Commonwealth. In this he has been successful. He deals with Great Britain and the Dominions only, and he touches economic problems hardly at all, but within these quite justifiable limits he gives a vigorous and enthusiastic exposition. This is just the book for those who want a brightly written and not too detailed account of the structure and problems of each member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and of the Commonwealth itself considered as a whole. Mr. Alport treats his subject historically, but there is never too much history. Present-day problems are analysed and explained with just the right emphasis upon their historical development. There are two interesting maps and the Statute of Westminster is printed in an appendix.

Mr. Alport's second task is to give an "interpretation" of the Commonwealth, an estimate of what it means in the world. This is an extremely difficult task in itself and, what is more, no matter how well it is done, the result is certain to provoke difference of opinion. This part of the book, indeed, seems the less successful. It is not profound, nor is it always even common sense. But it is the less important part of the book, and the reader who disagrees with it or fails to understand it should overlook it.

A book published on this subject and at this time is inevitably compared with three recent and important books in the same field—the *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, by Professor W. K. Hancock, *The British Empire*, by the Chatham House Study Group, and *The Empire in the World*, by Sir Arthur Willert, B. K. Long and H. V. Hodson. It may be helpful if a word is said of the relation of the present volume to these others. Mr. Alport's book is not as weighty as *The British Empire*, nor is it as heavy. It is more interesting, though less informative. Nor has it the intellectual quality and the regulative ideas of Professor Hancock's *Survey*, in which the task of giving an "interpretation" of the British Commonwealth has been attempted with such distinction. And it is not as realistic as *The Empire in the World*, though it has more dash.

There are a few errors which might mislead the reader unless corrected. Among misprints, Charnak (p. 94) should be Chanak or Chanāq; Braxland (p. 178) should be Blaxland; Willis (p. 183)

should be Wills; Premier's Plan (p. 194) should be Premiers' Plan; Lathan (p. 235) should be Latham; Foster (p. 246) should be Forster. The distinguished author of *Disarmament* is Señor Salvador de Madariaga, not Signor Salvatore de Madariaga (p. 103), that is to say, he is a Spaniard, not an Italian. The Statute of Westminster did not allow "any Dominion to contract out" of its main provisions (p. 59). It excluded Australia, New Zealand and Newfoundland from these provisions until they chose to contract in. The Irish Free State did not recognise December 10th, 1936, as did South Africa, as the date of Edward VIII's abdication and George VI's accession (p. 64); it chose December 12th. The power of the Government of Eire under the new Constitution to use the King for the conduct of external affairs is not found in the Preamble to the Constitution (p. 262), but in Article 29 of the Constitution itself. Not all constitutional lawyers would agree with Mr. Alport that "in Great Britain the King must always dissolve Parliament if his Prime Minister requests him to do so" (p. 50). Some would maintain that the King still has a discretion in certain cases. The Dominion Premiers at the Imperial Conference of 1937 are described as "conscious of the demand for leadership and their ability to provide it" (p. 148) and South Africa is called a "British democracy" (p. 211)—two judgments which most of us would wish to qualify, and which seem to be the product of excessive enthusiasm. And, finally, in any treatment nowadays of Dominion trustee securities some reference should be made to the Colonial Stock Act, 1934. This might come conveniently on p. 57.

K. C. WHEARE.

2. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. By Edward Jenks, D.C.L. Fifth revised edition. 1937. (London: John Murray. 8vo. xii + 432 pp., map. 9s.)

THIS book, which is now in its fifth revised edition, presents a comprehensive and simple description of the system under which the British Empire is governed. It has been brought up to date by a new chapter dealing with the Statute of Westminster and the Government of India Act, but unfortunately, although it was only completed in September 1937, it contains no reference to that unique document, the new Irish Constitution, which in effect has set up within (or without?) the Commonwealth what may be best described as a republican kingdom, entirely different in constitution and status from the other Dominions. It contains, however, a very fair and sympathetic summary of Irish history, of the original Free State Constitution, and of the position taken up by Mr. de Valera's Government concerning the land annuities and other matters. It pays a just tribute to the progressive policy of the Irish Free State in local government questions, but omits to mention the two most important developments in this direction—namely, the appointment of all local officials by an independent central commission and the introduction of the city-manager system into the principal cities, both of which steps have been revolutionary in nature and results. The section concerning the Irish courts of justice also requires revision in light of recent legislation. For instance, it is not now accurate to state that a verdict of nine jurymen will suffice in criminal cases.

The general picture presented of the Empire's Government is, however, both complete and accurate. Such important matters as the political rights of the King and the management of foreign policy

are fully and clearly explained. Recent events would seem to reinforce the opinion expressed that a Joint Committee of Parliament on Foreign Affairs representing all parties should be set up at the commencement of each Parliament to which the Foreign Secretary should continually report the progress of international negotiations.

JOHN J. HORGAN.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. By W. Ivor Jennings and the late C. M. Young. 1937. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 8vo. xviii + 364 pp. 18s.)

THIS is a very useful compilation of leading constitutional cases affecting the dominions, the topics chosen having been suggested by the syllabus of the University of London. It will be welcomed in all universities where the subject receives any consideration, for the material has been carefully selected and Dr. Jennings has provided the essential introductory sketches without which cases are often found confusing by students. The generosity of the Clarendon Press has enabled the authors (of whom Miss Young unfortunately died during its passage through the press) to give very recent material.

There are many points of interest to invite discussion. It is dubious if it can be said (p. 7) that no person not a British subject can have any remedy in an English Court for any action of the Crown done in a protectorate or mandated territory; there is no English ruling to this effect of conclusive character, for *R.* v. *Crewe*, [1910] 2 K.B. 576, was covered by a statutory proclamation, as was *Sobhuza II* v. *Miller*, [1926] A.C. 518, and the judgment in *Eshugbayi Eleko* v. *Nigerian Government*, [1931] A.C. 662, suggests that the Privy Council will not lightly accept the defence of Act of State in such a case (Keith, *Journ. Comp. Leg.* xiv. 118). Nor need we admit the power to amend the Statute of Westminster, 1931 (p. 266), if we regard section 2 of the Status of the Union Act, 1934, as valid. To admit the power to amend destroys the essential protection for the constitutions of Canada and Australia, while the Union enactment can easily be regarded as an additional safeguard as to the application of imperial legislation, not repugnant to section 4 of the Statute. It is hardly correct (p. 2) to say that the Dominions were technically colonies until 1931. The Statute of Westminster touches merely on the interpretation of Acts subsequent thereto, nor has this prevented the enactment for the benefit of the Union of the Colonial Stock Act, 1934. The technical change really dates from the resolution of the Colonial Conference of 1907, the definition in the Copyright Act, 1911, and other Acts of the Dominions, and their enumeration in international instruments. None of the misprints matters much; it takes the third attempt to get *Blankard* v. *Galdy* right (pp. xiv, 26, 38)!

A. BERRIEDALE KEITH.

4. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOMINION STATUS, 1900–1936. Edited by Robert MacGregor Dawson, D.Sc. 1937. (London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. xiv + 466 pp. 21s.)

IT is useful and interesting to have the development of the constitutional position of the Dominions since the death of Queen Victoria presented from the Canadian point of view. Inevitably Dr. Dawson regards the course of events in a manner which differs from that natural in the United Kingdom, as in his description (pp. 36–45) of 1920–22 as a period of tentative centralisation. While in some

quarters the Imperial Conference of 1921 may have been considered as a revival of the Imperial War Cabinet in time of peace, no such conception was in general favour in Great Britain, where the meeting was accepted simply as an ordinary conference. Such appearance of centralisation as there was simply reflected the fact that the Dominions after the exertions of the War were immersed in domestic problems and unwilling to concern themselves with foreign affairs. Again Mr. Cosgrave's moderation is contrasted favourably with the action of Mr. de Valera (p. 123), but the elimination of the King from the Irish Constitution and the abolition of the appeal had in effect been accomplished by the former, and there is more to be said for Mr. de Valera on the annuities issue than Dr. Dawson seems to admit. The Constitution of Eire came too late for comment. Most significant perhaps is the courageous recognition (pp. 130–2) of the fact that equality of status imposes new duties on the Dominions, which they have so far shown little inclination to undertake. The vexed question of nationality, which received decisive handling at the Imperial Conference of 1937, has, it seems, raised little feeling in Canada, though Canadian citizenship presents practical problems.

In the main, inevitably, the documents excerpted are familiar, but there are some characteristic articles by Mr. J. W. Dafoe. Mr. J. S. Ewart, however, is represented only by one of his less successful papers on the Privy Council appeal, and the Canadian case of *British Coal Corporation* v. *R.* is omitted in favour of the Irish case, *Moore* v. *Att. Gen. of the Irish Free State*. General Hertzog's later views on neutrality and secession seem to have escaped notice, but his insistence on the divisibility of the Crown falls just outside the scope of this valuable and stimulating work. A. BERRIEDALE KEITH.

5*. THE COLONIAL OFFICE: A History. By Henry L. Hall, Ph.D. [*Royal Empire Society Imperial Studies*, No. 13.] 1937. (London: Longmans, Green. 8vo. xiii + 296 pp. 12s. 6d.)

THIS book is less than 300 pages in length, but is so fully packed with varied information that it can almost be called a reference book. Yet in form it is an essay. In earlier researches, Dr. Hall discovered that the Colonial Office did not always deserve its low reputation; this set him on the track of the present investigation into the general history of the Office between 1836 and 1885. His work is based on the use of the Colonial Office records; but of course he has used them selectively. The first part of his book deals with administration; the second with policy. Each of the chapters in both parts examines a series of related topics and illustrates them from different territories. This makes the book hard reading, and makes it difficult for the author to get to grips with any single problem. On the other hand, it does give a fair picture of the way in which the heads of the office were compelled to work. Moreover, Dr. Hall is learned in his subject, and students may well find his short reviews of present knowledge on this topic or that a starting-point for further investigation.

W. K. H.

6. THE KING, THE CONSTITUTION, THE EMPIRE, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS: LETTERS AND ESSAYS, 1936–7. By Arthur Berriedale Keith. 1938. (London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. 194 pp. 8s. 6d.)

IN this volume the leading authority on British constitutional

law continues the series of day-to-day comments on legal and general public issues which have been collected in earlier volumes. Many of the points made are of extreme interest and importance—for example, the criticisms of the Regency Act, the argument that it was illegal for the King to take the new form of coronation oath without the sanction of Parliament, the defence of the Privy Council's view of Mr. Bennett's industrial legislation. There is also a valuable commentary on the new constitution of Eire. But when Professor Keith passes from the legal field to the political, he passes from the judge's seat into the arena of controversy; and his views will not find universal acceptance. The chief principles of the foreign policy he advocates would appear to be respect for the established principles of international law, coupled with a willingness to concede Germany's colonial claims. He regards the Spanish non-intervention agreement as a serious mistake. W. P. MORRELL.

7*. DE RECHTSBETREKKINGEN DER LEDEN VAN HET BRITSCHE GEMEENEBEST, ONDERLING EN IN HET VOLKENRECHT. By A. Tammes. 1937. (Purmerend: Muusses. 8vo. xi + 152 pp.)

A study of the constitutional relations between the member countries of the British Commonwealth, and their position in international law.

8*. THE NAVY. By Admiral Sir Herbert W. Richmond, K.C.B. [*National Defence Series.*] 1937. (London: William Hodge & Co. 8vo. 128 pp. 2s. 6*d.*)

IN this little outline of naval defence problems, Sir Herbert Richmond reveals the weaknesses of "splendid isolation" and the folly of talk of "abandonment" of the Mediterranean. He also argues the case for the retention of the big battleship as the cover for cruisers directly protecting merchantmen. He regards an aeroplane as torpedo-boat, and thus an integral part of the Naval forces. He maintains the necessity for Great Britain to have an adequate number of cruisers regardless of other Navies. The size of ships is discussed. Doubt is cast upon the value of the present position of bases in the United Kingdom. The possibility of invasion under modern conditions is analysed, and the author believes the Dominions are unwise in confining themselves to local defence. Lastly he deals with the fuel problem, and categorically disagrees with those who maintain that there are adequate supplies of oil fuel in Great Britain.

EDWARD HULTON.

9. THE SETTLEMENT OF CANADIAN-AMERICAN DISPUTES: A critical study of methods and results. By P. E. Corbett. [*The Relations of the United States and Canada.*] 1937. (New Haven: Yale University Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. viii + 134 pp. 11s. 6*d.*)

THIS is the latest volume in a series of studies on "The Relations of Canada and the United States," sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and edited under the direction of Dr. J. T. Shotwell.

It consists of a section of historical survey, which the author has (I think wisely) arranged under subject headings, and not in strict chronological order; a section on the importance of Canadian-American disputes in the development of principles of international law; and a concluding section on the suitability of the existing machinery for arbitral settlement and the possibility of its extension.

The first two parts are a useful and authoritative summary of material not readily available elsewhere in so convenient a form. The brevity imposed by the form and purpose of the work prevents Mr. Corbett from developing any of his points at much length; but the juxtaposition of the various cases in historical sequence is interesting in itself, and in the section on "Contributions to International Law" there is a good deal of original and illuminating comment.

It is the last section, however, which will be of most interest to non-specialist students. As Mr. Corbett says, the surprising thing about Canadian-American relations is the incompleteness and theoretical imperfection of the arbitral machinery which has in practice proved, with very few exceptions, extremely effective. The complete explanation of the paradox belongs rather to the other volumes of the series, in particular to those on industrial relations, but the author here sketches some of the elements of it, and concludes with a strong plea for the rationalisation of the position by the conclusion of a simple "all-in" arbitration treaty. W. J. M. MACKENZIE.

RACIAL AND POPULATION QUESTIONS

10*. LIMITS OF LAND SETTLEMENT. A Report on Present-Day Possibilities. Prepared under the direction of Dr. Isaiah Bowman. 1937. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 8vo. vii + 380 pp. With maps and charts. $3.50.)

THIS important and highly topical book leaves one with a feeling that the world has shrunk to ten chapters, that most of its hidden places have been illumined, and that one has seen continents dismembered and bared to the bone. It is a symposium which sets out in an attractive way the views of ten specialists (geographers, political scientists, a biochemist, and an explorer) upon the possibilities of further settlement in the under-developed and frontier areas of the world. The type of questions they seek to answer are these: What are the possibilities for the redistribution of the world's population—now, when mineral prospects are either well reconnoitred or are declining, when few new crops are likely, when the world's subsistence basis is shrinking, and in half a dozen regions settlement is receding from land which could not support it? Will technologic science (such as the vernalisation of crops) make much difference, and allow us to farm in the sub-Arctic? Need we do more, even now, than point to the thinly settled parts of the world and say "Send them there!"? Can settlement be forced ahead of its "natural" tempo? Where to-day can migrants go, politics apart, with some geographic hope of economic success? Can they live, *e.g.*, on the Central Brazilian plateau, as distinguished from merely existing?

Naturally enough, in a book of 380 pages, some only of the questions are answered, and some of the answers are half-answers. It seems a pity, too, that those whom the book will, or might, help the most are left themselves to form the final synthesis. The mass of hard, condensed, tightly-argued fact is difficult to master, and the argument bristles with implications for politician, economist, sociologist, and geographer. But one is filled with admiration for the way in which the authors have, in general, done their job. Some of the conclusions, and the solid body of well-documented colonial history of exploitation, settlement, and development of frontier areas, should be read and re-read. It is no part of the authors' intentions to join the colonies-

or-not controversy, but *de facto* they do. Much of what they have to say bears directly, and at times punishingly, on phases of this issue, which as grievance, spearhead, wedge, bludgeon, red herring, threatens grievously to complicate our relations with other Powers. The remarks of these geographers upon the notions of "over-population," "vast potentialities," and "unoccupied spaces" will be interesting reading for those nations which seem to hope that they can save the world for the *status quo*, or something very like it, no less than for those nations which are making other plans.

When the contributors have cropped these ideas down to stubble, one is left with the impression that though the greater part of the world's population is, as the authors say, where it "belongs," and where presumably it will stay, there are still immense possibilities of future "shift" within certain geographic limits. Nearly half the world's land surface can be ruled out as too cold, or too dry, or too hot. Within what remains there are so many areas of low resistance to migrants that any dream of a world cast more or less permanently in the mould, and with the segments and boundaries, of 1938 is only a dream. One contributor speaks, for instance, of his "dramatic certainty of a future populous Siberia," with a local Soviet population of 340 million by 1975. The military possibilities of this horde appear to the contributor, very moderately, to be "serious." Another, estimating the probable future trend of Asiatic migration (that is, if geographic logic and climatic attraction have their way), finds that all the arrows point, not west to inner Mongolia and inner China, but south and east to Malaya, the Philippines, Borneo, Celebes, Indonesia, New Guinea and the Oceanic Islands. The final map which outlines the areas of potentially denser settlement is likely to set the imaginative reader dreaming of great human movements in the years to be. The authors point to a wide strip of eastern and the extreme south-west tip of Australia, to an enormous tract of eastern South America (mostly Brazil and the Argentine), to a great belt of inner Asia running roughly west from Siberia, to the fringe of northern Africa, to central Canada, and to the islands of Indonesia and Oceania, as clearly the areas likely to draw heavier settlement. But there is no common index of "potentiality." Each of them is an area of uniquely limiting conditions. Each is subject to highly idiosyncratic "controls" —to local combinations of elevation, soil, accessibility, rainfall, and temperature. One of the most suggestive implications of the survey (particularly for Australia) is the area marked favourable for settlement by Orientals—the huge arc formed by Malaya, Indonesia, New Guinea, and Melanesia.

W. E. H. STANNER.

11*. WORLD POPULATION: Past Growth and Present Trends. By A. M. Carr-Saunders. 1936. (Oxford University Press. 8vo. xv + 336 pp. 12s. 6d.)

12*. POPULATION MOVEMENTS. Three Public Lectures given at the University of London, March 1936. By Robert R. Kuczynski. 1936. (Oxford University Press. Sm. 8vo. 121 pp. 5s.)

13. THE STRUGGLE FOR POPULATION. By D. V. Glass. 1936. (Oxford University Press. 8vo. 148 pp. 7s. 6d.)

IT seems a fairly safe forecast that the aspect of economics and sociology which will receive most attention over the next generation will be that of population growth, and we can, over that period, expect a spate of books dealing with one or more aspects of the population

:oblem. The three works here reviewed will be of great value to ıose who wish to be well informed on the subject. That of greatest :ope and depth of treatment is by Professor A. M. Carr-Saunders. he author describes the book as a brief introduction to a subject ' enormous scope and complexity. The description "brief intro- ıction" may be correct in its application to that part of the book ealing with "present trends," but it hardly does justice to the chief ırt of the book—that dealing with past growth. Professor arr-Saunders has written a book which seems likely to become a andard work on the history of population movements. Many revious writers have uncritically accepted figures published in earlier ooks of the population on this or that part of the earth's surface, and ıe only authority which can be accorded to some of the figures which ıss muster is that of repetition. Professor Carr-Saunders has ‹amined with great care the sources of information on which rofessor Wilcox based his estimates of the population of various parts f the world at different dates from 1650, and as a consequence finds necessary to make substantial alterations in the figures hitherto :cepted. The same critical spirit is evident in his discussion on ıigration movements, the explanation of the decline in fertility, and ıe present population situation in various parts of the world. He ghtly lays stress on the importance of the index of "net reproduction ıte" for the purpose of comparing the ability of populations in ifferent countries to replace themselves, and in this connection it is ıther surprising to find no mention of the work of Lotka in the book. he reason why statistical refinements are needed in comparing the :al birth rates—as contrasted with the crude birth rates based upon ıe total populations in the countries concerned—need not be touched pon here. Serious pitfalls may be met with, however, unless refined ıethods of measurement are used, and Professor Carr-Saunders has rovided an explanation of the method of deducing this "net :production rate," which should be readily understood by the non- atistical reader. Only by the proper understanding of this matter it possible to compare accurately and intelligently the underlying ›rces which are making for increase or decrease of population in ırious countries.

Professor Kuczynski's little book of a hundred or so pages is based pon three public lectures. It is a mixture containing on the one hand ıuch pure research on the very interesting subject of the peopling of merica, and on the other hand many entertaining views under the tle *Population Movements and Public Opinion*. The value to students f the former part—and also the substantial appendix in which are set ıt a large number of sources of information on population movements .l over the world—will be very great. The rest of the book is suited › the general reader, and particularly to the public man who has ttle grounding in the fundamental knowledge of population statistics, ıd who may be called upon to make pronouncements on the subject. his part of the book may be specially recommended to those who, ithout adequate statistical study of what is now a very complex ıbject, are called upon to take part in public discussions on Imperial ıigration.

Mr. Glass's volume on *The Struggle for Population* contains an troduction by Professor Carr-Saunders, and discusses population

problems in Great Britain and also in Germany and Italy, with particular reference to the policy of encouraging population growth. The rest of the book is directed to a description of the family allowance schemes in operation in various places, and particularly in France and Belgium. It describes a thorough piece of research promoted by the Council of the Eugenics Society. E. C. S.

14*. THE ATLANTIC AND EMANCIPATION. By H. A. Wyndham. [*Problems of Imperial Trusteeship.*] 1937. (Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 8vo. 300 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*; to Members of the R.I.I.A., 9*s.*)

THIS book is the third of a series of reports on "Problems of Imperial Trusteeship." The first volume, under the sub-title *Native Education*, described the early development of settlements in Ceylon and the East Indies. The second, under the sub-title *The Atlantic and Slavery*, described the development of the settlements along the West Coast of Africa and, through the slave trade, their relation to settlements in America. This, the third volume, is a sequel to the second, and deals with conditions in West Africa and America from the suppression of slave-trading and attempts to re-settle liberated slaves in Africa down to the present time. Its special interest for Englishmen lies in the comparisons it furnishes between the policies of Britain and France in Africa. In this respect it is similar to the first volume of the series in its comparison between early policies of Britain, Portugal, France and Holland in the Far East.

In the present volume is given the history of the settlement of liberated Africans in Sierra Leone, the story of the development of the Republic of Liberia, the story of the development of Senegal by the French and of Nigeria by the British, each being contrasted with the others. The second part of the book concentrates on the French and British dependencies in the West Indies, the third on the Negro problem in the United States, while the fourth tells the story of developments in South Africa.

One cannot help expressing regret that it had not been possible to expand each of these sections into a book by itself. The material has had to be so mercilessly pruned in order to bring it within the limits of a small volume that while the reader's appetite is whetted, he is denied the satisfaction he would have derived from a colourful full-length picture of the important changes under review in any one of the areas described.

From the point of view of the present writer, the first section of the book is the most stimulating. One wonders, however, whether Mr. Wyndham is not going too far when he suggests that, to France, aiming at the eventual assimilation of West Africa to her language and culture, educated Africans are the advance guard of the assimilation movement, while to Britain, looking forward to the evolution of a distinctive African polity, educated Africans are the negation of her policy. Such a statement says both too much and too little. As far as British policy is concerned, principles and aims are so obscure that they cannot be summarised as simply and in so few words. As one reads Government statements of policy, one is never clear whether the aim of the British is to develop in Africa a civilisation along modified European lines, or whether Britain really believes that there should be parallel civilisations in the world based on different ethical, economic and political patterns, characteristic of each ethnic group.

The conception of indirect rule in Africa seems to favour the latter interpretation of British policy, whereas the conception of adapting for Africa an education similar to that given in Europe would seem to be more in harmony with the former interpretation.

Another portion of the first part of the volume under review which specially interested the writer deals with the attempt that was made to develop Sierra Leone along European democratic lines and subsequently abandoned for reasons which it is difficult to understand. The book is full of references to official documents, and repeatedly brings to the notice of the reader stimulating, almost thrilling side-lights on controversial issues of to-day. Parts of the book are hard reading, but to administrators, educators and others who are faced with problems of inter-racial contacts this work is very strongly recommended: it is full of facts which should be known and taken to heart by us all. W. BRYANT MUMFORD.

15*. THE STORY OF THE NEGRO. By Ina Corinne Brown. 1937. (London: Student Christian Movement Press. 8vo. 208 pp. 5s.)

16*. THE NEGRO AS CAPITALIST. By Abram L. Harris. 1936. (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political Science. 8vo. xii + 205 pp.)

17*. JAMAICA THE BLESSED ISLE. By Lord Olivier. 1936. (London: Faber and Faber. 8vo. 466 pp. Map. 21s.)

MISS BROWN's book is an admirable short history of the Negro under slavery and in the United States since its abolition. It is written with restraint and without emotionalism or propaganda. The balance of the book is also right, for whereas one hundred and seven pages are devoted to the Negro's history before the present century, sixty-three pages are given to his present situation in the United States. The compression of the historical part sometimes leads to a loss of clearness, as, for example, in the treatment of the Civil Rights Bill; but on the whole no better short history of the Negro in the new World has yet appeared. When writing of the present century, Miss Brown, who is herself a member of the coloured community of the United States, shows more feeling than in her treatment of the past. This is understandable, and throughout she attracts the reader's sympathy. She is, however, hardly fair in her approval of a Southern Bishop's description of "the white man's burden" as only one of "the pious phrases of Nordic egotism covering a shameless economic and territorial imperialism." There is something to be said on the other side, and the book would be the better for saying it.

Mr. Harris's book on *The Negro as Capitalist* examines the problem only from the point of view of Negro banking, and suffers from the disadvantage of having had to depend mainly on the particulars of the many Negro banks that have failed, many of which had so small a capital as to be hardly worthy of being classed as banks. Generally speaking, it appears that Negro banking has suffered from an insufficiency of Negro commercial and industrial businesses, with the consequence that its funds have had to be invested in real estate. It has been a product of race prejudice rather than of economic necessity, and its failures point to the impracticability of building up a separate Negro economic structure parallel to the white in the circumstances of the United States.

On the other hand, Lord Olivier can claim that Jamaica, with its majority of Negro peasantry, is a "Blessed Island" because the percentage of the population holding land is perhaps larger than in any other country. Its future, therefore, can be built up on a peasant proprietary. H. A. WYNDHAM.

18*. THE NEGRO QUESTION IN THE UNITED STATES. By James S. Allen. 1937. (London: Lawrence and Wishart. 8vo. 224 pp. 5s.)

IN this book we have the Communist solution of the Negro problem of the United States. It takes the form of the "self-determination of the Black belt," which is defined as "an area of continuous Negro majority." A map shows clearly what it is and its population is stated to be 49·7 per cent. white and 50·3 per cent. negro. It is not clear why so small a majority should justify a self-determination by the Negroes, which, as socialist opponents of the plan claim, would certainly lead to a race war and would be unnecessary under a socialist régime. Mr. Allen replies to these objections, and his answers will no doubt be satisfactory to those who can appreciate Communist doctrines. The book contains much useful information on the tenant and crop-sharing system, which, from one point of view, is a legacy of slavery, and which is economically and socially unhealthy. But to the ordinary reader its argument is weakened by all evils being attributed without question to "monopoly capitalism," and no attention being paid to other obvious factors. H. A. WYNDHAM.

LAW

19*. INTERNATIONAL LAW: a Treatise. By L. Oppenheim. Vol. I—Peace. Fifth Edition edited by H. Lauterpacht. 1937. (London: Longmans, Green. 8vo. lvi + 819 pp. 45s.)

THIS volume and its companion, dealing with Disputes, War and Neutrality, constitute the most comprehensive up-to-date treatise on the Law of Nations in the English language. The present volume covers every aspect of the law of peace, as existing at the present day. Whilst preserving the general character and systematic arrangement of the original "Oppenheim," Dr. Lauterpacht has done far more than the work normally covered by the modest name of "editor." He has not only added a large amount of new matter called for by recent developments, but has freely modified the original text in order to bring it into harmony with later authorities, precedents and tendencies. All this is admirably done. The lucidity, balance and broad common sense of the great jurist whose name the book bears are preserved and carried on, so that the new "Oppenheim" will certainly become a classic like the original.

Although, as already stated, the work is thoroughly comprehensive, its size naturally makes exhaustive treatment of every topic impossible. The text, therefore, is wisely confined to general statements of the law, and controversial and difficult points, though indicated, are not pursued. But the bibliography which precedes each chapter, and the footnotes, are so full that the student or practitioner is put on the track of all the material necessary for detailed study. Almost everywhere the existing rules of international law are stated in the light of and with reference to their historical origin and development, and not merely as abstract propositions.

Where the field is so vast it is hard to pick out individual questions for notice in a short review, but among those of special interest may perhaps be mentioned the discussion of the Stimson doctrine of non-recognition, the position of the Dominions at international law, and the interpretation and effect of treaties, including the *rebus sic stantibus* rule. Attention may also be drawn to the excellent exposition of the nature, origin and development of international law. Nothing could be better than the treatment of this subject, with its clear and simple style and its avoidance of the quasi-scientific vocabulary so often used to the mystification of the reader. One truth which, although not new, is strongly brought out in these pages, is that the law of nations is the product of Christian civilisation and ideas—a fact which merits serious thought at the present time. The endeavour in certain countries to establish a new civilisation on a different basis will surely fail in the long run, but it is important to realise that the ideas in question are incompatible with a law of nations as we know it, or indeed in any form.

Dr. Lauterpacht and all concerned are to be warmly congratulated on the publication of this book. A. FACHIRI.

20. LES PRINCIPES DU DROIT DES GENS MODERNE. By Professor Robert Redslob. 1937. (Paris: Rousseau.)

21. COMMENTAIRE THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DU PACTE DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS ET DES STATUTS DE L'UNION PANAMÉRICAINE. By Professor J. M. Yepes and Professor Pereira da Silva. 1937. (Paris: Pedone. 8vo. 41 pp.)

PROFESSOR REDSLOB'S book is based, to a large extent, on the "Declaration of the Fundamental Principles of Modern International Law" drafted by Dr. Alejandro Alvarez, the eminent Chilean jurist, and already approved by three of the more important international scientific bodies: The International Diplomatic Academy, the International Law Association and the "Union Juridique Internationale." This Declaration, which is now commonly referred to as the "Alvarez Declaration," is intended to remedy the existing crisis in international law by laying stress on the rules which "modern legal conscience" consider indispensable in international relations. It is also intended as a preliminary step to the gradual and progressive codification of international law. The commentary supplied by Professor Redslob to the various articles of the "Declaration" is extremely useful, especially from the historical point of view, as showing the evolution of the principles of international law which, according to the author's phrase, finds itself on "the turning corner of its destiny." There are, in fact, two main considerations which loom largely in international relations: (*a*) an increasing regard for international law in the internal affairs of the Great Powers and (*b*) an increasing extension of its main object to safeguard law and peace in external affairs. This is well exemplified by Article 13 of the "Declaration," which lays down that although a State is sovereign within its territory for the purpose of internal government and legislation, it is nevertheless bound by the rules of international law in the exercise of its functions. Another important provision is that contained in Article 26, which enacts that "in the discharge of their duties, as well as in the exercise of their rights, States must always be guided by the consideration that their mission consists in advancing collectively human progress." Professor Redslob, who has already written many valuable treatises on international law, is to

be congratulated on the production of this book, which is not only very clearly written, but brings the subject up to date.

The *Commentaire* is a reprint of part of Vol. III in the important series on the "Question of the Reform of the Covenant" jointly written by Professors Yepes and da Silva. The learned authors share the commonly expressed view that one of the first reforms to be accomplished is the separation of the Covenant from the Peace Treaties. Their main thesis is, however, that the true reform of the League should consist in the *integral* application of the Covenant, both in the letter and the spirit; no view could at present be expressed on the value and effectiveness of the Covenant, since, either through weakness or through fear of future commitments, the member States of the League have failed consistently to apply its provisions. But if reform must be, the authors attempt to show very concisely what amendments should be incorporated in the various articles of the Covenant. As regards the Preamble, they are emphatically of the opinion that it should contain a declaration of the rights and duties of States, on the ground that it is impossible to organise efficiently an international society unless the main principles governing its existence and working are first set out. For this purpose, the authors suggest the incorporation in the Preamble of the "Declaration of the Fundamental Principles of Modern International Law" recently drafted by Dr. Alejandro Alvarez, and of the Convention adopted by the Panamerican Conference of Montevideo in 1933 on the "Rights and Duties of the American States."

C. JOHN COLOMBOS.

22*. LEGAL MACHINERY FOR PEACEFUL CHANGE. By Professor Karl Strupp. [*New Commonwealth Institute Monographs, Series B, No.* 4.] 1937. (London: Constable. 8vo. xxvi + 85 pp.)

IN this very learned study on "Peaceful Change," Professor Strupp directs his mind to the creation of an International Court of Equity and to the practical procedure to be adopted for the solution of all international disputes, whether justiciable or not. He has even taken the pains to draft a set of rules as part of an "International Peace Charter," accompanied by a very useful commentary. The position he takes up is that neither the Permanent Court nor any arbitration tribunals now in existence are qualified to meet some of the conflicts arising in international relations, and that there is therefore a crying need for the establishment of a new institution which, as a matter of regular practice, should apply not law, but "the general recognised principles of international justice which ought to be law" (Art. 51 of the "Charter"). One difficulty which immediately arises out of Professor Strupp's draft is that there exists at present no general agreement as to what principles of international *justice* should be made "law." Must there be a return to the old exploded ideas of a "law of nature"? Another main objection is that the proposed institution may in practice prove nothing else but a duplication of the present Council of the League of Nations, to which almost all the criteria surrounding the new Equity Tribunal seem to fit in admirably.

C. J. C.

23*. THE LAW OF NATIONS: an Introduction to the International Law of Peace. By J. L. Brierly. 2nd edition. 1936. (Oxford University Press. 8vo. viii + 271 pp. 5s.)

IN producing an improved edition of his unique "Introduction

to the Law of Peace," Professor Brierly has accomplished what some might have supposed an impossibility. Even when discarding a part of the original his decisions can be recognised, if regretfully, as right. And, with an added forty pages, he makes up for it.

Though altered a little in names, disposition and content, the chapters are still nine in number, and comprise, as before, thirty-nine sections in all. The piece most substantially recast is that on international organisation : it has also been promoted from the back to near the beginning of the book—which now ends instead with a new chapter, "International Law and Resort to Force." This permits the topic of coercion to be displaced from among the methods of settling disputes. "Settlement under the League Covenant" (18 pages) inherits its position.

Account is taken, in the text, of various new incidents and decisions, and, in the bibliographical note, of several new books. The Covenant gets more notice in the index than before.

Matters on which there is something new, or different, include : non-recognition, custom, justiciability, *rebus sic stantibus*, "gaps in the law," territorial waters, juristic writings, Dominion Status, and, conspicuously, the ratification of treaties.

If in the general tone there is any perceptible development, it is towards an even greater caution. Here and there a "perhaps" or an "it would seem" has newly found its way in. On the other hand, there is a notable paragraph beginning : "There need be no mystery about the source of the obligation to obey international law." The book none the less "retains its character" as an introduction.

C. A. W. M.

24*. DIE GEBIETSHOHEIT ÜBER DIE B- UND C-MANDATE. By W. Gaupp. 1937. (Tübingen : Mohr. 8vo. 63 pp.)

The author considers in some detail the question of sovereignty over the former German colonies, and, after drawing a parallel with the Saar statute, concludes that it would be legally possible to consider that sovereignty remained with the Reich, although its functions have been exercised by the mandatory powers on behalf of the League.

25*. GROTIUS : ANNUAIRE INTERNATIONAL POUR L'ANNÉE 1937. 1937. (La Haye : Nijhoff. viii + 276 pp. *Gld.* 10.)

Deals with the relations of the Netherlands with foreign countries and international bodies during 1936, with special reference to treaties and other matters of international law. There is a bibliography of works dealing with international law and related subjects published in the Netherlands during 1936.

26. ABHÄNGIGE MITGLIEDER VÖLKERRECHTLICHER VERBÄNDE. By Dr. Friedrich Apelt. 1936. (Brünn : Verlag Rudolf M. Rohrer. 8vo. 211 pp.)

This is a carefully written monograph on the principles governing the international relation of dependencies with their own and other countries. The many and various forms of semi-sovereign States known in history are fully analysed, and stress is laid on the new rules evolved by the Covenant of the League of Nations which, for the first time, accorded international recognition to the Nations constituting the British Empire. The treaty-making power of these Dominions is of great importance, although how far it may extend internationally is left entirely at large.

C. J. C.

SANCTIONS AND THE LEAGUE

27*. INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS : A Report by a Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1938. (Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 8vo. x + 247 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*; to Members of the R.I.I.A., 10*s.*)

CHATHAM HOUSE embarked on a study of the problem of sanctions so early that a draft report had been prepared before the Abyssinian War broke out. That report formed the basis of the Information Department Paper entitled *Sanctions : The Character of International Sanctions and their Application.* The volume under review is the result of labours conducted by the original group, which resumed work in the summer of 1936, in the light of experience gained during the course of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute. Its professed object, both negatively and positively, is defined in the following sentences :

" It is beyond the scope of this inquiry to consider whether or not the attempt to establish a world order on the basis of international law should be continued. Our purpose is less ambitious, namely, to try to discover how far the constitution of a system of sanctions for the enforcement of international legal obligations, at any rate in appropriate cases, is a feasible proposition."

All aspects of the problem, military, economic, legal, political and even psychological, receive their due share of attention in the Report. Both those who believe in the necessity and feasibility of sanctions and collective security and those who disbelieve should be urged to read the report and form their own conclusions.

The main impressions which emerge for one reader at least, who belongs to the former category, may be briefly stated as follows :—

(1) The difficulties of any effective system of sanctions are depressingly formidable in theory and a completely water-tight system is probably impossible. At the same time the conclusions at which the group arrive at the end of a chapter devoted to the " exceedingly complicated " problem involved in the determination of the aggressor is not improbably of more general application. That conclusion is

" in practice it has never, since the War, been difficult to determine the aggressor in any dispute which has led to war. . . . It can be affirmed with confidence that recent experience tends to show that in any given dispute it is not difficult to reach a conclusion as to where aggression lies."

Given a sufficient consensus of opinion and sufficient determination, the practical difficulties of applying sanctions would not be so formidable as theoretical considerations suggest.

(2) The time factor is of primary importance, and no system is likely either to deter an aggressor or to terminate his aggression unless the obligations involved by a system of sanctions are clearly laid down beforehand and machinery is erected which can be put into operation at short notice not only for the immediate application, but also for the continued co-ordination of sanctions.

(3) There can be no hope of collective action unless the nations of the world face, and are prepared to meet, the danger of war involved—the danger, that is, not that economic sanctions will be ineffective without military sanctions, but that their application may provoke military retaliation. You cannot assist in the apprehension of a criminal without incurring the risk of being hurt.

(4) The Italo-Abyssinian experience proves nothing except the folly of half-measures. The half-heartedness of collective action in

this case was due partly to political factors and partly to the fact that so long ago as 1921 the Assembly had passed resolutions which in almost every line insist on the necessity, if not the virtue, of gradualness. On the other hand, even though this recent experience furnished little in the way of proof, failure may have destroyed the possibility of applying effective sanctions in the future; if nothing succeeds like success, nothing fails like failure.

Perhaps the conclusion of the whole matter is to be found in the final paragraph of the book:

"The reader may possibly conclude that it is the absence of this 'union of wills,' rather than any technical obstacles, or lack of efficacy in the measures available, which prevents the sanctions of the Covenant from being the safeguard of peace and deterrent of aggression which they were considered to be by their designers. The question still remains whether, if the world lacks the spirit of courageous and self-sacrificing co-operation on which sanctions depend, any alternative course is available whereby the calamity of war can be permanently averted."

SIR A. MCFADYEAN.

28. PEUT-ON FERMER LE CANAL DE SUEZ? Par Raymond Guibal. 1937. (Paris: Pedone. 8vo. 177 pp.)

THIS monograph discusses the question whether there is a legal right to close the Suez Canal as a sanction under Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and comes to the conclusion that there is no such right. The question is well set out against its historical background and treated with care and fairness. The argument called, perhaps not quite correctly, the Anglo-American thesis, that the rights and obligations created by the Covenant override the right of free passage in time of peace or war created by the Convention of Constantinople of 1888, is dismissed on the ground that the Convention is preserved by the various Peace Treaties, and that there is no incompatibility between it and the Covenant such as to bring Article 20 thereof into play. A theory put forward by Monsieur Le Fur, that the Council of the League of Nations has jurisdiction to decide the legal question, is also rejected. Though not strictly necessary to the main purpose of the monograph, the author advances the opinion that flight over the Canal cannot legally be interrupted. This seems a doubtful proposition. ORME CLARKE.

29. CO-OPERATION OR COERCION? A CRITICAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE SURVEY OF THE LEAGUE. By L. P. Jacks. 1938. (London: Heinemann. 8vo. xvii + 153 pp. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

THE first part of this book sets out the author's case against international coercion of any kind. His argument is elaborated with force, but is weakened by a certain dogmatism. Participation in collective sanctions cannot simply be dismissed as "international altruism." The author quotes what Mr. Gladstone said in 1869, and asks, "What more is needed to explain the collapse of the League . . .?" Most readers will feel that more is needed in 1938.

The second part of the book puts forward what it is claimed is a constructive alternative. Disarmament and economic co-operation are to be treated together. The reduction on armament expenditure is to be paid into an international fund for promoting economic co-operation. The only reason given for thinking that linking these two subjects together would make international agreement on them easier is that it would be "a good bargain." No doubt it would, but is it a possible line of advance in present circumstances? A host of

difficulties will occur to the reader that do not seem to have occurred to the author. Would States be prepared to envisage placing a substantial part of their revenues in a fund to be administered by "internationally appointed trustees," and incidentally where would a fund of these dimensions—it is suggested that it might amount to as much as £600 million in three years—be invested? Would States agree to allowing these international trustees to use such a fund for "stabilising currencies," "lowering tariffs" (we are not told how) and "financing the distribution of raw materials"? If we can assume that they would, the author's argument that a scheme of this kind would find for its working a greater measure of good faith than any scheme which directly or indirectly involves coercion is worthy of attention. But even here the reader finds it confusing to be told that the basic principle is mutual insurance applied in such a way that what each State would get would be proportional to what it put in—which does not seem to be insurance at all. In any case, unless the scheme were developed in detail, and unless some evidence were adduced that would suggest its political possibility, it is difficult to do other than to class it with what the author himself condemns as the kind of peace plan that "any intelligent person gifted with a little ingenuity can work out . . . in the space of half an hour." E. F.

30*. THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. FIRST SESSION: JANUARY 1920—100th SESSION: JANUARY 1938. Composition, Competence, Procedure. Issued by the Information Section of the League of Nations. 1938. (Geneva: League of Nations; London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 141 pp., illus. 1s. 6*d*.)

A WELL-DOCUMENTED little book produced by the Information Section of the League; it describes the composition and functions of the Council, and draws a parallel between its competence and that of the Assembly. The evolution not only of its methods and procedure, but of the degree of representation given to the Great Powers, and to the larger geographical groups, is clearly traced. A series of tables show the dates of each session, the term of office of non-Permanent Member States, and the individual representatives of each country. A classified index indicating the session during which questions were discussed gives the book considerable value as a work of reference. L. V. D.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL

31. STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE. By Jacob Viner. 1937. (London: George Allen and Unwin. 8vo. xviii + 650 pp. 18s.)

PROFESSOR VINER has produced a sound work of scholarship. He surveys the growth and development of doctrines relating to international trade over a wide field; based on an extensive and minute examination of original sources, this study is executed with a fine mastery of theory, and may therefore be taken to be an authoritative statement unlikely to be surpassed.

Professor Viner brings out the continuity in the growth of thought. He shows a singular freedom from prejudice and partisanship and great fair-mindedness in attributions of priority and relative importance. He has dug out a number of points of high interest in the history of theory, but he lets his own discoveries take their proper place in the larger perspective. Himself a notable contributor to the principles of international trade, he does not allow any trace of egoism to show

itself. A considerable proportion of the book is concerned with modern controversy and goes far to clarify problems of current importance.

R. F. HARROD.

32*. INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN CERTAIN RAW MATERIALS AND FOODSTUFFS, by Countries of Origin and Consumption, 1936. [1937. II A. 21.] 1937. (Geneva: League of Nations; London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 164 pp. 5s.)

33*. INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 1936. [1937. II A. 17.] 1937. (Geneva: League of Nations; London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 384 pp. 10s.)

34*. BALANCES OF PAYMENTS 1936. [1937. II A. 16.] 1937. (Geneva: League of Nations; London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 236 pp. 6s.)

FOUR years ago, a committee of statistical experts arrived at the conclusion that the only method by which international statistics of imports and exports could be adequately compared was by asking governments to furnish figures of their imports according to country of origin, and the first of the above volumes is the result of the efforts of the League of Nations in collecting such information, which has now been published for the second year in succession by the Economic Intelligence Service of the League. This publication contains complete statistics of thirty-five commodities, mainly raw materials and foodstuffs, for 122 countries which accounted for 98 per cent. of the total world trade in 1935. It also contains some provisional statistics for 1936. The method of compiling foreign trade statistics differs between country and country; import figures are sometimes given according to the country of origin, in other cases according to the country from which the goods were consigned. In the same way, export figures in some cases denote the country to which goods are consigned for consumption, and in other cases those to which they are sent for transit. In this volume, however, will be found the imports into countries for consumption in those countries matched up with the corresponding export from the countries in which the goods were produced.

The second volume classifies imports and exports into 456 groups of commodities, and gives for each country the value for 1934-35-36 in the currency of the country, the weight where possible in long tons and the percentage of the import or export of each commodity to the total imports or exports. Thus in the case of the United Kingdom in 1936 we find that retained imports of butter exceeded in value that of any other foodstuff, accounting for 5·2 per cent. of the total of all imports, wheat coming second with 4·5 per cent. In raw materials our largest retained imports were wool and cotton, together making more than 10 per cent. of the whole. On the other hand our manufacture of cotton goods accounted for nearly 14 per cent. of our exports, and woollen goods for more than 7 per cent., no other item reaching these figures in importance.

Another useful table gives the percentages of imports and exports from and to the various countries and their values.

The last of these three books deals with the international balance of payments of thirty-six countries. It has been necessary to omit Italy, for which no figures have been available since 1930. The figures show that in 1936 the United States, the United Kingdom, and

France had adverse balances of trade amounting between them to 259 million gold dollars, and to this extent, of course, the strain on debtor countries has been reduced. The introduction to the volume warns readers that " as the estimates differ considerably in authority and value, and as in each individual statement the figures given vary from well-founded and carefully compiled administrative statistics to confessedly doubtful inferences drawn from an unquestionably inadequate basis of established fact, the figures supplied must be accepted with reserve, and any conclusions drawn must be treated as tentative."

Information relating to international capital movements is notoriously scanty, but some countries—for instance, Denmark and Norway—obtain fairly complete returns from financial institutions, while the United States Treasury Department publishes detailed weekly statistics of international sales and purchases of United States securities and movements of short term capital. We may hope that the time is not far distant when similar statistics may be published in Great Britian.

BARNARD ELLINGER.

35*. ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS. By Carl Iversen. 1936. (Oxford University Press. 8vo. 536 pp. 15s.)

THIS book of 536 pages must be read with close attention, and considerable technical equipment is needed before its study can be beneficial to the reader. It explains why capital flows here and there (sometimes it (capital) seems to have miraculous properties and to flow, as it were, uphill), what laws govern its movements, and, finally, how its work of irrigation is performed.

Perhaps the most vital part of the book is the discussion of the so-called " Adverse Balance of Trade." It is no exaggeration to say that question is one of the six most important problems with which mankind is faced to-day. The reviewer would regard such a balance (accumulated, of course, under a managed paper standard) as so much capital placed at the disposal of a country by obliging foreigners. Others take the opposite view. Imports of goods are dangerous. The laden ship coming into an English harbour is not welcomed. The vessel that sails for a foreign port carrying our goods is thrice blessed. Which of these views is the right one? Iversen does not commit himself save through a familiar and liberal-minded quotation from Cassel.

The problem of the export of capital by creditor nations is dealt with fully, and this also deserves close study. Iversen quotes an estimate that, even before the War, Great Britain had lent abroad about one quarter of her national wealth. Here again he does not feel justified in making a recommendation as to when this formerly beneficial lending can once more become auspicious. Perhaps that time will never come. When we receive the interest on our lendings abroad, does that in itself throw English men and women out of employment? Probably not, but how complex even this one question is, and how much more than scientific economics is needed to help us to come to a wise decision for the future! If we contrast " cheap " money in London with, say, countries like China and India, with their incredibly low standards of living and their shortage of capital, we sometimes wonder whether international movements of capital follow no laws, and are merely haphazard and without guidance from intelligent men.

Exchange equalisation accounts and their workings; the future price of gold and its relation to international trade; "hot money" and whether its recipients burn their fingers or not—these newer and profoundly interesting financial problems which so occupy our minds to-day are not, of course, all dealt with in detail by Iversen here. He does, however, lay a solid and permanent foundation for the study of the movements of international money. Indeed, if the student will fully master the technicalities of Iversen as here revealed, he will be well fitted for the problems of to-morrow. ARNOLD JONES.

36. THE ECONOMIC MERRY-GO-ROUND. By Edmund A. H. Walker. 1937. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 140 pp. 6s.)

"THIS book is not for the academic economist," are Mr. Walker's opening words. But at the same time he is not one of those economic amateurs who claim to know so much more about it than the professionals, and who can in a few pages supersede all previous writings on the trade cycle. He defines his aim as the more modest and explicit one of reminding the man-in-the-street of certain historical facts of which he might have remained unaware.

The book will serve this more modest and useful purpose only on condition that the reader disregards everything that Mr. Walker has said about the "Key Cycle"—his pet discovery. The "Key Cycle" is a period of twenty-seven years so divided up as to give "good years," "bad years" and "panic years" in somewhat irregular rotation. When Mr. Walker attempts to illustrate and apply this doctrine, the result is one of the most appalling examples of "forcing facts to fit theories" which has ever been seen. It is not even as if there were any good *a priori* reason which could be advanced in favour of the "Key Cycle" theory.

But if he neglects the Key Cycle and all reference to it, the reader will find that he has left a short and very readable factual account of trade and financial fluctuations from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the present day, written with common sense and historical judgment. There is an interesting chapter on the wheat trade, and a very interesting historical account of the markets and exchanges of London.

Mr. Walker concludes his book with a chapter of prophecies. Here he rides his hobby horse again, but with a light rein, and he reaches some exciting and interesting conclusions, beginning with a slump in 1942. Economic prophecy is an entertaining parlour game, containing also a slight element which is of more lasting value. Subject to this qualification, the chapter is a good one. COLIN CLARK.

37. A PROGRAMME OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH. Volume I: Report of the Explanatory Committee on Financial Research. Volume II: Inventory of Current Research on Financial Problems. 1937. (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research in Co-operation with the Association of Reserve City Bankers. London: Macmillan. 8vo. 81 and 253 pp. $1.50 or 4s. 6d. each volume.)

THESE volumes represent the preliminary results of a comprehensive study of the banking structure of the United States undertaken in July 1936 by the National Bureau of Economic Research. The inquiry is being financed by the Association of Reserve City Bankers. It is designed to answer such leading questions as—" (1) Has our financial

organisation as a whole accentuated booms and deepened depression? How can it be used to moderate them? (2) What should be the basis of competition between different types of specialised financial institution? (3) What are sound credit standards, in instalment financing, real-estate financing, investment financing?" Volume I outlines a programme of research, and suggests certain projects which might be undertaken immediately. Volume II contains a comprehensive survey of all research into financial problems at present being conducted in American universities, and in such institutions as the Federal Reserve Banks, the Federal Deposit Insurance Cotporation, and the National Bureau of Economic Research. B. S. KEELING.

38. LABOR TREATIES AND LABOR COMPACTS. By Abraham C. Weinfeld. 1937. (Bloomington, Ind.: Principia Press. 8vo. vi + 136 pp. $ 2.00.)

THE difficulties with which the Roosevelt Administration has been and is still faced as a result of the separation and limitation of powers under the American constitution are well known. This treatise deals with a cognate problem—that of the constitutional and legal position as a result of the membership by the United States of the International Labour Organisation at Geneva. The author's conclusions are that the Federal Government has power to regulate labour conditions by treaties, but that such power is limited by the due process clause of the constitution. Hence treaties dealing with the fixing of minimum wages infringe the limitation, but those dealing with hours of labour and child labour can be safely ratified. The distinction is an unhappy one which may in due course be swept away, if and when the President wins his battle over the constitution of the Supreme Court. There is an interesting chapter on the position in Canada, where, as a result of recent Privy Council decisions, whether the Dominion or the Provinces must legislate to give effect to labour conventions will depend in each case on the subject-matter. The unfortunate result may well be that Canada will only enter into treaties which can be put into effect by federal legislation.

This study can be recommended as a clear and careful treatment of its subject. A. A. MOCATTA.

39*. TRIPARTITE TECHNICAL CONFERENCE ON THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY, Washington, D.C., April 2–17, 1937. Record of Proceedings: First Part. Published by the International Labour Office, Geneva.

THIS is the first part of the record of proceedings of the Washington Conference which was attended by the representatives of twenty-seven different nations. In most cases the nations had delegates representing (*a*) the government, (*b*) the employers, and (*c*) the workers. In these circumstances it is not surprising that although much interesting discussion took place, there was considerable divergence of opinion, and on many important questions no definite conclusion was arrived at. There was, for instance, a full discussion, but no agreement, on the problem of shorter hours, and here opposition came in the main from those delegates who represented nations with a large competitive export trade. But differences also arose on the ratio of wages to total costs, the workers believing that wages formed only a small part, while the employers held that they were "a substantial ratio." A clear definition

of exactly what was meant, and some facts to substantiate the difference of opinion, would have been useful.

It seems to have been generally agreed that voluntary organisations of employers and workers were of great value in arriving at collective agreements, but this in itself would not be sufficient, and the enactment of national legislation to support these agreements would be desirable, and in many cases further support could be afforded by international conventions.

The question of the reduction of hours of work was left over for further consideration by the International Labour Conference to meet next June. It was agreed that night shifts "should be resorted to only when required as a matter of strict necessity, and should be prohibited for women and young persons." It was further suggested that governments should seriously consider the ratification of the conventions relating to weekly rest and annual holidays with pay. It was held to be desirable that a minimum age should be fixed by law in all countries for the admission of young persons to employment. Finally, the Report ends with some useful suggestions regarding international statistics. BARNARD ELLINGER.

40. PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMISTS, held at St. Andrews, Scotland, 1936. 1937. (London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. xiv + 528 pp. 17s. 6*d*.)

THIS very substantial volume covers a wide variety of subjects. Apart from the addresses of welcome, twenty-four papers were read, and of the 219 members in attendance, about fifty contributed to the discussions. The subjects covered were not all of international concern, but even in those of relatively local scope (*e.g.* The Evolution of the American Family Farm) there was much of general interest to all present.

The papers presented ranged from "The Relations of Agriculture to Industry and the Community" to "Changes in Chinese Currency and their Effects upon Commodity Prices." There appears to have been no well-defined central theme running through the work of the Conference, but, on the other hand, the wide variety of the topics considered necessarily meant that there was at least something of interest for the vast majority, if not all, present.

The most popular subject, judging from the number who participated in the subsequent discussion, was "Farm Organisation with Special Reference to the Needs of Technical, Industrial and Economic Development of Agriculture." Three papers were read and discussion was continued by representatives of Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The reply of Dr. Zörner to Professor Ashby's criticisms of his paper clearly shows that the merits and demerits of the "family farm" system are still in dispute.

The most topical subject was "Problems of Consumption of Agricultural Products." The first opening paper was by Professor Cathcart, who dealt with the physiological aspects. In connection with the quantitative requirements of the individual, his tables showing the average amounts of certain foods consumed per man per week according to total food expenditure are of particular interest. The positive correlation between food expenditure and the *per capita* consumption of meat, fruit and vegetables is striking. The number of

observations on which these data were based does not, however, appear to be given. Professor Forrester, in the second opening paper, presented the economic considerations. With reference to Sir John Orr's book *Food, Health and Income*, he stated that the "survey considers optimum and not minimum dietary requirements." But Sir John Orr's definition of the "optimum diet" renders any standard below that level inadmissible, and in this respect the "optimum" is in fact the minimum. Dr. Stiebeling's contribution to the subject is of particular importance, and shows how very far the study of family diets has progressed in the United States.

A full list of the subjects discussed could be given only by reproducing the "contents" pages. It can, however, be said with confidence that this volume represents much hard thought on the part of many authorities and constitutes a valuable record of what economists and agriculturists were thinking in 1936. R. F. GEORGE.

41. DAS DEUTSCHE DEVISENRECHT UND DIE SCHWEIZ. By Dr. iur. Erich Bendheim. [*Abhandlungen zum schweizerischen Recht, Neue Folge,* 112. *Heft.*] 1936. (Bern: Stämpfli. 8vo. x + 207 pp. *Rm.* 5.)

THIS monograph, a legal dissertation, tries to explain the general principles underlying the German currency restrictions and to provide a practical handbook for persons in Switzerland possessing assets in Germany, either from investments or from current business transactions. In both aims Dr. Bendheim's description seems to be highly successful. In carefully disentangling the complicated forms and somewhat bewildering variety of Mark-categories, and showing the commercial possibilities of each kind, he lends a helping hand to those who may feel inclined to despair and overrate the difficulties of doing any business at all under these embarrassing conditions.

It is this patience and this absence of any "moralising" which gives a lasting value to a survey which was of course out of date as regards its legal matter on the day of its publication. But this fate it has to share with any book on currency affairs and more particularly on exchange restrictions.

Bendheim's main thesis is that the German currency restrictions, begun with the *Notverordnung* of July 15th, 1931, are the expression of an actual state of emergency (*Staatsnotstand*). As such they have helped to mitigate the consequences of the economic depression not only for the German debtor but also for the foreign creditor—leaving, however, all participants in these ever more complicated regulations and agreements with a longing for better times, in which less international distrust and political upheaval will allow for simpler and more straightforward forms of transaction. E. ROSENBAUM.

42. RECIPROCITY: a national policy for foreign trade. By William Smith Culbertson: 1937. (New York: Whittlesey House. 8vo. x + 298 pp. 15s.)

THE chief interest of this book, by a former Vice-Chairman of the United States Tariff Commission, is that it is written by a Republican and protectionist in support of Mr. Cordell Hull's trade agreements policy. The case is clearly and persuasively argued for American Congressmen and business executives, and no doubt represents, and will help to strengthen, the influential body of opinion which supports Mr. Hull in his attempts to loosen the fetters of international trade.

It contains a useful series of official documents in the appendices, including Dr. Culbertson's correspondence with Mr. Hughes on the adoption by the United States of the unconditional most-favoured-nation policy in 1922–23.

The theme of the book is that Democrats and Republicans, free traders and protectionists should combine together "to support private enterprise in foreign trade and oppose a system of governmental control through quotas, exchange regulations, subsidies, monopolies and other devices of restriction." In other words, the old tariff controversy is regarded as out of date, and the issue is now between private enterprise and collectivism. It is curious to find that Dr. Culbertson, though he remains a protectionist and favours tariffs "to equalise competitive conditions," uses all the orthodox free-trade arguments to persuade Americans that imports are an economic good and not an evil. He is particularly helpful in his clear exposition of the balance of payments problem, and shows that the United States cannot continue for long to have both a surplus of merchandise exports and at the same time a net inflow of long-term and short-term capital. The huge imports of gold, which this has meant, embarrass both the senders and the recipients, and can only end by the United States getting all the world's gold.

The academic economist will find some parts of Dr. Culbertson's treatment of these issues elementary and old-fashioned. He avoids discussion of the Great Depression and says little about monetary policy and currency management and their relation to commercial policy. Nor does he attempt any theoretical analysis of the close connection between nationalism, of which he approves in moderation, and State planning, of which he disapproves except in the form of tariffs. In opposing the world-wide trend towards more planning and government control on a purely nationalist basis, he adopts neither the standpoint of the free trader nor that of the international socialist; but of the traditional American policy of moderate protection and "rugged individualism."

The book is a sober and topical plea, addressed by a protectionist to protectionists, that State interference with the free flow of trade has gone too far, and that creditor countries must be willing (subject always to "equality of competitive conditions") to take payment from their debtors in goods as well as in gold. E. M. H. L.

EUROPE

43*. South of Hitler. By M. W. Fodor. 1938. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 317 pp. 10s. 6d.)

This is certainly the best general book on Danubian Europe which has appeared since Gedye's *Heirs to the Habsburgs*, which in composition and tone it somewhat resembles. Mr. Fodor, who has spent nearly twenty years as *Manchester Guardian* correspondent in Vienna, knows his subject very thoroughly; his facts are practically always accurate, his judgments (in spite of the slight optimism of the last chapter, which has already been shown unfounded) are nearly always sound. Moreover, he is very fair. If he has a weakness for a country, it would seem to be Czechoslovakia; if for a political party, Social Democracy; but in neither of these cases is he a pure partisan.

The weakness of the book is that its scope is much too large. No one can cover twenty years of a post-War Europe which runs from Austria

to Turkey without shallowness somewhere. In fact, several of the chapters are so cursory as to be hardly worth reading, except to the complete amateur. The section on Austria, on the other hand, is first-class. It was high time that the achievements of the Social Democratic municipality of Vienna were properly recorded; and the account of the Dollfuss murder and subsequent Italian–Austrian–German intrigues, which is very painstaking and detailed, possesses a historic value all the higher now that the record of those things is to be systematically falsified. C. A. MACARTNEY.

44*. GERMANY PUSHES SOUTH-EAST. By Dr. Gerhard Schacher. 1937. 2nd impression, 1938. (London: Hurst and Blackett. 8vo. 256 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

THE title of Dr. Schacher's book denotes, and the contents describe, an undoubted fact. It is debatable, on the other hand, whether this fact is the outcome of economic forces or of more or less Machiavellian planning. The impression one gains is that Dr. Schacher has rather uncritically adopted the latter interpretation. Doubts accordingly arise on the validity of his conclusion, which are that the German thrust south-east is the greatest danger to European peace. Other—not necessarily German—ambitions might be mentioned to which that description could be more accurately applied. As a survey of German policy in South-East Europe, rather than as an interpretation, the book is not without value. W. H. JOHNSTON.

45*. THE SPIRIT AND STRUCTURE OF GERMAN FASCISM. By Robert A. Brady. 1937. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 383 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

THE rôle of the army in the creation of Fascism already stands revealed. Now, in a work which takes its place among those indispensable to the student of present-day Germany, Professor Brady, with vision trained in observing the practices of American big business, shows the Third Reich to be essentially a dictatorship of big business.

Since the 'eighties, Germany, like the United States, has evolved from the stage of small-scale industry with individual competition to monopolistic cartels. The pre-Nazi cartels, however, powerful as they were, did not have everything their own way. Organised labour, though not a life-and-death challenge, was nevertheless strong enough to extract a certain proportion of profits for the improvement of wages and working conditions, and the struggle between capital and labour was carried on with a certain regard for middle-class public opinion. The Nazi dictatorship is the triumph of a technique which was being evolved long before the War to neutralise public opinion and break down the defences of the working class against exploitation. Propaganda, based on ideas circulating already in pre-Nazi Germany, drugs the middle classes into acquiescence in all the doings of big business. The only difference between the Nazi Ministry for Propaganda and People's Enlightenment and the propaganda machine of American and British big business is that the former is backed by all the coercive forces of the government. (Diagrams illustrating the formidable armature of bureaucratic control suggest a dead weight of officialdom and of overlapping which Professor Brady does not stay to examine.) Middle-class technical knowledge is subservient to the needs of big business. Already under the Kaiser the business men determined programmes of scientific research, gave the funds for it and appropriated the results. " When business men changed their titles from

employers to 'leaders' they found no need to change their working relationship with the scientists in any fundamental respect." Under the pretext of diverting them from "materialism" to the "ideal values of the nation," the Nazi educational system moulds the middle- and lower-class youth to docile acceptance of lives of material and intellectual privation.

The "Strength through Joy" which controls the whole working and thinking environment of the working classes is but an extension of the German Institute for Technical Education set up by the Steel Trust for its employees in 1926. Labour Service was first organised in 1922 to replace Polish seasonal labour on the Junkers' estates by unpaid German labour. Brüning extended it in 1931 to remove the able-bodied persons of under twenty-five from unemployment relief. It only remained for the Nazi régime to make it compulsory for all except the upper classes, and thus provide the peasantry, too, with this free labour. Factory settlements were begun by Krupp as early as 1866, and soon imitated by other big concerns. The worker receives in part wages a house and small plot on company's land. This ties the worker to the industrial plant, de-urbanises and segregates him. The Nazi régime plans to extend this means of creating a static and quiescent working class.

The same motive underlies the treatment of the peasantry. The peasant owner of land up to about 300 acres has been tied to his farm by the Nazi National Law of Inheritance, must grow what he is told to grow and hand his produce over to a marketing board. Thus has arisen an industrial and rural servile caste exploited without check by the barons of the new feudalism. I. M. MASSEY.

46*. DEUTSCHE UND JUDEN. By Anton van Miller. 1936. (Mährisch-Ostrau: Soziologische Verlagsanstalt. 8vo. 361 pp.)

THIS book provides an exceedingly interesting analysis of the inconsequent nature of anti-Semitism in present-day Germany. The author points out that three little-related racial creeds exist side by side: Hitler's glorification of the Aryan conquerors of Europe's aborigines, Günther's eulogy of the true nordic race which should be bred purely, but to which he believes only 6 to 8 per cent. of all Germans belong, and Clauss' less physical belief in the nordic *Rassenseele*; anti-Semitic legislation cannot effectually further the aims of any of the three.

Herr van Miller regards the economic campaign against the Jews in Germany as a fairly natural, and of course by no means unprecedented, affair, though he believes that the banking disasters of 1931 had already broken the financial power of the Jews. While reminding us that the Jews had only done the jobs, commercial, journalistic, etc., which Germans had for many years despised, he is not surprised that the Nazis should have realised that very great influence attaches to such jobs. What he finds astonishing is that National-Socialist Germany should have portrayed the Jewish *Geist* as the most dangerous enemy to German *Kultur*. As Herr van Miller points out, the German Jews, but also the Jews to the east and south-east of Germany, were always the most devoutly enthusiastic admirers of German civilisation, especially in its most glorious period, the years covered by the activity of Goethe, Kant, Beethoven and the rest. This civilisation was based upon a spiritual freedom which was partially banished by nineteenth-century events; only by branding

it as Jewish, however, can National Socialism hope to destroy it completely.

Thus to Herr van Miller Nazi anti-Semitism is a form of suicidal mania, whether it drives out genius or alienates that Germanophile East European population which gave Germany a certain economic hegemony in Poland, Russia, Hungary and Roumania. In spite of an exaggerated belief in the power of the Junkers, and in spite of certain other small inaccuracies, this is a thoroughly stimulating book.

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

47. UNDER THE SWASTIKA. By J. B. Holt. 1937. (University of N. Carolina Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. 231 pp. 11s. 6*d.*)

MR. HOLT spent the years 1931–35 in Germany, and his experience of that country has been intimate, while his book is certainly one of the most interesting that has yet appeared on National-Socialist Germany. It is an attempt to describe the rise of the National-Socialist totalitarian State and its creed, together with the major political, economic, educational and religious changes resulting therefrom.

The writer is obviously interested in his subject in a not unfriendly manner, but endeavours to be as impartial as possible; and the result is a fair and accurate portrayal of the principal internal changes of the Nazi revolution. In the main, he is not over-critical, his book being mainly descriptive of the changes as he sees them, but he points his finger to the more obvious fallacies and drawbacks of the Nazi ideology, while at the same time indicating various fallacies in foreign opinion about the régime. It seems unfortunate, but perhaps too much to expect in a book of this kind, that the writer, who sets out to describe the National-Socialist creed, makes almost no mention of the implications of the changes brought about in German foreign policy, of the demand for *Gleichberechtigung*, or of the apparent desire for expansion, etc., but he does not appear to include these under "creed."

The chief interest of the book lies in the portrayal of the social aims and changes of the Reich government, which have hitherto received comparatively small attention abroad, although they are perhaps some of the most striking experiments of the present system.

Summing up, the writer explains that Nazism is a new collectivism with the good of the whole placed before selfish interest, and aiming at a classless society. On the other side, there are various forces resistant to this collectivism, such as the traditional German need to have a personal opinion, class distinctions, the deliberate antagonisation by the government of Jews, Protestants, Catholics, Veterans, Freemasons, and the fraternities and alumni. To most people, he feels, it has meant hope; and in spite of these disruptive forces he believes that Germany, in face of a general crisis, would probably exhibit more unity, and enthusiasm, than before.

DAVID DOUGLAS-HAMILTON.

48. GERMANY—THE LAST FOUR YEARS. By "Germanicus." With an Introduction by Sir Walter Layton. 1937. (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode. 8vo. viii + 116 pp. 5*s.*)

THIS is an extremely intriguing book, purporting to give the true politico-economic picture of National-Socialist Germany, and to reveal

its essentially military nature. The book is stated to be a symposium, and if the compiler's claim that some of his collaborators "are holding high posts in their country (*e.g.* Germany)" can be sustained, then the findings of the book deserve serious attention. Certainly some of the chapters seem to be the work of experts with inside knowledge, although it should be borne in mind that if they consciously contributed for this purpose, they may not have been entirely unbiased. The various sections are somewhat uneven in subject-matter and quality, but on the whole seem definitely to confirm the results of other personal observations of the German situation.

Some of the issues are not, curiously enough, sufficiently followed out. Thus, for instance, in dealing with the creation of a substitute raw materials' industry as basis for a war economy, no mention is made of the enormous extra skilled man-power it must absorb, and the much-increased risk of a technical breakdown, the dangers of which become immeasurably greater in time of war. In discussing foreign trade, not nearly enough is made of the growing difficulties of maintaining exports, even in a period of world recovery, and of the repercussions of this recovery on the German economy. Finally, the colonial problem is treated in the conventional manner, and the highly pertinent dilemma is not posed: Why, if colonies will give Germany what she wants, does she develop a costly substitutes industry, which, on receipt of colonies, will become superfluous? If, however, colonies are required for strategical reasons—then Germany must have a navy, which is, in a sense, the alternative to autarchy. The statistics used do not seem always happy. It seems hardly fair or wise to give equivalents in sterling for internal expenditure at the gold rate of exchange, when costs and prices are often nearer the *Sperrmark* rate. Also (on page 28) the estimated direct costs of the machinery of economic control of 2,000,000,000 marks can hardly be right. Finally, the comparison of provisional and final harvest statistics for 1936 (p. 116) does not seem to support the claim, that the attack on the book by the Institute of Business Research was ill-conceived.

M. Z.

49*. DER MYTHUS HITLER. By Edgar Alexander. 1937. (Zurich: Europa-Verlag. 8vo. 395 pp. *Sw. Fr.* 6; bound, *Sw. Fr.* 8.)

THIS hostile analysis of Herr Hitler and his movement is the work of a Catholic exile in Rome. Quoting frequently from *Mein Kampf*, he declares that National Socialism is the antithesis of Christianity, and attributes its success partly to the conditions of the time and partly to its prophet's remarkable knowledge of mass psychology. On the whole, however, he regards the Führer as a very inferior type and the late Gregor Strasser (of whom there are some interesting reminiscences) as the only decent member of the Nazi leadership. The author claims that the present régime is inwardly disliked by the Reichswehr and only tolerated because of its rearmament policy. He expects that it will be replaced sooner or later by a military dictatorship which will pave the way for the return of democracy.

The effect of the author's scathing condemnation is reduced by his prolix and involved style, which makes this book almost impossible to read with interest. Perhaps the most useful part of the book is the 20-page bibliography at the end, which lists all the important Nazi and anti-Nazi literature of recent times. J. GUEST.

50*. DEUTSCHLAND KÄMPFT FÜR EUROPA: GEOPOLITISCHE BILDREIHE. By K. Springenschmid. 1937. (Leipzig: Wunderlich. Obl. 8vo. 64 pp. *Rm.* 2.80.)

51*. DEUTSCHLAND UND SEINE NACHBARN: GEOPOLITISCHE BILDREIHE. By K. Springenschmid. Vollständig neugestaltete Auflage. 1937. (Leipzig: Wunderlich. Obl. 8vo. 54 pp. *Rm.* 2.80.)

Series of diagrams and sketch maps illustrating current international questions from the National-Socialist point of view. They make an interesting example of the use of "visual slogans" in the technique of propaganda.

52. POST-WAR GERMAN–AUSTRIAN RELATIONS: The Anschluss Movement 1918–1936. By M. Margaret Ball. 1937. (Stanford University Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. ix + 304 pp. 18*s*.)

MISS BALL'S book is the first to be written in English on the question of Austro-German relations. Unfortunately the industry with which the material has been collected is not matched by skill in the manner of arrangement. The chronicle of events is full, but the background and interpretation, which alone give the events significance, are lacking.

The earlier chapters contain a useful study of the Peace Treaties of 1919, and go on to give a complete survey of the superficial exchanges, visits of statesmen, speeches, demonstrations, etc., between Austria and Germany before 1931. The difficulty is that no attempt is made to discuss Austria's political background (parties, groups, politicians are introduced without comment or explanation), and that Austria's economic difficulties are often indicated, but never sufficiently stressed. Without a more comprehensive treatment of the post-War decade, most of what Miss Ball tells us in the later chapters of her book is unintelligible to the average reader, and some of the section dealing with the Customs union loses its point, although these Chapters VI–IX are the best and clearest in the book. For instance, on page 195 we are told that Dollfuss "at the time of his assumption of dictatorial powers . . . was backed by a Christian Socialist, Peasant Party (Landbund) and Fascist Militia (Heimwehr) coalition." But these groups were barely mentioned in the earlier chapters, and we are left wondering why they supported Dollfuss. Again, the earlier chapters give the impression of an Austria overwhelmingly in favour of the Anschluss. The kernel of the Austrian problem is why the Hitler revolution failed to carry Austria with it, but Miss Ball dismisses the question in one paragraph on page 196, and the average reader will be left with the vague impression that "the tide had apparently turned. Austria had decided that she did not want to join Germany after all." And the average reader will be still more puzzled when, a few pages later, he learns that the Schuschnigg Government dare not risk a plebiscite on Saar lines, for it is "aware that such a vote would lead to its immediate downfall." It is true that Schuschnigg's decision to hold such a plebiscite did lead to his government's downfall, but not in the sense suggested by Miss Ball, for she is referring to internal unpopularity, not to external pressure. Her statement as it stands is not only inexact, but in light of the facts supplied on earlier pages, incomprehensible as well.

The defect of the book is thus a lack of balance between the earlier and later chapters, with the result that the study is too superficial for the student, yet requires from the ordinary reader a knowledge of the background of Austrian politics which he is most unlikely to possess.

BARBARA WARD.

53. Il Fondamento Storico del Riarmo dell' Ungheria. By Mario Toscano. Reprint from *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali.* Vol. IV, Nos. 3–4. July–Dec. 1937. Pp. 353–376.

54. Europe at the Cross-Roads. By Hugh Sellon. 1937. (London: Hutchinson. 8vo. 288 pp. 10s. 6*d*.)

In consecutive chapters Mr. Sellon surveys the needs and aspirations of the greater countries of Europe. His avowed aim is impartiality, and this has been achieved in so far as impartiality implies the ability to assume the other man's standpoint. At the same time Mr. Sellon has not succeeded entirely in resisting the rather British temptation of allotting marks for good behaviour to the various countries, though it is true that he does not unduly favour his own. The outlook emerging from this survey is not an encouraging one. Mr. Sellon urges that causes of friction must be removed before peace can be organised. No doubt this is true. But surely, put thus in its simplest form, the problem is seen also to be insoluble. W. H. Johnston.

55*. Der Staat Masaryks. By Hans Singule. 1937. (Berlin: Freiheitsverlag. 8vo. 326 pp. *Rm.* 6.80.)

56. Masaryk of Czechoslovakia: A Life of Tomas G. Masaryk, First President of the Czechoslovak Republic. By Donald A. Lowrie. New and enlarged edition. 1937. (London: Humphrey Milford. Sm. 8vo. viii + 222 pp. 3*s*. 6*d*.)

It is sufficiently remarkable at this date to find issuing from a German press any book purporting to be an objective study of Czechoslovakia. When the author is also a Sudeten German who served for some years on the editorial staff of first a German and later of a Henlein party newspaper in Prague, one looks forward to gaining a new insight into the most crucial of European problems.

In readable and familiar terms Herr Singule traces Masaryk's development as the leading statesman of the post-War period, describes his influence on the internal structure of Czechoslovakia and the foreign policy of the young State. The core of the book is naturally a statement of the Sudeten German *impasse*; the justifiable grievances of the largest minority in Europe are clearly set out, and yet it is interesting to find a frank admission that the treatment of German soldiers in the Czechoslovak army has always been good.

"He who is master of Bohemia is master of Europe," said Bismarck over seventy years ago. The remark is worth remembering to-day. This book, however, makes no attempt to go below the surface and assess the far-reaching effect of German–Czechoslovak relations on the whole balance of Europe. In this respect Herr Singule's book suffers by comparison with Miss Grant Duff's recent studies of Czech and German tension, written admittedly from a different political point of view. In the book under review the agreement of February 1937 between the Czechoslovak Government and the German ministers of the so-called Activist parties is scarcely touched on, yet it would have been desirable to show its effect on Henlein and his followers as well as on the attitude of the Activists themselves.

It seems noteworthy that the author does not require the immediate granting of autonomy for the German districts; he pleads instead for a gradual removal of German grievances by negotiation. Miss Grant Duff would say that there is no hope of amelioration for the minority while the dominant issue of foreign policy remains.

Herr Singule does not manage to convey much of the very real glamour that surrounded the person of the late president. This loss will be amply compensated by a glance at the new and enlarged edition of Mr. Lowrie's racy little biography: guileless hero-worship written, one judges, with an eye on the American boy or girl in high school.

V. A. M. F.

57*. The Effect of the War in South-Eastern Europe. By D. Mitrany, D.Sc., Ph.D. 1937. (Newhaven: Yale University Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. 280 pp. 13s.)

Dr. Mitrany's knowledge, at once wide and profound, of South-Eastern Europe ensures respect and interest for anything which he writes on that subject. The present volume also does not fail to present its readers with much valuable information and many illuminating ideas. Nevertheless, judged by Dr. Mitrany's own extremely high standards, it is slightly disappointing. The subject-matter is, indeed, so vast that complete success would be almost superhuman, and perhaps the trustees of the Carnegie Endowment should never have asked for a study on it. But since they did take as a unit the area of South-Eastern Europe, a clear and effective result could have been obtained only by concentrating on those common factors with regard to which that area does in fact form a unit. Such common factors exist, in the shape of the universal struggle of the nationalities inhabiting it to destroy, or to re-adapt, older political and economic forms to the requirements of their new ambitions—an essentially political struggle, although one which often took on economic forms. Dr. Mitrany does in fact deal with his subject in this light, but not fully and consistently. He mars the unity of his essay by introducing a great deal of matter which is not relevant to the general question, but bears only on particular conditions in certain countries. Moreover his treatment of such questions (*e.g.*, the struggles for influence between the civil and the military power, the organisation of industry for war, the effects of monopolies, etc.) is most uneven. It is full for Austria, on which studies already exist, mentions Roumania, Bulgaria and Turkey occasionally but without giving any clear picture, and leaves Serbia and Hungary, not to speak of Albania, practically out of the picture. He does not even mention, except by implication, that the Hungarian Parliament continued to sit throughout the War. Thus much of his book consists of tantalising fragments, each most interesting in itself, but none of them exhaustive in its own field, and entirely failing to combine into a general picture.

The historical introduction is a most interesting piece of work, but also fails to satisfy entirely. The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 is made a scapegoat for too many sins. A passage on page 32, while rightly emphasising the Magyar character of the régime in pre-War Hungary, seems to ignore the whole question of Magyarisation, and in Hungary again we are left uncertain whether the result of economic development was to create more, or less, national unity in the country.

Dr. Mitrany concludes that the Peace Treaties have "left all the elements which made the panorama of life in the Danubian region virtually untouched"; that the old problem remains in a new guise. It is a pity that he does not formulate more systematically the reasons which lead him to it, the more so since no one is better qualified than he to do so.

C. A. Macartney.

58. THE BALKAN CONFERENCES AND THE BALKAN ENTENTE. By R. J. Kerner and H. N. Howard. 1936. (Berkeley, California: University of California Press; and London: Cambridge University Press. 8vo. 271 pp. 13s. 6d.)

PROFESSOR KERNER is more interested in unifying movements than in the study of single disruptive problems. That most useful bibliography *Slavic Europe* was one instance of his synthetic tendency; and the present work is another. But, while Panslavism was never a practical proposition, Balkan unity, as emerges not only from the balanced introductory study of its conditions but also from the instances of mental readjustment given incidentally in the chronicle of this movement, is merely a question of goodwill. Whether the promoters of the conferences were right in seeing it as a question of *autonomy* of will ("freedom from foreign domination and interference," as the authors put it) has not yet been tested. It is clear from the history of the conferences that, while the difficulties made by Albania were largely due to the absence of free-will, those made by Bulgaria were intrinsic in Balkan ethnographical conditions. It was the Bulgar-Yugoslav question, the minority question, which kept on bringing the conferences up with a jolt, and which, originally one of the bogys that the Yugoslav promoters hoped the conferences might lay, was yet instrumental in later Yugoslav tendencies to damp down the conference-system and to trust to bilateral *rapprochement*. All this the authors bring out with admirable impartiality. But they probably regarded it as outside the scope of their work to mention that the fundamental difficulty about this minority question is that it is an honest difference of opinion as to whether the minority does or does not exist. However, this difference will probably grow less important with time and the spread of that intellectual amiability which the authors rightly see as one of the finest fruits of the conferences and a pre-requisite of Balkan unity.

The addition of an extensive bibliography and of the texts of relevant documents completes this fair, sympathetic, accurate, and, within its limits, comprehensive chronicle of the conferences and their sequel. The bibliographical historian has of course the defects of his qualities. The book has all the virtues of a good catalogue. It records evenly, without light or shade; it is a valuable work of reference. Those in need of rather more "human angle" should supplement this account with Professor Seton-Watson's recent article on the Balkan Entente in the *Slavonic Review* (Vol. 16, no. 45); they will probably endorse the criticism there made, that this book deals too exclusively with official sources. It would, for instance, have been interesting to have some study of the differing arguments with which, each in his own country, the partisans of Balkan unity strove to win support for the conferences, in order to appreciate their various determining psychological approaches to the movement.

The illustrative accompaniments are poor; the photographs of Balkan statesmen are inappropriately chosen; their shifty and suspicious glances seem to betray their mistrust in the whole affair; the maps are too small and not detailed enough to be of use to any but the most ignorant reader. J. D. A. BARNICOT.

59. LE PROBLÈME DE LA DETTE PUBLIQUE DES ÉTATS BALKANIQUES. By Prof. Panagiotis B. Dertilis. 1936. (Athens: Éditions Flamma; Paris: Rousseau. 8vo. 388 pp.)

SINCE 1930 all the countries dealt with in this book have defaulted

on their external debt. There is consequently a real need for an impartial study of the many questions thereby raised, and Prof. Dertilis here attempts to fulfil this need. The countries considered are Albania, Bulgaria, Greece (to which nearly a third of the book is devoted), Roumania, Turkey and Yugoslavia. The position in each is analysed separately on similar lines. There is first a summary of the private external debt, which is followed by a fuller history of the public external debt. This is followed, in turn, by an account of the various settlements whereby the defaults of recent years have been regularised. Finally Professor Dertilis attempts to assess the transfer capacity of each of these States from the point of view both of the budget and of the balance of payments. Little that has happened since 1935 is included.

Though the book contains much useful information, many of the conclusions Professor Dertilis here reaches may well be questioned. Even as to information there are notable omissions. For example, attention is not drawn to the fact that a large proportion—according to some authorities well over a third—of the Greek public external debt is held inside the country and that, to this extent, the question of transfer does not arise. Nor is sufficient emphasis given to the gratuitous assistance which these States have received through the depreciation of the currencies in which most of their external debt is expressed. From the standpoint of completeness, also, it is unfortunate that Professor Dertilis excludes any detailed summary of the pre-War history of the Ottoman debt, though, as he says, full accounts are given elsewhere. It would, perhaps, have been better to omit Turkey altogether.

Professor Dertilis's general conclusion seems to be that, though some of these States have been largely responsible for their own troubles by unwise borrowing, the remedy now lies with the creditors, who, by extending greater trade facilities to the debtors, can help them to pay in goods. Here few would disagree with him. Where he seems to be on less firm ground is in refusing to admit the equity of debt settlements whereby the extent to which the debtor shall fulfil his obligations is progressively increased with any improvement in the debtor country. Professor Dertilis insists, on the contrary, that any settlement should be final. This is simply the old game of heads I win, tails you lose. If, in bad times, the creditor agrees to forgo part of his claim, it is only fair that, when times improve, the status of his claim should improve with them. D. B. B.

60. Les Échanges Commerciaux entre la France et les États Successeurs de l'Empire Austro-Hongrois. By Jean Morini-Comby. [Prepared with the collaboration of the Comité d'Études de l'Europe Centrale. *Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère*, publication No. 2.] 1936. (Paris: Paul Hartmann. 8vo. 104 pp.)

This is a useful examination of French trade with Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania, and Yugoslavia. Figures up to the end of 1935 for the most part are included. The author points out that, if France's trade with this group of countries is considered as a whole, it takes the eighth place in order of importance; he comes to the conclusion that the Danubian area is one in which French foreign trade is expanding, and that the improvement in the general situation of these countries is reflected by an increase of their purchases from France. It would be interesting to know how far this conclusion must be modified in the light of the German clearing policy in and after 1935. D. B. B.

61. Die deutsch-bulgarischen Handelsbeziehungen (mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Nachkriegszeit). By Dr. Erlfried Hoffmann. 1937. (Würzburg: Verlag Konrad Triltsch. 8vo. 56 pp. *Rm.* 2.)

This pamphlet contains a short survey of Germany's trade with Bulgaria from 1878 to 1932. It will no doubt be of use to the economic historian, but its practical value is greatly diminished by the complete change in the commercial relations between the two countries which has taken place since the latter date as the result of the clearing agreement concluded in 1932. Largely as the result of this agreement, Germany's share in the total of Bulgaria's exports and imports has increased from a quarter in 1929 to over a half in 1936. It is perhaps surprising to find no detailed analysis of this development in a work published in 1937.

D. B. B.

62*. King Zog's Albania. By J. Swire. 1937. (London: Robert Hale. 8vo. 302 pp. illus., map. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

In the words of the old advertisement, Mr. Swire's book meets "a long-felt want." There was no book in English written "for all those who travel—whether by sea, by land or by armchair—and would know something of Albania, her self-made king, her clansmen and antique towns, her heroes and rascals." Mr. Swire has supplied this knowledge with a pleasant mingling of history, geography, descriptions of scenery and the men and women who inhabit one of the few remaining parts of Europe where the rhythm of life has changed but little since the Middle Ages. It is a pity that Mr. Swire was obliged to rely on second-hand information for a description of the excavations of Butrinto, the site of one of the most interesting and important Greek settlements, and also that he was not able to give an up-to-date account of the relations between Italy and Albania. The author is not to blame, for as a result of some very mild criticism of the old gang of politicians then in power, he was incontinently ordered to leave the country. Of King Zog himself Mr. Swire gives an interesting and sympathetic character study, and the book as a whole will lead to a far clearer understanding of the problems—international, political, economic, social and indeed tribal—with which that monarch has to deal. M. Currey.

63. What Next, O Duce? By Beatrice Baskerville. 1937. (London: Longmans, Green. 8vo. xv + 305 pp. 10*s*. 6*d*.)

The purpose of this book is to make us question our future relations with Italy, after a brief study of political events from 1932 onwards. If a certain veiled bitterness underlies the style, it must be excused when taking into consideration the position of anyone living abroad and knowing what is going on, forced to see her own country as she considers being misled at every turn. The author places side by side the international, political and diplomatic events from 1932 and the private instructions given to Field-Marshal De Bono when he went to Eritrea and the correspondence between him and Signor Mussolini with regard to the eventual invasion and conquest of Abyssinia. These plans have been fully laid before the public in De Bono's own book, where he is anxious to show that his three years' preparation was essential to the subsequent campaign. The date of invasion, October 1935, was given in the orders which De Bono received in 1932 and was carried out accordingly.

The League of Nations was always spoken of with contempt by such Italians as knew of its existence. The large majority had never heard of it; knew nothing of the ideals that it stands for, did not

know that Italy had signed its Covenant, nor that she had broken it, and would not have cared if they had.

England is invited to learn from past experience to take the assertions of Italian propaganda into serious consideration and not to dismiss it as beneath contempt, but to be prepared for what follows. What is being systematically taught to the people? Nothing less, according to Miss Baskerville, than that England is the arch enemy of Italy and that she must be attacked now before rearmament is complete, in order that Italy may obtain predominance in the Mediterranean and a world empire. Nor may we hope in the light of recent happenings that the new agreements with Italy will quell the "daily dozen" of abuse in the ordinary press. G. L. VERSCHOYLE.

64. DIE AUSSENHANDELSPOLITIK DES NEUEN ITALIENS. By Dr. Vittorio Francescon-Centa. 1937. (Hamburg: Paul Evert. 8vo. 120 pp. *Rm.* 4.25.)

Hamburg publishes this concise and painstaking account of Italian policy as regards tariffs, commercial treaties, exports and imports, and clearing arrangements. While in general the author illustrates with approval the post-War policy of import restriction, export promotion, and, at a later stage, "organically" controlled foreign trade, he does not disguise Italy's great difficulties with a programme of self-sufficiency uneconomic to start with, but now constituting a vested interest not to be lightly tampered with. He estimates very soberly, as a long term possibility and no more, the economic advantages expected from the conquest of Abyssinia. C. J. S. S.

65*. IL PROBLEMA COLONIALE ITALIANO ALLA CONFERENZA DELLA PACE. By Mario Toscano. Reprint from *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*. Vol. IV, Nos. 3-4. July-Dec. 1937. Pp. 263-296.

66*. THE SPANISH COCKPIT. By Franz Borkenau. 1937. (London: Faber and Faber. 8vo. xvi + 303 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

As the ideological mists disperse, the Spanish conflict is being seen for what it is—a peculiar and characteristic Iberian convulsion exploited by the expansionist States of Europe in their challenge to the Mediterranean dominance so long enjoyed by Great Britain and France. The latter aspect of the war has been adequately treated by Henry Blythe (in *Spain over Britain*) and E. N. Dzelepy (in *The Spanish Plot*). But in all the cataract of writings of the past twenty months one book only—in English—has attempted to describe the Spanish phenomenon in itself—to cut through the tangle of party and partisan overgrowth down to the roots. That is the merit—and a great merit—of Franz Borkenau's book.

An Austrian who lived and worked for years in Germany, a sociologist who made something of a name for himself by his studies of the European Labour Movement, the author began his study of the Spanish schism, as he tells us in the Preface,

"under the common delusion that the Spanish revolution was simply an incident in the fight between Left and Right, Socialism and Fascism in the European sense. . . ."

Two separate journeys to Government territory, the first from August 5th to September 14th, 1936, the second from mid-January to the end of February 1937, convinced him that the actual driving forces ". . . differ widely from the conventional European patterns. . . ." He was a witness, that is to say, of the short-lived "revolutionary"

period when a working-class flushed with victory rode roughshod over the legal administration and exercised effective control through political and militia committees, yet were inhibited from setting up soviets on the Russian model by their own social-revolutionary limitations, particularly the profound cleavage between socialist and anarchist forces. And he also saw the phase of Communist dominance made possible by the superior abilities of the members of that Party and by the very present help furnished by the International Brigade at Madrid. Dr. Borkenau recognises that the Spanish Communist element was essentially moderate and un-revolutionary; all the same, his dispassionate sociological probings aroused the hostility of the rising bureaucracy, and he suffered a short spell of imprisonment. (The Franco authorities refused to give any admission to a trained sociologist of whose subservience they could not be sure in advance.)

It is a fascinating contribution to history. For the actual journeys the diary form is preserved, transcribed, as the author modestly says, into "comparatively readable English" from rough notes in German. Chapter I is a model of background writing, and there is also a chapter on the Battle of Guadalajara. Not only does Dr. Borkenau conclude—and rightly—that both Fascism and Communism are irrelevant concepts. He also sees that, though in the military sense one side may win victory, *in the political sense,*

"... There will finally only be vanquished ... There is ... a greater actor than the political factions on the stage, the Spanish people itself, which is not identifiable with any of the factions that to-day tear it to pieces. Only the Spanish people, as distinct from its factions, parties, newspapers and, last but not least, foreign allies and enemies, is inarticulate. ..."

That Spanish people will, ultimately, fulfil its own Iberian non-Western European destiny. This book should be read by all who wish to understand Spain—and then re-read. W. HORSFALL CARTER.

67. SPANISH TESTAMENT. By Arthur Koestler. 1937. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 384 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

WHEN Málaga fell to the insurgent forces and the Italian troops last year, Sir Peter Chalmers Mitchell and Arthur Koestler, the *News Chronicle* correspondent, were arrested. Sir Peter was released, but Mr. Koestler spent a long time in gaol in Seville, under sentence of death. *Spanish Testament* is—apart from a section on the background of the Civil War—an account of his experiences as correspondent in Rebel territory and his period in prison. It is one of the most striking books that has been published so far on the Spanish War.

Mr. Koestler first went to insurgent Spain in August 1936. He saw German airmen in Seville at a time when Germany first appointed a representative to the Non-Intervention Committee. He interviewed General Queipo de Llano, and the interview came abruptly to an end when he asked for proof of Red atrocities. He was in Málaga during the last days, and gives a nightmare picture of the "agony of the doomed city and the strange behaviour of the people who lived and died in it."

The second part—Dialogue with Death—is the diary of his days and nights in gaol. His analysis of the strain of prison conditions, intensified by the nightly shooting of prisoners, is of more than passing value. And Nicolás, the young peasant who could not read, and who was shot for loyalty to the Government he believed would teach him and others to read, is unforgettable. HELEN F. GRANT.

68. WHY SPAIN FIGHTS ON. By Louis Fischer. Foreword by C. R. Attlee. 1938. (London: Union of Democratic Control. 8vo. 62 pp. *6d.*)

A clear and well-argued pamphlet in support of the Spanish Government. The author gives his reasons for believing that the fate of Europe depends on taking a strong line against Fascist aggression in Spain.

H. F. G.

69*. CONTROVERSY ON SPAIN. By H. A. Gwynne and A. Ramos Oliveira. 1937. (London: United Editorial Ltd. 8vo. 72 pp. *6d.*)

70*. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SPAIN AFTER TERUEL. By Air-Commodore L. E. O. Charlton. 1938. (London: United Editorial Ltd. 8vo. 31 pp. *2d.*)

U.S.S.R.

71. HISTORY OF ANARCHISM IN RUSSIA. By E. Yaroslavsky. 1937. (London: Lawrence and Wishart. 8vo. 127 pp. *2s. 6d.*)

THE break between Marx and Bakunin in the 1870's, and the rejection of the doctrines of Anarchism by the Marxist International, are sufficient to explain the low esteem in which Anarchism has always been held by the Bolsheviks. It has hitherto received little attention from Soviet revolutionary historians; and the present book, which is the briefest and most superficial of outlines, has been prompted by the Civil War in Spain. It was the initiative of Bakunin (though he himself never set foot in the country) which led to the founding of the first branches of the International in Spain; and the Spanish workers' movement has ever since that time been predominantly anarchist. When Soviet intervention, preceded and provoked by Italian and German intervention, began in Spain in October 1936, the Soviet authorities were embarrassed to find that the supporters of the Madrid Government were divided into three discordant groups: liberal democrats of the type of President Azaña, anarchists, and communists (of whom the leaders, and perhaps the majority, were Trotskyists). Taking the insignificant fraction of orthodox communists as a nucleus, the Soviet leaders threw their weight on the side of the liberal democrats, *i.e.* the Right wing of the combination, and with their help crushed, first, the Trotskyist communists, and then (after much bitter fighting and a good deal of mutual assassination) the anarchists. But it is by no means certain that the last has been heard of Anarchism in Spain.

This is the background against which M. Yaroslavsky's book has been written. It is a thoroughgoing attempt, based on carefully selected facts from the history of the anarchist movement in Russia, not merely to discredit Anarchism as a doctrine, but to show that anarchists have on various occasions broken the unity of the workers' movement and thus given direct or indirect support to the capitalists. In Russia, where the anarchists have always been few and unorganised, a plausible case can be made out for this view, unjust though it is. In Spain, the boot would seem to be on the other leg. E. H. CARR.

72. BANKS, CREDIT AND MONEY IN SOVIET RUSSIA. By Arthur Z. Arnold. 1937. (Oxford University Press; Columbia University Press. 8vo. xxiii + 559 pp. *20s.*)

IN his preface Dr. Arnold says that he began the book five or six

years ago. It is easy to believe that it took him all this time to finish his work, for it is certainly the most complete survey of the Soviet financial system that has yet appeared. The first three chapters are devoted to a short description of Russia's pre-War currency and banking system from the time of Alexei, the second Romanoff Tsar. While the present Soviet system really only dates from the restoration of the currency and the introduction of the Tchervonetz in 1922, a certain amount of pre-revolutionary background is decidedly an advantage.

In a planned economy there is no place for a money market and currency management by open-market operations and interest rates. The Soviet financial system, therefore, must differ in many respects from capitalist systems. And, since the Bolshevik leaders had no precedents nor experience to guide them, they had to proceed to evolve a suitable system by a process of trial and error. The various experiments and their results, from the attempt to abolish money in the period of War Communism to the present organisation of the short-term State Bank and the various long-term investment banks, are admirably described by Dr. Arnold, who shows how circumstances compelled Soviet economists to revise their theories when these were proved untenable by economic facts.

Dr. Arnold concludes that the Soviet rouble to-day is intrinsically money, differing from capitalist money by reason of its environment. But he wisely refrains from being dogmatic as to the precise nature of Soviet currency. The book will be of most value as a reference book for students of Soviet economic history, being fully documented and containing many useful statistical data. L. E. HUBBARD.

73. FORTY THOUSAND AGAINST THE ARCTIC. By H. P. Smolka. 1937. (London: Hutchinson. 8vo. 288 pp. 12s. 6d.)

ONCE the Soviet Government determined, for strategic and economic considerations, to open up the Far North, it became necessary to solve innumerable problems relating to the establishment of industrial organisations and the maintenance of colonies of workers so far from convenient sources of supply.

Mr. Smolka is a journalist, and if his enthusiasm often savours of "propaganda," his account of the plans and hopes and achievements of an equally enthusiastic band of workers is graphic and often entertaining.

As he rightly observes, without wireless and aviation this whole scheme of industrial development, settlement, geological and geographical exploration and of navigation along the Northern Sea Route would be unthinkable and his account of aviators, paid on a piece-work basis, doing four to eight flights a day, transporting between one and two tons per flight of construction and other material, gives an excellent idea of the transport difficulties that are being overcome.

Mr. Smolka recounts a conversation with General Nobile, court-martialled in Italy for allowing himself to be rescued first when his airship was destroyed, and now employed as a specialist by the Soviet. General Nobile expressed the opinion that regular flights across the Pole are premature until there is a sufficient number of radio stations in the innermost circle round the Pole and adequate landing-grounds. The recent establishment of an observation station near the North Pole shows that the Soviet Government is following

this advice, and their plans for further stations indicate how seriously they believe in possibilities in this direction.

Of particular interest is Mr. Smolka's description of the way in which the Soviet is "mechanising" the nomads, the educational and cultural work amongst the native races of the Far North, and the work of the Institute of the Northern Peoples in Leningrad and at their summer camp near the Estonian border, where selected native students are given a four-year course to fit them to be teachers and leaders of their own people.

Mr. Smolka rightly reminds his readers of the earlier pioneer work of such believers in the future of the North as Mr. Jonas Lied, who blazed the trail with limited means.

Whilst Mr. Smolka's translations from the Russian are sometimes at fault and his figures occasionally do not carry conviction, he is a keen observer, and his book can be recommended to all interested in the Russian experiment. There are many excellent illustrations, also two maps contrasting the barren wastes of the pre-plan era with the activities now being pursued. NORMAN NEVILLE.

74. RUSSIAN SPRING. By Peter Stucley. 1937. (London: Selwyn and Blount. 8vo. 286 pp. 12s. 6*d*.)

MR. STUCLEY'S book gives a vivid account of a first pilgrimage to the U.S.S.R. As a pleasantly written and illustrated travel book, many will read it with interest. The author's equipment of knowledge and language is, however, far too slender to enable him to throw any critical light on the progress and universal value of the Russian experiment . . . which, after all, was the well-intentioned object of his journey. Mr. Stucley's travels led him through the Ukraine, the Caucasus and Armenia before taking stock of Moscow and Leningrad. He was favourably impressed by much that he saw, but his final impression is that communism is not the solution for the malaise of the capitalistic world which he had hoped it might be. There are a number of unimportant slips in the book. The Riviera Hotel in Sochi is not "the favourite playground of Red Army officers." These officers disport themselves about a kilometre away, in the palatial NKKA sanatorium. Nor is Mineralnyi Vodi "the most select of Soviet spas," in spite of its name; Mineralnyi Vodi does not possess one mineral spring, though it is the railway junction for the north Caucasus spa resorts. Mr. Stucley's comments on architecture and painting in Russia are fresh and original. It is a pity he had not equal familiarity with the Soviet system and institutions before setting out on his journey. His book would undoubtedly have gained much in depth and acumen as a result. VIOLET CONOLLY.

75. MOSCOW 1937. By Lion Feuchtwanger. 1937. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 174 pp. 2*s*. 6*d*.)

ONE novelist must cap another. This book by Herr Feuchtwanger, who visited Moscow last year, is evidently intended as a counterblast to M. Gide's critical appreciation, which is referred to again and again in it. Herr Feuchtwanger is a less subtle and less attractive writer than M. Gide. In other respects, it is difficult to assess their respective merits; for the books of both are little more than a string of subjective judgments. M. Gide found the Russian worker "indolent." Herr Feuchtwanger discovered more "American hustle" in Moscow than in Chicago. On certain points they agree. Both

deplore the material inconveniences of life in the Soviet Union, the prevalence of the "wrecker" psychosis and of fulsome Stalin-worship. Herr Feuchtwanger, indeed, for all his enthusiasm, is sometimes a little uncomfortable about it all. His remark that "the position in regard to freedom of speech and of the press in the Soviet Union is by no means ideal" deserves to be adopted by all future writers of grammar-books as the classic example of *meiosis*. One of the most interesting chapters is the account of his interview with M. Stalin which has already appeared in *Reynolds News*. It was in this interview that M. Stalin permitted himself, *à propos* of Radek, that odd outburst of anti-Semitism: "You Jews have created one eternally true legend—that of Judas." M. Stalin lamented the adulation with which he is surrounded, as well as "the time which he had to spend in a representative capacity"—though in fact his "representative" duties cannot be one-tenth part as onerous as those of any important public figure in any other country.

The book suffers from the irritating mangling of Russian proper names common to most translations from the German on Russian subjects; and clumsy translation has made a passage on p. 75 read as if the Weimar Constitution were still operative. E. H. CARR.

LATIN AMERICA

76*. THE REPUBLICS OF SOUTH AMERICA: A Report by a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1937. (Oxford University Press, for R.I.I.A. 8vo. x + 374 pp. 21*s.*; to Members of the R.I.I.A., 14*s.*)

IN the Introductory Note by Mr. Guedalla to *The Republics of South America* reference is made to a newly awakening consciousness of the significance of the ten sovereign States of the southern sub-continent of America. The volume that has been prepared by a group at Chatham House is full of information on many, if not all, important aspects of the life and relationships of the republics, and should prove of greatest service to those who prefer to have accurate information rather than a consciousness, more or less vague. In spite of the diversity of subjects treated, which cannot have equal interest for any one reader, and the number of writers who have contributed to the book, a high standard of readability is maintained. Doubtless it will be most frequently used as a work of reference, but those who read it as a book will be rewarded with a balanced view of South American political, economic, social, cultural and religious conditions.

It is frequently said by its people that, as the nineteenth century saw the rise of North America to a leading position amongst the nations of the world, the twentieth century will witness the emergence of South America. The chapters dealing with economics and commerce indicate the possibility of a great material future for many of the republics. It may be, however, that the most significant chapter is that which deals with culture and education. It is true that the rate of illiteracy in many regions is lamentably high, but South America has much to contribute to the worlds of thought and art. The study given here of the development of South American thought, a subject to which comparatively little attention is usually paid, is of particular interest.

To select any chapter for special mention, when each one is a mine of information, is perhaps invidious. Except for such minor slips as giving the date of the foundation of San Marcos University as four

years before the foundation of the city of Lima, the standard of accuracy is very high. If one part of the production seems to fall short of the general level, it is the maps. These are of considerable interest, but leave something to be desired in craftsmanship. J. DUVAL RICE.

77*. GEOGRAPHY OF LATIN AMERICA. By Fred A. Carlson. 1936. (New York: Prentice-Hall. 8vo. xxii + 642 pp. illus. $5; Special price to schools, $4.)

UNDER the general title of " Latin America," this book is organised in two parts: (I), South America, and (II), Middle America (Central America, Mexico and the West Indies). In his preface the author says: " The main purpose in preparing this book is an endeavour to establish a better understanding and appreciation of the countries of Latin America through the enumeration and interpretation of nature's conditions that have retarded or promoted their progress." This quotation does not typify the literary style of the book, which, though undistinguished, is workmanlike; but it does indicate its general tone, which, albeit rather superficially, relates human developments to their geographical background in quite an interesting way. The work is intended for use in secondary and higher educational courses.

As regards the quality of the information, it is not possible, for the purposes of a short note, to check every statement, which would be the only adequate method. The description in Chapter VIII of the transport system of Argentina is, however, frankly poor, and gives no general picture of the various railway systems, nor of their junctions with systems of adjacent Republics. For instance, the author gives four paragraphs to the Transandine line, describing the scenery with " local colour," but not even mentioning that in January, 1934, a considerable stretch of the Argentine–Transandine section was swept away by flood and is only now in course of reconstruction, the gap being in the meanwhile filled by motor and mule transport. Instead, he describes the route as the " most comfortable," with the rider that " service is interrupted occasionally by floods, winter snows and economic conditions." With regard to Argentine highways, the author states (without giving a date) that there are 138,000 miles of roads, 3000 miles hard-surfaced, 45,000 miles graded drained unsurfaced, and 90,000 miles earth roads. An Argentine official statement of October, 1935, gives 3000 kilometres of paved roads in course of construction, 50,000 km. of roads passable in all weathers, and 20,000 km. of new earth roads. Airways are not mentioned in this chapter. H. J. H.

78*. BUILDING AN INTER-AMERICAN NEIGHBOURHOOD. By Samuel Guy Inman. [*World Affairs Books*, No. 20.] 1937. (New York: National Peace Conference. 8vo. 63 pp. 35 *cents*.)

A concise and illuminating account of the Buenos Aires peace conference of December 1936, by one of the special advisers to the United States delegation. It includes an outline of the Pan-American movement and of the " good neighbour " policy of the United States. K. D.

79*. THE SOUTH AMERICAN HANDBOOK. 1938 edition. (London: Trade and Travel Publications. Sm. 8vo. 698 pp. 3*s*. 6*d*.)

Deals with the countries, products, trade and resources of Cuba, Mexico Central and South America.

80. LATIN AMERICA. By Stephen Duggan. [*World Affairs Books*, No. 15.] 1936. (Boston: World Peace Foundation. 8vo. 65 pp. 75 *cents*.)

81. Histoire de l'Amérique Espagnole. By Hugo D. Barbagelata. 1936. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 8vo. 323 pp. 28 *frs.*)

The title of the first book, hardly more than a pamphlet, is a misnomer, since it is far from including the whole of Latin America in its references, however brief. These deal chiefly with the ten republics of South America in such sweeping terms that a certain inaccuracy is inevitable; and are concerned for the main part with South America's value to the United States as a market. The book is "based," it is stated, upon another volume by the same author; in both, then, the author might note that Europe, at least, was cognisant of the "growing importance" of Latin America long before the World War; that the West Coast of South America was not, historically, the region developed next after the West Indies by Spain; that the West Coast was served by European vessels sailing via Cape Horn for a century before the Panama Canal was opened. No one who is acquainted with the New World can agree that these pages contain all that "every American needs to know and would enjoy knowing about Latin America"; but one can give the author credit for frankness and good sense in references to the political and financial relations of the United States with Latin America. No illustrations, no index.

Dr. Barbagelata has produced a volume, the "fruit of ten years of honest work," which brings within a relatively small compass an excellent *résumé* of the story of the Spanish discovery, conquest and colonisation of the greater part of the New World.

The bibliography shows that the author's studies were, if not off the beaten track of the worker in the Spanish-American field, sufficient for his purpose; he has carefully weighed and collated the more outstanding records of missionary and other historians of the earlier years of Spanish dominance, and he is sedulous in preserving an impartial attitude when relating the outlines of the entangled period following Independence. The chapter devoted to "la situation actuelle" of Spanish America suffers from the condensation that the author found imperative; but perhaps his ideas are expressed in his closing sentence. Speaking of the world economic crisis, he thinks that Spanish America will emerge rapidly because she is not much industrialised and remains "nearer nature" than most regions of the world. "Young America is not the United States, it is Latin America." A useful compilation; a good index would be of help to students.

L. E. Joyce.

82. The Caribbean since 1900. By Chester Lloyd Jones. 1936. (New York: Prentice Hall. 8vo. xi + 511 pp. $5.00.)

This is an indispensable book for the student of Latin America. Mr. Chester Lloyd Jones knows his subject thoroughly, and those who are acquainted with his previous works on the Caribbean region, and consequently expect a good deal of Mr. Jones, will not be disappointed with his present work.

The story is an extraordinary one, but so is the setting. When a number of nations, several of which have a population of under a million, are quite near neighbours of a people so numerous and enterprising as those of the United States, they must almost inevitably have that uncomfortable feeling of living for ever in a great taskmaster's

eye. But as the story proceeds the reading becomes increasingly more cheerful. Strategic, commercial and political considerations have led in the past to various shades and qualities of control or "intervention" by the United States. But of recent years there has increasingly been a genuine desire to exchange the big stick for the voice of the charmer. Difficulties are bound to occur: for instance, the mere denial of recognition by the United States to a government in Central America is sufficient to ruin its prospects. And why should Jupiter thunder if it is sufficient for him to nod?

There are many suggestive facts tabulated. For example, the United States claimed 81,000,000 *bolivars* from the Venezuelan Claims Commission and was awarded two million; Great Britain, which claimed fifteen million, got nine million. Some of the nineteenth-century experiences of international finance in Central America were evidently as fantastic and scandalous as the political corruption and chronic revolutions of the little republics themselves. But if Panama has to thank the United States for its creation, the others should at least recognise that they have been enabled by its help to survive.

K. GRUBB.

83. JOHN LIND OF MINNESOTA. By George M. Stephenson. 1935. (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. 398 pp. 18s.)

THE earlier part of the book, which is entirely occupied with the legal and political career of John Lind, is of little interest except to those concerned with the domestic affairs of Minnesota. He was elected to Congress as a Republican in 1887, and resigned at the end of his third term in 1893. After standing unsuccessfully for Governor of Minnesota as a Fusion Candidate in 1896, he was successful on the same ticket in 1898. He then became an avowed Democrat, and was defeated in the election for Governor in 1902. On the inauguration of the Democratic Government under President Wilson in 1913, he was offered the Assistant Secretaryship of Interior, which he declined.

In July of that year he was suddenly called to an entirely new sphere of activity by the President, as his "personal representative and adviser to the American Embassy in the City of Mexico." The President was at that moment embarking on the policy of, to use his own words, "teaching the South American Republics to elect good men." Earlier in the year the killing of Madero in Mexico City had created a very difficult situation, and President Wilson, in spite of the friendly disposition of Ambassador Wilson towards Huerta, who was now in complete control of the Federal District and Southern States of Mexico, had determined that Huerta was an usurper and should be removed from power. It is evident that Lind was sent to Mexico to advise him as to how this could best be done.

Lind arrived at Vera Cruz in the month of August 1913, bringing with him no knowledge of the country or the Spanish language, and without even a suit of dress-clothes, a strange introduction to a country then, as now, one of the most formal in the world. There he stayed, except for brief visits to Mexico City and one trip to the United States for conference with the President, until the following April. His first reactions, which were necessarily based on second-hand knowledge and inferior information, since he resided almost entirely at Vera Cruz, were much in accordance with the President's ideas. Huerta was a despicable character, and the British and American diplomats who leaned towards him as the strong man most likely to re-establish

order and good government were utterly wrong. The support given to Huerta by British interests and the Catholic Church was to be strenuously opposed. To remedy the situation, he was of opinion that " a cur must be whipped by a cur," and that " the house-cleaning should be done by home talent," and suggested that these processes should be entrusted to either Villa or Carranza, describing the former as " a man of moral and mental efficiency," and the latter as " honest and a man of his word and convictions." On 31st January, 1914, mainly, it would appear, on his advice, the embargo on the export of munitions to Mexico was removed, and thus overt support was given by the United States Government to the rebel leaders in the North. The progress, however, of these forces was not nearly fast enough to please Lind, and in March he propounded to Secretary Bryan the almost insane idea that a small band of American naval officers should go to Mexico City, kidnap Huerta and hand him over to the Mexican authorities there. This proposal was promptly turned down by President Wilson. On 6th April he finally left Vera Cruz in order to confer with the President, and while on his way north there occurred the arrest of American sailors at Tampico, followed by the demand of an apology from Washington. Lind on arrival advised that failing apology the American Admiral should be instructed to sink the Mexican gunboat *Bravo*, but his advice was not followed. The occupation of Vera Cruz a few days later, on 21st April, was decided on without Lind's approval, and he subsequently expressed himself as in strong disagreement with the action taken. He stayed on in Washington until late in June, and his official connection with the President was finally severed in August. After returning to Minneapolis and his practice there as a lawyer, he kept in constant touch with Mexican affairs, and corresponded frequently with Washington in support of Carranza. In 1915 he twice visited Washington without seeing the President, and pressed Secretary Lansing, who had succeeded Bryan, to grant recognition to Carranza. Recognition was finally granted in October of that year, and was a source of great gratification to Lind. From 1916 onwards he appears to have ceased to correspond with the authorities, though he continued to keep a close watch on the events which followed recognition and very nearly involved war between the two countries.

It is disappointing to find that this book, which embodies much research and much new documentary evidence, throws but little new light on the history of the troubled relations between the two countries during the two terms of office of President Wilson. The mistakes of his policy are becoming more and more apparent as time goes on, and the consequent infliction of suffering on millions of innocent and peaceable Mexicans for five or six years was as criminal as it was unnecessary. The encouragement of the more backward and barbarous elements of the North to overthrow the more highly cultured people of the Centre and South was a policy thoroughly unsound in itself, and one opposed by practically all the diplomatists stationed at the time in Mexico City. That John Lind should have encouraged the President to pursue such a policy cannot be a matter of surprise. He was by experience and training a man most unsuitable for such a mission, and his estimates of the characters of Carranza and Villa, as time has clearly shown, were utterly wide of the mark. At the same time, one cannot but feel that he did his best to form an honest judgment, and, erroneous as it was bound to be, to enforce it with much courage and pertinacity.

VINCENT W. YORKE.

84. THE EJIDO: MEXICO'S WAY OUT. By Eyler N. Simpson. 1937. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 8vo. xxi + 849 pp. $5.00.)

Ejido is a term used in Mexico to describe lands which have been restored to agricultural communities under the reforms started in 1915. Mr. Simpson's substantial volume (of which the last 250 pages are devoted to appendices) is an exhaustive study of the handling of these reforms during the two decades between 1915 and 1934. This is the most thorough study of the Mexican land question yet published.

The mass of accumulated facts, the numerous valuable observations, and the "case studies" together testify to the intricate complications of the subject and the immense difficulties which have to be faced in unravelling them. In spite of all the decrees, institutions and committees, and in spite of all the eloquence of Mexican statesmen, 93·7 per cent. of the total area of all farm land was privately owned in 1934. Attempts to provide financial help for farmers have fallen foul of the pecuniary ambitions of influential generals and ex-Cabinet members. The National Bank of Agricultural Credit itself was hardly a model organisation: in 1930 total loans of about three million pesos were made, while the operating costs for the year were nearly 700,000 pesos!

Nevertheless the process of land distribution goes on. Agrarian policy in the past has, at times, tended in the direction of a conditional development of private property, but the real *ejido* programme implies a complete socialisation of lands and waters. Perhaps Mr. Simpson has hardly emphasised sufficiently not only the demand for a high degree of technical efficiency in all branches of an administration concerned with agrarian reform, but also the indispensable necessity for unswerving honesty and immunity against undesirable personal and local influences. On other questions, however, he is unmistakably clear. He shows, for example, the obvious need of a far more thorough collection of essential facts. The Federal Government must itself be prepared to assume a greater degree of responsibility in the future; while it must be recognised that the decline in agricultural production is not due to the radical nature of the reforms, but to the fact that they have not gone far enough.

Two broad impressions remain. Firstly, Mexico is struggling in its own way with a problem which is essentially Mexican. Here and there it has borrowed from the experience of other agrarian situations; but the land itself is Mexican, the problem has roots in Mexican history, and the solutions proposed are those for which Mexicans have fought, both literally and politically. Neither Russia nor the United States have counted for much in this Mexican problem. Secondly, the stir and the ferment, and even the strife and difficulties of the process, are at any rate signs of a conscious hopefulness. They have taken the place of the irresponsive apathy of the past, and are at least evidence of the birth and growth of new ideals and aspirations. K. GRUBB.

85. LA LUCHA DE CLASES A TRAVES DE LA HISTORIA DE MEXICO. By Rafael Ramos Pedrueza. 1936.

This is the second edition (25,000 copies) of a book which is especially recommended to the school-teachers of Mexico by the Ministry of Education. Its interest for the foreign reader is largely in the fact that it reveals the attitude that is being inculcated in the younger generation of Mexico. It claims to be a Marxist interpretation of the history of Mexico up to 1910, and each chapter is duly summed up in the form of a thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis. The book also reproduces some valuable historical documents.

It is not necessary to accept the author's general position in order to believe that the Revolution of 1910 was, indeed, long overdue. K. G.

86*. AN ADVANCING CHURCH IN LATIN AMERICA. By K. G. Grubb. 1937. (London: World Dominion Press. Sm. 8vo. 81 pp. Bibliography. 1s.)

A short survey of missionary problems in Latin America.

87*. THE INFLUENCE OF BORDER TROUBLES ON RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, 1876–1910. By Robert D. Gregg. [*The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series LV, No. 3.*] 1937. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. Cr. 8vo. 200 pp. Bibliography. $2.)

A detailed and fully-documented history of the subject in the period covered.

FAR EAST AND PACIFIC

88*. THE LEGAL STATUS OF ALIENS IN PACIFIC COUNTRIES: A Report in the International Research Series of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Issued under the auspices of the Secretariat of the I.P.R. Edited by Norman MacKenzie. 1937. (Oxford University Press. 8vo. xii + 374 pp. 21s.)

PROFESSOR NORMAN MACKENZIE'S introduction to this report attempts to present to the reader the problem of the alien in its legal aspects, and is followed by nineteen reports by experts on the status of aliens in the several Pacific countries. Those interested in any aspect of the aliens problem will find a great deal of information otherwise only accessible with difficulty. The reports are not of the same length and are not uniform as to the questions included in each of them. The general impression given by the study is that while in the abstract all countries admit certain general principles of treatment of aliens, the legislation and practice of none of them corresponds to those of another. One feels with the learned editor that "some degree of uniformity" is desirable. The problems touched upon, for instance, questions of private international law, are so complicated that one is grateful for the guidance afforded by the contributors and the editor of this most valuable and reliable study. V. R. IDELSON.

89*. MALAYSIA: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule. By Rupert Emerson, Assistant Professor of Government in Harvard University. 1937. (New York and London: Macmillan. 8vo. xii + 536 pp. 21s.)

THIS book is primarily concerned with Malaysia as a testing ground for the technique of colonial government. The chapters entitled "The Setting of the Problem," and "Malaya To-day," should be read, with the "Conclusion," by those who are familiar with the historical background. Others will find in the historical chapters a useful account of the development of British and Dutch control. The author shows himself a competent historian and a shrewd observer. Nevertheless there are, in these historical portions, *obiter dicta* on the motives of the colonising Powers and their agents which are at least disputable.

One must allow for the author's political and economic standpoints. He says, "The ultimate frame of reference must be a world of free peoples, each taking its own peculiar place and contributing autonomously its peculiar share to the well-being of the whole. Since

Imperialism is based upon a fundamental denial of freedom . . . it can find its justification only if it is working to overcome what is the essence of its being." These political standards are still fashionable among British writers on the Empire. His economic standards are less explicitly stated, but incidental remarks suggest that he regards the economic activities of the colonising Powers as being in essence mere exploitation of the native and the draining off of all surplus wealth to the metropolitan country. The dangers of such excessive simplifications are obvious, and the author sometimes has to labour hard to account for features which are not quite consistent with the most cynical interpretation of imperialist activities. But, after all, every observer must stand somewhere to take his view, and Professor Emerson is no more rooted to the ground than those who stand elsewhere.

Though extremely critical of the British and Dutch social services, including education, Professor Emerson seems to admit the balance of advantage for indirect rule. Its benefits to the Imperial Power are obvious enough. For the ruled, it has the advantage of softening the shock of inevitable transition from the old tradition and culture to new forms. These he sees as necessarily nationalist, socialist and revolutionary. " Imperialism appears always to be committed to perpetuating its own rule unless challenged by a force which makes it necessary or expedient for it to withdraw." The force is to be supplied by the revolt of the leaders of nationalist movements.

We may disagree with Professor Emerson that the successors of the British and Dutch rule must necessarily be the nationalist politicians, and we may doubt with him whether the peoples of Malaysia will be allowed effective independence at all while the great imperialist Powers are in conflict. But if the object of indirect rule really is to establish independence and self-government for all, then it must be admitted that little has been done by the Dutch, and less by the British rulers of Malaysia in this respect, whatever the excellencies and advantages of their rule from other points of view. W. J. HINTON.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor,
International Affairs.

DEAR SIR,

Will you allow me to answer General Temperley's question as to why I thought that there was not a " deep laid plot on the part of Italy for the conquest of Abyssinia " ?

I need not remind General Temperley that all General Staffs discuss plans for war with all countries, and I felt that had there been the intention to conduct such a war as eventually took place in Abyssinia, adequate preparations would have been made well in advance. I would ask General Temperley to re-read the chapters in De Bono's book describing the congestion at Massawa and the total lack of roads in Eritrea. Had he seen for himself, as I did, the appalling transport difficulties, I think that he might have agreed with that sentence in my review.

Yours faithfully,
MURIEL CURREY.

23 *Courtfield Gardens, S.W.* 5.
March 30*th*, 1938.